通货膨胀目标制并不能解决我国货币政策低效率问题-一个基于政策时滞和扰动冲击的研究

本文在一个引入时滞、政策传导扰动和中介目标的货币政策模型中,分析了通货膨胀目标制的实施与货币政策效率之间的关系。我们发现,由于货币政策的时滞和货币政策传导机制的不畅,中央银行无法及时地对经济中的扰动做出正确的估计,尽管可以利用中间目标变量和其他参考变量的实际值对目标值的偏离所给出的信息来适当调整货币政策,但仍然无法对冲击及时做出正确的响应;再加上中央银行货币政策执行中的财政占优、金融占优和外部占优问题,使得中央银行无法执行其意愿的政策,因此通货膨胀目标制的引入无助于解决货币政策的低效率问题。     

我国实行通货膨胀目标制的可行性分析

通货膨胀目标制是基于对通货膨胀做出相对精确的预测并以稳定价格为首要目标的货币政策框架。目前国际上实现通货膨胀目标制的国家都取得了巨大的成功。考察我国的中央银行、经济和金融体系等实施通货膨胀目标制的前提条件,可以发现我国目前已经具备了一些条件,应该加速金融创新,渐进地向通货膨胀目标制政策框架转变。     

货币市场对货币政策传导机制效力影响分析

在新的国际环境，我国国内的金融环境将不可避免地受到影响，中共中央银行实施货币政策的不定因素将增多，造成中央银行控制相关经济变量的力度减弱，有效的货币政策传导机制将失灵，进而导致中央银行无法及时、有效地实施货币政策。因此，有必要对新环境下的货币政策传导机制的研究，特别是货币市场对货币政策传导机制的效力影响。     

中国货币政策适宜转向通货膨胀目标制——基于中央银行预期管理的视角

简单的最优货币政策是促使通货膨胀与产出二者之间达到“神奇巧合”的货币政策.本文立足于最优货币政策共识和预期的异质性,全面分析了中央银行预期管理.通货膨胀预期形成中的问题主要是信息问题,透明度与交流是预期管理的关键货币政策工具,着重于信息提供和中央银行的意图表达,能够盯住更多的目标.传统的货币政策工具主要是依靠中央银行的政策行为作用于价格稳定目标,比较而言,通货膨胀目标制能够形成预期管理的内生机制.本文建议,当下中国在经济疲弱、价格剧烈动荡之际,应率先推出“准通货膨胀目标制”,管理经济下行风险,从而推动宏观经济的健康发展.     

通货膨胀目标制在我国的适用性分析

本文从央行操作技能、制度保障体系、市场传导机制和宏观经济环境等四个方面对通货膨胀目标制在我国的适用性进行了分析.结论表明我国已基本具备实施通货膨胀目标制的前提条件,中央银行应尽快实现由当前货币政策操作框架向通货膨胀目标制的转变.     

当前我国货币政策实施通胀目标制的几点思考

中央银行在实施货币政策中不可能直接达到其最终目标,而只能通过中介目标来影响实际的经济活动。文章认为,无论是学术理论价值上,还是政策实际操作上,作为我国的货币政策中介目标,货币供应量面临新情况和新问题,所以可以借鉴通货膨胀目标制来改进和提高我国货币政策传导机制的有效性。     

通货膨胀目标制及对中国货币政策的启示

自1990年新西兰实行通货膨胀目标制（IT）后，有40多个上业化国家和新兴市场经济国家相继公开宣布以IT作为货币政策的新框架。这种新型的货币政策框架的主要特点：一是政策当局事先确定一个明确的、定量化的通货膨胀目标，并向全社会公布；二是中央银行随时对通货膨胀的未来走向进行预测，并根据预测值与目标值是否一致决定货币政策工具的运用；三是中央银行具有较高的透明度和责任感。     

中国货币政策传导机制分析

中国当前货币政策调控需要探讨的是，中央银行调控的政策意图如何有效地传导并实现货币，信货的预期调控目标，该文介绍了近年来中央银行货币政策无法有效传导的表现，分析了传导机制失败的原因，并指出央行近期和中期的努力方向。     

降低货币政策动态不一致性的理论方法

货币政策的决策和执行过程可能存在动态不一致性。如果中央银行预先公布了保持低通胀的最优货币政策,但在随后的执行过程中,企图利用公众已经形成的低通货膨胀预期,执行完全相机抉择的政策,那么公众的理性选择是根据中央银行的最优化问题,重新确定自己的预期通货膨胀,使中央银行的     

通货膨胀目标制实践经验的国际考察

作为一种新型的货币政策制度框架,标准型通货膨胀目标制在全球的中央银行中已经获得了一定的认同.然而迄今为止,我们还缺乏一个对目前大量的通货膨胀目标制实践经验进行简洁而全面的概括,借以对货币政策的实践和通货膨胀目标钉住者的前景展望提供相应指南.而这种指南之所以必要,是因为队伍不断庞大的发展中国家和新兴市场经济体正在考虑是否采纳通货膨胀目标制.借鉴标准型通货膨胀目标制国家在控制通货膨胀过程中所积累的经验,探讨通货膨胀目标制国家面临的主要问题、发展趋势、政策实践,其目的是为了从国家的角度来思考是否应该采纳通货膨胀目标制;而对于已经实施通货膨胀目标制的国家,则要考虑如何健全这一制度框架.     

