Back‐to‐Front Down Under? Part‐Time/Full‐Time Wage Differentials in Australia

We investigate part‐time full‐time hourly wage gaps using panel data from the first four waves of the new Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey. We find that, once unobserved individual heterogeneity has been taken into account, part‐time men and women typically earn an hourly pay premium. This premium varies with casual employment status, but is always positive. We advance some hypotheses as to why there is a part‐time pay advantage in Australia.     

High-Involvement Management and Pay in Britain

High‐involvement management practices have well‐established benefits for employers, but what do they do for employees? Using a nationally‐representative survey of British private‐sector workplaces, high‐involvement management is shown to be associated with higher pay. The wage premium is little affected by the choice of employee involvement practices (e.g., teams versus quality circles), but it appears only where employee involvement practices are supported by job security guarantees. Powerful trade unions increase the premium.     

Underwork,Work‐Hour Insecurity,and A New Approach to Wage and Hour Regulation

When it was passed in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) sought to address the “evils” of underpay and overwork by establishing an hourly minimum wage and requiring premium overtime pay. However, today's low‐wage, hourly workers more often face underwork than overwork, as well as fluctuating, unstable schedules, neither of which is addressed by the FLSA. This paper presents and assesses the effectiveness of an alternative approach to wage and hour regulation, the “reporting pay” guarantee. We begin by examining the problem of work‐hour insecurity, particularly employers’ practice of sending workers home early from scheduled shifts. We then move to a detailed assessment of state laws that require reporting pay, as well as reporting pay guarantees in union contracts and private‐employer practices that attempt to address the problem of work‐hour insecurity. We conclude by considering paths for strengthening such protections in law.     

Public- and Private-Sector Occupational Pay Structures

Data from a representative sample of wage and salary workers are used to estimate wage equations that provide for direct estimates of the differences between public and private occupational pay structures. The results show that at the state and local levels of government in particular, the public/private wage differential tends to decline as occupational skill requirements increase. Public employees who work on jobs unique to the public sector are paid a wage premium. There is little support for the idea that degree of union coverage in the private sector affects public wages for an occupation.     

Who Fared Better? The Fortunes of Performance Pay and Fixed Pay Workers through Recession

Using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, we explore whether the fortunes of employees paid for performance differ from those of fixed pay workers during recession. Only in the bottom quintile of the wage distribution were performance pay employees more likely to experience greater falls in real wages than fixed pay employees. Accounting for fixed unobserved worker characteristics suggests that this was not due to the wage‐setting mechanism itself, but that other factors are likely to be at play. While across most of the earnings distribution there was little evidence of greater wage flexibility among performance pay employees, they did have longer job tenure than fixed pay employees over the recession.     

Collective Bargaining in the Canadian Public Sector, 1978–2008: The Consequences of Restraint and Structural Change

We study public‐sector bargaining and contract outcomes using Canadian data from 1978 to 2008. We have a number of interesting results, but our principal findings are from our analysis of wage settlements. We find that the essential services designation, which only allows non‐essential members of a bargain unit to strike, is associated with decreases in wages. Our estimates also suggest that there is an arbitration wage premium and that making adjustments to the ability to pay criterion used by arbitrators to determine awards does not affect this premium. We also discuss the implications of our estimates.     

Organizational governance and employee pay: how ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy

This research investigated how the ownership structure is related to the firm's overall compensation strategy. The findings extend previous research that focused primarily on CEO compensation strategy. We show that there are significant differences in the compensation practices that apply to all employees as a function of the ownership structure. The results show that for owner‐controlled firms and owner‐managed firms there is significant pay/performance sensitivity for all employees. In management‐controlled firms, changes in pay are related to changes in size of the firm. These findings lead us to conclude that ownership structure not only affects upper management's pay, but also the pay of all employees through substantial differences in the firm's compensation practices. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Public- and Private-Sector Wage Differentials in Canada Revisited

Using a variety of techniques, we estimate the wage premium for federal, provincial, and municipal public-sector employees in Canada. We find that females in the public sector are paid a wage premium, with federal government workers enjoying the highest rents, followed by local and provincial public-sector employees. Estimates for males suggest that rent payments are comparably less, but results are inconclusive.     

HRM Practices and the Within‐Firm Gender Wage Gap

The effect of HRM practices on the within‐firm gender gap in wages in manufacturing is investigated merging a 1999 survey on work practices among Danish firms to matched employer–employee panel data. Self‐managed teams, project organization and job rotation schemes are the most widely introduced practices. Accounting for non‐randomness in adoption, the pay gap is reduced among hourly paid workers but increases among salaried workers. Considering practices individually, wage gains from adoption accrue to males except for salaried workers in firms that adopt project organization and for hourly paid workers in firms that introduce quality control circles.     

The Wage–Health Insurance Trade‐off and Worker Selection: Evidence From the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 1997 to 2006

Key provisions within healthcare reform will likely further increase the cost of employer‐sponsored insurance. Theory suggests that workers pay for their health insurance through a wage offset. We investigate this issue using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. GMM estimates aimed at correcting for endogenous worker mobility reveal evidence of a trade‐off for workers who are offered health insurance as the only fringe benefit. On the other hand, employees in establishments with a more comprehensive set of benefits enjoy higher wages relative to employees in establishments that offer no benefits. Health also affects the wage–health insurance trade‐off.     

Bringing Home the Bacon: The Relationships among Breadwinner Role,Performance, and Pay

We evaluate the relationships among breadwinner role, performance, and pay. Differences in pay are present despite limited differences in performance. We find a pay premium for primary‐breadwinner employees across gender, yet a pay penalty for secondary‐breadwinners employees only for women, suggesting an asymmetric relationship among breadwinner role, gender, and pay.     

