Are Investors Misled by “Pro Forma” Earnings?*

This paper uses stock market data to investigate the popular claim that investors are misled by the “pro forma” earnings numbers conspicuously featured in the press releases of some U.S. firms. We first document the frequency and magnitude of pro forma earnings in press releases issued during June through August 2000, and describe the 433 firms that engaged in this financial disclosure strategy. Our test period predates public expressions of concern by trade associations and regulators that pro forma earnings may mislead investors and the subsequent issuance of guidelines and rules on the disclosure of pro forma earnings numbers. We use two complementary approaches to determine whether the share prices that investors assign to pro forma firms are systematically higher than the prices assigned to other firms. Our market‐multiples tests for differences in price levels find some evidence suggesting that pro forma firms may be priced higher than firms that do not use the disclosure strategy. This apparent overpricing is not, however, related to the pro forma earnings numbers themselves. Our narrow‐window stock returns tests reveal no evidence of a stock return premium for pro forma firms at the quarterly earnings announcement date. Collectively, the results cast doubt on the notion that investors are, on average, misled by pro forma earnings disclosures despite the widespread concern expressed in the financial press and by regulators.     

The Declining Value‐relevance of Accounting Information and Non‐Information‐based Trading: An Empirical Analysis*

Recently, a growing body of literature has suggested that financial statements have lost their value‐relevance because of a shift from a traditional capital‐intensive economy to a high‐technology, service‐oriented economy. These conclusions are based on studies that find a temporal decline in the association between stock prices and accounting information (earnings and book values). This paper empirically tests a theoretical prediction arising from the noisy rational expectations equilibrium model that suggests that the decline could be driven by non‐information‐based (NIB) trading activity, because such trading reduces the ability of stock prices to reflect accounting information. Specifically, Dontoh, Radhakrishnan, and Ronen (2004) show that when NIB trading increases, the R²s of a regression of stock price on accounting information declines. Our empirical tests confirm this prediction; that is, the decline in the association between stock prices and accounting information as measured by R²s is driven by an increase in NIB trading.     

Market Consequences of Earnings Management in Response to Security Regulations in China*

Under the 1996‐98 security regulations in China, the accounting rate of return on equity (ROE) has to be greater than 10 percent for three "consecutive" years for a firm to qualify for stock rights offers. Despite declining economic conditions during this period, the percentage of firms reporting ROE between 10 and 11 percent is about "three" times that for 1994‐95. This unique regulatory environment provides a natural experimental setting for the empirical assessment of earnings‐management behavior and its consequences. This study examines whether listed Chinese firms manage earnings to meet regulatory benchmarks and whether regulators and investors consider the quality of earnings in their respective regulatory and investment decisions. On the basis of a sample of listed Chinese firms from 1996 to 1998, we observe that managers execute transactions involving below‐the‐line items and use income‐increasing accounting accruals to meet regulatory ROE targets for stock rights offerings. The firms that apply for, but fail to receive, regulatory approval manage earnings more significantly than do firms that receive approval and pair‐matched control firms. Our market study also suggests that investors differentiate the quality of earnings and put less value on earnings suspected of a greater degree of management. Overall, our results imply that the regulatory bodies and investors to some extent make rational adjustments for the quality of earnings.     

Sentiment,Loss Firms,and Investor Expectations of Future Earnings*

This study investigates the mispricing of market‐wide investor sentiment by exploring the relation between sentiment and investor expectations of future earnings. Prior research argues that sentiment‐driven mispricing should be most pronounced for hard‐to‐value firms, such as those reporting losses (Baker and Wurgler 2006). Using investor expectations of future earnings, we provide empirical results consistent with this behavioral finance theory. We predict and find that investors perceive losses to be more (less) persistent during periods of low (high) sentiment; that (in contrast) investors perceive profit persistence to be lower (higher) during periods of low (high) sentiment; and that the effects appear stronger for loss firms relative to profit firms. We also document predictable cross‐sectional variation within losses (with the mispricing mitigated for losses associated with activities expected to generate future benefits), R&D, growth, large negative special items, and severe financial distress. Overall, our results document a new and important channel—investor expectations of future earnings—to explain sentiment‐driven mispricing.     

