Innovation and Corporate Tax Planning: The Distinct Effects of Patents and R&D*

Using a large US sample, we find a significant and positive relation between patents and corporate tax planning, and the effect is incremental to the effect of R&D on tax planning. We employ a quasi‐natural experiment based on staggered industry‐level innovation shocks to identify the positive causal effect of patents on corporate tax planning. We also find that patents are not associated with tax planning for domestic firms, but their association with tax planning is concentrated in multinational firms, which have the ability to shift domestic income to low‐tax countries. Moreover, we find that the identified effect mainly exists in the post–check‐the‐box (CTB) rule period when shifting income among affiliates becomes more flexible and convenient. Finally, we use two income‐shifting models and find that patents, rather than R&D, facilitate tax planning through an income‐shifting channel. Overall, our results suggest that R&D and patents facilitate firms' tax planning in distinct ways: R&D facilitates tax planning as intended through tax credits and deductions, whereas patents are used by taxpayers to avoid taxes aggressively through income shifting.     

Corporate Taxes and Financing Methods for Taxable Acquisitions*

We examine the influence of corporate taxes on U.S. firms' financing methods for taxable acquisitions of 100 percent of a target corporation's stock. We conduct tests of acquirer firms' use of debt or internal funds as the funding source for these acquisitions over the period 1987‐97. Our results provide the first empirical evidence that U.S. firms' use of debt to fund acquisitions significantly declines as foreign tax credit limitations reduce the marginal tax benefits received from borrowing. This finding is consistent with earlier speculation that U.S. foreign tax credit provisions could materially affect the capital costs of U.S. companies in debt‐financed acquisitions. We also find that these firms are generally high‐tax‐rate corporations whose financing choices are not significantly influenced by whether they acquire target‐firm tax loss carryovers. Our findings contribute to the accounting literature on the influence of taxes on the structure and financing of corporate acquisitions.     

Tax‐Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations*

This paper investigates whether economies of scale exist for tax planning. In particular, do larger, more profitable, multinational corporations avoid more taxes than other firms, resulting in lower effective tax rates? While the empirical results indicate that, ceteris paribus, larger corporations have higher effective tax rates, firms with greater pre‐tax income have lower effective tax rates. The negative relation between effective tax rates (ETRs) and pretax income is consistent with firms with greater pre‐tax income having more incentives and resources to engage in tax planning. Consistent with multinational corporations being able to avoid income taxes that domestic‐only companies cannot, I find that multinational corporations in general, and multinational corporations with more extensive foreign operations, have lower worldwide ETRs than other firms. Finally, in a sample of multinational corporations only, I find that higher levels of U.S. pre‐tax income are associated with lower U.S. and foreign ETRs, while higher levels of foreign pre‐tax income are associated with higher U.S. and foreign ETRs. Thus, large amounts of foreign income are associated with higher corporate tax burdens. Overall, I find substantial evidence of economies of scale to tax planning.     

Tax Avoidance and the Implications of Weak Internal Controls

I examine whether corporate tax avoidance is associated with internal control weaknesses (ICWs) disclosed under the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). ICWs disclosed under SOX are frequently related to a firm's tax function. When pervasive ICWs exist, the likelihood increases that these frequent tax‐related ICWs spill over from financial reporting issues to tax avoidance objectives. Thus, my research helps corporate stakeholders understand the implications of internal controls beyond simply financial reporting objectives. Results indicate that, on average, firms with a tax‐related ICW have a 4 percent higher three‐year cash effective tax rate relative to firms without any such weaknesses. Further estimates reveal that this negative relation stems from pervasive, company‐level tax ICWs. Analysis of remediation suggests a causal link. I find that after remediating tax‐related ICWs, firms report higher levels of tax avoidance in the future. Broadly, these findings support that internal control quality represents a proxy for internal governance, and thus the strength of alignment between managers and shareholders. Furthermore, tax‐related internal controls represent an important underlying determinant of tax avoidance with significant cash flow effects, and implications beyond financial reporting.     

Investment incentives and the relative demand for skilled labor: Evidence from accelerated depreciation policies in China

This study evaluates the effects of China's 2014 and 2015 accelerated depreciation policies on the relative demand of firms for skilled labor. We develop a simple model to explore how the policies affect the relative demand of firms for skilled labor and illustrate the roles of financing constraints and tax compliance in mediating the policy effects. We then employ a firm-level dataset from China's A-share listed companies and use a quasi-experimental design to examine the model predictions. We find that the policies significantly increase the relative demand of firms for skilled labor. The channels underlying the policy effects are that the policies generate additional cash flow for firms, stimulate investment and, thus, raise the demand of firms for skilled labor with the presence of capital–skill complementarity. We also find that the positive effects of the policies on the relative demand for skilled labor are primarily significant for firms with strong financing constraints and high tax compliance. Moreover, we document the positive effects of the policies on R&D investment, firm value added, productivity, workers' benefits, and corporate social responsibility performance, which further corroborate our main results.     

Preferential corporate income tax treatment: Valuation in the market portfolio

In the setting of the market portfolio, the impacts of preferential corporate income tax treatments through the valuational reduction for risk are opposite to and offset the impacts through the expected proceeds. This suggests that focusing on the absolute valuation of tax-favored firms results in the undermeasurement of implicit taxes on returns on investments in tax-favored firms and the relative valuation with reference to fully taxed (i.e., tax-disfavored) benchmark firms be used. In addition, corporate income taxes imposed on entities and capital income taxes imposed on investors have opposite valuational effects through the endogenously derived market-aggregate aversion to risk.     

The Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 on Defined Benefit Pension Contributions*

This study examines the effect of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) on corporate defined benefit pension contributions. The TCJA decreases the corporate tax rate from 35 percent in 2017 to 21 percent in 2018 and thereafter. This change incentivizes firms to increase 2017 pension contributions to take advantage of tax deductions at a higher rate. Consistent with this incentive, we find firms increase defined benefit pension contributions by an average of 25 to 31 percent in 2017 compared with earlier years. We also find that taxpaying firms are the primary contributors. Further, taxpaying firms with high levels of pension-related deferred tax assets contribute over three times as much as taxpaying firms with low levels of pension-related deferred tax assets. We also find firms that increase pension contributions in 2017 reduce 2018 contributions, consistent with intertemporal income shifting rather than a permanent change in pension funding strategy.     

Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness

This study investigates the relation between corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness. We study a broad array of corporate political activities, including the employment of connected directors, campaign contributions, and lobbying. Using a large hand‐collected data set of U.S. firms' political connections, we find that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than nonconnected firms, after controlling for other determinants of tax aggressiveness, industry and year fixed effects, and the endogenous choice of being politically connected. Our findings are robust to various measures of political connections and tax aggressiveness. These results are consistent with the conjecture that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive because of their lower expected cost of tax enforcement, better information regarding tax law and enforcement changes, lower capital market pressure for transparency, and greater risk‐taking tendencies induced by political connections.     

Deciphering Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Credit Rating Disagreements

This study investigates the role of tax avoidance in the credit‐rating process and whether differences exist in how rating agencies account for the risk relevance of tax avoidance. Using a sample of initial credit ratings assigned to public debt issuances during 1994–2013, our evidence is consistent with Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's assessing the costs and benefits associated with tax avoidance differently from one another, resulting in more frequent and pronounced rating agency disagreement. Rating agency disagreement over tax avoidance is most evident when it is accompanied by relatively high levels of uncertain tax positions, foreign activities, research and development activities, or tax footnote opacity. We also find evidence that decreases (increases) in tax avoidance or tax footnote disclosure opacity are positively (negatively) associated with the convergence of split ratings. This suggests that firms can exacerbate or mitigate rating agency disagreement subsequent to bond issuance. Our study complements prior research by examining why sophisticated information intermediaries disagree about the risk relevance of tax avoidance. It also sheds light on how firms can influence rating agencies’ understanding of tax avoidance.     

Tax Loss Carryovers in a Competitive Environment*

The fact that incumbent firms can immediately deduct research and development (R&D) investments from taxable income is generally believed to give them a strategic advantage over new firms that cannot deduct the investment cost, but instead generate a net operating tax loss carryover. Using an analytical model, we show that this conventional wisdom need not hold in a competitive environment. We examine operating and investment decisions in a duopolistic industry in which an initial investment in R&D yields an immediate tax benefit for one firm, but creates a net operating loss carryover for the other firm. If both firms invest in R&D, the firm with the net operating loss carryover makes more aggressive capital investment decisions following successful R&D. This may deter the incumbent firm from investing in R&D despite the lower aftertax costs of this investment. Changing the tax loss carryover rules would thus not only affects start‐up or loss firms, but would also affect the investment decisions of profitable firms in the same industry.     

Volatility of Tax Payments and Dividend Payouts*

Dividends are a key mechanism for shareholders to discipline managers and mitigate agency conflicts. This study examines whether the volatility of tax payments is associated with dividend payouts. Consistent with the predictions, results suggest that firms with more volatile tax payments are less likely to pay dividends overall and their dividends are lower in magnitude when doing so. These effects are economically significant and incremental to a firm's operating risk. The link between volatile tax payments and the likelihood of dividend payouts is weaker for firms that distribute dividends to alleviate agency conflicts. Similarly, the link between volatile tax payments and the amount of dividend payouts is weaker for firms that hold more cash for tax reasons. Taken together, these findings add to our understanding of the economic consequences of volatile tax payments and the determinants of dividend payouts.     

