Coordination of sectoral climate policies and life cycle emissions

Drastically reducing greenhouse gas emissions involves numerous specific actions in each sector of the economy. The costs and abatement potential of these measures are interdependent because of sectoral linkages. For instance, the carbon footprint of electric vehicles depends on the electricity mix. This issue has received large attention in the literature on Life Cycle Assessments (LCA). This paper analyzes how life cycle considerations should be integrated into policy design. We model a partial equilibrium with two vertically connected sectors, an upstream (e.g. electricity) and a downstream (e.g. transportation) one. In each sector, a dirty and a clean technology are available. The clean downstream technology consumes the upstream good and may thus shift emissions to the upstream sector. Our main contribution is to detail how optimal subsidies on clean technologies should incorporate life cycle emissions when carbon pricing is limited. The optimal downstream subsidy should be corrected for all external costs generated in the upstream sector, not only unpriced pollution but also the fiscal externality due to the subsidy to the clean upstream technology. We also analyze the joint optimization of upstream and downstream policies. The upstream subsidy should not incorporate features of the downstream sector, whereas the downstream optimal subsidy depends upon the upstream sector characteristics. All results are illustrated using a calibrated example of the electrification of passenger cars.     

Licensing a quality-enhancing innovation to an upstream firm

This paper examines the case where a patent holder who is not a producer licenses its quality-enhancing innovation to an upstream firm, which sells its product through a downstream monopoly. It is found that the patent holder prefers a two-part tariff contract, which includes both a fixed-fee and per-unit output royalty. However, the royalty included in the licensing contract makes each firm price at a markup over marginal cost and therefore makes both consumers and the society worse off, if the innovation is small and the supplier is weak. From a welfare perspective, licensing by means of an ad valorem tax is more efficient, as it allows the upstream firm to be less aggressive when trading with the downstream firm.     

Patent Protection,Innovation and Technology Licensing

We show that the common wisdom suggesting higher investment in innovation under a stronger patent protection may not be true if the innovator can license its technology ex‐post innovation. If the initial cost of production is high and the slope of the marginal cost of undertaking innovation is moderate, investment in innovation is maximised at a patent protection that is weaker than the strongest patent protection. Otherwise, strongest patent protection maximises investment in innovation. We also show that welfare is maximised neither at the strongest patent protection nor at the weakest patent protection but at an intermediate patent protection. Our results are important for patent policies.     

Brand/product innovation and the optimal length of trademark/patent protection

A simple CES model of product differentiation is used to consider brand innovation and compulsory trademark licensing. Judd has used a different but closely related model to study product innovation and optimal patent length. Under Cournot assumptions, computer simulations show that the optimal length of trademark/patent protection is finite and varies in an intuitive way with the costs of innovation and production, interest rates and taste parameters.     

Growth and optimal policies in an R&D-growth model with imperfect international capital mobility

In this paper, we examine the effects of international capital mobility on innovation, growth, and optimal growth policies in a small open economy with R&D-driven growth. Households can borrow funds from an imperfect international capital market to finance their investment in R&D firms. We show that the economy can reach a higher growth rate if international capital is more mobile. This result is consistent with recent empirical findings. Moreover, we show that the common growth-enhancing policies, such as patent protection and the R&D subsidies, have an additional negative welfare effect when households can access the international capital market. Accordingly, the optimal patent protection and R&D subsidy should be smaller when the degree of international capital mobility is higher.     

The struggle to survive in the R&D sector: Implications for innovation and growth

By allowing for investment activities by research and development (R&D) firms to prevent product obsolescence, we show that if legal patent protection is too strong, a higher R&D subsidy rate delivers insufficient investments for survival in the R&D sector, depressing innovation and growth in the long run.     

Effects of a blocking patent on R&D with endogenous survival activities

This study analyzes the effect of strengthening patent protection for innovation and economic growth by introducing a blocking patent into the endogenous growth model developed by Furukawa (Econ Lett 121(1):26–29, 2013a), which features survival activity of patent holders in the R&D sector with a variety-expansion model. Results show that strengthening patent protection can raise the economic growth rate and social welfare through an endogenous survival investment. Additionally, this study examines the effects of increasing subsidies for R&D. We find that increasing R&D subsidy rate can negatively affect economic growth and social welfare because of the investment for survival activities. This result shows the novel role of a blocking patent in determining innovation effects of R&D subsidies. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of patent breadth which is another patent instrument in this model on innovation and economic growth. Results show that the growth and welfare effects of the profit-division rule and the subsidy rate for R&D may vary with the size of patent breadth.     

Breaking the Fence: Can Patent Rights Deter Biomedical Innovation in 'Technology Followers'?

