Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and Corporate Balance Sheets

Abstract. This paper studies how the exposure of a country's corporate sector to interest rate and exchange rate changes affects the probability of a currency crisis. To analyze this question, we present a model that defines currency crises as situations in which the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate exceed the costs of abandonment. The results show that a higher exposure to interest rate changes increases the probability of crisis through an increased need for output loss compensation and an increased efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output. A higher exposure to exchange rate changes also increases the need for output loss compensation. However, it lowers the efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output through the adverse balance sheet effects of exchange rate depreciation. As a result, its effect on the probability of crisis is ambiguous.     

Liquidity and Twin Crises

This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for understanding 'twin crises'– i.e. crises where a currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The distinguishing feature of such crises is the spill‐over effects across financial institutions through collateral constraints, declines in market values of assets, currency mismatches on the balance sheet and the endogenous amplification of financial distress through asset sales. We explore the role of liquidity and the role of monetary policy in such crises. In particular, a central question is whether raising interest rates in the face of a twin crisis is the appropriate policy response. Raising interest rates has two countervailing effects. Holding the domestic currency becomes more attractive (other things being equal), but the value of the domestic banking system falls due to the fall in asset prices. When assets are marked to market, there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. It is thus possible that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating both the currency crisis and the banking crisis.     

Cross-country differences in monetary policy execution and money market rates’ volatility

Volatility patterns in overnight interest rates display differences across industrial countries that existing models—designed to replicate the features of individual countries’ markets—cannot account for. This paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches cross-country differences in patterns in interest volatility by incorporating differences in how central banks manage liquidity in response to shocks. Our model is consistent with central banks’ practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short-term interest rates conflicts with another high-frequency objective, such as an exchange rate target.     

Financial systems and the cost channel transmission of monetary policy shocks

We study the role of financial systems for the cost channel transmission of monetary policy in a calibrated business cycle model. We characterize financial systems by the share of bank-dependent firms and by the degree of the pass-through from policy to bank lending rates, for which we provide empirical estimates for the euro area and the US. For plausible calibrations of the dynamics of the lending rate we find that the cost effects directly related to interest rate movements have only a limited effect on the transmission mechanism.     

Sudden stops and the Mexican wave: Currency crises,capital flow reversals and output loss in emerging markets

Sudden stops are the simultaneous occurrence of a currency/balance of payments crisis with a reversal in capital flows. We investigate whether sudden-stop crises are a unique phenomenon and whether they entail an especially large and abrupt pattern of output collapse (a “Mexican wave”). Using a panel data set over 1975–1997 and covering 24 emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. Sudden-stop crises have a large negative, but short-lived, impact on output growth over and above that found with currency crises. A currency crisis typically reduces output by about 2–3%, while a sudden stop reduces output by an additional 6–8% in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a sudden stop is even larger, around 13–15% over a 3-year period. Our model estimates correspond closely to the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain well the sudden (and seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997–1998 Asian Crisis.     

Household lending, interest rates and housing price bubbles in Korea: Regime switching model and Kalman filter approach

This study investigates whether interest rates and household lending caused housing price bubbles in Korea over the period of 1986 to 2003. Using a regime-switching model, we found evidence of the existence of housing price bubbles throughout the sample period, with the exception of 1998 when Korea suffered from a financial crisis. Using a Kalman filter technique, we estimated the size of housing price bubbles for the sample period. Finally, using generalized impulse response function analysis and variance decompositions, we found that housing price bubbles increased with household lending and industrial production, whereas they decreased with interest rate; this latter effect is relatively small, however. Policy implications include the importance of preemptive intervention on household lending in order to contain housing price bubbles, but interest rates appear to be a less effective policy tool.     

An almost‐too‐late warning mechanism for currency crises1

We propose exploiting the term structure of relative interest rates to obtain estimates of changes in the timing of a currency crisis as perceived by market participants. Our indicator can be used to evaluate the relative probability of a crisis occurring in one week as compared to a crisis happening after one week but in less than a month. We give empirical evidence that the indicator performs well for two important currency crises in Eastern Europe: the crisis in the Czech Republic in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998.     