Does Information Asymmetry Matter to Equity Pricing? Evidence from Firms’ Geographic Location*

The scarcity of suitable proxies for asymmetric information has impeded empirical research from providing reliable evidence on whether information risk shapes equity pricing. In reexamining this unresolved question, we rely on firms’ geographic distance from financial centers to gauge information asymmetry. We provide strong, robust evidence supporting the prediction that equity financing is cheaper for firms nearer central locations, implying that investors rationally require more compensation when information asymmetry is worse. The equity pricing role of geographic proximity is economically large, with our coefficient estimates translating into firms located within 100 kilometers of the city center of the nearest of six major financial centers, or in their metropolitan statistical areas, enjoying equity financing costs that are seven basis points lower. Our inferences are insensitive to measuring both the cost of equity capital and distance in several ways, controlling for corporate governance quality, and addressing endogeneity. Collectively, our analysis suggests that investors discount the price that they pay for their securities to reflect the greater information asymmetry that ensues when firms are far from major financial centers.     

The Differential Role of R&D and SG&A for Earnings Management and Stock Price Manipulation*

This paper documents a differential role of R&D versus selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) for real earnings management. The distinction of these two components is important because prior studies mostly examine their combined use, but firms could manipulate them differently given the differing valuation implications. Reduced SG&A is viewed positively by investors as evidence of cost reduction, while reduced R&D is viewed negatively by investors as such expenditures are critical signals of expected growth. I examine their use in the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) as well as firms receiving accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs). Although both groups face strong incentives to manage earnings upward by reducing expenses, I predict and find that firms will reduce SG&A but increase R&D. During the manipulation period, SEO and AAER firms exhibit lower discretionary SG&A and higher discretionary R&D, relative to control firms, and investors positively value low discretionary SG&A and high discretionary R&D. Overall, this study confirms the importance of distinguishing between R&D and SG&A in real earnings management contexts and suggests a complementary (substitutive) relation between cutting SG&A (R&D) and accruals management.     

Regulation and the Valuation Relevance of Book Value and Earnings: Evidence from the United States*

Electric utilities in the United States are subject to a cost-plus normal profits pricing that is designed to align the market value of equity with the balance sheet book value. Perfect alignment implies the equality of the market and book values. Extant empirical evidence suggests that, for these utilities, actual cost/profit recovery does not follow a pure cost-plus pricing, raising the prospect that income statement items contribute to the determination of market value. What is not obvious is the extent to which the noted departure from pure cost-plus pricing results in misalignment of the market and book values, or the relative contribution of income statement items to the valuation of electric utility shares. This study pursues this question, using benchmark results for a sample of manufacturing firms to highlight the degree of market-to-book alignment for regulated and competitive firms. The results show a considerable alignment of the market and book values for utilities. In examining the relevance of book value and income statement items in the determination of market value, it is found that the contribution of earnings level to explaining market value diminishes markedly in the presence of book value for electric utilities, and the contribution of earnings change to explaining returns diminishes markedly in the presence of earnings levels. Earnings level complements book value in explaining market value for manufacturing firms, while earnings change complements earnings level in explaining returns. The results further show that the market and accounting values exhibit pronounced misalignments in returns-earnings models, especially for utilities.     

