“Post‐Truth,” “Alternative Facts” and “Fakenomics”

South African companies are accused of hoarding profits to accumulate large amounts of “idle” cash, as well as of being the perpetrators of massive illegal capital flight. This paper argues that much of the claimed corporate cash is either offshore or belongs to banks. It reminds that bank deposits increase when companies borrow, not when they retain profits. It shows, too, that measures of massive capital flight actually reflect data errors. Exaggerating, through faulty methodology the extent to which companies have cash or may be involved in illegal capital flight is unhelpful. It exacerbates already‐fraught government‐business relations, and complicates the search for solutions to South Africa's economic problems.     

Discussion of “Accounting Recognition,Moral Hazard,and Communication”

This paper addresses two issues within an agency setting. First, it identifies conditions under which late recognition of an event is preferred to early recognition in the absence of communication of other private information. Second, it demonstrates that the agent's ability to voluntarily disclose his or her private information interacts with the preference for early versus late recognition. Of special interest is the case where early recognition is preferred to late when there is no other source of information, but late recognition is preferred in the presence of a secondary source. I have three types of comments on the paper. The first summarizes the important aspects of the model. The second involves the interpretation of the control problem as accounting recognition. The third contains suggestions regarding how one might bring a valuation perspective into the control setting.     

PCAOB Inspections: Public Accounting Firms on “Trial”

The objective of our article is to obtain a better understanding of how auditors anticipate the potential for PCAOB inspection, experience the inspection, cope with the consequences of the inspection, and understand the PCAOB's influence within the context of professionalism. We use a qualitative approach that uses both surveys (55) and interviews (20) of auditors (of varying rank and firm) across a five‐year period (2012–2017). Respondents suggest that PCAOB inspectors are powerful, representing the “prosecution,” “judge,” and “jury” of the auditing profession. We therefore use a structural metaphor of the PCAOB inspection as a judicial “trial.” By controlling the criteria used to evaluate performance, inspectors have the power to repeatedly “subpoena,” “interrogate,” and return a “verdict” on the firm (auditor); those judged as “guilty” require supervised “probation.” This process is perceived as having improved audit quality but at a cost. Passing an inspection is so important that auditors (firms) have resorted to impression management strategies and “functionally stupid” work practices (e.g., excessive documentation, a decrease in critical thinking as a result of a “box ticking” approach to auditing). Furthermore, some respondents believe that being a good auditor has come at the expense of being a good accountant; the emphasis on audit process and concurrent de‐emphasis on technical accounting could ultimately lead to audits themselves falling short. In addition, it is evident that inspectors and auditors differ in their perceptions of risk, likely manifesting because inspectors are standards‐focused while auditors (firms) are methodology‐focused. Finally, the inspection process has created excessive stress and tension, beyond budget and fee pressures, which some auditors perceive as affecting the pool of talented auditors that firms may be able to attract and retain in the future.     

“Regional questions”

Publications Reviewed:

Royal Town Planning Institute, 1986: Strategic Planning for Regional Potential. A discussion document.

Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 1986: Regional Policy-A Fresh Approach.

Armstrong, H. and Taylor, J. 1987: Regional Policy: The Way Forward. The Employment Institute.

Northern Region Councils Association, 1986: The State of the Northern Region.

South East Economic Development Strategy (SEEDS), 1987: South-South Divide. An exposition of the SEEDS project.     

”Uneven development“

John Allen and Doreen Massey (eds), 1988: The Economy in Question. London: Sage Publications, £8.95 paper.

Doreen Massey and John Allen (eds), 1988: Uneven Re-Development: Cities and Regions in Transition. A Reader. London: Hodder and Stoughton, £7.50 paper.

Kevin Morgan and Andrew Sayer, 1988: Microcircuits of Capital: “Sunrise” Industry and Uneven Development Oxford: Polity Press. £35.00 cloth.     

“Low-Balling” and Efficiency in a Two-Period Specialization Model of Auditing Competition*

This paper develops a simple, two-period specialization model to analyze the effect of start-up costs on auditing competition. Audit firms in the model make strategic specialization and pricing decisions. Through specialization, an audit firm achieves a comparative cost advantage over its competitors for all clients whose characteristics are closer to its area of specialization. This comparative cost advantage is further fortified by the presence of start-up costs. As a result, each audit firm obtains some market power and is able to price-discriminate across clients by offering “specialization-and-relationship-specific” audit fee schedules. This paper demonstrates that the practice of “low-balling” is a natural consequence of competition among audit firms. However, low-balling occurs only in a certain market segment where audit firms compete fiercely. This paper also shows that a policy of banning low-balling acts as a substitute for the commitment of the audit firms to partially collude their pricing policies and results in increased profits for audit firms and increased fees. However, it also results in audit firms choosing specializations in a more efficient way, thereby reducing total auditing costs.     

The meaning of “social safety nets”

In Southeast Asia, the issue of “social safety nets” (SSNs) has emerged more prominently since the financial crisis. Despite the increased interest in social safety nets, there is still considerable confusion among scholars and national and international organizations regarding the use and meaning of the term. This article considers the different definitions of the term—particularly as it was used during the Asian Financial Crisis—and to attempt to clarify its meaning and proper use.The safety net analogy is drawn from high-wire walkers who are protected by a safety net if they fall. The safety net prevents any walker who falls—unexpectedly or not—from hitting the floor and incurring catastrophic injuries. Following this line of reasoning, it is not surprising to learn that some organizations and scholars use the term SSN such that it encompasses private and public mechanisms that assist individuals in maintaining a minimum level of consumption.The term “social safety net” (SSN) began to be used by Bretton Woods’ institutions in connection with structural adjustment programs related to their lending programs. Developing countries introduced SSNs to mitigate the social impact of structural adjustment measures on specific low-income groups. They were initially formulated to serve three objectives: poverty alleviation, to make adjustment programs more politically acceptable, and institutional reform. During the Asian Financial Crisis, there was a great deal of confusion regarding the content and consequent identification of SSN programs.Public SSN programs can be classified into formal and informal safety nets. Formal and informal safety nets are, generally, distinguished by law enforcement: formal safety nets are those which legally guarantee individuals access to economic or social support whereas informal safety nets provide likelihood of support to individuals to assure them of attaining or remaining above the designated minimum standard of living but with no legal guarantee.Informal SSNs can be divided into private and public ones. Examples of private informal SSNs include transfers from family members, friends, neighbors and community members and institutions, including NGOs, while those of public informal SSNs refer to the support which individuals can hope for from the government, through programs which generate assets or employment, transfer income, or provide basic social services, as a means of helping affected individuals from falling below the designated minimum standard of living. The difference between formal and informal public SSNs is whether there exists a formal legal support of the assistance.The article has provided more discussion on the definitions of SSN used by the World Bank, ESCAP, ILO and TDRI.In conclusion, the authors note that the tremendous variation in the use of the term invites confusion and makes it virtually useless as a technical concept. The very nature of the metaphor invokes a vision of a large net that encompass a number of different types of programs. In many cases it is not even possible to list specific programs that are included, as the particular forms of these programs could, of course, vary with place, time and circumstances. Complicating things further, the term is sometimes used in a very narrow sense. Given the low probability that usage of the term will ever be standardized, economists and national/international organizations might be well served by avoiding the term completely and instead using its component parts.