Speculative attacks and defenses as wars of attrition

This paper extends the currency crisis models in Obstfeld [Obstfeld, M., 1994. The logic of currency crises. Cahiers Economiques et Monetaries], [Obstfeld, M., 1996. Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features. European Economic Review 40, 1037–1047] by modeling both the government's side and speculators' side and introducing uncertainty about each party's payoff. We argue that a speculative attack (defense) can be well modeled as a war of attrition between the government and speculators under asymmetric information. We then solve for a pure strategy, weakly perfect, Bayesian rational expectation equilibrium in which each party's time until concession depends on her benefits from winning and her costs of fighting. Using this model, we are able to explain important facts of currency crises. First, the model shows that failed defenses (attacks) can be ex-ante rational for governments (speculators). Second, the model predicts systematic variations in the durations of defenses. Finally, we also show that currency crises can be self-fulfilling in the sense that there exist multiple rational expectation equilibria in our model.     

Securitisation and the bank lending channel

The dramatic increase in securitisation activity experienced in Europe in the years following the introduction of the euro has altered the liquidity, credit and maturity transformation role traditionally performed by banks. We claim that the changing role of credit intermediaries due to securitisation has also modified the effectiveness of the bank lending channel and banks’ ability to grant loans. We use a novel database of securitisation activity and a large sample of European banks and find that the use of securitisation shelters banks’ loan supply from the effects of monetary policy. Securitisation activity has also strengthened banks’ capacity to supply new loans. This capacity, however, depends on business cycle conditions and, notably, on banks’ risks positions. The recent credit crisis is instructive in this respect.     

Trade credit, bank lending and monetary policy transmission

This paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission of monetary policy. Most models of the transmission mechanism allow firms to access only financial markets or bank lending according to some net worth criterion. In our model we consider external finance from trade credit as an additional source of funding for firms that cannot obtain credit from banks. We predict that when monetary policy tightens there will be a reduction in bank lending relative to trade credit. This is confirmed with an empirical investigation of 16,000 UK manufacturing firms.     

The bank lending channel of monetary policy in EU countries during the global financial crisis

The study examines the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in European Union (EU) countries. The paper advances current research on the monetary transmission mechanism in the following ways: Firstly, we analyze the differences between ‘old’ Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and ‘new’ EU countries. Secondly, we examine the key bank characteristics and monetary policy indicators that may have an impact on the bank lending channel. We assume that short-term market interest rates and monetary aggregate M2 affect banks' activities. We apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) with pooled data from 1999 to 2012. We show that in the pre-crisis period the effect of changing the short-term market interest rates on the bank lending channel of monetary policy is more pronounced among ‘old’ EMU countries, whereas the effect of M2 is significant during the period of the global financial crisis (GFC) among ‘old’ EMU countries. Last but not least the important finding is that banks in ‘new’ EU countries react differently to monetary shocks.     

Transmission of monetary policy and exchange rate shocks under foreign currency lending

This paper analyses the differences in reaction of domestic and foreign currency lending to monetary and exchange rate shocks, using a panel VAR model estimated for the three biggest Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary). Our results point toward a drop in domestic currency loans and an increase of foreign currency credit in reaction to monetary policy tightening in Poland and Hungary, suggesting that the presence of foreign currency debt weakens the transmission of monetary policy. A currency depreciation shock leads to an initial decline in foreign currency lending, but also in loans denominated in domestic currency as central banks react to a weaker exchange rate by increasing the interest rates. However, after several quarters, credit in foreign currency accelerates, indicating that borrowers start using it to substitute for depressed domestic currency lending.     

Evaluating currency crises: A Bayesian Markov switching approach

In this paper we examine the nature of a currency crisis. We do so by employing an out-of-sample forecasting exercise to analyse the Mexican crisis in 1994. Forecast evaluation was based on modern econometric techniques concerning the shape of forecaster’s loss function. We also extend the empirical framework suggested by Jeanne and Masson [Jeanne, O., Masson, P., 2000. Currency crises and Markov-switching regimes. Journal of International Economics 50, 327–350] to test for the hypothesis that the currency crisis was driven by sunspots. To this end we contribute to the existing literature by comparing Markov regime switching model with a time-varying transition probabilities with two alternative models. The first is a Markov regime switching model with constant transition probabilities. The second is a linear benchmark model. Empirical results show that the proxy for the probability of devaluation is an important factor explaining the nature of currency crisis. More concretely, when the expectation market pressure was used as a proxy of probability of devaluation, forecast evaluation supports the view that currency crisis was driven by market expectation unrelated to fundamentals. Alternatively, when interest rate differential is used as a proxy for probability of devaluation, currency crisis was due to predictable deterioration of fundamentals.     

Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?

