Speculative attacks and defenses as wars of attrition

This paper extends the currency crisis models in Obstfeld [Obstfeld, M., 1994. The logic of currency crises. Cahiers Economiques et Monetaries], [Obstfeld, M., 1996. Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features. European Economic Review 40, 1037–1047] by modeling both the government's side and speculators' side and introducing uncertainty about each party's payoff. We argue that a speculative attack (defense) can be well modeled as a war of attrition between the government and speculators under asymmetric information. We then solve for a pure strategy, weakly perfect, Bayesian rational expectation equilibrium in which each party's time until concession depends on her benefits from winning and her costs of fighting. Using this model, we are able to explain important facts of currency crises. First, the model shows that failed defenses (attacks) can be ex-ante rational for governments (speculators). Second, the model predicts systematic variations in the durations of defenses. Finally, we also show that currency crises can be self-fulfilling in the sense that there exist multiple rational expectation equilibria in our model.     

Currency crises and the real economy: The role of banks

This paper attempts to explain the divergent output effects of currency crises through a very simple and intuitive model that relates the effects of a devaluation not only to the financial fragility of banks, but also to the degree of financial market imperfection. The model shows that countries with higher degrees of financial market imperfection and/or a banking sector whose balance sheets are weak, in terms of having low net worth and high foreign currency exposure, are much more likely to suffer a contraction in the wake of a currency crisis.     

Fixed Exchange Rates and Banking Crises: When Does the Former Prevent the Latter?

Because monetary policy is constrained in fixed exchange rate regimes, banks should expect fewer money‐financed bailouts and therefore manage their risks more carefully when exchange rates are fixed than when they are flexible. It follows that we should observe fewer banking crises in countries with formal currency pegs. The 1990s however are littered with occurrences of banking crises in countries with fixed exchange rates. This paper asks whether banks in those countries could have adopted excess risk expecting money‐financed bailouts or whether their pegs discouraged such moral hazard‐type risks.     

Fiscal Trends and Self-Fulfilling Crises

This paper develops a second-generation currency crisis model with endogenously changing fundamentals. Previous second-generation models are static, e.g. Obstfeld (1994 ), or dynamic with exogenous paths of fundamentals, e.g. Obstfeld (1986 ). In our model, the government weighs the disutility of making fundamentals consistent with a peg against a penalty for floating. If the former dominates, the government runs expansionary policies, precipitating a crisis. For some parameters, self-fulfilling speculation affects when the crisis happens, but not whether it happens. For other values, there are "purely self-fulfilling" crises, where a peg that could have survived forever collapses if attacked in the first few periods.     

The role of (non-)transparency in a currency crisis model

This paper extends the work by Morris and Shin (Am. Econom. Rev. 88 (1998) 587-597) where multiple equilibria in the self-fulfilling currency attack models can be reduced to a unique equilibrium when agents observe fundamentals privately with small errors. We find that under a more general specification with realistic parameters, noisy private observations are generally insufficient to prevent the multiplicity of equilibria. The pivotal role played by the transparency of fundamentals/policies in currency crisis is also examined. Surprisingly, transparency may trigger rather than eliminate currency crises when fundamentals are relatively healthy. Our results may be relevant to research in other coordination problems.     

Policy Measures to Alleviate Foreign Currency Liquidity Shortages under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard

During the recent global financial crisis, certain central banks introduced two innovative cross‐border operations to deal with the problems of foreign currency liquidity shortages: domestic liquidity operations using cross‐border collateral and operations that supply foreign currency among central banks based on standing swap lines. We show theoretically that central banks improve the efficiency of equilibrium under foreign currency liquidity shortages using these two innovative temporary policy measures.     

Evaluating currency crises: the case of the European monetary system

In this paper we examine the nature of currency crises. We ascertain whether the currency crises of the European Monetary System (EMS) were based either on fundamentals, or on self-fulfilling market expectations driven by extrinsic uncertainty. In particular, we extend previous work of Jeanne and Masson (J Int Econ 50:327–350, 2000) regarding the evaluation of currency crisis. We contribute to the existing literature proposing the use of Markov regime-switching with time-varying transition probability model. Our empirical results suggest that the currency crises of the EMS were not due only to market expectations driven by external uncertainty, or ‘sunspots’, but also to fundamental variables that help to explain the behavior of market expectations. We would like to thank Joseph Byrne, James Mitchell, Martin Weale and two anonymous referees for very useful comments and suggestions.     

