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1.
Nicholas C. Yannelis 《Economic Theory》2009,38(2):419-432
We provide several different generalizations of Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem by allowing for asymmetric information
and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend the ones in Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77:330–353, 1977), Yannelis
and Rustichini (Stud Econ Theory 2:23–48, 1991), but also new theorems are obtained which allow for a convexifying effect
on aggregation (non-concavity assumption on the utility functions) and non-convex strategy sets (pure strategies). This is
achieved by imposing the assumption of “many more agents than strategies” (Rustichini and Yannelis in Stud Econ Theory 1:249–265,
1991; Tourky and Yannelis in J Econ Theory 101:189–221, 2001; Podczeck in Econ Theory 22:699–725, 2003).
To the memory of Gerard Debreu. A preliminary draft was presented in Paris, in April of 2005. I have benefited from the discussion,
comments and questions of Erik Balder, Jean-Marc Bonnisseu, Bernard Cornet and Filipe Martins Da-Rocha and Conny Podczeck.
A careful and knowledgeable referee made several useful comments and rescued me from a mishap. 相似文献
2.
Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always
reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented –
and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that
even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.”
We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research was supported by Ramón y Cajal
contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors was also partially supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (BEC2002-02130 and SEJ2005-01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA). 相似文献
3.
Patrick L. Leoni 《Economic Theory》2009,39(2):217-229
A natural conjecture is that if agents’ beliefs are almost correct then equilibrium prices should be close to rational expectations
prices. Sandroni (J Econ Theory 82:1–18, 1998) gives a counterexample in an economy with sunspots and complete markets. We
extend Sandroni’s result by showing that the conjecture is generically true for economies with complete markets. We consider
a standard General Equilibrium model with large but finite horizon and complete markets. We show that, for almost every such
economy, if conditional beliefs eventually become correct along a path of events then equilibrium prices of assets traded
along this path converge to rational expectations equilibria in the sup-norm. Moreover, we establish that, generically, there
exist along any such path local diffeomorphisms between individual beliefs and equilibrium prices.
I would like to thank C. Ewerhart and A. Kirman for their comments, as well as the seminar participants at the University
of Minho, the General Equilibrium Workshop 2005 in Zurich, and the 15th Asian General Equilibrium Conference 2007 in Singapore.
An anonymous referee also provided very valuable comments. 相似文献
4.
Truncated distributions commonly arise in economics and related areas, see, for example, Lee (Econ Lett 3:165–169, 1979), Lien (Econ Lett 19:243–247, 1985; Econ Lett 20:45–47, 1986), Burdett (Econ Lett 52:263–267, 1996), Sercu (Insur: Math and Econ 20:79–95, 1997), Abadir and Magdalinos (Econom Theory 18:1276–1287, 2002), and Horrace (J Econom 126:335–354, 2005). In this note, we consider the most commonly encountered truncated distributions with heavy tails: the truncated t distribution and the truncated F distribution. For each of these distributions, we derive explicit expressions for the moments and estimation procedures by
the method of moments and the method of maximum likelihood. An application is illustrated to a popular data set in the econometric
literature.
相似文献
5.
We investigate the properties of Johansen’s (J Econ Dyn Control 12:231–254, 1988; Econometrica 59:1551–1580, 1991) maximum
eigenvalue and trace tests for cointegration under the empirically relevant situation of near-integrated variables. Using
Monte Carlo techniques, we show that in a system with near-integrated variables, the probability of reaching an erroneous
conclusion regarding the cointegrating rank of the system is generally substantially higher than the nominal size. The risk
of concluding that completely unrelated series are cointegrated is therefore non-negligible. We suggest ways of identifying
the problem and different approaches to reduce the size distortions of the tests. 相似文献
6.
Konrad Podczeck 《Economic Theory》2009,38(2):399-418
This paper presents new methods to obtain purification results for continuum games, which don’t make use of the “many more
players than strategies” assumption (Yannelis in Econ Theory (in press) 2007) or of Loeb spaces (Loeb and Sun in Illinois
J Math 50, 747–762, 2006). The approach presented doesn’t use nonstandard analysis; it is based on standard measure theory
and in particular on the super-nonatomicity notion introduced in Podczeck (J Math Econ (in press) 2007).
Thanks to Erik Balder, Peter Loeb, Yeneng Sun, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful comments. 相似文献
7.
Jack Robles 《Economic Theory》2008,35(1):19-36
I include a role for time preferences within a version of the Young (J Econ Theory 59:145–168, 1993b) evolutionary model of
bargaining. With or without time preferences, the stochastic stable convention yields a generalized version of the Nash (Econometrica
18:155–162, 1950) Bargaining Solution. When time preferences are added to the model, agents’ discount factors enter into the
stochastically stable convention in a natural manner. That is, an agent’s discount factor acts as a bargaining weight within
the Nash Bargaining Solution. By taking appropriate limits, an evolutionary foundation for the Rubinstein (Econometrica 50:97–110,
1982) Bargaining Solution is provided.