Banks attitude towards speculative lending is typically regarded as the result of trading-off the short-term gains from risk-taking against the risk of loss of charter value. We study the trade-off between stability and competition in a dynamic setting where charter value depends on future market competition. Promoting the takeover of failed banks by solvent institutions results in greater market concentration and larger rents for the surviving incumbents. This converts banks’ speculative lending decisions into strategic substitutes, granting an additional incentive to remain solvent. Entry policy may subsequently serve to fine-tune the trade-off between competition and stability.     

Bank lending and interest on excess reserves: An empirical investigation

This paper econometrically tests for effects on bank lending of the Federal Reserve’s policy of paying interest on excess reserves (IOER). Following the 2008 financial crisis, US banks decreased their loan allocations and increased holdings of excess reserves. A model of bank asset allocation shows that when the rate of IOER is higher than other short-term rates, banks will switch from zero excess reserves to a regime with higher excess reserves and lower lending. Using a sample of panel data on US banks from 2000 through 2018, we find evidence of a switch to a positive excess reserve regime in the post-crisis period. Controlling for market interest rates, loan demand, and economic activity, we find that IOER accounts for the majority of the decline in bank lending after the financial crisis.     

A methodology for constructing a financial systemic stress index: An application to Greece

The paper develops a financial systemic stress index (FSSI) for Greece. We present a novel methodology for constructing and evaluating a systemic stress index which i) adopts the suggestion of Hollo et al. (2012) [“CISS — A ‘Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress’ in the Financial System” ECB working paper] to incorporate time-varying correlations between different market segments, but uses a multivariate GARCH approach which is able to capture abrupt changes in correlations, shown to be a prerequisite for correctly identifying financial crises, ii) utilizes both market and balance sheet data which is a novel feature for systemic stress indicators and iii) evaluates the FSSI utilizing the results of a survey, conducted among financial experts, in order to construct a benchmark chronology of financial crises for Greece, which in turn is used to investigate whether changes in the FSSI are good leading indicators for financial crises. The results show that the FSSI is able to provide a precise periodization of crises. Our findings suggest that accurate depiction of the systematic nature of stress is pivotal in order to provide proper policy guidance with respect to financial crisis identification.     

Policy Measures to Alleviate Foreign Currency Liquidity Shortages under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard

During the recent global financial crisis, certain central banks introduced two innovative cross‐border operations to deal with the problems of foreign currency liquidity shortages: domestic liquidity operations using cross‐border collateral and operations that supply foreign currency among central banks based on standing swap lines. We show theoretically that central banks improve the efficiency of equilibrium under foreign currency liquidity shortages using these two innovative temporary policy measures.     

Monetary Policy in the Aftermath of Currency Crises: The Case of Asia

The paper evaluates monetary policy and its relationship with the exchange rate in the five Asian crisis countries. The findings are compared with previous currency crises in recent history. It is found that there is no evidence of overly tight monetary policy in the Asian crisis countries in 1997 and early 1998. There is also no evidence that high interest rates led to weaker exchange rates. The usual tradeoff between inflation and output when raising interest rates suggested the need for a softer monetary policy in the crisis countries to combat recession. However, in some countries, corporate balance sheet considerations suggested the need to reverse overly depreciated currencies through firmer monetary policy.     

Evaluating currency crises: the case of the European monetary system

In this paper we examine the nature of currency crises. We ascertain whether the currency crises of the European Monetary System (EMS) were based either on fundamentals, or on self-fulfilling market expectations driven by extrinsic uncertainty. In particular, we extend previous work of Jeanne and Masson (J Int Econ 50:327–350, 2000) regarding the evaluation of currency crisis. We contribute to the existing literature proposing the use of Markov regime-switching with time-varying transition probability model. Our empirical results suggest that the currency crises of the EMS were not due only to market expectations driven by external uncertainty, or ‘sunspots’, but also to fundamental variables that help to explain the behavior of market expectations. We would like to thank Joseph Byrne, James Mitchell, Martin Weale and two anonymous referees for very useful comments and suggestions.     

Currency crises and the real economy: The role of banks

This paper attempts to explain the divergent output effects of currency crises through a very simple and intuitive model that relates the effects of a devaluation not only to the financial fragility of banks, but also to the degree of financial market imperfection. The model shows that countries with higher degrees of financial market imperfection and/or a banking sector whose balance sheets are weak, in terms of having low net worth and high foreign currency exposure, are much more likely to suffer a contraction in the wake of a currency crisis.