Analysts' Interpretation and Investors' Valuation of Tax Carryforwards*

We examine how financial analysts and equity investors incorporate information on deferred taxes from carryforwards into earnings forecasts and share prices. We focus on carryforwards because, in providing this information each period, management must use their private information about the firm's profitability prospects. Thus, accounting measurement of tax carryforwards is another way of providing a management earnings forecast. In analyzing the role of carryforwards in valuation, we distinguish between two conflicting effects. First, deferred taxes from carryforwards represent future tax savings; hence, they should be valued positively as assets. In contrast, the existence of tax carryforwards may signal a higher likelihood of future losses, which would have a negative effect on expected earnings and share prices. We find that analysts consider earnings of firms with carryforwards to be less persistent because of the increased likelihood of future losses. We also find that analysts tend to be less precise and more optimistic (biased) in forecasting earnings of firms with carryforwards. This higher optimism and lower precision are more pronounced just after firms adopt Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SPAS) 109 and are almost entirely corrected over time. An analysis of investors' valuation indicates a strong positive relation between deferred taxes from carryforwards and share prices, suggesting that these carryforwards are valued as assets. Also, earnings and book values of equity are valued less in firms that have carryforwards than in firms without carryforwards. Finally, the valuation allowance required under SFAS 109 assists equity investors in valuing a firm's earnings and net assets. The combined findings on analysts' interpretation and investors' valuation suggest that analysts fail to fully capture the implication of carryforwards on future earnings within their forecasting horizon.     

Earnings Forecasts and Price Efficiency after Earnings Realizations: Reduction in Information Asymmetry through Learning from Price*

When information asymmetry is a major market friction, earnings forecasts can lead to higher price efficiency even after the information in forecasts completely dissipates upon earnings realizations. We show this in an experimental market that features information asymmetry (i.e., some traders possess differential private information). Earnings forecasts reduce information asymmetry and lead to prices that reflect a greater amount of private information. Traders can learn more about others' information from prices. This information learned from past prices continues to reduce information asymmetry and improve price efficiency even after earnings realizations. We contribute to the disclosure literature by showing the evidence that the learning‐from‐price effect amplifies the impact of public disclosure on price efficiency.     

An Analysis of Historical and Future-Oriented Information in Accounting-Based Security Valuation Models*

The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) valuation model provides a rigorous framework for summarizing the information in expected future earnings and book values. However, the model provides little guidance on selecting an empirical proxy for expected future earnings. We examine whether and under what circumstances historical earnings and analyst earnings forecasts offer comparable explanation of security prices. This issue is of particular interest because analyst forecasts are less readily available than historical data. Under appropriate circumstances, historical data may allow wider use of the Feltham-Ohlson valuation model by researchers and investors. A related issue is the incremental explanatory power of historical earnings and realized future earnings (perfect-foresight forecasts) for security prices beyond analyst forecasts. If historical earnings are incrementally informative, that would suggest that analyst forecasts do not fully reflect price-relevant information in past earnings. If future earnings are incrementally informative, that would suggest that security prices reflect investors' implicit earnings forecasts beyond analyst forecasts. We examine these issues using a historical model (based on past earnings), a perfect-foresight model (based on realized future earnings), and a forecast model (based on Value Line earnings forecasts). All three models provide significant explanatory power for security prices, and each set of earnings data provides incremental explanatory power for prices when used with the other sets of earnings data. We estimate the models separately for firms with moderate and extreme earnings-to-price (E/P) ratios, a proxy for earnings permanence. For moderate-E/P firms, the historical model's explanatory power exceeds that of the perfect foresight model, and is indistinguishable from that of the analyst forecast model. In contrast, for extreme-E/P firms, the perfect-foresight model offers greater explanatory power than the historical model, but lower explanatory power than analyst forecasts. Our results suggest that financial analysts' forecasting efforts are best focused on firms whose earnings contain large temporary components (extreme E/P firms). However, in general, both historical data and analyst forecasts are complementary information sources for security valuation.     

Horizon‐Dependent Underreaction in Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

This paper provides empirical evidence that underreaction in financial analysts' earnings forecasts increases with the forecast horizon, and offers a rational economic explanation for this result. The empirical portion of the paper evaluates analysts' responses to earnings‐surprise and other earnings‐related information. Our empirical evidence suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts underreact to both types of information, and the underreaction increases with the forecast horizon. The paper also develops a theoretical model that explains this horizon‐dependent analyst underreaction as a rational response to an asymmetric loss function. The model assumes that, for a given level of inaccuracy, analysts' reputations suffer more (less) when subsequent information causes a revision in investor expectations in the opposite (same) direction as the analyst's prior earnings‐forecast revision. Given this asymmetric loss function, underreaction increases with the risk of subsequent disconfirming information and with the disproportionate cost associated with revision reversal. Assuming that market frictions prevent prices from immediately unraveling these analyst underreac‐tion tactics, investors buying (selling) stock on the basis of analysts' positive (negative) earnings‐forecast revisions also benefit from analyst underreaction. Therefore, the asymmetric cost of forecast inaccuracy could arise from rational investor incentives consistent with a preference for analyst underreaction. Our incentives‐based explanation for underreaction provides an alternative to psychology‐based explanations and suggests avenues for further research.     

Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: An Analysis Using Special Items*

This paper investigates whether managers’ presentation of special items within the financial statements reflects economic performance or opportunism. Specifically, we assess special items presented as a separate line item on the income statement (income statement presentation) to those aggregated within another line item with disclosure only in the footnotes (footnote presentation). Our study is motivated by standard‐setting interest in performance reporting and financial statement presentation, as well as prior research investigating managers’ presentation choices in other contexts. Empirical results reveal that special items receiving income statement presentation are less persistent relative to those receiving footnote presentation. These results are consistent across numerous alternative specifications. Overall, the findings are consistent with managers using the income statement versus footnote presentation to assist users in identifying those special items most likely to differ from other components of earnings — that is, for informational, as opposed to opportunistic, motivations.     

Common Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management*

This study examines the relation between earnings management and block ownership of same‐industry peer firms by a common set of institutional investors (common institutional ownership). This relation is important given the tremendous growth of common institutional ownership and the significant influence of blockholders on financial reporting. We hypothesize that common institutional ownership mitigates earnings management by enhancing institutions' monitoring efficiency and by encouraging institutions to internalize the negative externality of a firm's earnings management on peer firms' investments. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that higher common institutional ownership is related to less earnings management. Analyses of a quasi‐natural experiment based on financial institution mergers show that this negative relation is unlikely to be driven by the endogeneity of common institutional ownership. Cross‐sectional tests provide evidence that the negative relation is stronger among firms for which common institutional ownership is likely to generate a greater reduction in institutions' information acquisition and processing costs, and among firms whose severe financial misstatements are more likely to distort co‐owned peer firms' investments, supporting both mechanisms underlying our hypothesis. Our findings inform the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of common institutional ownership by highlighting an important benefit: the enhanced monitoring of financial reporting.     

Institutional Ownership and the Extent to which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings*

Articles in the financial press suggest that institutional investors are overly focused on current profitability, which suggests that as institutional ownership increases, stock prices reflect less current period information that is predictive of future period earnings. On the other hand, institutional investors are often characterized in academic research as sophisticated investors and sophisticated investors should be better able to use current‐period information to predict future earnings compared with other owners. According to this characterization, as institutional ownership increases, stock prices should reflect more current‐period information that is predictive of future period earnings. Consistent with this latter view, we find that the extent to which stock prices lead earnings is positively related to the percentage of institutional ownership. This result holds after controlling for various factors that affect the relation between price and earnings. It also holds when we control for endogenous portfolio choices of institutions (e.g., institutional investors may be attracted to firms in richer information environments where stock prices tend to lead earnings). Further, a regression of stock returns on order backlog, conditional on the percentage of institutional ownership, indicates that institutional owners place more weight on order backlog compared with other owners. This result is consistent with institutional owners using non‐earnings information to predict future earnings. It also explains, in part, why prices lead earnings to a greater extent when there is a higher concentration of institutional owners.     

上市公司IPO之后财务业绩变脸研究

从股权融资规模的角度对上市公司 IPO 之后的财务业绩变脸现象进行研究,由于中国股市的外部股权融资行为往往 NPV 大于0,即融资价格高于投资价值,许多劣质企业有强烈的融资和上市的动机。据此提出假说,并用 1992～2000年上市的 A 股公司数据对假说进行了实证检验。研究表明,融资规模越大的企业,在 IPO 当年变脸的可能性越大,而且变脸幅度也越大。     

Individual Investors' Attention to Accounting Information: Evidence from Online Financial Communities*

Online financial communities provide a unique opportunity to directly examine individual investors' attention to accounting information on a large scale and in great detail. I analyze accounting-related content in large samples of Yahoo! message board posts and StockTwits and find investors pay attention to a range of accounting information, fixating particularly on earnings, cash, and revenues. Consistent with the expectation that investors react to relevant information events, I find accounting-related discussion elevated around the filings of earnings releases and 8-K reports, but the reaction to periodic reports is confined to small firms. I also find investors expand their acquisition of accounting information and processing efforts in poor information environments. Greater attention to accounting information at earnings releases does not appear to be meaningfully associated with better information processing.     

