Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Role of Accounting Earnings in CEO Turnover

We study whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to accounting earnings and how the impact of IFRS adoption varies with country‐level institutions and firm‐level incentives. We find that CEO turnover responds more to a firm's accounting performance after adoption. This increase in turnover‐to‐earnings sensitivity is concentrated in countries with stronger enforcement of financial reporting and is more prominent for mandatory adopters that have strong firm‐level compliance incentives. In addition, we link the change in turnover‐to‐earnings sensitivity directly to accounting changes due to IFRS adoption and find a stronger adoption effect when firms report large overall accounting changes and large de‐recognition of loss provisions upon adoption. Some of the above findings are sensitive to the exclusion of UK firms, which account for more than half of our sample.     

Economic Consequences of IFRS Adoption: The Role of Changes in Disclosure Quality*

This study adopts a two‐step approach to highlight the disclosure quality channel that drives economic consequences of IFRS adoption. This approach helps address the identification challenge noted by prior research and offers direct evidence on the role of disclosure quality. In the first step, we document the impact of the IFRS mandate on changes in disclosure quality proxied by the granularity of line item disclosure in financial statements. We find that IFRS‐adopting firms provide more disaggregated information upon IFRS adoption, such as more granular disclosure of intangible assets and long‐term investments on the balance sheet and greater disaggregation of depreciation, amortization, and nonoperating income items on the income statement. In the second step, we link the observed disclosure changes to the benefits and costs of IFRS adoption. We show that greater disaggregated information due to IFRS adoption enhances market liquidity and decreases information asymmetry, but does not affect audit fees differentially. Our evidence has implications for standard setters as they evaluate cost‐benefit trade‐offs when considering disclosure changes in the future.     

Accounting Comparability and Economic Outcomes of Mandatory IFRS Adoption

This study examines the associations between four economic outcomes of the 2005 mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and concurrent changes in two important accounting constructs, accounting comparability and reporting quality. My primary purpose is to evaluate the relative importance of cross‐country accounting comparability and firm‐specific reporting quality in explaining previously documented increases in Tobin's Q, stock liquidity, analyst forecast accuracy, and analyst forecast agreement following IFRS adoption. Given that improvements in both comparability and reporting quality are primary stated objectives of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), it is important to understand their relative roles in shaping the information environment of financial statement users following IFRS adoption. Using 1,861 first‐time adopters in 23 countries, I find that firms with a larger improvement in comparability have larger increases in Q, liquidity, forecast accuracy, and forecast agreement following adoption, relative to other adopters. In contrast, improvements in reporting quality around adoption appear to have only a second‐order effect that is generally limited to Q effects among those adopters with concurrent improvements in comparability. These results are robust to alternative design and variable specifications. Finally, I continue to find these results for samples restricted to countries with weaker pre‐adoption institutional environments and countries that did not initiate proactive financial statement reviews, indicating that strong institutions and regulatory improvements are not driving the results. Overall, my results suggest that improvements in cross‐country accounting comparability played an important role in the previously documented economic benefits that accrued to 2005 mandatory IFRS adopters.     

Deviations from the Mandatory Adoption of IFRS in the European Union: Implementation,Enforcement, Incentives,and Compliance

In this paper, we evaluate the common assumption that European Union (EU) firms began using international financial reporting standards (IFRS) in 2005 when the EU formally adopted IFRS. Although the incidence of firms using local (or some other) GAAP declined between 2005 and 2012, it is still non‐trivial. By 2012 the incidence of non‐IFRS financial statements was still in excess of 17 percent (87 percent of which were fully consolidated). We estimate a model of the non‐adoption of IFRS as a function of implementation features of the IFRS regulation, country‐specific enforcement, and firm‐specific reporting incentives. As expected, being specifically required by EU‐wide and country‐specific rules to adopt IFRS is positively associated with IFRS adoption but does not constitute a complete explanation. Proxies for enforcement are significantly associated with non‐adoption, but the marginal effects of the enforcement variables are weak. We find that larger firms, firms with foreign operations and more analyst following, and firms that issue new debt and equity were more likely to adopt IFRS, both when the regulation was initially imposed and in subsequent years. We conclude that many EU firms do not use IFRS; that some firms exploited definitions, exemptions, and deferrals to avoid adopting IFRS while some firms simply failed to comply with the regulation; and that firms responded to their incentives in deciding whether to adopt IFRS.     

