Product standards, trade disputes, and protectionism

Abstract.  Disputes over national product standards are a major source of tension in international trade negotiations. The usual pattern is that exporters challenge new product standards as a 'disguised barrier to trade.' The paper develops a two‐country political agency model of standard setting. It is shown that there exists a political equilibrium in which the importing country on average applies a more stringent standard than the exporting country. This difference can be due either to a too lax standard in the exporting country or a too stringent standard in the importing country. JEL classification: F18, F13, D72     

Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying

This paper assesses the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs) in the presence of lobbying by organized foreign interest groups. The assessment is based on a model in which external tariffs and the decision to form an FTA are endogenously determined. The findings demonstrate that, in the presence of an organized lobby group in a prospective partner country, an FTA may initiate an increase in the level of protection against imports from third countries and impede trade with non‐member countries. Further, this study finds that a foreign lobby may encourage the local government to enter a welfare‐reducing trade‐diverting FTA. Finally, this paper shows that an FTA increases the lobbying power of the organized lobby groups of the member countries, which can potentially obstruct the viability of welfare‐improving multilateral trade liberalization.     

Endogenous trade policy in general equilibrium: An interaction of redistribution rule,trade openness,and labor market condition

Using a general equilibrium framework, the paper derives trade policy endogenously for a small country. It shows that, contrary to the existing literature, a lobbying industry is not guaranteed trade protection; it may even face trade taxes. Besides lobbying, trade policy depends on other factors such as the trade revenue distribution rule, income distribution across groups, trade openness, factor substitutability in production, industry employment size, and labor market flexibility. The paper also shows that the observed phenomenon of government preference for import tariffs over export subsidies—a long overdue puzzle—is an inherent outcome of lobbying equilibrium. It also shows that trade policies such as import tariffs and export taxes that have the same impact on economic market—Lerner symmetry (1936)—are driven by the same forces in the political market.     

Common markets and trade liberalization

Abstract.  The GATT Rounds show that trade liberalization is essentially a cooperative non‐stationary dynamic process. Therefore, the impact of Regionalism on trade liberalization possibly changes over time. I adapt the trade liberalization model of Devereux (1997) to examine how this impact varies. Common markets lead to a one‐time shock in immediate tariffs, as well as to a change in their rate of decline. I find that common markets that happen late in the trade liberalization process are more likely to lead to a decline in immediate tariffs. Common markets also increase the rate of decline of tariffs after their formation. JEL Classification: F03, F15     

Inequality and trade

Abstract.  We incorporate demand‐side considerations in trade in a systematic but straightforward way. We do so by focusing on the role of inequality in the determination of trade flows and patterns. With non‐homothetic preferences, when countries are similar in all respects but asset inequality, we find that trade is driven by specialization in consumption , not production. Besides, these assumptions allow us to generate some interesting international spillover effects of redistributive policies. Finally, we study a model of monopolistic competition and find a novel V‐shaped relationship between the ratio of inter‐industry to intra‐industry trade and a country's inequality. JEL classification: F11, F12     

A factor endowment theory of international trade under imperfect competition and increasing returns

Abstract.  Constructing a two‐good (competitive and imperfectly‐competitive goods), two‐primary factor (capital and labor) and two‐country model of international trade where the imperfectly‐competitive sector is subject to increasing returns to scale, we establish an oligopolistic version of the Heckscher‐Ohlin theorem. JEL classification: F10, F12     

The determinants of bilateral trade

Abstract.  In this paper we present a monopolistic competition model that incorporates asymmetric trade barriers and international differences in production costs. The model implies a highly non‐linear bilateral trade equation. Estimation of this equation yields parameters for the elasticity of substitution and trade costs that are more reasonable than those found in previous studies. A simulation indicates that trade liberalization will shift trade from rich countries to poor countries and from within continental trading partners with preferential trade agreements to intercontinental trading partners. JEL Classification: F1     

Preferential trade areas, multinational enterprises, and welfare

Abstract.  The effects of preferential trade areas (PTAs) on the investments by multinational enterprises and their implications for the welfare of members and non‐members are studied in a model with two types of firms: national firms and multinational firms. In the presence of multinational activity PTAs can create new investment as well as divert investment from non‐members to members. Both affect the welfare of members positively. More interestingly, if the investment creation effect of a PTA is sufficiently strong, then the PTA could be welfare enhancing for non‐members as well. JEL classification: F2, L1     

