Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production

Conventional models of equilibrium unemployment typically imply that proportional taxes on labor earnings are neutral with respect to unemployment as long as the tax does not affect the replacement rate provided by unemployment insurance, i.e. unemployment benefits relative to after–tax earnings. When home production is an option, the conventional results may no longer hold. This paper uses a search equilibrium model with home production to examine the employment and welfare implications of labor taxes. The employment effect of a rise in a proportional tax is found to be negative for sufficiently low replacement rates, whereas it is ambiguous for moderate and high replacement rates. Numerical calibrations of the model indicate that employment generally falls when labor taxes are raised.     

Optimum income taxation and layoff taxes

This paper analyzes optimum income taxation in a model with endogenous job destruction that gives rise to unemployment. It is shown that optimal tax schemes comprise both payroll and layoff taxes when the state provides public unemployment insurance and aims at redistributing income. The optimal layoff tax is equal to the social cost of job destruction, which amounts to the sum of unemployment benefits (that the state pays to unemployed workers) and payroll taxes (that the state does not get when workers are unemployed).     

Unemployment insurance and redistributive taxation

This paper studies the simultaneous determination of the socially optimal levels of unemployment insurance, income taxation and experience rating. It argues that there is a normative justification for state unemployment insurance. When the government wishes to use redistributive taxes, but cannot enforce lump-sum transfers, it is not socially optimal for there to be full experience rating of unemployment insurance schemes: one distortion should be used to off-set another. The state must then intervene in the provision of insurance for those without jobs.     

Effect of labor market policies on unemployment when firms adapt their recruitment strategy

Firms conduct interviews to select who to hire. Their recruitment strategies affect not only the hiring rate but also job destruction rate as more interviews increase the chances of finding the right worker for the job; a link mostly overlooked in the literature. I model this recruitment behavior and investigate the effects of labor market policies on unemployment. These policies change the value of hiring the right worker, altering firms' incentives to conduct interviews. Policies further affect job creation and destruction when firms adapt their recruitment strategies. Net effect of a policy on unemployment depends on the magnitude of change in job creation versus destruction. Qualitative analysis reveals that the effect of a policy on unemployment is mostly weakened with the introduction of firms' recruitment behavior to the model. Firing taxes still increase unemployment, albeit at a lower rate. The effect of hiring subsidies on unemployment is even reversed: Unemployment increases with hiring subsidies if firms adapt. Minimum wage and unemployment insurance policies are also analyzed.     

Labor market dynamics over the business cycle: evidence from Markov switching models

This paper explores the evolution of the U.S. labor market across the business cycle and specifically the relationship between the unemployment rate and the average duration of unemployment. Labor market recoveries have long been thought of as lagging recoveries in broad economic activity. In particular, the unemployment rate peaks several months after official business cycle troughs and the average duration of unemployment lags further behind. Using estimates from Markov switching models of the unemployment rate, average duration of unemployment, jobless claims, and the exhaustion rate of regular unemployment insurance, this paper dates contractionary and expansionary phases of various aspects of the labor market and their relationship to the official phases of the business cycle. Evidence from these models suggests that inflows into unemployment recover almost contemporaneously with broad economic activity, while outflows recover almost a year after the end of official recessions. The differential timing in the recoveries of unemployment inflows and outflows, which is not a characteristic of most macro models of the labor market, accounts for the observed pattern between the unemployment rate and average duration of unemployment. Finally, when comparing the phases of the labor market to periods where Congress extends unemployment insurance benefits, it appears that policymakers target periods where the job finding rate is low, rather than periods where the stock of unemployed workers is high.     

Unions, progressive taxes, and education subsidies

Progressive income taxes moderate distortionary wage demands by trade unions and thereby reduce unemployment, and at the same time underlie disincentives to acquire skills and decrease labour productivity. Governments can respond by combining progressive taxes with subsidies to investment in human capital. A system of generous education subsidies and steep progressive tax rates is more likely to emerge, the greater the market power of trade unions and the better the ability of governments to influence private education decisions. Empirical analysis for several OECD countries provides results consistent with these propositions. A policy mix of high education subsidies and relatively progressive income taxes is found in countries where union membership is significant.     

Economic growth and the employer of last resort: A simple model of flexicurity capitalism

This paper presents a model of economic growth with unemployment due to labor market rigidities. The economy consists of a firm that maximizes profits, of a government and of two types of households that maximize inter-temporal utility. One household supplies skilled labor at the first labor market, the other household supplies simple labor at the second labor market. The government in the economy raises taxes and uses its revenues to employ labor receiving unemployment benefits, to finance transfers to the household in the second labor market and to finance public spending. We analyze both the version with exogenous growth as well as an endogenous growth variant, where growth is made endogenous by assuming positive externalities of capital. The exogenous growth model is characterized by global determinacy while it is locally indeterminate. The endogenous growth model can be globally indeterminate with the high balanced growth path being locally indeterminate and the low balanced growth path being locally determinate. We also study how taxation and how the speed of the wage adjustment affect the economy.     

Employment effects of payroll taxes - an empirical test for Germany

This study tests to what degree the incidence of payroll taxes in Germany is on employment and whether in consequence payroll taxes, in particular social insurance contributions, are the culprit behind the growing unemployment problem. Using industry level data for 18 years (1977–1994) a system of five dynamic factor demand equations is estimated. Various simulations indicate that the employment effects of payroll taxes are minimal.     

Why is mobile capital taxed?

The government for a jurisdiction has both capital and labor taxes at its disposal. It taxes mobile capital to finance the public good despite the desire to attract capital and despite the tax on immobile labor if capital incomes are distributed more unequally than labor incomes among the residents of the jurisdiction. The result extends to progressive taxes and to pure redistribution.     

Factors of Immobility: Why the Unemployment Rate is Slow to Adjust

During the recent recession and the continuing recovery, the national unemployment rate has maintained a level that has only been observed one other time since the Great Depression. While the initial causes of the increased unemployment rate are documented, the adjustment process and reduction of unemployment rates back toward some natural rate has not been addressed empirically. In this paper, the authors analyze labor supply side factors that may cause unemployment rates to remain high for a longer period than the typical recession. The authors focus on the impact of unemployment insurance extensions, housing market contractions and the general breadth of the economic downturn as factors that slow the labor supply adjustment process and lead to prolonged high rates of unemployment.     

Optimal unemployment insurance and redistribution

We characterize optimal income taxation and unemployment insurance in a search‐matching framework where both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous and Nash bargaining determines wages. Individuals decide whether to participate as job seekers and if so, how much search effort to exert. Unemployment insurance trades off insurance versus search and participation incentives. We also allow for different productivity types so there is a redistributive role for the income tax and show that a piecewise linear wage tax internalizes the macro effects arising from endogenous wages. Type‐specific lump‐sum taxes and transfers can then redistribute between individuals of differing skills and employment states. Our analysis embeds optimal unemployment insurance into an extensive‐margin optimal redistribution framework where transfers to the involuntarily and voluntarily unemployed can differ, and nests several standard models in the literature.     

累进性劳动所得税、失业波动与内生稳定器——一个动态新凯恩斯主义的视角

将累进性劳动所得税引入NKMP—DSGE模型中考察失业波动与累进性税收的宏观效应。贝叶斯脉冲响应函数表明,外生冲击对于就业与失业具有不同的冲击效应,因而忽略失业可能引起结论的偏误;失业的贝叶斯冲击分解结果表明,货币政策冲击是推动我国失业波动最重要的力量,并且我国劳动力市场存在显在的“失业回滞”。进一步,通过模型比较发现,累进性劳动所得税具有内生稳定器的作用。在失业问题日益严峻的背景下,采用对劳动力市场做出反应的货币政策机制以降低失业,并使用内生稳定器缓和经济波动,将可能实现降低失业与缓和经济波动的双重效果。     

Unemployment,insurance and smoking

Using recent state-level data from the United States, this article examines new influences on cigarette demand. In particular, we uniquely focus on the effects of unemployment and health insurance coverage on smoking. Results show that higher cigarette prices, a lack of health insurance and restrictions on smoking at home, all lead to reduced smoking. On the other hand, literacy, income, unemployment, workplace smoking restrictions, smokeless tobacco taxes and tobacco-producing states do not seem to have an appreciable impact. The magnitude of the price elasticity of demand is greater than that found in the pre-MSA era. Policy implications are discussed.     

The labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality

Unemployment benefit systems are nonexistent in many developing economies. Introducing such systems poses many challenges which are partly due to the high level of informality in the labor markets of these economies. This paper studies the consequences on the labor market of implementing an unemployment benefit system in economies with large informal sectors and high flows of workers between formality and informality. We build a search and matching model with endogenous destruction, on-the-job search, and intersectoral flows, where agents in the economy decide optimally whether or not to formalize jobs. We calibrate the model for Mexico, and show that the introduction of an unemployment benefit system, where workers contribute when employed in the formal market and collect benefits when they lose their jobs, even if they obtain informal jobs, can lead to an increase in formality in the economy, while also producing small increases in unemployment. The exact impact of incorporating such benefits depends on the relative strength of two opposing effects: the generosity of the benefits and the level of the contributions that finance those benefits. We also show important policy complementarities with other interventions in the labor market. In particular, combining the unemployment benefit program with policies that reduce the cost of formality, such as lower employment taxes and firing costs, can produce greater decreases in informality and lower impacts on unemployment than when the program is applied in isolation.     

Why Unemployment Insurance Might Not Only Be Good for the Soul,It Might Also Be Good for the Economy

Contrary to the conventional view that unemployment insurance serves to directly increase the rate of unemployment as well as reducing an economy's competitiveness by increasing the market wage of labor, the argument presented in this paper is that this worldview critically depends on unrealistic behavioral assumptions. A more realistic modeling suggests that unemployment rates need not rise and competitiveness need not deteriorate with the introduction of or improvements in unemployment insurance, which can also induce increases in economic efficiency. These analytical predictions are consistent with the empirics of unemployment insurance. Unemployment insurance can therefore protect the unemployed without damaging the economy.     

Unemployment of Skilled and Unskilled Labor in an Open Economy: International Trade,Migration, and Outsourcing

We show how international trade, migration, and outsourcing affect unemployment of skilled and unskilled labor, in a framework that integrates the Heckscher–Ohlin model of trade with the Shapiro–Stiglitz model of unemployment. Our approach allows us to analyze changes in not only aggregate unemployment, but also the distribution of unemployment between skilled and unskilled labor. As the analysis demonstrates, the unemployment rates of these two types of labor often move in opposite directions, thereby dampening the change in aggregate unemployment. Results depend on the source of comparative advantage, based on international differences in (for example) unemployment insurance or production technology.     

Adverse selection in credit markets and regressive profit taxation

In many countries, taxes on businesses are less progressive than labor income taxes. This paper provides a justification for this pattern based on adverse selection that entrepreneurs face in credit markets. Individuals choose between becoming entrepreneurs or workers and differ in their skill in both of these occupations. I find that endogenous cross-subsidization in the credit market equilibrium results in excessive (insufficient) entry of low-skilled (high-skilled) agents into entrepreneurship. This gives rise to a corrective role for differential taxation of entrepreneurial profits and labor income. In particular, a profit tax that is regressive relative to taxes on labor income restores the efficient occupational choice.     

A POSITIVE THEORY OF GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY AND SOCIAL INSURANCE*

This article presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model explaining cross‐country data on geographical mobility, unemployment, and labor market institutions. Rational forward‐looking agents vote on unemployment insurance (UI). Agents with higher moving costs (larger attachment to their location) prefer more generous UI. Attachment is assumed to increase with the duration of residence. UI mitigates incentives for moving and increases, therefore, the fraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. This self‐reinforcing mechanism can yield two steady‐states: one “European” and one “American.” The former (latter) features high (low) unemployment, low (high) geographical mobility, and high (low) UI.     

Social Insurance Based on Personal Savings

Many countries have reformed, or plan to reform, their pension system. The trend is to move from an entitlement based system to a system in which contributions accumulate in some form of personal savings account. In recent years proposals have been made to apply a personal savings account also to other elements of social insurance, such as unemployment insurance, social assistance, health care costs and others. This paper presents a simple model and a simulation to compare the lifetime consequences of replacing a wide range of social insurance systems with savings account based social insurance. The results indicate that savings account based social insurance can be designed to provide the same economic security as offered by a generous welfare state, and yet lower marginal taxes considerably.     

Fiscal Effects of Minimum Wages: An Analysis for Germany

Abstract. Against the background of the current discussion of statutory minimum wages in Germany, this paper analyzes the potential employment and fiscal effects of such a policy. Based on estimated labor demand elasticities obtained from a structural labor demand model, the empirical results imply that minimum wages in Germany will be associated with significant employment losses among marginal and low- and semi-skilled full-time workers. Even though minimum wages will lead to increased public revenues from income taxes and social security benefits, they will result in a significant fiscal burden, due to increased unemployment benefits and decreased revenues from corporate taxes.