The Relevance to Investors of Greenhouse Gas Emission Disclosures

This study finds that investors price firms' greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a negative component of equity value, and this valuation discount does not differ between firms that voluntarily disclose to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and nondisclosing firms. We derive the GHG emissions for nondisclosers from an estimation model that incorporates firm characteristics and industry. The finding that investors view CDP amounts and estimates of emissions as equally value‐relevant suggests that equity values reflect GHG information from channels other than the CDP. An event study of investors' response to emission‐related information in firms' 8‐K filings further supports this finding. Economically, our results suggest that, for the median S&P 500 firm, GHG emissions impose a market‐implied equity discount of $79 per ton, representing about one‐half of 1 percent of market capitalization.     

重大会计差错临时披露的盈余信息含量分析

文章以2004-2005年期间353家发生重大会计差错更正的A股上市公司为样本,运用Wilson（2005）的一期模型．检验了重大会计差错更正披露前后的季度盈余信息含量。研究发现,重大会计差错更正披露减少了此后季度盈余公告的信息含量,特别是重大会计差错更正披露前后季度盈余的ERC呈现u形;但是这种影响是暂时的。从重大会计差错更正披露后的第二季度到第四季度,盈余公告的信息含量很快恢复到重大会计差错更正披露前盈余公告信息含量;另外,投资者对重大会计差错更正临时披露信息是有反应的,核心盈余差错更正披露减少了此后四个季度的盈余公告信息含量。     

Market Response to Earnings Surprises Conditional on Reasons for an Auditor Change*

Our interest in this study is the relative informativeness of earnings announcements reported before and after Form 8‐K disclosures of the reason for an auditor change. We appeal to several models that predict that the market's response to an earnings surprise is positively related to the perceived precision of the earnings report. We predict that the Form 8‐K reason disclosures aid investors in updating their expectations of earnings precision by providing useful information about the financial reporting process that produces the earnings report. For 802 auditor changes from late 1991 through late 1997, the average price response per unit of earnings surprise is lower subsequent to an auditor change for companies that switched for disagreement‐related or fee‐related reasons and higher for those that switched for service‐related reasons. This paper provides further evidence on the effects of differential earnings quality on differences in the returns‐earnings relation across companies and over time as well as the efficacy of Form 8‐K disclosures of reasons for auditor changes.     

Is Audit Committee Equity Compensation Related to Audit Fees?*

Section 301 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) implicitly assumes that audit committees can independently determine audit fees. Critics of section 301 have questioned this assumption in particular, and the efficacy of section 301 more generally. In response, the SEC issued a concept release in 2015 calling for public disclosure of the process that audit committees follow for determining auditor compensation. Motivated by these calls and the widespread use of stocks and options to compensate firms' independent directors, we examine the relation between equity compensation granted to audit committee members and audit fees. Using a sample of 3,685 firm‐year observations during 2007–2015, we find a negative relation between audit committee equity compensation and audit fees, consistent with larger equity pay inducing audit committee members to compromise independence by paying lower audit fees. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, firm size, alternative measures of equity compensation, alternative samples, and an alternative treatment of extreme values. We further show that larger equity compensation is associated with lower earnings quality. We also find that the negative effect of equity compensation on audit fees is stronger when city‐level audit market competition is high. However, this negative relation disappears when (i) firms face high litigation risk, (ii) auditors have stronger bargaining power, (iii) the audit committee includes a high proportion of accounting experts, and (iv) auditors are industry experts. Our results are relevant for regulators and investors.