A theory of mutual migration of polluting firms

Abstract.  Suppose that governments care about their tax revenue and local firms have some say in environmental regulations. Then, the level of employment and environmental compliance may be negotiated. We find that firms located in different countries can improve their threat‐point payoffs by mutual migration. This in turn affects the negotiated output/employment and environmental regulations, which causes profits to increase if the firm's threat‐point payoff is higher than that of the local government. The model predicts that pollution‐intensive firms or firms with highly inelastic demands are more likely to move out. Increases in the government's valuation of the environment, or in the degree of globalization also cause mutual migration of dirty firms. The effect of a government caring about consumer surplus leads to a lower pollution tax, reducing firms' incentives to move out. JEL classification: F2, Q0     

Decentralized Policymaking in a Long‐run Growth Model with Seigniorage and Taxes

The paper introduces decentralized policymaking into a game‐theoretic model with output growth through capital accumulation, and in which the determination of taxes, seigniorage and the long‐run growth rate of the economy reflects the strategic interactions between the government, the central bank and the private sector. The paper investigates, among other things, the impact on the long‐run growth rate of a higher degree of inflation aversion of the central bank and a higher degree of inefficiency in the tax system.     

Fiscal multipliers in the Eurozone: an SVAR analysis

We compute the value of fiscal multipliers (for government primary expenditure, Income and wealth taxes and for Production and import taxes) in the Eurozone countries since the creation of the currency union (2000Q1-2016Q4), in order to understand how the values can vary according to the public debt level, the pace of economic growth, and the output gap. Imposing quarterly fiscal shocks, the results showed that government expenditure had a positive effect on output, with an annual accumulated multiplier of 0.44, whereas tax multipliers presented negative signs: the Income and wealth and the Production and import taxes stood at ?0.11 and ?0.55, respectively. Furthermore, the spending multiplier showed a higher value for countries with lower levels of public debt, during recessions, and in countries with negative output gaps. On the other hand, tax shocks seemed to be recessive in highly indebted countries and those facing positive output gaps.     

Public capital, asymmetric information, and economic growth

Abstract.  We investigate the provision of public capital in an endogenous growth model with asymmetric information. In a credit market with costly screening, we show that the equilibrium contracts are characterized by the self‐selection of borrowers. Through identifying an additional adverse effect of taxation on growth, we show that the optimal tax rate in our model is smaller than the output elasticity of public capital. Therefore, our analysis justifies a more conservative tax policy in the presence of asymmetric information. Furthermore, our model suggests a number of implications that appear to be well supported by preliminary evidence in cross‐country data. JEL classification: D82, H21, O41     

Investment scaling up and the role of government

This article studies the fiscal and welfare implications of a scaling up of public investment when the government is subject to inefficiencies on the spending and on the tax collection side. In our simulations, the scaling up of public investments results in higher long-run output and consumption levels but requires a fiscal stabilization package in order to preserve fiscal sustainability. The effects on consumers’ welfare after the fiscal adjustment are nontrivial. Our welfare analysis shows that consumers’ welfare is increased when the government smooths the fiscal adjustment via higher borrowing and not through an increase in taxation. Moreover, the comparison between several stabilization packages via tax adjustment shows that higher welfare is achieved when the government relies mostly on taxation of capital as this allows higher levels of consumption. Lower fiscal costs that do not undermine fiscal sustainability can however be achieved if the government manages to reduce inefficiency in tax collection. Finally, we consider a change in the trade regime that causes a decline in revenues. We find that the higher fiscal burden required to preserve fiscal sustainability would completely wipe out the welfare gain of higher public investments.     

Public investment,taxation, and long-run output in economies with multi-level governments

This paper examines the dynamic effects of taxation and investment on the steady state output level of an economy. A simple neoclassical growth model with different tiers of government is developed. The initial focus is on governments that aim to maximise their citizens' welfare and economic performance by providing consumption goods for private consumption and public capital for private production. It is shown that a long-run per capita output maximising tax rate can be derived and that there also exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation. The analysis then extends to the case where governments attempt instead to maximise their own tax revenue to fund expenditures which do not contribute to the utility of their citizens. Three different cases of taxation arrangement are considered: tax competition, tax sharing, and tax coordination. The modeling shows that intensifying tax competition will lead to an increase in the aggregate tax rate as compared to the cases of sharing and coordination amongst governments. These tax rates are both higher than the long-run per capita output maximising rate that was implied under the welfare maximising government scenario.     