A dynamic model of endogenous trade policy

Empirical evidence suggests that past levels of protection are significant determinants of current levels of protection. We investigate dynamic interactions among interest groups and resulting endogenous links between current and future trade policies. We explore these intertemporal links in a small open economy in which lobbying and tariff policies are the outcome of a dynamic game among factor owners. The model can generate cycles with prolonged periods of free trade and/or prolonged periods of restricted trade (i.e., persistent trade policies). An interesting aspect of the environment is the role of lobbying as a partial substitute for intertemporal trade. JEL Classification: F13, C73
Un modèle dynamique de politique commerciale endogène. Les résultats d'analyses empiriques montrent que les niveaux passés de protection sont des facteurs importants dans l'explication des niveaux de protection actuels. Ce mémoire analyse les interactions dynamiques entre groupes d'intérêt et les liens endogènes qui en résultent entre les politiques commerciales présentes et futures. On explore ces liens intertemporels dans une petite économie ouverte où lobbying et politiques tarifaires sont le résultat d'un jeu dynamique entre les propriétaires des facteurs de production. Le modèle peut engendrer des cycles où on observe des périodes prolongées de libre commerce et/ou des périodes prolongées de commerce restreint (i.e. des politiques commerciales persistantes). Il appert que le rôle du lobbying est un substitut partiel pour le commerce intertemporel.     

The silent success of customs unions

Globally, 81 countries are now part of a customs union (CU), following the rapid proliferation of this type of trade agreement in past decades. Much of this growth has been driven by countries “upgrading” their links from a free trade agreement (FTA) to CU. At the same time, the rapid formation of new FTAs among countries that had no prior agreement in place has largely overshadowed this growth, making CUs the silent success of regional integration. Using the canonical regionalism model, augmented to allow for political bias towards firm interests, we investigate the endogenous choice of trade agreement. We show it is generally politically viable to move from FTA to CU, because such a move is rent‐creating; but for countries without a trade agreement in place, it may be optimal to form an FTA as a stepping stone to reduce the risk of political derailment. Importantly, forming a CU is consistent with member social welfare maximization: as long as trade with the rest of the world does not cease entirely, a CU leads to higher social welfare than either FTA or no agreement. These gains come at the expense of third‐country welfare. If past trends continue, one can expect more FTAs to be upgraded to CU with associated adverse consequences for outsiders.     

Cross‐border Lobbying in Preferential Trading Agreements: Implications for External Tariffs and Welfare

This paper examines the effect of cross‐border lobbying on domestic lobbying and on external tariffs in both Customs Union (CU) and Free Trade Area (FTA). We do so by developing a two‐stage game which endogenizes the tariff formation function in a political economic model of the directly unproductive rent‐seeking activities type. We find that cross‐border lobbying un‐ambiguously increases both domestic lobbying and the equilibrium common external tariffs in a CU. The same result also holds for FTA provided tariffs for the member governments are strategic complements. We also develop a specific oligopolistic model of FTA and show that tariffs are indeed strategic complements in such a model.     

The economic and trade effects of the UK–Korea free trade agreement on the United Kingdom,Korea, Japan,China, and the European Union

We explored a comparative static computable general equilibrium model with six regions and 12 sectors to estimate the impacts of the recent UK–Korea free trade agreement (FTA) along with the European Union (EU)–Korea FTA. The empirical results provide quantitative evidence of the impact on national GDP, national exports and imports by sector, and the changes in exports or imports among the United Kingdom, Korea, Japan, China, and the EU. The UK–Korea FTA, along with the EU–Korea FTA, increases GDP and welfare for the United Kingdom and Korea; moreover, there is a large increase in automobiles, transport equipment, and machinery exports between Korea and the United Kingdom. The GDP and welfare level of non-member countries such as Japan and China will slightly decline. Exports from the United Kingdom and Korea to non-member countries are also expected to decrease in most manufacturing sectors. The UK–Korea FTA will lead to increases in imports between the United Kingdom and Korea due to mutual trade creation effects and trade diversion effects. However, non-member countries such as Japan's exports are expected to experience a large decline in automobiles to the United Kingdom and in most manufacturing products to Korea due to the negative impact of the UK–Korea FTA.     

Forest sustainability and trade policies

Many analyses of trade and environment have concluded that trade liberalization is Pareto improvement with Pigovian tax systems even when production and consumption processes bring non-market externalities. But in case of global forest issue there are many accusations that the trade liberalization of forest products has caused the degradation of forest sustainability. In this paper we try to explain the gap between the theory and the real situation from theoretical point of view. We will analyze comprehensively about free trade and forest sustainability by partial and general equilibrium analyses. Pigovian systems work well under the assumption of complete substitutivity of consumption between external effects and marketable commodities. If it were not satisfied, it is inevitable to levy import tariff or to take some domestic price support systems to guide the production point into sustainable forests.     