Does Mandatory Adoption of IFRS Improve Accounting Quality? Preliminary Evidence

We provide evidence on the preliminary effects of mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on accounting quality for a relatively broad set of firms from 20 countries that adopted IFRS in 2005 relative to a benchmark group of firms from countries that did not adopt IFRS matched on the strength of legal enforcement, industry, size, book‐to‐market, and accounting performance. Relative to these benchmark firms, we find that IFRS firms exhibit significant increases in income smoothing and aggressive reporting of accruals, and a significant decrease in timeliness of loss recognition; however we do not find significant differences across IFRS and benchmark firms in meeting or beating earnings targets. Our findings contrast with findings in earlier studies which suggest that IFRS adoption leads to increased accounting quality. Our findings primarily hold for firms in strong enforcement countries, which suggests that enforcement mechanisms in these countries were not able to counter the initial effects of greater flexibility in IFRS relative to domestic GAAP.     

Accounting Standards Harmonization and Financial Integration

We empirically examine whether adopting a uniform set of accounting standards mitigates information frictions in financial markets and facilitates market integration. Using a difference‐in‐difference design, we find that after the mandatory adoption of IFRS local stock returns incorporate more global information and at a faster speed. The effect of IFRS adoption is stronger in countries where there are larger improvements in accounting comparability and for firms with a larger increase in foreign ownership. Overall, our results suggest that accounting standards harmonization facilitates financial market integration.     

The Role of Similar Accounting Standards in Cross‐Border Mergers and Acquisitions

This study investigates whether differences in accounting standards across countries create information costs that inhibit firms from investing in foreign markets. Using the frequency and dollar magnitude of cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) from 32 countries over the period 1998–2004, we find that the aggregate volume of M&A activity across country pairs is larger for pairs of countries with similar Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and that this increased volume of M&A activity is driven by target countries that also have strong enforcement. We also find that the 2005 mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) attracted more cross‐border M&As among IFRS‐adopting countries, and that this increase in M&A activity within the IFRS countries is more pronounced for country pairs with low similarity in GAAP in the pre‐IFRS adoption period. Overall, our results highlight the role of accounting standards and enforcement in shaping cross‐border M&A activity.     

Does Mandatory IFRS Adoption Improve the Information Environment?*

More than 120 countries require or permit the use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by publicly listed companies on the basis of higher information quality and accounting comparability from IFRS application. However, the empirical evidence about these presumed benefits is often conflicting and fails to distinguish between information quality and comparability. In this paper we examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on firms’ information environment. We find that after mandatory IFRS adoption consensus forecast errors decrease for firms that mandatorily adopt IFRS relative to forecast errors of other firms. We also find decreasing forecast errors for voluntary adopters, but this effect is smaller and not robust. Moreover, we show that the magnitude of the forecast error decrease is associated with the firm‐specific differences between local GAAP and IFRS. This finding suggests that it is IFRS adoption rather than a correlated unobservable factor that is causing forecast errors to decrease. Exploiting individual analyst level data and isolating settings where analysts would benefit more from either increased comparability or higher quality information, we document that the improvement in the information environment is driven both by information and comparability effects. These results suggest that mandatory IFRS adoption has improved the quality of information intermediation in capital markets, and as a result firms’ information environment, by increasing both information quality and accounting comparability.     