Tax Expenditures on Health in Australia: 1960–61 to 1988–89

Commonwealth government tax expenditures arise because departures from the tax structure produce favourable tax treatment of particular types of activities or taxpayers. Such tax concessions can be used in the same way as direct expenditures to give effect to government policies, and in fact are often used as substitutes for direct expenditures. Although estimates of tax expenditures on health in more recent times are readily available, this form of subsidisation of the health sector has not been used heavily since the introduction of Medicare in 1984. It is for the period spanning the 1960s and the 1970s, when tax expenditures were a much more important source of health care finance, that consistent estimates are lacking. This article presents estimates of the revenue cost of income tax concessions for health in Australia over the period 1960–61 to 1988–89 and integrates these estimates into the currently available health expenditure statistics. It is concluded that failure to allow for tax expenditures on health when analysing public expenditures on health in Australia can lead to misleading conclusions about the net fiscal impact of changes in the Commonwealth's health expenditure policy. In particular, the fiscal effect of introducing Medihank in 1975 is significantly lower if account is taken of changes to tax concessions on health occurring at the same time. Likewise, the net cost of the introduction of Medicare in 1984 is overstated by measures based on direct outlays alone.     

Optimal fiscal policy in a dynamic multicountry world with public services

The authors construct a dynamic one‐good multicountry growth model with productive government spending and perfect capital mobility to study fiscal interdependence among countries. In the case of a source‐based tax, it is found that there is no strategic interaction and that the equilibrium spending/tax mix coincides with the optimal one. In the case of a residence‐based tax system, however, there is strategic interaction across countries and, under noncooperation, countries tend to spend and tax over and above the optimal Pigouvian level.     

A 'long march' perspective on tobacco use in Canada

Abstract.  In this paper we present a model of tobacco demand in Canada, with a view to establishing if price and tax policy on the one hand or educational, regulatory, and demographic influences on the other have been primarily responsible for the substantial drop in consumption since 1980. We address some methodological and econometric issues that have escaped the attention of some analysts to this point. Using data for the period 1972–2000, we find that non‐price developments have had a strong deterrent effect and that the price elasticity of demand is now lower than even the recently obtained low estimates propose. These findings have strong public policy content. JEL Classification: I12, C13, C22     

The Role of State Fiscal Policy in State Economic Growth

Do state policy makers have the ability to affect a state's rate of economic growth? This article examines one possible source of growth and per capita output level disparities by studying the role that state taxation and public expenditure decisions play in fostering economic development. Using pooled annual U.S. state‐level data from 1972 to 1998, a fixed‐effects model is employed to examine the effects of changing tax rates on both state per capita output levels and growth rates. The results indicate that higher tax rates negatively influence short‐run state economic growth, which lowers state output levels. However, long‐run growth is unaffected by changes in state tax rates, even after adjusting for the effects of initial per capita output levels, state expenditures, and aid from the federal government. Nor do changes in state public spending rates and federal aid permanently alter state growth rates, implying that state fiscal policies have only transitory effects on state growth. (JEL H71, O40, R11)     

Environmental Funds,Public Abatement,and Welfare

This paper addresses some features of environmental funds that the government uses to finance public abatement with pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue. I find that when the pollution tax rate and the tariff rate are jointly chosen optimally, then the optimal pollution tax rate is higher than the Pigouvian tax rate under public abatement financed by tariff revenue, and lower when public abatement is financed by pollution tax revenue. Furthermore, I show that the optimal tariff rate is positive regardless of which tax revenue is used to finance public abatement. These results are relevant for countries where the government seeks revenues earmarked for the financing of environmental funds.     

The Role of Central Government in Tax Competition Between Heterogenous Regions

This paper analyzes the role of central government in a Nash tax competition between two heterogenous regions, which differ in their endowments of two production factors. Regional governments use a source-based unit tax on mobile capital to finance their public service expenditures. The central government employs excise subsidies and lump-sum taxes to induce the two regions to efficient resource allocations. We answer to the question that whether the central government can induce an efficient equilibrium, and investigate the effects of endowments difference on the optimum subsidy rates. We find that there exists a unique tax rate under which the efficiency is achieved. We identify the set of endowment allocations for which the subsidy rate to one region is higher (or lower) than the subsidy rate to the rival. The large poor region receives a higher subsidy than the small rich region, but the subsidy to the small poor region may be higher or lower than that to the large rich region. [H2]     

Government expenditure,external and domestic public debt,and economic growth

This paper analyzes the relationship between government expenditure, tax on returns to assets, public debt, and growth in an endogenous growth model. Public debt is composed of two components, domestic debt and external debt. We show conditions for existence, uniqueness, and multiplicity of the steady states. More precisely, existence of steady state requires a sufficiently high productivity and a sufficiently low tax on returns to assets. We also provide the effects of an increase in the tax rate on returns to assets on the steady state. In particular, the relation between public spending and the tax rate has a bell shape. Domestic debt unambiguously increases with tax whereas external debt displays an inverted U‐shaped curve. A high tax rate leads to a reallocation of public debt in favor of domestic debt (to the detriment of external debt). The effect of taxation on consumption (and production) also displays a nonlinear pattern when the output elasticity of capital is lower than unity (the effect is monotonously increasing if this elasticity is unity). We also derive the conditions under which a tax increase can boost or reduce the balanced growth rate.     

