企业审计任期、非审计费用与审计独立性关系

本研究探讨审计师的独立性是否与非审计费用和审计任期有关,结果表明,非审计费用和应计费用之间是一个正相关关系,当审计师任期短暂时,非审计费用可能损害审计师的独立性。此外,探索性分析表明非审计费用与公司盈余管理正相关关系,对审计师任期短的小客户,并非对大客户具有重要意义。总而言之,这些结果表明,非审计费用和审计师的独立性之间的关联取决于审计师任期,审计任期短且被审计单位规模小时,非审计费用高对审计师的独立性产生负面影响。     

内部控制质量对审计意见的影响研究

作为建立和完善现代企业制度的重要组成部分,促使上市公司建立和完善内部控制已成为国内外监管部门、学术界、实务界关注的重要问题。利用我国上市公司内部控制指数,本文检验了内部控制质量与审计师签发的审计意见之间的关系,研究发现:企业内部控制质量越高,有助于审计师签发的更好的审计意见。本文研究结果表明,我国上市公司的内部控制建设取得了明显的效果,同时,我国审计师的审计独立性有所增强,审计行为趋于理性。     

我国上市银行的产权性质、经济利益与审计质量

以2001年至2010年期间的A股上市银行为研究样本,检验不同产权性质的上市银行支付给审计师的经济利益对审计质量的影响。研究发现,上市银行支付给审计师的经济利益越大,与非政府控制的上市银行相比较,政府控制的上市银行的盈余管理水平更高;审计师为非政府控制的上市银行提供业务情形中,审计质量并未随着客户支付的经济利益的增加而降低,在为政府控制的上市银行提供业务情形中,过高的经济利益促使审计师默许客户的盈余管理行为,导致审计质量遭受损害,这在一定程度上说明,并非在所有情况下,审计质量都会随着经济利益的增加而受损。     

审计师个人视角下客户影响力与审计质量的关系研究

利用中国A股上市公司2012～2015年的数据,采用面板数据模型与文本挖掘方法检验了审计师层面的客户费用影响力、规模影响力、舆论影响力与审计质量的关系.研究发现: 客户的费用影响力、舆论影响力与审计质量显著正相关,在控制了事务所层面的客户影响力与内生性问题后该结果依然稳健.进一步研究显示,审计师部分个人特征、客户所处的法律环境、舆论环境等因素会对主要结果起到一定的调节作用.研究结果为客户影响力与审计质量的关系提供了进一步的理论解释和全新的经验证据,其重要启示是: 在我国的审计市场中,客户影响力并未迫使审计师在审计质量上做出让步,为避免审计失败可能造成的声誉损害、经济损失和诉讼风险,审计师有动机为影响力高的客户提供高质量的审计服务.     

审计师变更对审计费用的影响——来自中国A股市场的经验数据

审计师的"低价揽客"行为一直受到国内外监管机构的关注,其对审计师独立性、审计质量的影响也一直是学术研究的热点。在回顾国内外有关"低价揽客"研究的基础上,收集了2018年度A股上市公司的审计师变更,发现首次审计定价存在7%的折扣,证实"低价揽客"现象在我国确实存在,特别是将审计师由普通公司变更为八大公司时,折扣幅度高达24.91%。     

客户重要性影响审计独立性了吗?——来自上市公司1998-2006年的初步证据

本文以我国证券市场1998-2006年的上市公司为样本，在控制其他变量的影响后，研究发现随着客户重要性的增加，审计师会更加谨慎，进而会更加倾向于出具非标审计意见。由此得出的研究结论是：客户重要性没有影响审计独立性。     

客户重要性与审计质量：基于投资者保护视角

本文探讨投资者保护条款的完善与执行、客户重要性与审计质量之间的关系,利用我国证券市场2003~2005年的数据研究发现：（1）客户重要性对审计质量并没有产生负面影响,事务所审计质量普遍有所提高;（2）随着法律责任的加重,法律保护条款的完善与盈余管理空间显著负相关,然而法律执行越严的省区,上市公司的盈余管理却越强烈,这表明中国证券市场出现了法律条款的完善与执行逆向起作用的＂背驰效应＂;（3）审计师对盈余管理方向的关注与国外文献的发现不一致,审计师能够关注重要客户操纵盈余减少的行为,但却无法控制重要客户操纵盈余增加的行为;（4）相对于规模较小的事务所而言,投资者保护条款的完善对规模较大的事务所提高审计质量具有更明显的促进作用。     

审计师-客户长期关系、强制轮换与审计质量

本文从审计师-客户长期关系的视角出发,对审计师强制轮换与审计质量之间的关系进行了探讨.研究发现:对于财务状况较差的公司,若审计师与客户之间不存在长期关系,则强制轮换后的审计质量显著提高,若审计师与客户之间存在长期关系,则强制轮换后审计质量的提高被弱化;而对于财务状况较好的公司,无论审计师与客户之间是否存在长期关系,强制轮换后的审计质量均未发生显著变化.本文研究对审计师强制轮换的监管具有借鉴意义.     