I thank Lew Evans, Jack Leach, Collin Starkweather, Aaron Strong, a referee and associate editor. All errors are my own. 相似文献
8.
The main difficulty in treatment effect analysis with matching is accounting for unobserved differences (i.e., selection problem)
between the treatment and control groups, because matching assumes no such differences. The traditional way to tackle the
difficulty has been “control function” approaches with selection correction terms. This paper examines relatively new approaches:
sensitivity analyses—sensitivity to unobservables—in Rosenbaum (Biometrika 74:13–26, 1987), Gastwirth et al. (Biometrika 85:907–920,
1998) and Lee (J Appl Econ 19:323–337, 2004). These sensitivity analyses are applied to the data used in Lee and Lee (J Appl
Econ 20:549–562, 2005) to see how the assumption of no unobserved difference in matching affects the findings in Lee and Lee,
to compare how the different sensitivity analyses perform, and to relate the “sensitivity parameters” in the different sensitivity
analyses to one another. We find (i) the conclusions in Lee and Lee are weakened in the sense that only the “strong” ones
survive, (ii) the sensitivity analysis in Rosenbaum (Biometrika 74:13–26, 1987) is too conservative (and inferior to Gastwirth
et al.’s), and (iii) Gastwirth et al.’s and Lee’s approaches agree on some findings to be insensitive, but the two approaches
also disagree on some other findings.
The authors are grateful to the Editor and anonymous reviewers for their constructive and helpful comments. 相似文献
9.
In general rational expectations equilibrium (REE), as introduced in Radner (Econometrica 47:655–678, 1978) in an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie
setting with uncertainty, does not exist. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and is also
not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 26:765–791,
2005). The lack of all the above properties is mainly due to the fact that the agents are supposed to predict the equilibrium
market clearing price (as agent’s expected maximized utility is conditioned on the information that equilibrium prices reveal),
which leads inevitably to the presumption that agents know all the primitives in the economy, i.e., random initial endowments,
random utility functions and private information sets. To get around this problematic equilibrium notion, we introduce a new
concept called Bayesian–Walrasian equilibrium (BWE) which has Bayesian features. In particular, agents try to predict the market-clearing prices using Bayesian updating
and evaluate their consumption in terms of Bayesian price estimates, which are different for each individual. In this framework
agents maximize expected utility conditioned on their own private information about the state of nature, subject to a Bayesian
estimated budget constraint. Market clearing is not an intrinsic part of the definition of BWE. However, both in the case
of perfect foresight and in the case of symmetric information BWE leads to a statewise market clearing; it then becomes an
ex post Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This new BWE exists under standard assumptions, in contrast to the REE. In particular,
we show that our new BWE exists in the well-known example in Kreps (J Econ Theory 14:32–43, 1977), where REE fails to exist.
This work was done in the Spring of 2005, when EJB was a visiting professor at the University of Illinois. 相似文献
10.
Pelikan (J Evol Econ 21:341–366, 2011) develops an interesting conceptual framework that adds to prior work on generalised Darwinism. Despite claims to the contrary
we show that it is similar to the approach developed by Hodgson and Knudsen (J Evol Econ 16(4):343–366, 2006a, J Econ Behav Organ 75(1):12–24, 2010a, b), Aldrich et al. (J Evol Econ 18(5):577–596, 2008) and others. Pelikan also mischaracterises the Hodgson–Knudsen position over Lamarckism. We show why the term is misleading
(rather than strictly wrong) when applied to social evolution. 相似文献
11.
This paper investigates the Keynesian view and the Wagner’s Law on the role of public expenditure on economic growth for Malaysia
(1970–2004). The empirical results using the Auto-Regression Distributed Lag (ARDL) model and the ‘bounds test’ (Pesaran et
al. in J Appl Econ 16:289–326, 2001) showed evidence of a long run relationship between total expenditures (including expenditures
on defense, education, development and agriculture) and Gross National Product. The results also show that with the structural
break in 1998, the long run causality is bi-directional for GNP and expenditures on administration and health, supporting
both Keynes view and Wagner’s Law. For all other expenditure categories the long run causality runs from GNP to the expenditures,
which supports Wagner’s Law.
An erratum to this article can be found at 相似文献
12.
A modified yardstick competition mechanism 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
This paper expands Shleifer’s (Rand J Econ 16:319–327, 1985) theory of yardstick competition and develops a modified yardstick competition mechanism (MYC), where the yardstick employed consists of a tariff basket and total costs. This mechanism
has a significant information advantage: the regulator “only” needs to observe total costs, prices and output of all firms.
The MYC mechanism can ensure a socially optimal outcome when allowing for spatial and second degree price discrimination.
