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ORIE E. BARRON CHARLES O. KILE TERRENCE B. O'KEEFE 《Contemporary Accounting Research》1999,16(1):75-109
This study examines the predictive value of Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) information. More specifically, this study tests the association between properties of analysts' earnings forecasts and MD&A quality, where MD&A quality is measured by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). We find that high MD&A ratings are associated with less error and less dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts after controlling for many other expected influences on analysts' forecasts. We also find that estimated regression coefficients are consistent with MD&A information having a substantial effect on earnings forecasts. Finally, we find our results are driven by forward-looking disclosures about capital expenditures and operations, and also by historical disclosures about capital expenditures. These findings are consistent with the suggestion by many constituencies (including the SEC) that the type of information found in high quality MD&A is particularly relevant for predicting earnings. 相似文献
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Abstract. This article reports the results of an investigation into the informativeness of financial communications with shareholders when the level of market uncertainty regarding future firm performance varies. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the informativeness of annual reports is positively associated with the level of market uncertainty. The informativeness of annual reports is measured by the extent of price reaction, regardless of direction, at the time of disclosure. To obtain a sample of firms with temporal variation in the level of market uncertainty, the article investigates firms nearing financial distress. Financial distress is represented by the firm's receipt of a going-concern audit report from the external auditor. Time periods immediately preceding receipt of the going-concern report are presumed to exhibit changing market uncertainty regarding future firm prospects. The empirical evidence is consistent with the article's hypothesis in that price reactions to annual reports systematically vary the nearer the firms are to financial distress. Specifically, price reactions to annual reports for the three years preceding distress are more than 35 percent larger than the price reactions to reports from earlier periods. This evidence is consistent with the informativeness of financial disclosures being dependent on the level of market uncertainty and advances our understanding of the usefulness of accounting disclosures to market participants. To the extent that accounting regulatory agencies are interested in environmental factors that determine the usefulness of accounting information to shareholders, this article offers evidence on one important factor. Résumé. Les auteurs exposent les résultats d'une analyse du contenu informationnel des renseignements financiers communiqués aux actionnaires lorsque varie le degré d'incertitude du marché relativement aux perspectives de rendement d'une entreprise. Ils posent plus précisément l'hypothèse selon laquelle le contenu informationnel des rapports annuels est en relation positive avec le degré d'incertitude du marché. Le contenu informationnel des rapports annuels est mesuré en termes d'importance de la réaction du cours des actions, peu importe l'orientation, au moment de la communication des renseignements financiers. Pour constituer un échantillon d'entreprises à l'égard desquelles le degré d'incertitude du marché a varié dans le temps, les auteurs ont choisi d'analyser des entreprises sur le point de connaître des difficultés financières. La réception, par l'entreprise, d'un rapport des vérificateurs externes mettant en question la continuité de l'exploitation témoigne de ces difficultés financières. Les auteurs posent l'hypothèse selon laquelle on enregistre, au cours des exercices qui précèdent immédiatement la réception d'un rapport de cette nature, une variation du degré d'incertitude du marché relativement aux perspectives d'avenir de l'entreprise. Les constatations empiriques confirment l'hypothèse formulée, en ce sens que la réaction du cours des actions à la publication des rapports annuels varie de façon systématique lorsque les entreprises se rapprochent des difficultés financières. Plus précisément, la réaction du cours des actions à la publication des rapports annuels pour les trois exercices précédant les difficultés financières est plus de 35 pour cent supérieure à la réaction du cours des actions à la publication des rapports des exercices antérieurs. Cette constatation vient confirmer le fait que le contenu informationnel des renseignements financiers publiés dépend du degré d'incertitude du marché, et elle nous permet de mieux comprendre l'utilité de la publication d'information comptable à l'intention des participants au marché. Dans la mesure où les organismes de réglementation comptable sont intéressés aux facteurs liés à l'environnement qui déterminent l'utilité de l'information comptable pour les actionnaires, les auteurs nous permettent d'acquérir certaines certitudes à l'égard d'un facteur important. 相似文献