Evidence of Manager Intervention to Avoid Working Capital Deficits

We study managers’ interventions in financial reporting by examining working capital deficits, measured as current ratios less than 1.0. Current ratios represent important balance sheet liquidity indicators to lenders and creditors, and have an identifiable and naturally occurring reference point at 1.0, analogous to the profit/loss income statement reference point. We find that distributions of reported current ratios of both U.S. and non‐U.S. firms exhibit a discontinuity at 1.0. For U.S. firms, we find that the discontinuity increases with exogenous increases in the cost of credit in the economy, and that determinants of the likelihood to achieve a given current ratio are diagnostic precisely at the 1.0 discontinuity location but not at other nearby locations in the current ratio distribution. U.S. firms that avoid working capital deficits report lower proportions of inventory and higher proportions of accounts receivable in current assets and, when credit is tight, higher proportions of cash, consistent with managers increasing sales volume so as to capitalize profit margins and thereby increase current assets. For non‐U.S. firms, the discontinuity is more pronounced for observations from common law countries, a proxy for jurisdictions where financial reports are more intended to provide decision‐useful information. The evidence suggests that managers intervene to achieve a balance sheet reporting objective that stems from stakeholder use of reference points.     

Transparency,Information Shocks,and Tax Avoidance

This study helps provide clarity to the prior mixed findings on the association between financial reporting transparency and tax avoidance by studying the effect that transparency has on tax avoidance in a cross‐country sample through aggregate‐ and firm‐level tests. Results using firm‐ and country‐level (aggregate) measures of transparency and tax avoidance show that countries and firms with greater levels of transparency exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance and that the effect of country‐level transparency is incremental to firm‐level transparency. Furthermore, results of difference‐in‐difference tests using the adoption of IFRS and the initial enforcement of insider trading laws around the world as exogenous shocks that increase transparency find that transparency has a statistically and economically significant effect on tax avoidance and address empirical concerns regarding endogeneity and reverse causality not fully addressed in the prior research. The results of these tests as well as tests that address potential correlated but omitted variables suggest that financial transparency is an important tool which regulators can use in battling tax avoidance.     

Common Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management*

This study examines the relation between earnings management and block ownership of same‐industry peer firms by a common set of institutional investors (common institutional ownership). This relation is important given the tremendous growth of common institutional ownership and the significant influence of blockholders on financial reporting. We hypothesize that common institutional ownership mitigates earnings management by enhancing institutions' monitoring efficiency and by encouraging institutions to internalize the negative externality of a firm's earnings management on peer firms' investments. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that higher common institutional ownership is related to less earnings management. Analyses of a quasi‐natural experiment based on financial institution mergers show that this negative relation is unlikely to be driven by the endogeneity of common institutional ownership. Cross‐sectional tests provide evidence that the negative relation is stronger among firms for which common institutional ownership is likely to generate a greater reduction in institutions' information acquisition and processing costs, and among firms whose severe financial misstatements are more likely to distort co‐owned peer firms' investments, supporting both mechanisms underlying our hypothesis. Our findings inform the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of common institutional ownership by highlighting an important benefit: the enhanced monitoring of financial reporting.     

Sentiment,Loss Firms,and Investor Expectations of Future Earnings*

This study investigates the mispricing of market‐wide investor sentiment by exploring the relation between sentiment and investor expectations of future earnings. Prior research argues that sentiment‐driven mispricing should be most pronounced for hard‐to‐value firms, such as those reporting losses (Baker and Wurgler 2006). Using investor expectations of future earnings, we provide empirical results consistent with this behavioral finance theory. We predict and find that investors perceive losses to be more (less) persistent during periods of low (high) sentiment; that (in contrast) investors perceive profit persistence to be lower (higher) during periods of low (high) sentiment; and that the effects appear stronger for loss firms relative to profit firms. We also document predictable cross‐sectional variation within losses (with the mispricing mitigated for losses associated with activities expected to generate future benefits), R&D, growth, large negative special items, and severe financial distress. Overall, our results document a new and important channel—investor expectations of future earnings—to explain sentiment‐driven mispricing.     