The impact of patent protection on biomedical innovation has been a controversial issue. Although a 'medical anti-commons' has been predicted as a result of a proliferation of patents on upstream technologies, evidence to test these concerns is only now emerging. However, most industrial surveys that shed light on this issue are mainly from developed countries, making it very difficult to predict the impact of patenting on biomedical innovation in developing and least developed countries. This paper develops a framework of analysis for the impact of patent rights on biomedical innovation in 'technology follower' developing countries. Based on the framework developed in the paper, empirical data collected in an industry-level survey of the Indian pharmaceutical industry between November 2004 and January 2005 is used to analyze the impact of patent rights as recognized under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) on biomedical innovation in technology followers.     

Sequential R&D and blocking patents in the dynamics of growth

The incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for economic growth. How does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, innovation and growth? In a common law system an explicitly dynamic macroeconomic analysis is appropriate. This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with endogenous skill acquisition. We focus on two issues: (a) the over-protection versus the under-protection of intellectual property rights in basic research; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators. We show that the dynamic general equilibrium interactions may seriously mislead the empirical assessment of the growth effects of IPR policy: stronger protection of upstream innovation always looks bad in the short- and possibly medium-run. We also provide a simple “rule of thumb” indicator of the basic researcher bargaining power.     

Trade Policy in Lobbying Equilibrium: With Non‐Traded and Traded Final Goods and Intermediate Inputs

The paper derives trade policies endogenously for final consumption and intermediate input industries in the presence of a non‐traded sector. Contrary to what the existing literature suggests, results show that there is no definite relation between lobbying status and the direction of trade policy of an industry. Trade protection of an industry depends on how its consumption (horizontal) and production (vertical) linkages with other industries reinforce or cancel out its lobbying efforts. To cite a few results, (i) an organized industry may face trade tax, whereas an unorganized one may obtain protection; (ii) an organized downstream industry may not be able to impose trade tax to an unorganized upstream industry, (iii) an organized upstream industry may not hurt unorganized downstream industry, (iv) lobby for non‐traded industry alone can influence trade policies, and (v) lobby for traded industry affects the size of the non‐traded sector in the economy.     

去产能背景下跨部门产业政策与技术创新

基于政策效果的部际传导视角，建立包含上游能源部门、中游电力部门和下游生产部门的多部门一般均衡模型，对高耗能产业生产函数以施加外生冲击方式刻画中国2015年实施的去产能政策，通过校准模型分析核心内生变量在政策冲击时期相较于平衡增长路径时期的变化。结果显示：①以“短期阵痛”为代价的去产能政策能够实现提振过剩产业产品价格的基础政策目标；②在能源部门技术创新的内生设定下，去产能政策能够提高绿色能源占能源使用总量的比重，实现绿色结构效应；③去产能政策能够降低绿色能源相对价格，实现绿色成本效应。进一步地，引入价格政策进行政策情景模拟，比较实现同一减排目标时内生技术模型和外生技术模型的政策成本，发现内生技术设定能够以更低税率和更小福利损失实现减排目标。研究结论表明，内生的技术创新是完善去产能政策传导、降低政策成本的关键环节，推动了下游过剩产业的市场提振和上游能源部门的绿色转型，为供给侧改革研究提供了产业政策与技术创新互动的新视角。     

技术创新链的结构、形成与运行

技术创新链是围绕核心技术、基于技术配套的技术创新体系。配套技术既包含上下游互补的纵向配套技术,也包含基于同一技术环节的横向配套技术。技术创新链的形成源于企业技术知识的有限性、产品的互补性以及对创新的速度经济的追求。技术创新链的运行包含基于平台、专利池和协议研发的3种运行机制。     

去产能背景下跨部门产业政策与技术创新

基于政策效果的部际传导视角，建立包含上游能源部门、中游电力部门和下游生产部门的多部门一般均衡模型，对高耗能产业生产函数以施加外生冲击方式刻画中国2015年实施的去产能政策，通过校准模型分析核心内生变量在政策冲击时期相较于平衡增长路径时期的变化。结果显示：①以“短期阵痛”为代价的去产能政策能够实现提振过剩产业产品价格的基础政策目标；②在能源部门技术创新的内生设定下，去产能政策能够提高绿色能源占能源使用总量的比重，实现绿色结构效应；③去产能政策能够降低绿色能源相对价格，实现绿色成本效应。进一步地，引入价格政策进行政策情景模拟，比较实现同一减排目标时内生技术模型和外生技术模型的政策成本，发现内生技术设定能够以更低税率和更小福利损失实现减排目标。研究结论表明，内生的技术创新是完善去产能政策传导、降低政策成本的关键环节，推动了下游过剩产业的市场提振和上游能源部门的绿色转型，为供给侧改革研究提供了产业政策与技术创新互动的新视角。     

专利保护、补充性资产与创新企业技术许可选择

创新企业采用什么方式阻止竞争对手的模仿创新是创新战略的重要部分,分析专利保护和补充性资产对创新企业技术许可的影响,发现专利保护和补充性资产对创新企业选择技术许可,阻止模仿创新有着重要的影响,在此基础上,本文建立库诺特模型分析了市场主导型创新企业的最优技术许可战略.     