Effects of Occupational Licensing and Unions on Labour Market Earnings in Canada

Using longitudinal data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics from 1999 to 2011, the article compares the pay and benefits of licensed and unionized workers. In a cross section of respondents and using ordinary least squares estimates, it finds a pay premium of 0.155 log points for those with an occupational licence compared to those without one; the comparable union wage premium is slightly more than half, that is 0.085 log points. Fixed‐effects estimates go in the opposite direction (0.028 and 0.046 log points for licensing and unionization, respectively), suggesting the existence of unobservable factors correlated with licensing and union status. Unionized workers are more likely to access standard benefits, such as medical insurance and pension plans, but licensed workers benefit little from their licensing status in access to benefits. Finally, union workers are significantly less likely to receive incentive pay, such as profit sharing, while the association between occupational licensing and incentive pay is close to zero and statistically insignificant.     

Do Broad‐based Employee Ownership,Profit Sharing and Stock Options Help the Best Firms Do Even Better?

This article analyses the linkages among group incentive methods of compensation (broad‐based employee ownership, profit sharing and stock options), labour practices, worker assessments of workplace culture, turnover and firm performance in firms that applied to the ‘100 Best Companies to Work For in America’ competition from 2005 to 2007. Although employers with good labour practices self‐select into the 100 Best Companies firms sample, which should bias the analysis against finding strong associations among modes of compensation, labour policies and outcomes, we find that employees in the firms that use group incentive pay more extensively participate more in decisions, have greater information sharing, trust supervisors more and report a more positive workplace culture than in other companies. The combination of group incentive pay with policies that empower employees and create a positive workplace culture reduces voluntary turnover and increases employee intent to stay and raises return on equity.     

Who Works for Whom and the UK Gender Pay Gap

This study reports novel facts about the UK gender pay gap. We use a representative, longitudinal and linked employer–employee dataset for 2002–2016. Men's average log hourly wage was 22 points higher than women's in this period. We find that 16 per cent of this raw pay gap is accounted for by estimated firm-specific wage effects. This is almost three times the amount explained by gender occupation differences. When we decompose a pre-adjusted measure of the pay gap, we find less than 1 percentage point or a 6 per cent share is accounted for by the gender allocation across high- and low-wage firms. In other words, only a small share of what is traditionally referred to as the ‘unexplained’ part of the pay gap is explained by the differences between men and women in whom they work for.     

Does Wage Rank Affect Employees’ Well‐being?

How do workers make wage comparisons? Both an experimental study and an analysis of 16,000 British employees are reported. Satisfaction and well‐being levels are shown to depend on more than simple relative pay. They depend upon the ordinal rank of an individual's wage within a comparison group. “Rank” itself thus seems to matter to human beings. Moreover, consistent with psychological theory, quits in a workplace are correlated with pay distribution skewness.     

Does Individualizing the Labor Contract Hurt Women?

The twenty‐first century has been marked by a retreat of the collective bargaining rights of public employees throughout the United States. This study exploits the variation in legal environments resulting from these reforms to estimate the causal impact of different collective bargaining policies on public employee compensation. Using data from the American Community Survey, results show a modest wage penalty at the aggregate level for employees covered by constraints on collective bargaining. However, this wage penalty is differential and is concentrated on women in all but one case—a legal environment in which collective bargaining over wages has either been prohibited or directly constricted, allowing governments to periodically institute wage freezes and caps on raises for public employees. In this case, a pre‐existing wage gap in which men earned more than women is disappearing as male and female earnings converge at a lower wage. The paper suggests that the long‐term effects of restricting collective bargaining occur through the individualization of the labor contract and should be examined along individual‐level characteristics, such as gender.     

Entry deregulation,firm organization,and wage inequality

This paper identifies a causal link between changes in product market competition, firm reorganization and within-firm wage inequality. We exploit a unique episode of comprehensive firm entry deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment and use exceptionally detailed linked employer-employee data for the universe of private sector firms and workers in Portugal. Following deregulation affected firms flatten their hierarchies: the number of layers is reduced and managers’ span of control increased. Dropping a hierarchy layer is accompanied by a significant reduction in wage inequality within the firm, by 8% for the average pay ratio between the top and the bottom layer and 4.4% for the 90-50 percentile wage ratio, showing that there are real changes arising from firm reorganization. Overall wage dispersion, measured by the standard deviation of hourly pay, is also reduced. We discuss mechanisms and interpretations for these changes.     

Pay Secrecy and the Gender Wage Gap in the United States

Legislators and advocates claim that pay secrecy perpetuates the gender wage gap and that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) should be amended to outlaw these practices. Using a difference‐in‐differences fixed‐effects human‐capital wage regression, I find that women with higher education levels who live in states that have outlawed pay secrecy have higher earnings, and that the wage gap is consequently reduced. State bans on pay secrecy and federal legislation to amend the FLSA to allow workers to share information about their wages may improve the gender wage gap, especially among women with college or graduate degrees.     

The Greek Public Sector Wage Premium before the Crisis: Size,Selection and Relative Valuation of Characteristics

We examine the Greek public–private wage differential before the debt crisis to evaluate the prospective impact of the recent public sector pay cuts. We find a large public premium which persists after controlling for individual and job characteristics. For men, much of this is accounted for by self‐selection into the sector that rewards better their characteristics, while for women it is largely driven by sectoral differences in returns. We attribute these effects to more egalitarian pay structures in the public sector and to demand problems in the private sector. The recent policy measures only partially change this situation, as wage deflation extends to the private sector, preserving public premia for the low paid.     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.