The relationships between IFRS,earnings losses threshold and earnings management

An increasing number of countries have adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Prior research indicates that IFRS increase the relevance of financial statements, but also increase opportunism in earnings management (EM). Despite this, no evidence is found in this study to demonstrate that the adoption of IFRS increases the use of EM by companies as a whole. Furthermore, the results indicate that the use of IFRS can enhance the neutrality of financial statements. However, these phenomena occur only in the case of firms with positive earnings. Therefore, if a firm faces earnings losses (ELOSS), the manager will often exhibit EM behaviour after implementing IFRS. Thus, when the firm has ELOSS and adopts IFRS, the situation that results will usually decrease the neutrality of financial statements. As for the management implications, these findings suggest that the government and regulator should implement more in-depth supervision to prevent the increased use of EM by managers following the adoption of IFRS.     

Contracting and Reporting Conservatism around a Change in Fiduciary Duties*

We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine simultaneously two types of conservatism that play important roles in resolving creditor–owner agency conflicts: contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism. The ruling expanded managerial fiduciary duties in favor of creditors for Delaware-incorporated firms in the vicinity of insolvency. In those firms, following the ruling, debt contracts are less likely to include conservative adjustments to accounting numbers used for covenant compliance (i.e., contracting conservatism decreases), while public financial reporting becomes more conservative (i.e., reporting conservatism increases). The decrease in contracting conservatism is concentrated in firms that exhibit a greater increase in reporting conservatism, suggesting that reporting conservatism is more cost-effective in resolving agency conflicts. In addition, the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms facing greater business uncertainty and firms with greater board independence.     

Do Accounting Firm Consulting Revenues Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from the Pre‐ and Post‐SOX Eras

In recent years, public accounting firms have experienced a steady increase in the proportion of their revenues generated from consulting services. Although growth in consulting revenue following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) has been generated primarily from services provided to nonaudit clients, regulators have expressed concerns about the potential implications of this increase for audit quality. In contrast, accounting firms assert that the expertise developed by their consulting professionals helps them to provide better quality audits. We examine the relation between the proportion of accounting firm consulting revenue to total revenue and audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. Because SOX drastically altered the source of consulting revenues for public accounting firms, we also separately examine these relations in the pre‐ and post‐SOX eras. We find evidence suggesting that before SOX, higher proportions of audit firm consulting revenues negatively impacted both audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. However, we do not find a statistically significant association between audit firm consulting revenues and either audit quality or investor perceptions of audit quality following SOX. Our analyses suggest that even if these relations exist following SOX, the potential economic magnitude of the effect is small.     

The role of information sharing in trade credit distribution: evidence from Thailand

Prior research has shown that information sharing among lenders facilitates bank credit allocation and reduces default rates. We examine the role of information sharing in trade credit allocation using a sample of publicly traded firms in Thailand over the 1994–2005 period. Taking the establishment of a private credit bureau in 1999 as signalling improvement in information sharing among lenders, we obtain three main results in the improved information sharing period: (1) Thai firms have become less dependent on supplier credit; (2) financially constrained firms redistribute more funds via trade credit; and (3) the relationships between the use of trade credit and firm‐specific factors such as liquidity, free cash flow, tangible assets, interest cost ratio, and firm size weaken as information sharing improves. Our results are consistent with the view that better information sharing facilitates credit allocation. Hence, policies aiming at facilitating information exchange among financial intermediaries should be supported. We also find support for the view that bank credit substitutes for trade credit. This substitution lowers firms' cost of capital, given that trade credit is assumed to be more costly than bank loans.     