Optimal time-consistent fiscal policy under endogenous growth with elastic labor supply

We explore the implications of incorporating an elastic labor supply in an endogenous growth economy when characterizing the time-consistent Markov policy. We consider two policy instruments: an income tax rate and the split of government spending between consumption and production services. The Markov-perfect policy implies a higher income tax rate and a larger proportion of government spending allocated to consumption than those chosen under a commitment constraint on the part of the government. As a consequence, economic growth is slightly lower under the Markov-perfect policy than under the Ramsey policy. Under the Markov and Ramsey optimal policies, a higher weight of leisure in households' preferences leads to a lower optimal income tax rate and a lower proportion of public resources devoted to consumption. We also show that the policy bias that would arise when imposing a Markov policy designed ignoring the presence of leisure in the utility function would lead to a significant welfare loss.     

改革我国现行分税制需要解决的几个问题

严格的讲，1994年我国实行的分税制财政体制又是一次中央政府与地方政府的“发钱”，而不是实质意义上的分税制，按照公共财政理论，改革和完善现行分税制，必须认识和解决三方面问题；一、以政企分离作为分税制改革的切入点，理顺政府与企业的关系；二、适当下放税权，解决分税制改革的关键问题；三，完善地方税系，为彻底的分税制改革提供保障。     

Mixed Oligopoly and Environmental Policy

We show in this paper that when there are both public and private firms in product markets (a mixed oligopoly) the decision whether to privatize a public firm interacts with the environmental policy of governments. Therefore, the outcome of the decision whether to privatize a public firm may be different if the government internalizes the environmental damage than if the government ignores it. When the government sets a tax to protect the environment, the tax is lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private one even though the environmental damage is greater. In the mixed oligopoly the marginal cost of the public firm is lower than the market price.     

Advancing Loss Given Default Prediction Models: How the Quiet Have Quickened

We describe LossCalc™ version 2.0: the Moody's KMV model to predict loss given default (LGD), the equivalent of (1  −  recovery rate). LossCalc is a statistical model that applies multiple predictive factors at different information levels: collateral, instrument, firm, industry, country and the macroeconomy to predict LGD. We find that distance‐to‐default measures (from the Moody's KMV structural model of default likelihood) compiled at both the industry and firm levels are predictive of LGD. We find that recovery rates worldwide are predictable within a common statistical framework, which suggests that the estimation of economic firm value (which is then available to allocate to claimants according to each country's bankruptcy laws) is a dominant step in LGD determination. LossCalc is built on a global dataset of 3,026 recovery observations for loans, bonds and preferred stock from 1981 to 2004. This dataset includes 1,424 defaults of both public and private firms – both rated and unrated instruments – in all industries. We demonstrate out‐of‐sample and out‐of‐time LGD model validation. The model significantly improves on the use of historical recovery averages to predict LGD .     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: A RECONSIDERATION

In countries with tax-sharing systems, assigning local governments a large share of locally generated revenues is often thought to promote economic development. The more local officials benefit from local economic activity, the more supportive of business and less corrupt they should be, resulting in higher output. Some attribute China's rapid growth to its high local retention rates and Russia's 1990s stagnation to the central clawback of local revenues. I show that such arguments ignore an important actor in the game – the central government. If increasing the local tax share improves incentives for local authorities, it worsens them for central officials. The net effect on output is indeterminate.     

Estimating the public economic consequences of introducing varenicline smoking cessation therapy in South Korea using a fiscal analytic framework

Background and aims: Smoking gives rise to many cross-sectorial public costs and benefits for government. Costs arise from increased healthcare spending and work-related social benefits, while smoking itself provides significant revenue for government from tobacco taxes. To better understand the public economic impact of smoking and smoking cessation therapies, this study developed a government perspective framework for assessing smoking-attributable morbidity and mortality and associated public costs. This framework includes changes in lifetime tax revenue and health costs, as well as changes in tobacco tax revenue, from fewer smokers.

Methods: A modified generational accounting framework was developed to assess relationships between smoking-attributable morbidity and mortality and public economic consequences of smoking, including lifetime tax revenue gains/losses, government social transfers, and health spending. Based on the current prevalence of smoking in South Korean males, a cohort model was developed for smokers, former-smokers, and never-smokers. The model simulated the lifetime discounted fiscal transfers for different age cohorts in 5 year age bands, and the return on investment (ROI) from smoking cessation therapy.

Results: Former smokers are estimated to generate higher lifetime earnings and direct tax revenues and lower lifetime healthcare costs due to the reduction of smoking-attributable mortality and morbidity compared to smokers, even after accounting for reduced tobacco taxes paid. Based on the costs of public investments in varenicline, this study estimated a ROI from 1.4–1.7, depending on treatment age, with higher ROI in younger cohorts, with an average ROI of 1.6 for those aged less than 65.

Conclusions: This analysis suggests that reductions in smoking can generate positive public economic benefits for government, even after accounting for lost tobacco tax revenues. The results described here are likely applicable to countries having similar underlying smoking prevalence, comparable taxation rates, and social benefit protection provided to individuals with smoking-related conditions.