THE 1987 BUDGET

Our pre-Budget forecast published last month correctly anticipated the main Budget measures (with the exception of the decision not to re-valorise excise duties) and is very close to the Treasury's own forecast. We have updated the forecast for the Budget measures and other new information. Compared with the February Economic Outlook, our post-Budget assessment has revised down slightly the short-term forecast for output, inflation and the current account deficit. Consequently we share the Treasury's view that output will rise 3 per cent this year, but we are a little more optimistic on the outlook for inflation and the current account.
In holding the PS BR to last year's expected outturn of £4bn, and more particularly in cutting the PSFD by £11/2zbn, the Budget represents a tightening in fiscal policy. Whether the overall policy stance is tightened depends on the response of the monetary authorities. Early indications are that the government will prevent interest rates from falling as far or as fast as they would otherwise do and that the exchange rate will be allowed to rise. This implies a tightening of policy in order to head off problems on inflation or the balance of payments. This argument is supported by the Treasury's own forecast, which is more pessimistic on both inflation and the current account than its predecessor in the Autumn Statement, and explains the Chancellor's decision not to re-valorise excise duties. The post-Budget forecast incorporates this change in policy. We now assume that the sterling index averages 70 this year and that base rates fall to 9 per cent by the end of the year.     

THE 1981 BUDGET

In this Forecast Release we examine the short-term prospects for the UK economy in the light of the Budget and other developments. Compared with our February forecast the Budget has raised taxes by about £2 bn but it has also increased public expenditure by a similar amount The net effect on the PSBR, compared with our February forecast, is therefore small, especially if the Treasury's estimates for nationalised industry profits and/or public sector wages prove over-optimistic. We therefore believe that the outturn for the PSBR in 1981-82 could be close to the figure of £12 bn presented in our last forecast.
We also believe that the prospects for output and inflation are little changed The Budget by itself will have raised prices by about 1 per cent compared with our previous forecast but because we had probably over-estimated indirect tax receipts, the net effect on prices is small For output, the likely reduction in consumers' expenditure is more or less offset by higher public spending. We continue to expect a fall in output between 1980 and 1981 of 1–11/2 per cent, inflation during the year at about 10 per cent, a current account surplus of £3 bn, monetary growth of 8 to 9 per cent and a PSBR of £12 bn.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Collapsing oil prices and a falling dollar set the background to a Budget in which the Chancellor, hamstrung by lower oil revenues, was seen as having little room for manoeuvre. In fact the sharp fall in the sterling price of oil has provided him with the perfect excuse for not making significant cuts in personal income tax that were largely irrelevant to the needs of the economy. Instead of a boost to household demand we have had, thanks to OPEC, a transfer to companies in the form of a reduction in costs. This should enable them to expand output against a background of falling inflation. Our post-Budget assessment of macroeconomic prospects (Section I), made on the Treasury's assumption of a $15 oil price, shows output growing by 2 1/2 per cent this year and inflation falling below 3 per cent in 1987. We are thus less optimistic than the Treasury about output but more optimistic about inflation. How was the Chancellor able, within the confines of the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, to give anything away having lost so much oil revenue? A detailed analysis of the PSBR forecast (Section II) reveals good reasons why non-oil tax revenues should be some £3 1/2n higher than forecast this time last year. But, because we still expect public spending to be above the official figures, our PSBR forecast is £1bn higher than the Treasury's. Although the macroeconomic impact of the Budget was small (especially in relation to that of the fall in oil prices which preceded it), it continued the process of tax reform. We focus, in Section III, on the new proposals to deal with the problem of the pension fund surpluses to which we drew attention in the November issue of Financial Outlook. We conclude that the proposed measures could have a larger effect on tax revenues in the longer term than is indicated by the Treasury's Budget estimates.     

A BUDGET FOR STERLING AND A BUDGET FOR JOBS

In our assessment macroeconomic policy is now tighter as consequence of the Budget than we had assumed in February. We interpret the Budget speech as indicating higher interest rates (tighter monetary policy) and, in consequence, a stronger exchange rate. On this basis we find that the prospects for inflation are slightly better than before, though output is weaker. Additionally we forecast a PSBR in 1985-6 of £ 63/4bn, below the official forecast of £7.1bn but in line with our February forecast. Of £7.1bn but in line with our February forecast. Because output is lower, however, this implies a tighter fiscal policy.
The other main change to our forecast is unemployment. The changes to National Insurance Contribution scales represent a very cheap way of reducing the cost of employing the lower paid, and we estimate that these measures, together with the extension of the Youth Training Scheme and Community Programme, will create an extra 375,000 jobs and training places by 1988. However these effects are partially offset by the effects on output of the higher interest rates and higher exchange rate that we are now forecasting. When account is also taken of the increase in labour supply that follows any increase in employment, the net effect on unemployment is to reduce it by 300,000 by 1988 compared with our February forecast.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

This forecast release examines the latest monthly indicators. In general they are in line with the detailed forecast published in February; retail sales have recovered from the fall in 1977 and price inflation is firmly in single figures, whilst output is showing only slight signs of recovery. The most disturbing indications are for money supply and the exchange rate. Monetary growth has been above the limit and the exchange rate has drifted in a manner that we did not expect until later this year. These indicators are related and give a clear warning for the Budget strategy. Unless the rate of monetary growth is brought back below 12 per cent it will not be possible to maintain a stable exchange rate. The target of maintaining single-figure inflation would then be virtually impossible.     

Assumptions–Central Forecast

We continue to make our best guesses about likely policy developments rather than assuming 'unchanged' policies. In the central forecast we assume that the broad thrust of policy is unchanged, i.e. we have made the technical assumption that the present government is returned in the next General Election. But, because an election must be held within the next 15 months, we also consider the medium-term prospects under alternative economic policies. (For details see p. 19.) In the central forecast. e herefore. we assume that policy will continue to be guided-though not completely determined-by an extended Medium- Term Financial Strategy (MTFS). For 1983-4 the MTFS requires the PSBR to be 23/4% per cent of GDP at market prices. Given official inflation and output forecasts, the Chancellor is therefore aiming for a 1983-4 PSBR of £8bn (Autumn Statement, p. 13). In the central forecast. however, we have assumed that the Budget of 15 March will give greater weight to the political objectives of cutting income tax and maintaining the attack on inflation, even if this implies slippage from the MTFS targets. Specifcally we have assumed that the standard rate of income tax will be cut by lp. that personal tax allowances will be raised by 12 per cent and that indirect taxes will be raised by only half the amount required for full revalorisation. This amounts to a total tax giveaway (compared with unchangedpolicy) of £1 1/2 and results in a PSBR of just over £9bn. 3.1 per cent of GDPat market prices.     

Briefing Paper: Why has the economy recovered?1

By the end of last year GDP (though strike affected) was 9 per cent higher than in the first half of 1981, an annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent. In this Briefing Paper we seek to explain the recovery from the recession. We conclude that much of the recovery represents a natural response of the economy after the oil and price shocks of 1979-80. The recovery occurred in spite of the deflationary Budget of 1981 and the sharp rise in interest rates in the autumn of 1981. Since 1981 fiscal policy has been stable, whereas the original intention was to tighten fiscal policy progressively in subsequent years. This stability and the fall in the inflation rate that accompanied it allowed growth to resume. We believe that the upturn would have been rather weaker (though inflation would have been lower) if the progressive tightening of the original Medium- Term Financial Strategy had been adhered to.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The package that was announced just as we completed our June forecast has, for the time being, produced a more stable financial position. The exchange rate has stopped falling and by mid-July the Smithsonian index had reached 62, the highest level since March. Short- and long-term interest rates have stopped rising. We still emphasise, however, that control over DCE and the money supply has been achieved artificially through direct controls on the banks. The government has achieved short-run consistency between its fiscal and monetary policy, but in the longer term its fiscal policy is inconsistent with its hopes of keeping inflation in single figures. No incomes policy will succeed unless it is accompanied by policies designed to achieve a consistent exchange rate path. The issue has been given prominence by the recent proposals for a European currency system. In the June Economic Outlook we argued that the maintenance of exchange rate stability with the Deutschmark (unless West Germany can be persuaded to increase the growth of its money supply) would require major cuts in the Budget deficit over the next three years. The same monetary constraints would apply whether we joined a fixed exchange rate system or unilaterally decided to hold the exchange rate. If the government seriously wants to control inflation a reduction in the Budget deficit will be essential.     

Forecast Release

Although the Chancellor did not say in so many words precisely what lay behind his thinking on the Budget, the implicit message was clear. His aim was to rebalance fiscal and monetary policy, tightening the former so that the monetary relaxation that we have already had does not have to be quickly reversed. In so doing, he has increased the chances that interest rates can stay lower for longer than would have been the case if he had not acted on the PSBR. The reaction of the foreign exchanges critical but again the Budget makes it more likely that the devaluation of the pound since last September can be made one off, not the precursor to a prolonged downward float. This is a necessary condition for a 'successful' devaluation, but it is not sufficient: the wage response is also critical. High unemployment is helpful in this respect, though it has not stopped us frittering away the benefits of previous devaluations. Our February forecast was pessimistic on the UK's ability to hold onto the competitive advantage that devaluation brings; the Budget, while short on monetary underpinning, increases the odds in favour of a more optimistic outturn.     

Monetary policy with interest on reserves

I analyze monetary policy with interest on reserves and a large balance sheet. I show that conventional theories do not determine inflation in this regime, so I base the analysis on the fiscal theory of the price level. I find that monetary policy can peg the nominal rate, and determine expected inflation. With sticky prices, monetary policy can also affect real interest rates and output, though higher interest rates raise output and then inflation. The conventional sign requires a coordinated fiscal–monetary policy contraction. I show how conventional new-Keynesian models also imply strong monetary–fiscal policy coordination to obtain the usual signs. I address theoretical controversies. A concluding section places our current regime in a broader historical context, and opines on how optimal fiscal and monetary policy will evolve in the new regime.     

Forecast Summary

Backed by the lowest interest rates in fifteen years and a competitive exchange rate, we see the economy moving off the corrugated bottom of last year and recovery gathering pace as this year progresses. We expect output to rise 1.4 per cent this year, 0.5 per cent more than we forecast in October when we were expecting a far more cautious approach on interest rates, and 3 per cent in 1994. Here we have factored in another 1 per cent cut in base rates to coincide with the Budget on 16 March but this may prove to be the floor, especially if, as is rumoured, the Prime Minister has vetoed tax increases in the Budget for fear of derailing a fragile recovery. By the end of the year, however, we expect the trend in interest rates to be upwards to halt a sliding exchange rate and to cap the devaluation-induced price increases that will be feeding into domestic prices by then. On this basis we believe that inflation can be contained at 4 per cent underlying this year, 5 per cent in 1994 - outside the Chancellor's target range. While we are more sanguine than before on the outlook for output and inflation, major problems remain on the PSBR and the balance of payments. Beginning in the December Budget, the Government will have to raise taxes to avoid a debt spiral on the budget deficit and channel resources into net exports. Even on the basis of a £4bn tax hike in the first of the unified Budgets, we expect the PSBR to run along close to £50bn and the current account deficit in the £15bn-20bn range.     

Monetary Policy; Questions of Adequacy, Design and Presentation

In this article John Flemming considers three possible modifications to the presentation and design of monetary policy. He argues first that it is odd to forecast the target variable – inflation – when it is policy to do what is necessary to deliver the target. What would be interesting would be a forecast of what interest rates might prove necessary. Secondly he considers the possibility that with monetary policy dedicated to price stability and fiscal policy to paying for public expenditure – and stabilising output – a third control might be appropriate to stabilise the financial system. Finally, and overlapping with the last, he explores ways in which asset price changes might be reflected in a broader measure of inflation – as recently suggested by Charles Goodhart and the IMF.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The Budget embodies many of the recommendations that we have put forward over the last year -on personal savings and the appropriate stance of macroeconomic policy - but a void remains on the key issue of ERM entry. With inflation set to rise above 9 per cent in the short term, there is a danger that an inflation l sterling depreciation cycle becomes entrenched. In fiscal terms, the Budget was broadly neutral and the Chancellor con- firmed that the strategy is to rely on high interest rates to support the exchange rate and tame inflation. This year, with base rates of 15 per cent, we expect the pound to remain reasonably stable but in 1991-2, as interest rates fall -which they are bound to ahead of the election -the pound could well come under pressure, so putting the government's inflation objectives at risk. ERM entry would provide the obvious support and is consistent with the Treasury forecast. Without it, inflation is unlikely to fall below 5 per cent next year.     

The effects of monetary policy in Russia: A factor-augmented VAR approach

Using factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) models, this study examines the effects of the Central Bank of Russia’s (CBR) monetary policy on economic indicators. The sample includes 39 monthly macroeconomic series and covers the period 2004 through 2019. The analysis revealed counter-intuitive results, with consumer prices often responding positively to a contractionary monetary policy shock, and vice versa; this is related to the impossible trinity. The ruble exchange devaluation was accompanied by price increases through an import price pass-through, so the CBR chose exchange stability and free capital flows out of the impossible trinity, temporarily subordinating monetary policy independence. Such independence was limited, possibly due to Russia’s high dependence on energy exports and the link between energy prices and the exchange rate. The findings indicate no direct evidence of an effect of monetary policy tightening on the decrease in consumer prices; rather, the attenuation of ruble depreciation may have helped to stabilize prices, even after the CBR adopted inflation targeting.     

THE REAL WAGE GAP

Over the past year a gap has opened up between the growth of manufacturing productivity and that of real wages. This gap cannot persist indefinitely, but it can be closed in many different ways. The best that can happen is that wage settlements fall while output and productivity accelerate. The worst outcome would be continued stagnation of real output and no deceleration of wages, in which case the required productivity improvement would have to come about through renewed labour shedding. There are worrying signs that this has started to happen. An intermediate solution might involve a fall in the exchange rate, with some improvement in competitiveness boosting real output (so that UK producers get a larger share of buoyant consumer spending) and some rise in prices holding back real wages.
We continue to believe that the most likely outcome is a rise in output and a fall in the rate of wage settlements. In our June forecast this occurs despite a fall in the real exchange rate. In these circumstances we expect the growth of unit labour costs to fall back from its current high level so that the current 3 per cent inflation rate becomes a true "core" rate. But a moderate fall in the real exchange rate may prove hard to achieve, especially if the oil price continues to weaken. We therefore explore what would happen if the required depreciation happens more rapidly, so that interest rates have to remain high to prevent it getting out of control. In this case we would expect lower growth and higher inflation than we forecast in June.     

Does trade integration alter monetary policy transmission?

This paper explores the role of trade integration—or openness—for monetary policy transmission in a medium-scale new Keynesian model. Allowing for strategic complementarities in price setting, we highlight a new dimension of the exchange rate channel by which monetary policy directly impacts domestic inflation: a monetary contraction which appreciates the exchange rate lowers the local currency price of imported goods; this, in turn, induces domestic producers to lower their prices too. We pin down key parameters of the model by matching impulse responses obtained from a vector autoregression on time series for the US relative to the euro area. Our estimation procedure yields plausible parameter values and suggests a strong role for strategic complementarities. Counterfactual simulations show that openness alters monetary transmission significantly. While the contractionary effect of a monetary policy shock on inflation and output tends to increase in openness, we find that monetary policy's control over inflation increases, as the output decline which is necessary to bring about a given reduction of inflation is smaller in more open economies.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Output has stagnated in the main industrialised countries this year but we expect the benefits of lower oil prices to show up in rapid growth from now on. The present weakness in the world economy stems from tighter US fiscal policy and the oil price shock itself. These have combined to reduce domestic demand in the United States, and hence to cut the market for Japanese exports in particular, and also to reduce expenditure by energydependent countries and companies. A further factor is that, with prices of oil-based products falling, there is an incentive to delay expenditure. We expect this impact effect of OPEC III to be short-lived and to give way to its positive effects in the second half of this year. Specifically, we expect consumer spending to lead the recovery as real incomes will be boosted by the terms of trade gain from lower oil prices - equivalent to 3 per cent of GNP in the OECD area as a whole. On the basis of oil prices holding at $15. we forecast OECD output growth of 3 per cent this year, rising to 41/2 per cent in 1987. Additionally, we expect lower oil prices to produce a significant reduction in world inflation. Zero growth of producer prices is forecast on average this year arid consumer price inflation is expected to fall to wards 2 per cent in the course of the year.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

At the end of 1982 output in the world economy was still falling, although there were signs that the decline had very nearly run its course. We expect a radual recovery to begin in the first half o f 1983. Unlike the recovery which began in the late summer of 1980, when inflation was still in double figures, any upturn in 1983 would be set against a background of declining inflationary expectations and weak oil prices. IJ. as we expect, a falling inflation rate proves a decisive factor in keeping interest rates on a downward path, we forecast that the output will gather pace in I983 and rise reasonably strongly in 1984. Of the 4 per cent rise in industrial production which we foresee in 1984. a large part is due to the fall in real oil prices.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

Relative to what we expected following the collapse in the oil price, growth in the OECD economy was disappointing last year and, with activity still not registering a convincing pick-up, we have lowered our forecast for 1987–88. Previously we argued that the sharp drop in oil prices from around 27 a barrel in 1985 to an average of 15-16 last year represented a significant boost to real incomes in the oil-consuming countries. Notwithstanding the corresponding real income loss to the oil producers, we expected OECD demand to rise sharply in the course of last year, with clear benefits to output becoming apparent by the end of the year. In the event this analysis, though correct in outline, has apparently underestimated the negative elements - tighter fiscal policy, the failure of consumers in some countries to obtain the terms of trade gains from lower oil prices and/or currency appreciation, the offset to domestic demand from falling exports. Consequently, we now expect OECD output to rise by only 3 per cent p. a. over the next two years. The corollary of this is that inflation is also unlikely to record a marked increase and this enhances the prospect of sustained output growth in the medium term. The forecast combines steady output growth of around 3 per cent p. a. with inflation stable in the 3–4 per cent range.     

Forecast Summary

The sluggish response of the current account to severe monetary tightening has put pressure on the exchange rate, which was instrumental in the decision to raise base rates to an eight-year high of 15 per cent. In so doing, the government has declared itself ready to risk recession to hold the pound - its main bulwark against rising inflation. Our forecast illustrates the risk. Compared with June, when we saw the economy avoiding a hard landing in the short term (at the cost of a protracted battle to reduce inflation over the medium term), the present forecast projects a sharp deceleration in output next year. Over the medium term output grows a disappointing 2 per centp.a., unemployment starts to rise and it is not until 1992 that retail price inflation is back below 5 per cent.