Lobbying,political competition and the welfare effect of campaign contribution tax

This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign contributions to parties, contingent on the policy position the party adopts. Parties may have different propensities for diverting campaign funds towards rents. We show that a party that skims more from contributions mobilises fewer uninformed voters but places more value on receiving greater contributions. Further, the contributions and vote share of the party increases with the distance between the lobby's preferred policy and the median voter's ideal policy. Finally, we show that the equilibrium policy is between the median voter's ideal point and the lobby's preferred policy. Such an equilibrium policy does not maximise the aggregate social welfare due to the distortionary nature of lobbying. However, when an appropriate contribution tax is introduced to limit this distortion, social welfare will be maximised.     

Information transmission and inefficient lobbying

In a seminal paper, Grossman and Helpman (1994) introduced a framework to understand how lobbying influences the choice of import/export tariffs. In this paper we extend their analysis and assume that lobbies have private information to analyze the effects of information transmission in a Grossman and Helpman lobby game. Information transmission leads to two agency costs. One refers to the cost of signaling and the other to the cost of screening the lobby's competitiveness. The signaling cost reduces distortions resulting from the screening cost. On the other hand, distortions from the screening cost enhance the signaling cost. The two combined effects generate more distortions in the political game than each effect separately. Tariff protection and lobbies' rents are lower than those found in Grossman and Helpman's truthful equilibrium. Therefore, information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of rent-seeking activities.     

The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policies*

This paper applies Grossman and Helpman's (1994 ) common agency model to investigate the formation of strategic export subsidy and strategic import tariff under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, the Grossman–Helpman politically‐determined export policy is identical to the rent‐shifting export policy, which is export subsidy (export tax) in Cournot (Bertrand) competition. The politically‐determined import tariff will be higher than the optimal level. This paper highlights the possibility that lobbying can restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of the benevolent dictator.     

Interest Groups, Trade Liberalization, and Environmental Standards

In considering a country that imposes a minimum standard on an imported polluting good, which generates negative consumption externalities, we construct a common-agency model, in which a domestic environmental group and a foreign industrial lobby can influence the formation of the minimum standard by providing political contributions to the government. This paper investigates the effects of trade liberalization on the political equilibrium environmental standard, the pattern of trade, environmental disutility, and social welfare. We find that trade liberalization tightens the minimum standard, decreases imports of the polluting good, and reduces environmental disutilities. The importing country’s social welfare, however, does not necessarily increase with trade liberalization. The weaker the environmental group’s lobbying efficiency, or the stronger the foreign firm’s lobbying efficiency, the more likely it is that trade liberalization will enhance the importing country’s welfare.     

How close is Asia already to being a trade bloc?

FTA bilateral and regional negotiations in Asia have developed quickly in the past decade moving Asia ever closer to an economic union. This paper uses a fifteen-country global general equilibrium model with trade costs to numerically calculate Debreu distance measures between the present situation and potential full Asia integration in the form of a trade bloc. Our results reveal that these large Asia economies can be close to full integration if they act timely in agreements through negotiation. All Asia countries will gain from Asia trade bloc arrangements except when the Asia FTA can only eliminate tariffs. These countries’ gain will increase as bilateral non-tariff elimination deepens. Larger countries will gain more than small countries. Asia FTA, Asia Union and RCEP will benefit member countries more than ASEAN+3. Global free trade will benefit all countries the most.     

Country asymmetry,trade agreements,and transfers

Using a standard 2 × 2 trade agreement model, I show that the welfare effects of a free trade agreement (FTA) depend on the asymmetry on supply and demand functions. When countries are sufficiently asymmetric with respect to the size or the demand functions, the small country tends to be better off, while the large country is worse off. Thus, the small country must compensate the large country for the FTA to be incentive‐compatible. However, in the presence of sufficient asymmetry in the supply functions, the small country is worse off, while the bigger is better off. In this case, the transfer must flow from the large to the small country. This last finding helps explain why some FTAs between rich and poor countries provide for adjustment transfers to the latter.     

Rules of origin and gains from trade

Free trade areas (FTAs) involve unharmonized tariffs and rules of origin that have prevented proving the formal general equilibrium existence of a welfare-enhancing FTA. This paper identifies the most restrictive limit that rules of origin can enforce and still continue to guarantee gains from trade for FTA formation. We note that many commonly used rules of origin exceed this condition in practice. We apply the identified welfare-supporting rules of origin and prove the existence of a FTA general equilibrium involving only within-FTA transfers that is at least as satisfactory for every consumer as an arbitrary original world trade allocation. The analysis also helps to explain why hub-and-spoke extensions of FTAs cannot be expected to guarantee gains from trade for all participants in general.