Monetary policy and commodity terms of trade shocks in emerging market economies

Commodity terms of trade shocks have continued to drive macroeconomic fluctuations in most emerging market economies. The volatility and persistence of these shocks have posed great challenges for monetary policy. This study employs a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to evaluate the optimal monetary policy responses to commodity terms of trade shocks in commodity dependent emerging market economies. The model is calibrated to the South African economy. The study shows that CPI inflation targeting performs relatively better than exchange rate targeting and non-traded inflation targeting both in terms of reducing macroeconomic volatility and reducing the losses of a non-benevolent central bank. However, macroeconomic stabilisation comes at a cost of increased exchange rate volatility. The results suggest that the appropriate response to commodity induced exogenous shocks is to target CPI inflation.     

Monetary Policy in Russia: Identifying exchange rate shocks

Russian monetary policy has failed persistently to achieve sustained low inflation, both in absolute terms and relative to the peer group of countries similarly exiting from Soviet-style central planning. This paper explores the reasons for this state of affairs by analysing the kind of monetary policy that has been pursued by the central bank during the period 1995 to 2009. Our contribution is to search for a possible transmission channel between the real interest rate, inflation rate, exchange rate, output growth and foreign reserve growth, after having controlled for the effect of oil price inflation. Using a vector autoregressive model in error-correction form and using sign restrictions methodology, we show that the monetary authorities’ failure to abate double-digit inflation appears to be driven by the policy of exchange rate targeting, as reflected in our identified exchange rate shocks.     

Inflation Targeting - the Holy Grail of Monetary Policy?

Inflation targeting is a statement about the objective of central bank policy and not about operating procedures. Its success depends not only on the actions of the central bank, but requires a broad consensus concerning the proper role of monetary policy in the economy. It also requires the backing of a sound fiscal policy. As countries differ both in economic structure and monetary transmission mechanism, the implementation of inflation targeting must be country specific. Instability over time in the transmission mechanism also implies that inflation targeting strategies must evolve to avoid the fate of previous monetary policy targeting practices.     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

中国实行通货膨胀目标制的可行性分析

通货膨胀目标制是一种以保持低而稳定的通货膨胀为首要目标的货币政策框架。本研究参照IMF提出的相关指标,并考虑到中国作为转型国家的经济特征,从中国当前经济运行中控制一般物价水平的必要性、经济结构的完善性、金融市场和银行体系的健全性、中央银行的独立性、货币政策的透明度以及央行准确预测通货膨胀的技术等方面考察了中国实行通货膨胀目标制的可行性,得出中国已经初步具备实施该货币制度的条件。并提出更彻底的制度改革将会确保中国成功实施通货膨胀目标制,从而使得宏观经济运行处于稳定的价格水平因而更有效率。     

SHOULD CENTRAL BANKS CARE ABOUT REGIONAL IMBALANCES?

Regional imbalances may arise both as a result of asymmetric shocks and of divergent responses to symmetric shocks, such as monetary policy shocks. This paper analyses flexible inflation targeting when regional imbalances are included in the loss function. By adding regional imbalances, the time‐inconsistency problem in monetary policy becomes more complex. The paper analyses alternative institutional arrangements designed to improve the discretionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an over‐ambitious output target, it is shown that the outcome of monetary policy is improved if the central bank places less weight on regional imbalances than the political authorities.     

Optimal price‐level drift under commitment in the canonical New Keynesian model

Abstract In both the canonical and many extended versions of the New Keynesian model, optimal monetary policy under commitment implies price‐level stationarity as long as expectations are rational. We show that this is no longer the case if the central bank and private agents make decisions before observing current shocks. The optimal amount of price‐level drift in response to unexpected innovations to inflation is quantitatively important. This result has important implications for monetary policy, including the design of the optimal loss function for the central bank if it cannot commit to its future policies.     

A Repeated Game Model of Monetary Union

Given a policy rule of the common central bank of a monetary union, member countries with different preferences about inflation and facing asymmetric shocks have different incentives to secure political intervention in the bank's operation and achieve the temporary benefit of surprise inflation. This is modelled as a repeated game, and the most cooperative outcome subject to the countries' incentive compatibility constraints is found. The optimal rule responds flexibly to asymmetric shocks, adjusting policy away from the full commitment level toward the discretionary level, so as to maintain the worse-hit country's incentive to abide by the rule.     

Monetary–fiscal policy interaction and fiscal inflation: A tale of three countries

We study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross-country data from 1965 to 1999. In a first step, we contrast the monetary–fiscal narrative for Germany, the U.S., and Italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time-varying VAR. We find that the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of non-responsible fiscal policy and accommodative monetary authorities. In a second step, we use an estimated DSGE model to interpret the low-frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run. The findings from the DSGE model suggest that switches in the monetary–fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation.