市场化进程、产权性质与企业慈善捐赠

文章从市场化进程的角度入手,探讨了该因素对上市公司慈善捐赠的影响。研究结果表明：市场化进程与企业慈善捐赠正相关;但在贫困地区,市场化进程显著消弱了慈善捐赠水平。进一步对产权性质分组回归结果表明,在发达地区,民营企业较之国有企业,市场化进程对慈善捐赠水平的促进作用更加明显;而在贫困地区,市场化进程对企业慈善捐赠水平均有显著的抑制作用,且对国有企业慈善捐赠的抑制程度更深。     

环境管制会影响公司绩效吗?——以中国6大水污染密集型行业为例

本文选取极具代表性的中国6大水污染密集型行业上市公司作为研究对象,实证分析了环境管制对公司绩效的影响。研究结果发现,环境管制并没有降低水污染密集型行业的经济绩效,除电力热力生产和供应业外,环境管制对其他5大行业的经济绩效都具有显著促进作用;环境管制对国有控股企业绩效的影响高于非国有控股企业,中西部地区企业高于东部地区企业。针对不同性质的水污染密集型行业,实行差异化环境管制政策可以提升公司价值,公开透明的政策信息可以减少非国有控股企业规制成本,适度控制企业规模、分散股权更有利于提高公司绩效。     

企业慈善捐赠与分析师关注度

企业慈善捐赠是企业履行社会责任的重要体现,也是企业用来提升社会声誉、构建与政府良好关系的重要手段。本文采用我国上市公司的数据,实证检验企业的慈善行为是否会导致分析师关注度的增加,并考虑了企业产权性质以及政治关联、企业规模对这种影响的作用。本文从企业捐赠的"印象管理"理论和"政企纽带"理论出发研究了企业慈善捐赠的影响问题,从企业外部相关者分析师的角度阐述了企业慈善捐赠可能带来的后果。本文的研究结论丰富了分析师预测影响因素的文献,有助于深入理解公司进行的社会捐赠的动因;也有助于分析师了解企业捐赠行为对其盈余预测的影响。     

控股股东股权质押与公司慈善捐赠决策 ——基于成本收益视角下的不同行为选择分析

股权质押在解决控股股东资金短缺问题的同时,也会增大其控制权转移风险,慈善捐赠可能会缓解这种风险.然而,慈善捐赠会使公司资金流出,控股股东因此会权衡成本收益来选择慈善捐赠的时机,并考虑其他备选方法.本文选取2008—2018年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证发现:控股股东股权质押比例与公司慈善捐赠水平之间呈倒U型关系.在不同股权质押区间,慈善捐赠与不同盈余管理手段之间具有共存或替代关系,公司会作出策略性选择以缓冲控制权转移风险.分析师关注使两者之间的倒U型关系变成了正相关关系.本文的研究加深了投资者、监管机构和审计师对上市公司规避控制权转移风险方式的理解,有助于他们采取相应的决策.     

党组织参与治理对上市公司慈善捐赠的影响

利用我国A股非金融类上市公司2008—2017年数据，采用“双向进入”、“交叉任职”两个指标衡量党组织参与企业治理的情况，实证检验其对企业慈善捐赠行为的影响。结果发现，党组织“双向进入”和“交叉任职”与企业是否捐赠、捐赠水平均呈显著正向关系。此外，上述作用在国有企业与非国有企业中均存在，但与中央国有企业相比，党组织参与治理对企业捐赠的促进效应在地方国有企业中更为明显。研究还发现，党组织参与治理对企业慈善捐赠的促进作用并不以损害企业价值为代价，反而会提高公司经营绩效和价值，并且党组织参与治理对企业捐赠的促进作用并非以获取更多的政府补贴为目的。研究表明，党组织参与治理促进了企业的捐赠行为，这一结论有助于进一步理解党组织在公司治理中的地位与作用。     

中国银行业的慈善捐赠对企业绩效的影响研究

中国的银行业作为具有一定行业优势的企业,具有慈善捐赠的实力且应积极担负起社会责任。随着银行业频繁涌现的慈善捐赠,本文选择了罕有研究的中国银行业为研究对象,以中国16家上市银行作为研究对象,运用2008～2013年的面板数据,建立个体固定效应模型。结果表明：慈善捐赠对企业财务绩效产生了显著的正向影响且对于国有商业银行而言,这种慈善捐赠带来的财务绩效的提升尤为明显。     

行业竞争影响企业慈善捐赠吗?

本文以2011年度我国沪深A股进行了慈善捐赠的企业为研究对象,实证检验企业慈善捐赠的金额与企业面临的行业竞争程度的关系,并且对不同产权的企业进行了研究.得出了以下主要结论:(1)对我国企业总体而言,企业慈善捐赠金额与行业竞争程度之间呈现“U”型关系.(2)国有企业的慈善捐赠特征符合总体企业特征.而非国有企业的慈善捐赠金额与行业竞争的程度之间“U”型关系并不显著.     

管理层薪酬激励、产权性质与企业绩效

选择沪、深A股在2013-2018年间2444家上市公司的14664个样本观测值,详细分析管理层薪酬激励、产权性质及企业绩效间的联系。研究发现:对管理层薪酬激励促进公司提高绩效;在不同公司各年度整体分析的背景下,第一大股东持股比率放大管理层薪酬激励对公司绩效的影响,两权分离率缩小管理层薪酬激励对公司绩效的影响,管理层薪酬激励对公司绩效的影响效果在国有资本控股企业中被放大;指定一家公司很少变动其股权结构,某一家公司持续经营中产权性质在管理层薪酬激励促进公司提高绩效影响中的调节作用仍需要被进一步研究。     

由汶川地震引发的关于企业如何进行慈善捐赠的几点思考

文章从汶川地震中企业慈善捐赠入手,分析中国企业当前所面对的慈善环境及企业自身慈善捐赠过程中存在的问题,并结合汶川地震中企业的捐赠情况为企业慈善捐赠提出了可行的慈善捐赠策略和建议。     

金字塔持股结构下的现金股利政策——基于国有控股和家族上市企业的研究

本文立足现金股利政策,选取我国金字塔持股结构最为典型的国有控股上市企业和家族上市企业,探讨这种特殊的股权结构对不同产权的公司现金股利政策的影响。家族企业现金股利支付水平普遍低于国有控股企业,这主要是受它们各自最终控制人的现金流量权、现金流量权与控制权分离度以及金字塔持股层级的影响。     

Philanthropic disaster relief giving as a response to institutional pressure: Evidence from China

This paper investigates if firms under high institutional pressure donate more to disaster relief than firms under lower institutional pressure. By taking Chinese listed companies' donations to May 12, 2008 Wenchuan earthquake as the sample, this research finds that large firms and firms who have political ties donate a significant more to disaster relief than smaller firms and firms who do not have political ties. But the findings indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) donate no more than non SOEs, and service companies donate significantly less than non-service companies. The results of this research partly support the institutional point of view of corporate philanthropy. Firms under high institutional pressure are more likely to donate more than firms facing lower institutional pressure.     

How Owners Matter? An Examination of Ownership Type in Corporate Disaster Relief Giving

Little research has investigated the effect of ownership identity (or type) and corporate philanthropy experience on giving. In this research, relying on legitimacy theory, we first assess the effect of ownership identity on corporate philanthropy (CP) in the context of the 2008 earthquake in China. Then we explore moderation effects of firms' prior CP experience and size as proxies for perceived legitimacy on owners' efforts at increasing giving and legitimacy. We find that state and CEO ownership are deterrents, while non‐SOE and institutional ownership enhances giving probability and amount. In addition, there is evidence that firm size and prior CP weaken the effects of institutional ownership on CP. This study provides a complete assessment of owner behaviour. Copyright © 2018 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Donate Money,but Whose? An Empirical Study of Ultimate Control Rights,Agency Problems,and Corporate Philanthropy in China

Using empirical evidence gathered from Chinese listed companies, this article explores the relationship between micro-governance mechanisms and corporate philanthropy from a corporate governance perspective. In China’s emerging market, ultimate controlling shareholders of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are reluctant to donate their assets or resources to charitable organizations; in private enterprises (PEs) marked by more deviation in voting and cash flow rights, such donations tend to be more likely. However, the ultimate controllers in PEs refuse to donate assets or resources they control or own, which implies that corporate philanthropy by PEs comes at the cost of others, through assets or resources owned by minority shareholders. Even after devastating natural disasters such as the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, the controlling shareholders continue to express reluctance to donate any assets they control. Despite widespread evidence that corporate philanthropy boosts corporate growth and profitability, these ultimate controllers indicate no intention to donate their own money as a means to improve corporate performance.     

How does the turnover of local officials make firms more charitable? A comprehensive analysis of corporate philanthropy in China

Building on institutional theory, this study investigates the impact of local officials' turnover on corporate philanthropy in China. Using data from Chinese listed firms from 2000–2015, we find that when city-level officials are replaced, firms increase the amount of money they donate. We also note that such positive relationship is stronger when the turnover of a local secretary is unexpected or when the firm experiences stronger performance than in the prior year. Further in-depth analysis shows that the positive impact of the turnover of local officials becomes more salient when firms have high levels of state ownership.     

Corporate Donations in China: A Strategic- Political Perspective

This paper explores how the political identity of top managers influences corporate donations, based on upper echelons theory (UET). The results show that the political identity of the top manager has a significant impact on the donation behavior of a company, especially in areas with poor institutional environments. Corporate donations depend not only on whether the top manager has a political identity but also the type of this identity. Furthermore, the impact differs significantly between companies with different ownership structures. This study enriches our knowledge of corporate philanthropy by demonstrating that corporate donation practices are shaped by a range of contextual factors. Corporate giving behaviors in emerging economies such as China are differently motivated according to the fundamentally different aspects of their institutional settings.     

Political Connection,Ownership Structure,and Corporate Philanthropy in China: A Strategic-Political Perspective

This paper investigates whether philanthropic giving decisions and amount of charitable giving are related to firms’ political connections and ownership type. To this end, Chinese firms listed on either the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange between 2004 and 2011 are examined, where government interference in the business sector is prevalent, state ownership structure is dominant, and corporate political connections prevail. Our analyses show (1) a significant and positive relationship between political connections and the likelihood and extent of firm contributions; (2) a significant and negative relationship between state ownership and extent of firm contributions; and (3) a stronger relationship between political connections and corporate philanthropy in non-state-owned firms. These findings with regard to the relationship between corporate giving, political connections, and ownership type have important implications for understanding corporate giving behavior in China and in emerging markets in general.     

Intragroup Transactions,Corporate Governance,and Corporate Philanthropy in Korean Business Groups

This study examines how the corporate philanthropy decisions of group-affiliated firms in Korea (Chaebol firms) are made. Based on the attention-based view, we argue that when corporate decision makers at group-affiliated firms focus their attention more (less) on internal markets than external stakeholders because of the firm’s high (low) reliance on intragroup transactions, the firm will decrease (increase) its level of corporate philanthropy. We further argue that the relationship will be stronger when governance mechanisms focus on the instrumental value of corporate philanthropy. Using a panel sample of group-affiliated firms in Korea from 2011 to 2015, we find that as intragroup sales increase, the level of corporate philanthropy decreases, and such a negative relationship is stronger when outside director representation and foreign investor ownership are high. Our study suggests that internal dependence and corporate governance mechanisms jointly affect the level of corporate philanthropy at firms in a business group. Thus, this study contributes to the literature on corporate philanthropy, business group, and corporate governance.     

Corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets: Evidence from Turkey

This is a study of the relationship between context, internal corporate governance and firm performance, looking at the case of Turkey, an exemplar of family capitalism. We found more concentrated ownership, often in the hands of families, led to firms performing better; concentrated ownership means that controlling families bear more of the risks of poor performance. Less predictably, given that the institutional environment is so well attuned to family ownership, we found that mechanisms that accord room for a greater range of voices and interests within and beyond families – larger boards and foreign ownership stakes – seem to also make for positive performance effects. We also noted that increase in cross ownership did not influence market performance, but was negatively associated with accounting performance. Conversely, we found that a higher proportion of family members on boards had no discernable effect on performance. Our findings provide further insights on the relationship between the type of institutions encountered in many emerging markets, internal corporate governance configurations and firm performance.     

Corporate Philanthropy and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China

How to mitigate stock price crash risk has become a focus in the theoretical and practical fields. Building on the work of Kim et al. (J Bank Finance, 43:1–13, 2014b), this paper investigates the relation between corporate philanthropy and crash risk under the unique Chinese institutional background. The results show that both state ownership and the 2005 split share reform attenuate the mitigating effect of corporate philanthropy on crash risk. Specifically, the negative relation between corporate philanthropy and crash risk is less pronounced for state-owned enterprises than for non-state-owned enterprises, and it is also less pronounced after firms accomplish the split share reform. Further, this effect is more pronounced for firms with greater financial risks and poorer performance. Our paper contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of stock price crash risk and the economic consequences of corporate philanthropy. It also offers useful guidance to firms that are seeking to reduce stock price crash risk in emerging markets.     

CEO duality leadership and corporate diversification behavior

This study examines an important, yet understudied relationship between CEO duality and corporate diversification. Results based on the data collected from Fortune 1000 U.S companies indicate that CEO duality is positively associated with corporate diversification into unrelated industries. Further analyses reveal that this relationship is moderated by a number of corporate governance mechanisms. We find that board equity ownership and institutional ownership concentration weaken the initially positive relationship between CEO duality and unrelated diversification while CEO tenure and board independence strengthen this relationship.