审计费用的公开披露对客户与审计师间的议价能力影响研究——以福建省上市公司为例

长久以来社会对于审计工作独立性的需求日益提高,而会计事务所面临的减价压力日益增加,信息的不对称使得审计服务的供需双方处于信息不平等地位,审计师与客户之间的谈判能力使得审计收费问题比以往更加难以解决。在《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号》规定上市公司应在年度报告中披露审计费用,客户在议价时提供费用数据对比的同时,也引发学术界和实务界对审计收费的关注。研究结合福建省上市公司实际案例以修正的Francis审计定价模型基础上,以审计费用的公开披露对客户和审计师之间的议价能力的影响及机制进行了分析。运用SPSS多元回归分析,从公开披露对议价能力影响的视角拓展了审计费用的经济性研究,验证审计费用的议价与披露是否影响审计师的独立性,实证结果获得审计费用和议价能力间的关系提供了经验证据,有助于完善审计定价模型。     

公司债务违约风险影响审计收费吗

企业一旦发生债务违约,企业以及相关主体利益都会受到重大损害,而作为专业人士的审计师能否提前做出反应显得至关重要.本文选取A股上市公司2001-2015年的债务违约数据,首次系统研究债务违约曝光前后审计收费的变化.研究发现,在公司债务违约曝光之前,审计师已经提前做出反应,提高审计费用;在债务违约曝光之后,审计师还会继续进行反应,审计费用进一步提高.审计师提高对债务违约公司的审计收费,主要是基于对会计信息质量和审计风险的考虑.综上表明,审计师对公司债务违约风险具有敏感性和谨慎性,能够先于债务违约曝光事件进行反应.这对于认识和发挥审计师的债务风险预判能力具有重要启示.进一步研究发现,审计师市场地位和公司违约严重程度均会对审计师反应的及时性产生影响.另外,审计师对国企债务违约曝光并不敏感,说明我国债务市场确实存在政府隐性担保的现象,损害了审计师对国企债务风险的恰当反应.     

事务所的任期、会计师轮换与审计独立性——来自中国A股市场的证据

近年来审计任期与审计独立性的问题日益受到人们的关注。我国也出台了有关签字会计师轮换的相关规定。本文以来自中国A股证券市场的数据,检验了事务所任期和签字会计师轮换与审计独立性之间的关系。我们发现,审计独立性将随着事务所审计任期的延长而下降,但是,轮换签字会计师并不能够有效地改变这种趋势。该项政策实施的有效性值得进一步研究。     

‘An Examination of the Ethical Commitment of Professional Accountants to Auditor Independence’

This research explores the relationship between work context and professional ethics. Specifically, we analyze through an online survey of professional accountants the degree to which changing work conditions have altered individual accountants’ commitment to the core professional value of auditor independence. We argue that certain changes in the condition of work have made some categories of accountants more susceptible to the logic of commercialism rather than the logic of professionalism. We find general support for this argument. We observe that accountants working outside of public accounting have a higher commitment to independence than do accountants working in the context of public accounting firms. We further observe that accountants in large international accounting firms (i.e. the “Big Four”) report lower commitment to auditor independence than do others in public accounting. And we observe that older accountants report stronger commitment to auditor independence. One finding, however, contradicts our general thesis. We find that commitment to one’s client does not necessarily result in a loss of commitment to the core professional value of independence. We conclude that changes in the context of work have contributed to the demise of ethics among professional accountants and suggest that further research be done to elaborate the relationship between client commitment and independence commitment.     

Auditor switching, earnings manipulation and auditor independence: Evidence from A-share listed companies in China

Based on data from Chinese A-share listed companies between 1999 and 2004, this paper examines the causes of auditor switching and its effects on the independence of successive auditors from the perspective of earnings manipulation. Results show that: (1) listed companies manipulate their earnings through replacing their auditor and the successive auditor fails to exercise necessary prudence; (2) for companies reporting profit in the year of auditor change, the formerly low discretionary accruals usually increase significantly after the switch mostly resulting from assets devaluation and adjustments to non-recurring items; (3) In contrast, for companies reporting losses in the year of auditor change, they take a “big bath” to adjust lower earnings of the same year. These findings indicate that auditor change is related to the conservatism of predecessor auditors and it damages the independence of successive auditors.      