A corporate balance-sheet approach to currency crises

This paper presents a general equilibrium currency crisis model of the ‘third generation’, in which the possibility of currency crises is driven by the interplay between private firms’ credit-constraints and nominal price rigidities. Despite our emphasis on microfoundations, the model remains sufficiently simple that the policy analysis can be conducted graphically. The analysis hinges on four main features (i) ex post deviations from purchasing power parity; (ii) credit constraints a la Bernanke-Gertler; (iii) foreign currency borrowing by domestic firms; (iv) a competitive banking sector lending to firms and holding reserves and a monetary policy conducted either through open market operations or short-term lending facilities. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a sunspot equilibrium with currency crises. We show that an interest rate increase intended to support the currency in a crisis may not be effective, but that a relaxation of short-term lending facilities can make this policy effective by attenuating the rise in interest rates relevant to firms.     

Empirical models of short-term debt and crises: Do they test the creditor run hypothesis?

A positive correlation between short-term debt and crises has been interpreted as evidence in favor of self-fulfilling creditor runs, which have been blamed for financial crises in developing countries. We show that this correlation can also be explained by a standard model of optimal borrowing without creditor runs. In such a model, imposing capital controls on short-term external debt is not Pareto-improving.     

Forex interventions and exchange rate exposure: Evidence from emerging market firms

Foreign exchange (forex) interventions by central banks have recently become too frequent in emerging markets. The effects of these interventions on exchange rate volatility are widely documented, but their implications for firm-level outcomes have rarely been examined. This study argues that forex interventions should influence the sensitivity of firms’ cash flows to currency movements. Accordingly, I address a novel question regarding the effect of forex interventions on emerging market firms’ exchange rate risk exposure. I find an asymmetric effect, such that the impact of forex purchase interventions differs from that of forex sale interventions. Moreover, the positive effects of forex sale interventions on the magnitude of firms’ exposure are more pronounced during depreciation periods. Study findings imply that firms remain unhedged, given that interventions are perceived as implicit government guarantees against currency fluctuations. Credible communication from policymakers regarding the motives for interventions by central banks would assist in alerting firms to potential currency risks.     

The Government's Foreign Debt in the Argentine Crisis

Though the government had adopted a currency board regime since 1991, the Argentine economy suffered a currency crisis in 2002. It is shown that currency crises can arise, even under currency board systems in which the central bank has enough international reserves to respond to arbitrary withdrawals by individuals. The model implies that a government's rapid accumulation of foreign debt should be included as a major predictor of currency crises.     

Currency substitution, portfolio diversification, and money demand

Abstract .  We extend the Thomas (1985) dynamic optimizing model of money demand and currency substitution to the case in which the individual has restricted or no access to foreign currency denominated bonds. In this case currency substitution decisions and asset substitution decisions are not separable. The results obtained suggest that the significance of an expected exchange rate depreciation term in the demand for domestic money provides a valid test for the presence of currency substitution. Applying this approach to six Latin-American countries, we find evidence of currency substitution in Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, but not in Brazil and Chile.     

Sudden stops: Determinants and output effects in the first era of globalization, 1880-1913

We study the determinants and output effects of sudden stops in capital inflows during an era of intensified globalization from 1880 to 1913. Higher levels of exposure to foreign currency debt and large current account deficits associated with reliance on foreign capital greatly increased the likelihood of experiencing a sudden stop. Trade openness and strong reserve positions had the opposite effect. Sudden stops accompanied by financial crises are associated with drops in output per capita below trend equal to three to four percent. Frictions in the international capital markets of the day are a likely candidate for these output losses. Sudden stops connected with crises do not seem to bring trend growth downwards. Sudden stops not connected with crises appear to be associated with significant declines in trend growth.     

Liquidity and Twin Crises

This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for understanding 'twin crises'– i.e. crises where a currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The distinguishing feature of such crises is the spill‐over effects across financial institutions through collateral constraints, declines in market values of assets, currency mismatches on the balance sheet and the endogenous amplification of financial distress through asset sales. We explore the role of liquidity and the role of monetary policy in such crises. In particular, a central question is whether raising interest rates in the face of a twin crisis is the appropriate policy response. Raising interest rates has two countervailing effects. Holding the domestic currency becomes more attractive (other things being equal), but the value of the domestic banking system falls due to the fall in asset prices. When assets are marked to market, there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. It is thus possible that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating both the currency crisis and the banking crisis.     