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Abstract. This paper examines how analysts combine earnings and dividend information when they predict future earnings. Because both earnings and dividends are noisy indications of future earnings, we posit that analysts use the two corroboratively, to confirm the information reflected in each, and that analysts will substitute away from earnings when it is noisy and toward dividends. Using regressions of analysts' earnings forecast revisions on unexpected earnings, unexpected dividends, and five variables that reflect whether the signs of unexpected earnings and dividends confirm or contradict each other, we find evidence of both corroboration and substitution. Analysts' earnings forecast revisions are significantly related to the five corroborative variables, and this relation has statistically significant explanatory power beyond that in the magnitudes of unexpected earnings and unexpected dividends. Consistent with expectations, we find that the evidence of corroboration varies across the noisiness of earnings information; there is more evidence of corroboration when earnings are more variable. We also find evidence consistent with analysts substituting away from earnings, toward dividend information for firms with noisy earnings information (high variance). Overall, the results imply that analysts use earnings and dividend information interdependently, with some interdependency determined by the noisiness of earnings announcements. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent comment les analystes combinent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes pour prévoir les bénéfices futurs. Les bénéfices et les dividendes étant tous deux des indicateurs imparfaits des bénéfices futurs, les auteurs posent l'hypothèse que les analystes utilisent les deux, à titre corroboratif, pour confirmer l'information que livre chacun de ces indicateurs et qu'ils préféreront les dividendes aux bénéfices, si ces derniers se révèlent un indicateur imparfait. En procédant à la régression des révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes sur les bénéfices imprévus, sur les dividendes imprévus et sur cinq variables indiquant si les pronostics de bénéfices et de dividendes imprévus se confirment ou s'infirment les uns les autres, les auteurs enregistrent des données qui vont à la fois dans le sens de la corroboration et de la substitution. Les révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes présentent une relation significative avec les cinq variables de corroboration, relation qui affiche un pouvoir d'explication statistiquement significatif, au-delà de celui de l'ampleur des bénéfices imprévus et des dividendes imprévus. Conformément aux prévisions, les auteurs constatent que la preuve de corroboration varie selon le degré d'imperfection de l'information relative aux bénéfices; les preuves de corroboration sont plus fortes lorsque les bénéfices varient davantage. Les auteurs font également état de constatations conformes à l'hypothèse selon laquelle les ana lystes écartent l'information relative aux bénéfices pour y substituer l'information relative aux dividendes dans le cas d'entreprises dont l'information relative aux bénéfices est imparfaite (variance élevée). Dans l'ensemble, les résultats invitent à la conclusion que les analystes utilisent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes de manière interdépendante, une partie de cette interdépendance étant déterminée par l'imperfection de l'information communiquée en ce qui a trait aux bénéfices. 相似文献
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PETER M. CLARKSON 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2000,17(4):595-622
In this study, we appeal to insights and results from Davidson and Neu 1993 and McConomy 1998 to motivate empirical analyses designed to gain a better understanding of the relationship between auditor quality and forecast accuracy. We extend and refine Davidson and Neu's analysis of this relationship by introducing additional controls for business risk and by considering data from two distinct time periods: one in which the audit firm's responsibility respecting the earnings forecast was to provide review‐level assurance, and one in which its responsibility was to provide audit‐level assurance. Our sample data consist of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) initial public offerings (IPOs). The earnings forecast we consider is the one‐year‐ahead management earnings forecast included in the IPO offering prospectus. The results suggest that after the additional controls for business risk are introduced, the relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality for the review‐level assurance period is no longer significant. The results also indicate that the shift in regimes alters the fundamental nature of the relationship. Using data from the audit‐level assurance regime, we find a negative and significant relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality (i.e., we find Big 6 auditors to be associated with smaller absolute forecast errors than non‐Big 6 auditors), and further, that the difference in the relationship between the two regimes is statistically significant. 相似文献
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Recently, much of the research into the relation between market values and accounting numbers has used, or at least made reference to, the residual income model (RIM). Two basic types of empirical research have developed. The “historical” type explores the relation between market values and reported accounting numbers, often using the linear dynamics in Ohlson 1995 and Feltham and Ohlson 1995 and 1996. The “forecast” type explores the relation between market value and the present value of the book value of equity, a truncated sequence of residual income forecasts, and an estimate of the terminal value at the truncation date. The analysis in this paper integrates these two approaches. We expand the Feltham and Ohlson 1996 model by including one‐ and two‐period‐ahead residual income forecasts to infer “other” information regarding future revenues from past investments and future growth opportunities. This approach results in a model in which the difference between market value and book value of equity is a function of current residual income, one‐ and two‐period‐ahead residual income, current capital investment, and start‐of‐period operating assets. The existence of both persistence in revenues from current and prior investments and growth in future positive net present value investment opportunities leads us to hypothesize a negative coefficient on the one‐period‐ahead residual income forecast and a positive coefficient on the two‐period‐ahead residual income forecast. Our empirical results strongly support our hypotheses with respect to the forecast coefficients. 相似文献