机密还是专利?

在传统社会中,为保护创新成果,人们通常只能将其保留为技术机密或他人无法共享的私有知识,这不但降低了创新效率,也会增加技术的失传风险。有识于此,本文将专利看做政府向创新者提供的一种机密交换契约,并借此论证了引入"事后"专利保护的合理性:人们为了要获得排他性的专利保护,就必须将其私有知识公开披露,而这消除了技术失传风险。但只有当专利利润高于商业机密利润时人们才会申请专利,故专利保护会导致更大的垄断扭曲。社会最优专利期限就是在机密失传风险和垄断定价扭曲之间权衡的结果,只要存在技术失传风险,事后最优专利期限就必须是正的。     

R&D policy in a vertically related industry

In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of public policy aimed to stimulate business-performed R&D in a vertically related market. We examine the role of an R&D active upstream supplier in a four-stage R&D model, where we incorporate public funding. The considered policy instrument is direct funding of firms’ R&D efforts. We calculate the optimal policies and show that they have a positive impact on firms’ R&D investments. From a welfare point of view, it is optimal to differentiate the subsidy rates between the upstream and the downstream markets. Competition in the product market leads to a higher subsidy rate to the upstream supplier than to the downstream firms. When concentration is high in the downstream market, the optimal solution is an R&D subsidy for these firms, otherwise the optimal solution is an R&D tax for the downstream firms.     

企业研发与专利保护——基于企业间策略性竞争的分析视角杨

本文使用空间价格歧视模型,分析了企业研发决策与政府专利保护之间的关系。结果不仅证明了企业在专利保护程度较高、研发环境较好时会进行研发,研发数量与政府的专利保护呈倒U型关系,而且发现,企业研发后,在专利保护程度极低和极高时,企业会采用特许权方式对外专利授权,中间状态下企业不对外授权。从社会福利和社会创新的角度来看,专利保护不是越多越好,而是存在一个临界的拐点。该拐点随着社会研发环境和行业交易费用的增加而递增。     

美国农业生物技术研发投资与专利保护

现代农业生物技术在缓解全球粮食安全、资源枯竭、环境恶化等一系列重大问题中发挥了极其重要的作用。美国农业生物技术研究和产业化发展非常迅速，与其相关的知识产权制度立法也经过多次调整完善，巩固了其技术和市场优势。本文通过介绍美国农业生物技术研发投资现状，梳理其知识产权制度的发展历程，并从授权专利的申请单位类型、技术类型和前十强企业的专利集中度等方面，分析农业生物技术的专利保护进展，总结美国农业生物技术研发及其知识产权保护制度的成功经验，以期为促进我国农业生物技术创新及其知识产权保护制度的完善提供经验借鉴。     

Private patent protection in the theory of Schumpeterian growth

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model with privately optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement and investigate the implications for intellectual property and R&D policies. In our setting, successful innovators undertake costly rent protection activities (RPAs) to enforce their patents. RPAs deter innovators who seek to discover higher quality products and thereby replace the patent holder. RPAs also deter imitators who seek to capture a portion of the monopoly market by imitating the patent holder's product. We investigate the role of private IPR protection by considering the impact of subsidies to RPAs on economic growth and welfare. We find that a larger RPA subsidy raises the innovation rate if and only if the ease of imitation is above a certain level. With regards to welfare, we find that depending on the parameters it may be optimal to tax or subsidize RPAs. Thus a prohibitively high taxation of RPAs is not necessarily optimal. We also show that the presence of imitation strengthens the case for subsidizing R&D.     

Does intellectual monopoly stimulate or stifle innovation?

This study develops an R&D-based growth model with vertical and horizontal innovation to shed some light on the current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or stifles innovation. We analyze the effects of patent protection in the form of blocking patents. We show that patent protection changes the direction of innovation by having asymmetric effects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement) and horizontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion). Calibrating the model and simulating transition dynamics, we find that strengthening the effect of blocking patents stifles vertical innovation and decreases economic growth but increases social welfare due to an increase in horizontal innovation. In light of this finding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth and welfare implications of patents, it is important to consider their often neglected compositional effects on vertical and horizontal innovation.