Banking crises in monetary economies

Abstract.  This paper analyzes the effect of inflation on banking crises in a model in which money and banks play essential roles. The model's equilibrium replicates some key features of actual banking crises, namely, the partial suspension of payments and the desire to hold cash even in the absence of pressing liquidity needs. When banks have access to a stable foreign currency, inflation has a threshold effect on banking crises: higher inflation reduces the likelihood of crises when inflation is below the threshold; the reverse happens when inflation exceeds the threshold. This result appears to be broadly consistent with available evidence.     

放弃成本、政府偏好与资本控制:一个审慎的机会主义汇率制度选择模型

本文在Obstfeld(1 996)第二代货币危机模型的基础上 ,建立了一个考虑经济结构、供给冲击以及金融风险的多因素汇率制度选择模型 ,以成本分析为工具解释了资本控制、各类成本和政府偏好对均衡的影响以及对汇率制度选择的影响。研究表明 :(1 )资本控制可以通过多种途径对均衡产生影响 ,在一定条件下可以利用资本控制措施使经济避免多重均衡 ;(2 )放弃成本对汇率制度选择发挥关键作用 ;(3 )较大的政府偏好促使政府选择固定汇率制度 ,在放弃成本不足够大的条件下 ,决策者也可以通过提高政府偏好或者实施资本控制措施来保护本国固定汇率制度 ;(4)对人民币现行汇率制度的放弃成本的估计表明 ,当前人民币汇率制度放弃成本正处于中间水平 ,因此有必要增大政府对固定汇率制度的偏好并且对资本帐户实施适度管理以保持人民币汇率的稳定 ,防范金融风险。至于未来人民币汇率波动幅度的扩大、资本项目自由化的进程以及人民币汇率制度何时回归真正的“管理浮动” ,应主要取决于人民币汇率制度放弃成本的有效降低     

Sudden stops and the Mexican wave: Currency crises,capital flow reversals and output loss in emerging markets

Sudden stops are the simultaneous occurrence of a currency/balance of payments crisis with a reversal in capital flows. We investigate whether sudden-stop crises are a unique phenomenon and whether they entail an especially large and abrupt pattern of output collapse (a “Mexican wave”). Using a panel data set over 1975–1997 and covering 24 emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. Sudden-stop crises have a large negative, but short-lived, impact on output growth over and above that found with currency crises. A currency crisis typically reduces output by about 2–3%, while a sudden stop reduces output by an additional 6–8% in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a sudden stop is even larger, around 13–15% over a 3-year period. Our model estimates correspond closely to the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain well the sudden (and seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997–1998 Asian Crisis.     

Self-fulfilling Currency Crises and Central Bank Independence

We develop a model of a fixed exchange rate peg arrangement derived from the Barro–Gordon model of rules versus discretion. It is shown that the fixed peg is vulnerable to self-fulfilling currency crises in which the unemployment rate increases, the credibility of the rule decreases, but, paradoxically, the reputation of the policy-maker improves. Delegating monetary policy to an independent central banker does not prevent this type of crisis from arising, and can even make it more costly.
JEL Classification: F 3; F 4     

Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation

We characterize optimal debt policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of defaults and devaluations in which self-fulfilling crises can arise. When the government cannot commit to repay its debt and cannot commit to maintain the exchange rate, consumers’ expectations of devaluation make the safe level of government debt very low. We show that, when the debt is in the crises zone—where self-fulfilling crisis can occur—the government finds it optimal to reduce the debt to exit the zone. The lower the probability that consumers assign to devaluation, however, the greater is the number of periods that the government will choose to take to exit the crisis zone. We argue that our model can help understand events in Argentina in 2001–2002 and throw light on some aspects of the current EMU sovereign debt crisis.     

STABILITY OF THAI BAHT: TALES FROM THE TAILS

We demonstrate how the EVT‐based signalling approach for currency crises can be applied to an individual country with a small sample size. Using Thai historical data, first, we study the tail characteristics of the distributions of two Thai baht instability measures and 21 economic fundamentals. Then, we test asymptotic dependence between the currency instability measures and lagged economic fundamentals. Empirically, we find that the distributions of both currency instability measures and economic variables are heavy tailed. Assuming a normal distribution for the variables tends to underestimate the probability of extreme events. Furthermore, most of the economic variables which are usually used as signalling indicators for currency crises are asymptotically independent of the currency instability measures. Signals issued by these variables are thus not reliable. Nevertheless, the non‐parametric EVT approach facilitates the selection of economic indicators with credible signals and high crisis prediction success.