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This paper provides empirical evidence that underreaction in financial analysts' earnings forecasts increases with the forecast horizon, and offers a rational economic explanation for this result. The empirical portion of the paper evaluates analysts' responses to earnings‐surprise and other earnings‐related information. Our empirical evidence suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts underreact to both types of information, and the underreaction increases with the forecast horizon. The paper also develops a theoretical model that explains this horizon‐dependent analyst underreaction as a rational response to an asymmetric loss function. The model assumes that, for a given level of inaccuracy, analysts' reputations suffer more (less) when subsequent information causes a revision in investor expectations in the opposite (same) direction as the analyst's prior earnings‐forecast revision. Given this asymmetric loss function, underreaction increases with the risk of subsequent disconfirming information and with the disproportionate cost associated with revision reversal. Assuming that market frictions prevent prices from immediately unraveling these analyst underreac‐tion tactics, investors buying (selling) stock on the basis of analysts' positive (negative) earnings‐forecast revisions also benefit from analyst underreaction. Therefore, the asymmetric cost of forecast inaccuracy could arise from rational investor incentives consistent with a preference for analyst underreaction. Our incentives‐based explanation for underreaction provides an alternative to psychology‐based explanations and suggests avenues for further research. 相似文献
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FRANK D. HODGE PATRICK E. HOPKINS DAVID A. WOOD 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2010,27(1):101-133
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), in their joint Financial Statement Presentation project, are reconsidering the basic format of financial statements. The Boards’ preliminary discussions related to this joint project indicate that they intend to modify the required financial statements to increase the proximity of performance‐related information for each reported period. We provide evidence related to this potential change by investigating the effects of financial statement information proximity on investors’ ability to learn the forecast‐relevant time series properties of reported cash flows and accruals. We also examine the role feedback plays in this relationship. Our experimental results suggest that nonprofessional investors are able to more quickly learn the relation between current period cash flows and accruals and future cash flow realizations when financial statement information is presented in a single statement rather than separated into two statements. In addition, we find that nonprofessional investors exhibit lower levels of absolute forecast errors and less forecast dispersion when financial statement information is unified into a single statement. Finally, we provide evidence that nonprofessional investors who receive extensive outcome feedback on a single page initially learn more quickly and later, after learning has leveled off, accurately forecast more consistently than do investors who receive extensive or limited feedback spread across two pages. Overall, our results provide evidence on the effectiveness of alternate financial statement presentation formats and the potential usefulness of receiving more extensive feedback. 相似文献
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Abstract. This study shows that financial analysts of brokerage firms that provide investment banking services to a company (investment banker analysts) are optimistic, relative to other (noninvestment banker) analysts, in their earnings forecasts and investment recommendations. Returns earned by following the investment recommendations of investment banker analysts, however, are not significantly different from those of non-investment banker analysts. Given that information regarding the investment banking relationships of brokerage firms is publicly available, we find evidence that capital market participants rely relatively less on the investment banker analysts in forming their earnings expectations. Although we find a significant capital market reaction around the noninvestment banker analysts' research report dates and not around the investment banker analysts' research report dates, the difference between the two market reactions is not statistically significant. Finally, we find that investment banker analysts' earnings forecasts are, on average, as accurate as those of noninvestment banker analysts. Résumé. Les auteurs mettent en évidence le fait que les analystes financiers des maisons de courtage qui offrent des services de prise ferme aux entreprises (les analystes de courtiers preneurs ferme) sont optimistes dans leurs prévisions de bénéfices et leurs recommandations de placements, par comparaison aux autres analystes (c'est-à-dire aux analystes de courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme). Les rendements obtenus par les investisseurs qui observent les recommandations de placements des analystes de courtiers preneurs ferme ne sont cependant pas sensiblement différents de ceux qu'obtiennent les investisseurs qui se fient aux analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme. Compte tenu du fait que l'information relative aux relations qu'entretiennent les maisons de courtage en matière de prise ferme est du domaine public, les constatations des auteurs confirment que les participants au marché financier s'appuient relativement moins sur le verdict des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme dans le calcul de leur espérance de gains. Bien que les auteurs observent une réaction marquée du marché financier à proximité des dates de publication des rapports de recherche des analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme, ce qui n'est pas le cas à proximité des dates de publication des rapports de recherche des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme, la différence entre ces deux réactions n'est pas statistiquement significative. Enfin, les auteurs constatent que les prévisions de bénéfices des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme sont, en moyenne, aussi exactes que celles des analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme. 相似文献