Corporate Governance Reform and Executive Incentives: Implications for Investments and Risk Taking

We investigate the mechanism through which the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) was associated with changes in corporate investment strategies. We document that the passage of the governance regulations in SOX was followed by a significant decline in pay‐performance sensitivity (Delta) and incentives to take risk (Vega) in CEOs' compensation contracts. These changes in compensation contracts are related to a decline in investments, including research and development expenditures, capital investments and acquisitions. Moreover, consistent with the rules in SOX directly affecting CEOs' incentives to take risk, we document that the decline in investments exceeds the amount that would be expected from changes in compensation packages alone. Finally, we also find evidence that the changes in investments are related to lower operating performances of firms, suggesting that these changes were costly to investors. Our evidence speaks to the debate on how corporate governance regulation interacts with firms' and managers' incentives, and ultimately affects corporate operating and investment strategies. Our study suggests that one indirect cost of such regulations in SOX is the significant reductions in corporate risk‐taking activities in the post‐SOX period. The changes in investments were in part due to changes in executive compensation contracts and in part related to increased executives' personal costs of engaging in risky activities.     

The value-added tax reform and labor market outcomes: Firm-level evidence from China

The tax incentives designed to stimulate firm investment may have a large and unexpected impact on labor market outcomes. Using a comprehensive data set on Chinese manufacturing firms during the period 1998–2007 with a difference-in-differences approach, we examine the impact of the value-added tax reform in 2004 on the firm-level labor market outcomes. We find that firms in eligible industries and pilot regions (treated firms) enjoying lower costs of purchasing fixed assets under the reform tended to increase capital investment and reduce employment simultaneously relative to firms that did not have tax incentives (the control firms). Compared with the control firms, the treated firms became more capital intensive but had declines in labor share in value added and average wage. We also find that the employment adjustment is associated with increase in the share of skilled workers in terms of engineers and technicians, but not workers with a college degree or higher.     

Assessing Tax Risk: Practitioner Perspectives

This study uses insights from tax practitioners and tax authorities to define and develop an estimate of ex ante tax risk that is independent of common tax outcomes studied in prior literature. Validation tests confirm that our tax risk measure (i) represents the predictable and unpredictable uncertainty inherent in the three sources of tax risk (i.e., economic risk, tax law uncertainty, and inaccurate information processing) and (ii) is a construct different from tax avoidance, tax uncertainty, and general business risk. Using our tax risk measure, we address two research questions of interest to academics and practitioners. First, we examine the association between tax risk and long-run tax avoidance and find a negative association between tax risk and future long-run cash effective tax rates (ETRs). Second, we consider the extent to which unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) reflect tax risk, tax avoidance, or financial reporting incentives and demonstrate that our tax risk measure explains a substantial portion of UTBs, incremental and relative to measures of information risk, conditional conservatism, unconditional conservatism, and tax avoidance. Our study offers a measure of tax risk that, consistent with the Scholes-Wolfson paradigm, reflects the tax risk inherent in all business activities, not just tax avoidance activities; has unique industry effects; and contributes to our understanding of the factors that affect tax planning decisions and result in variation in firms' ETRs. Our findings will help managers and tax practitioners focus on industry-specific tax risk components, assess risk during tax planning initiatives, exercise caution when engaging in additional risk if ETRs are low, and adapt tax risk strategies to fit specific company needs. We enhance future tax research by improving the definition and measurement of tax risk.     

The Complementarity between Tax Avoidance and Manager Diversion: Evidence from Tax Haven Firms

We investigate whether tax avoidance and manager diversion are complementary when the costs of diversion are low by comparing dividend payouts, performance, and overinvestments of tax haven firms versus other multinational firms based in countries with weak and strong investor protections. Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2009a, b) and Desai et al. (2007) set forth a theory of tax avoidance within an agency framework (the D&D theory) based on the assumption that tax avoidance and manager diversion are complementary when the corporate governance system is “ineffective” (i.e., the manager's expected costs of diversion are low). Tax haven firms are corporate groups whose parent firms are incorporated in tax haven countries that are not the countries where the groups’ headquarters or primary operations are located (i.e., their “base” countries). We argue that tax haven incorporation potentially lowers the costs of diversion for managers of firms based in countries with weak investor protections. Using a sample from 28 base countries, we provide evidence that manager diversion and tax avoidance are complementary for tax haven firms based in countries with weak investor protections but not for tax haven firms based in countries with strong investor protections. Our results are consistent with the complementarity assumption underlying the D&D model and provide additional insights into the potential impact of the decentralization of the global firm.     