We also introduce regulatory lags to the model. In addition, we compare the two approaches for the case of unobserved firm
heterogeneity, and provide numerical estimations of the effects. The MYC mechanism fares better in the case of unobserved
heterogeneity, and may thus be a useful extension of Shleifer’s yardstick mechanism.
相似文献
13.
Silviano Esteve-Pérez Amparo Sanchis-Llopis Juan A. Sanchis-Llopis 《Empirical Economics》2010,38(2):281-304
Firms may exit the market in several ways and each form of exit is likely to be caused by different factors (Schary in RAND
J Econ 22:339–353, 1991). This paper explores the determinants of different exit routes. Using a sample of Spanish manufacturing
firms for 1990–2000, we estimate a competing risks proportional hazards model to identify the factors leading firms to exit
the market through (the mutually precluding events of) liquidation/bankruptcy and acquisition/merger. Our results show the
existence of a sharp difference between the determinants of these two exit routes in terms of firm and industry characteristics. 相似文献
14.
Differentiating ambiguity: an expository note 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Ghirardato et al. J Econ Theory 118:133–173, 2004 propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the
decision-maker’s reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which they refer to as invariant biseparable. This class includes CEU and MEU. This note presents some examples which illustrate their results.
Research supported by ESRC grant no. RES-000-22-0650. For comments and discussion we would like to thank Klaus Nehring and
a seminar audience at ESEM, Vienna 2006. 相似文献
15.
This paper studies the optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform when one side is affected by congestion. We show that
the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy (or skewed pricing) depends not only on the relative magnitude of the sides’ price
elasticities of demand but it also depends on the marginal congestion cost that an agent imposes on the others. Compared with
the no-congestion case, this pricing strategy gives rise to some interesting features that violate the results of Rochet and
Tirole (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003, Rand J Econ 37:645–667 in 2006). In the case of equal price elasticities of demand, the no-congested side is charged the highest price. On the other hand,
in the case of different price elasticities, the platform congestion pricing depends on a certain threshold of the marginal
congestion cost. We show, under some conditions, that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy is reversed. In the social context,
the Rochet and Tirole’s (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003) cost allocation condition is modified by the congestion cost. We show that the congestion does not only affect the buyers’
contribution to the sellers’ surplus, but it also affects the sellers’ contribution to the buyers’. 相似文献
16.
Guilherme Carmona 《Economic Theory》2011,48(1):31-45
We introduce a new condition, weak better-reply security, and show that every compact, locally convex, metric, quasiconcave
and weakly better-reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. This result is established using simple generalizations of classical
ideas. Furthermore, we show that, when players’ action spaces are metric and locally convex, it implies the existence results
of Reny (Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999) and Carmona (J Econ Theory 144:1333–1340, 2009) and that it is equivalent to a recent
result of Barelli and Soza (On the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous and Qualitative Games, University of Rochester,
Rochester, 2009). Our general existence result also implies a new existence result for weakly upper reciprocally semicontinuous
and weakly payoff secure games that satisfy a strong quasiconcavity property. 相似文献
17.
In this paper, we give an example in which the price of tradable emission permits increases despite firms’ adoption of less
polluting technology, a result that is in contrast with Montero (J Environ Econ 44:23–44, 2002) and Parry (J Regul Econ 14:229–254,
1998), among others. If two Cournot players switch to a cleaner technology, the price for permits may increase due to an increase
in the net demand for permits and a decrease in the net supply of permits after the clean technology is adopted. This is only
the case when output demand is quite elastic. 相似文献
18.
19.
We analyze the social learning process of a group of individuals who have limited information about the payoff distributions
of each action. We say that a behavioral rule is first-order monotone (FOM) if the number of individuals who play actions
with first-order stochastic dominant payoff distributions is expected to increase in any environment. We provide a characterization
of FOM rules. Both Imitate if Better and Schlag’s (J Econ Theory 78:130–156, 1998) Proportional Imitation rule are FOM. No
FOM rule is dominant in the sense of having the best performance in every environment. 相似文献
20.
We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature.
It was proved in Einy et al. (Econ Theory 18, 321–332, 2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility)
constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of
competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal,
competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis
et al. in Econ Theory 21, 495–526, 2002). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility.
We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (Econ Theory 18, 321–332, 2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then,
motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution, we adapt the incentive compatibility property introduced in Krasa and Yannelis
(Econometrica 62, 881–900, 1994) and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible,
implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.
We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the Associate Editor for their valuable suggestions and remarks. This work
was partially done while V.F. Martins-da-Rocha was visiting the Dipartimento di Matematica e Informatica of the Università
degli Studi di Perugia. We thank the audience of the First General Equilibrium Workshop at Rio. Section 6 dealing with contract
enforcement and coalitional incentive compatibility has benefited from discussions with J. Correia-da-Silva, W. Daher, F.
Forges, C. Hervès-Beloso, E. Moreno-García, K. Podczeck, Y. Vailakis and N.C. Yannelis. 相似文献