The Effect of Guanxi on Audit Quality in China

Two types of guanxi have a close association with auditor independence in China: firm-level connections derived from state ownership and personal connections developed through management affiliations with external auditors. This article examines the effects of these two types of connection and their joint effect on audit quality. We find that state ownership and management affiliations with the external auditor both increase the probability of receiving a clean audit opinion in China. Furthermore, the probability increment brought by management affiliations for non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) is greater than that for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These results suggest that state ownership and management affiliations are two important types of connection that impair auditor independence, and that management affiliations are of greater importance to private-sector firms than to SOEs.     

审计师规模、审计费用与审计意见购买

本文引入审计师规模作为审计师特征的代理变量,区分审计费用的异常升高与降低以及审计意见的改善与恶化,并进一步考虑到审计师规模对异常审计收费和审计意见之间作用关系可能存在的调节效应,研究以审计师规模为代表的审计师特征和实际发生的异常审计费用对管理层审计意见购买行为的影响。     

Ethical Issues Related to the Provision of Audit and Non-Audit Services: Evidence from Academic Research

Audit standards require auditors to conduct audits being independent in mental attitude from their clients. Regulators and financial statement users are concerned that auditors compromise their independence by allowing clients that contract for consulting services, i.e., non-audit services, more financial statement discretion relative to clients that demand relatively little non-audit services from their auditor. This paper begins by discussing the role of auditing in the capital markets and the various stakeholders that rely on audited financial information in making their capital allocation decisions. The paper continues by explaining the ethical dilemma inherent in audit contracts in general, and more specifically, how the provision of non-audit services threatens auditor independence. The paper concludes by summarizing research studies that report conflicting evidence that there is a violation of auditor independence due to the provision of non-audit services to audit clients.     

The effect of bonds on loyalty towards auditors: the mediating role of commitment

The study examines the impact of knowledge and social bonds on commitment and behavioural loyalty in auditor–client relationships. A model is proposed and tested using data collected from stock exchange company executives in the UK. The results show the significant effects of the knowledge and social bonds on commitment. Commitment is shown to be a mediating variable, which influences word-of-mouth and continuance but not the purchase of non-audit services. In the light of these findings, suggestions are provided to auditors in developing relationship bonds and managing the relationship at the firm level.     

审计师变更、审计师任期与审计收费关系研究——基于2001~2003年的实证分析

审计收费是审计服务供需双方就审计服务供求所达成的价格,一些国家审计市场表现出审计收费降低的趋势。要求上市公司披露财务审计费用,为充分揭示我国审计师变更、审计师任期与审计收费的关系提供了数据资料。本文从研究我国审计市场现状入手,提出了审计师变更、审计师任期与审计收费关系的假设。通过对我国2001年、2002年与2003年数据的检验,结果发现审计师变更并没有带来明显的审计收费下降,同样审计师任期的延长也没有带来审计收费的下降,与我国目前一些关于审计收费研究的结论不一致,说明我国并不存在明显的审计收费的恶性竞争。     

Financial Statement Audits,a Game of Chicken?

This paper uses the intuition from the game of chickento model client-auditor financial reporting and audit effort strategies. Within an ethical context, our model is concerned with the client misreporting and its detection by the auditor. The paper uses a welfare game(similar to the game of chicken) to more formally model client-auditor strategies. The welfare game is then extended to provide additional insight into ethical and audit effort issues.Such a welfare gameprovides equilibrium in mixed strategies. This mixed strategy solution makes possible four outcomes from the game: 1) Financial Statements are fairly presented by client and the auditor performs a normal audit, 2) Financial Statements are fairly presented by client and the auditor performs an extended audit (over auditing), 3) Financial State-ments are misstated by client and detected by the auditor, and 4) Financial Statements are misstated by client and not detected by the auditor (audit failure despite no intended unethical action on the part of the auditor).The first extension of the welfare gameallows clients to be ethical or unethical clients. Unethical clients are rewarded for misreporting because the auditor wishes to minimize audit effort for ethical clients. The second extension allows the client to unknowingly misstate the financial statements; the client "strategy" then becomes random (a play of nature). The auditor must distinguish between this random play and the strategic play of the welfare game. Finally auditor ethics are considered and the influence of auditor ethics on reducing failed audits.     

审计师选择、留存股权和盈余披露——中国IPO公司价值信号传递机制研究

公司通过权衡信号成本与信息收益,选择一种或多种市场信号,包括审计师选择、留存股权和盈余披露等。各信号间的内生性问题是本文的研究重点。我们以2000—2002年中国155家IPO公司为研究样本,通过构建联立方程系统实证,发现：我国IPO市场审计师选择、盈余预测与留存股权并非替代信号,风险越大公司越倾向保留较低股权;盈利预测对股权留存并没有显著影响;审计收费对公司审计师选择具有显著影响,但审计风险对审计收费的影响并不明显。