Home Country Investor Protection,Ownership Structure and Cross‐Listed Firms' Compliance with SOX‐Mandated Internal Control Deficiency Disclosures

We examine whether home country investor protection and ownership structure affect cross‐listed firms' compliance with SOX‐mandated internal control deficiency (ICD) disclosures. We develop a proxy for the likelihood of cross‐listed firms' ICD misreporting during the Section 302 reporting regime. For cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, we have three main findings. First, firms whose managers control their firms and have voting rights in excess of cash flow rights are more likely to misreport ICD than other firms during the Section 302 reporting regime. Second, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and voluntary deregistration from the SEC prior to the Section 404 effective date. Third, for firms that chose not to deregister, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and the reporting of previously undisclosed ICDs during the Section 404 reporting regime. We do not find similar evidence for cross‐listed firms domiciled in strong investor protection countries. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, for cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, managers who have the ability and incentive to expropriate outside minority shareholders are reluctant to disclose ICDs in order to protect their private control benefits. The results of our study should be of interest to regulators who wish to identify noncompliant firms for closer supervision, investors who wish to identify ex ante red flags for poor financial disclosure quality, and researchers who wish to understand the economic forces governing cross‐listed firms' financial disclosure behavior.     

The Impact of Legal and Voluntary Investor Protection on the Early Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)

Summary Prior studies explain the early adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by firm-specific benefits. However, IFRS adoption also leads to increased disclosure and reduced accounting choices, resulting in a loss of private benefits for company insiders. This paper argues that this loss depends on characteristics of the institutional environment (i.e. the level of investor protection). We find that in countries with strong laws or extensive corporate governance codes IFRS is more likely adopted as the loss of private benefits for company insiders is smaller. Furthermore, corporate governance recommendations are as effective as laws in stimulating IFRS adoption and become more important when laws are weaker. We thank the FWO for the financial support (FWO-project G.0244.02). We gratefully acknowledge the comments of the participants of the 26th Annual European Accounting Association Congress in Seville (2003), and of the International Accounting Section Mid-year Conference of the American Accounting Association in San Diego (2004). We acknowledge the comments of the discussant and participants of the Accounting Research Day in Antwerp (May 2004). Special thanks go to M. Willekens, J. Suys, and W. Landsman and two anonymous referees.     

Internal Control and Operational Efficiency

In this study, we examine whether internal control over financial reporting affects firm operational efficiency. We find that operational efficiency, derived from frontier analysis, is significantly lower among firms with material weaknesses in internal control relative to firms without such weaknesses. We also find that the remediation of material weaknesses leads to an improvement in operational efficiency. Additional analyses indicate that the negative effect of material weaknesses on operational efficiency is stronger for firms with a greater demand for higher quality information for decision making, for weaknesses that are deemed to be more severe, and to a certain extent, for smaller firms. Overall, our study extends the literature by presenting systematic evidence on the effect of effective internal control on operational efficiency and informs the debate over the costs and benefits of the internal control reporting requirements under the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002.     

Is Audit Committee Equity Compensation Related to Audit Fees?*

Section 301 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) implicitly assumes that audit committees can independently determine audit fees. Critics of section 301 have questioned this assumption in particular, and the efficacy of section 301 more generally. In response, the SEC issued a concept release in 2015 calling for public disclosure of the process that audit committees follow for determining auditor compensation. Motivated by these calls and the widespread use of stocks and options to compensate firms' independent directors, we examine the relation between equity compensation granted to audit committee members and audit fees. Using a sample of 3,685 firm‐year observations during 2007–2015, we find a negative relation between audit committee equity compensation and audit fees, consistent with larger equity pay inducing audit committee members to compromise independence by paying lower audit fees. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, firm size, alternative measures of equity compensation, alternative samples, and an alternative treatment of extreme values. We further show that larger equity compensation is associated with lower earnings quality. We also find that the negative effect of equity compensation on audit fees is stronger when city‐level audit market competition is high. However, this negative relation disappears when (i) firms face high litigation risk, (ii) auditors have stronger bargaining power, (iii) the audit committee includes a high proportion of accounting experts, and (iv) auditors are industry experts. Our results are relevant for regulators and investors.