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PETER M. CLARKSON JENNIFER L. KAO GORDON D. RICHARDSON 《Contemporary Accounting Research》1999,16(1):111-134
The objective of this study is to investigate the role, if any, that management discussion and analysis (MD&A) plays in a firm's disclosure package. First, we present evidence regarding the usefulness of MD&A. Our evidence is uniformly supportive of the view that MD&A is a source of new and useful information and indicates that MD&A is used for financial analysis purposes by at least one significant user group, sell-side analysts, who are members of the Toronto Society of Financial Analysts. We then provide evidence on disclosure quality. The results reveal that, overall, MD&A disclosure quality varies with disclosure stimuli similar to those found to influence disclosure choice in other disclosure channels. However, a more refined analysis of the MD&A subcomponents reveals that different factors influence disclosure quality for those subcomponents. Taken together, our results are consistent with the notion that MD&A is a part of a firm's overall disclosure package. 相似文献
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This study empirically examines the relation between certain board of director characteristics and the extent that audit committee composition voluntarily exceeds minimum mandated levels and includes outside directors with financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and experience. This study focuses on board characteristics because the board directly controls audit committee membership. Such staffing decisions can directly affect the ability of the audit committee to monitor management's financial reporting process on behalf of the board. Results suggest that Canadian firms that voluntarily include more outside directors on the audit committee than the mandated minimum have larger boards with more outsiders serving on those boards and are more likely to segregate the board chairperson position from the CEO/president positions. Additionally, firms that voluntarily create audit committees composed of outsider members with a breadth of relevant financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and experience have boards that are larger, have more outside members, and are less likely to be chaired by the CEO/president. Implications of these findings for auditors, institutional investors, regulators, and other interested parties are discussed. 相似文献
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Abstract. A key characteristic of the reporting of private management information is that managers do not always report their information, and they reveal or withhold both “good” and “bad” news. Several recent papers provide models of managers' voluntary disclosure decisions. These models are typically constructed so that managers do not always disclose or withhold their information, despite rational behavior by both the privately informed managers and interested uninformed parties external to the firm. Our paper seeks to contribute further to this literature by developing a richer model of the forces that might influence a manager's decision to disclose private information. Our model is a direct extension of the model in Darrough and Stoughton (1990). In our model, there is a continuum of possible private incumbent signals and the entrant may be privately informed about the cost of entry. Partial disclosure of private information results from the tension that exists between an informed manager's desire to communicate good news to (and hide bad news from) the capital market and his desire to communicate bad news to (and hide good news from) competitors in the firm's product market. Résumé. La communication par la direction de l'information privilégiée qu'elle détient présente une caractéristique déterminante: les gestionnaires ne font pas toujours état de cette information, et ils révèlent ou retiennent l'information aussi bien «positive» que «négative ?. Dans plusieurs études récentes sont proposés des modèles décisionnels en matière de présentation volontaire d'information par les gestionnaires. Ces modèles sont habituellement construits de telle sorte que les gestionnaires ne communiquent ou ne retiennent pas toujours l'information, malgré le comportement rationnel affiché tant par les gestionnaires dépositaires de l'information privilègiée que par les parties intéressées extérieures à l'entreprise qui ne disposent pas de cette information. Les auteurs ont voulu ici enrichir ces études en élaborant un modèle plus étoffé des forces susceptibles d'influer sur la décision du gestionnaire de communiquer l'information privilégiée dont il dispose. 相似文献
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BRUCE J. MCCONOMY 《Contemporary Accounting Research》1998,15(2):167-195
This paper assesses how the bias and accuracy of managers' earnings forecasts in prospectuses were affected by a 1989 regulation that required the forecasts to be audited by public accountants. Theory suggests that auditors' association with the forecasts would reduce positive (optimistic) bias, by reducing moral hazard. Regulators expected that the audit requirement would also improve the accuracy of the forecasts. Both predictions were tested using management earnings forecasts disclosed in prospectuses of Canadian initial public offerings. The results show that audited forecasts contained significantly less positive bias than reviewed forecasts, but there was only a marginally significant improvement in accuracy. 相似文献