The Three Hurdles of Tax Planning: How Business Context,Aims of Tax Planning,and Tax Manager Power Affect Tax Expense

The question of why some companies pay fewer taxes than others is a widely investigated topic of interest. One of the well‐known explanations is a phenomenon called tax avoidance. We develop a grounded theory model of influences on corporate tax planning through a series of 19 in‐depth German tax expert interviews. Our research identifies three independent hurdles in the tax planning process, which can help to explain different levels of tax expense across companies. Those three hurdles sequentially address which tax planning methods are available (defined by business characteristics), desirable (given via aims of tax planning), and implementable (determined by tax manager power). A large part of previous research has estimated the influence of firm characteristics, which we incorporate in the broader term business characteristics, on tax expense, while the other influences that we identify have largely been left “out of the equation.” In the light of the current public debates on tax avoidance, we reveal two important findings: First, we find that companies vary widely in the aggressiveness of their aims of tax planning, which contrasts sharply with the picture often drawn by undifferentiated media reports. Second, tax managers can assume very different levels of power in their organization. The implementation of desirable tax planning methods varies depending on this level of tax manager power. In conclusion, our three‐hurdle grounded theory provides generalizable insights into important influences on corporate tax planning which help to explain the observed variation in tax expenses across firms.     

Tax Incentives and Maturity Mismatch between Investment and Financing: Evidence from China

This paper examines the effects of China's accelerated depreciation policy (ADP) on the maturity mismatch between investment and financing. Using panel data for China's A-share nonfinancial listed companies from 2010 to 2019 and a staggered difference-in-differences approach, we found the following. First, ADP significantly aggravated the degree of corporate maturity mismatch, and this result was robust across multiple checks. Second, due to an insufficient long-term loan supply, firms had to finance the fixed investments induced by ADP with short-term debts, leading to maturity mismatches. Third, the positive policy effects were mainly significant for firms with high policy exposure, high-risk preferences, a high degree of information asymmetry, and firms with weak long-term financing capacity. Finally, maturity mismatch exacerbated corporate financial risks. Our research findings indicate that passive maturity mismatch is prevalent among Chinese companies and emphasize the need to address financial repression in order to mitigate the potential financial risks that may arise from tax incentives.     

Does Tax Planning Affect Analysts' Forecast Accuracy?

We investigate whether firms' tax planning affects the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. Tax planning can exacerbate the complexity of firms' operations through strategic choices to exploit tax laws. Because of its effect on firms' operations, tax planning can influence analysts' efforts to understand and forecast earnings. Specifically, if the additional complexity arising from tax planning makes firm attributes less representative of expected earnings, analysts may issue less accurate forecasts. Using auditor‐provided tax services (APTS) as a measure of tax planning, we find that, as firms spend more on tax planning, the accuracy of analysts' forecasts of both earnings per share and tax expense declines. We also document that firms with higher levels of APTS have greater year‐to‐year volatility in, and lower persistence of, effective tax rates and earnings. Our results suggest that increased firm complexity, due to greater tax planning, makes earnings and tax expense more difficult to forecast and that analysts do not properly adjust for these effects. Thus, when deciding to engage in tax planning, firms appear to make trade‐offs between potential tax savings and negative effects on earnings properties and analysts' forecasts.     

Transfer Pricing: Strategies,Practices, and Tax Minimization

Using a survey of tax executives from multinational corporations, we document that some firms set their transfer pricing strategy to minimize tax payments, but more firms focus on tax compliance. We estimate that a firm focusing on minimizing taxes has a GAAP effective tax rate that is 6.6 percentage points lower and generates about $43 million more in tax savings, on average, than a firm focusing on tax compliance. Available COMPUSTAT data on sample firms confirm our survey‐based inferences. We also find that transfer pricing‐related tax savings are greater when higher foreign income, tax haven use, and R&D activities are combined with a tax minimization strategy. Finally, compliance‐focused firms report lower FIN 48 tax reserves than tax‐minimizing firms, consistent with the former group using less uncertain transfer pricing arrangements. Collectively, our study provides direct evidence that multinational firms have differing internal priorities for transfer pricing, and that these differences are strongly related to the taxes reported by these firms.     

新个税法下高校教师个人所得税纳税筹划探索

随着学校创收项目的增多和教师收入的提高,如何进行合理的纳税筹划,合理避税,成为高校财务部门的重要任务。结合高校代扣代缴个人所得税的现状,对实施新个税法后的纳税筹划等问题进行讨论,在遵守税法的情况下,争取减轻个人所得税税负,提高教师的实际收入。