Patience auctions: the impact of time vs. money bidding on elicited discount rates

We introduce, test, and compare two auction-based methods for eliciting discount rates. In these “patience auctions”, participants bid the smallest future sum they would prefer -or- the longest time they would wait for a reward, rather than receive a smaller, immediate payoff. The most patient bidder receives the delayed reward; all others receive the immediate payoff. These auctions allow us to compare discounting when participants’ attention is focused on the temporal versus monetary dimension of delayed rewards. We find that the estimated parameters in the three most commonly used discount functions (exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic) differ across these two bidding methods (time-bids vs. money-bids). Specifically, our participants tend to show more impatience under time-bids. Furthermore, we find that people are more likely to exhibit exponential (as opposed to hyperbolic) discounting and exhibit less present bias under time-bids, compared to money-bids. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to directly compare time versus money preference elicitations, within the same subjects, using an incentive-compatible mechanism.     

Social Structure in Economic Theory

This paper investigates the factors that drive ruler decision making under democracy. By dividing politicians’ actions into two distinct domains and exploring their compositions, we construct a fuller and more realistic picture of politician decision making. In the non-discretionary domain, the politician’s actions are clearly limited by voter desires; in the discretionary domain the politician is free to make choices as he chooses without voter repercussions. Standard neoclassical models of political behavior suggest that when votes don’t matter, monetary income drives ruler behavior. While monetary pursuit may explain some ruler decisions, it leaves many other observed choices unexplained. Our non-discretionary/discretionary dichotomy highlights the up-to-now neglected role that psychic income plays in explaining otherwise unexplained ruler decisions. The case studies considered support this view.     

Two-period cycles in a three-period overlapping generations model

We study the properties of two-period monetary cycles in simple pure exchange overlapping generations economies in which the households live for three periods. We demonstrate that these economies can support cycles under a much broader—and, arguably, more plausible—range of assumptions than the analogous two-period economies. We show that economies that fail the well-known Grandmont (Econometrica 53 (1985) 995) condition can have cycles, and that economies that satisfy the condition can fail to have cycles. In addition, we show that economies can have monetary cycles when they do not have conventional monetary steady states, and when aggregate demand for assets is not decreasing in the real return rate at a gross real rate of unity.     

Which type of producer organization is (more) inclusive? Dynamics of farmers’ membership and participation in the decision‐making process

Producer organizations (POs) provide benefits to smallholders by alleviating market access challenges. However, whether all farmers benefit from a PO is still a question. Limited evidence is available on whether POs are inclusive of poor farmers. Even if the poor join, do they participate in decision‐making? We conducted interviews with 595 smallholder dairy farmers in Kenya. We distinguish three groups; members of a bargaining PO, members of a processing PO and non‐members. We show that membership is related to the structural characteristics of the organization: processing POs favor membership of farmers that are wealthier, more educated and more innovative. As to participation in the decision‐making process: older, male and specialized farmers have a higher chance of being involved than poor farmers. Factors distinguishing farmer participation in decision‐making between bargaining and processing POs are highlighted. We find that a bargaining PO is more inclusive of all groups of farmers, while women and poor farmers are excluded from decision‐making in a processing PO. Our findings contribute to policymaking on inclusive development.     

Monetary Stabilisation Policy in a Monetary Union: Some Simple Analytics

We do two things in this paper. First, we look at some simple models of monetary decision making in a monetary union and ask how much more variable a country's output and inflation is likely to be if it joins the union. We answer this analytically and then go on to 'calibrate' the simple model. The model has few structural equations, but it is useful in allowing us to examine how the variability of output and inflation are likely to change as key parameters change. Our conclusions on this front are likely to be sensitive to model specification. However, we also identify a second best issue concerning the optimal make–up of the monetary union which is likely to be more robust: namely that only when all members of the union have the same structural parameter values (and shocks are perfectly correlated) will it be optimal for a new member to have these same structural parameter values.     

An experimental test of Taylor-type rules with inexperienced central bankers

We experimentally test monetary policy decision making in a population of inexperienced central bankers. In our experiments, subjects repeatedly set the short-term interest rate for a computer economy with inflation as their target. A large majority of subjects learn to successfully control inflation by correctly putting higher weight on inflation than on the output gap. In fact, the behavior of these subjects meets a stability criterion. The subjects smooth the interest rate as the theoretical literature suggests they should in order to enhance stability of the uncertain system they face. Our study is the first to use Taylor-type rules as a framework to identify inflation weighting, stability, and interest-rate smoothing as behavioral outcomes when subjects try to achieve an inflation target.     

Cost-effectiveness modeling for neuropathic pain treatments: investigating the relative importance of parameters using an open-source model

Aims: The study objective was to develop an open-source replicate of a cost-effectiveness model developed by National Institute for Health and Care (NICE), in order to explore uncertainties in health economic modeling of novel pharmacological neuropathic pain treatments.

Materials and methods: The NICE model, consisting of a decision tree with branches for discrete levels of pain relief and adverse event (AE) severities, was replicated using R, and used to compare a hypothetical neuropathic pain drug to pregabalin. Model parameters were sourced from NICE’s clinical guidelines and associated with probability distributions to account for underlying uncertainty. A simulation-based scenario analysis was conducted to assess how uncertainty in efficacy and AEs affected the net monetary benefit (NMB) for the hypothetical treatment at a cost-effectiveness threshold of £20,000 per QALY.

Results: Relative to pregabalin, an increase in efficacy was associated with greater NMB than an improvement in tolerability. A greater NMB was observed when efficacy was marginally higher than that of pregabalin, while maintaining the same level of AEs than when efficacy was equivalent to pregabalin, but with a more substantial reduction in AEs. In the latter scenario, the NMB was only positive at a low cost-effectiveness threshold.

Limitations: The replicate model shares the limitations described in the NICE guidelines. There is a lack of support in scientific literature for the assumption that increased efficacy is associated with a greater reduction in tolerability. The replicate model also included a single comparator, unlike the NICE model.

Conclusions: Pain relief is a stronger driver of NMB than tolerability, at a cost-effectiveness threshold of £20,000 per QALY. Health technology assessment decisions which are influenced by NICE’s model may reward efficacy gains, even if they are associated with more severe AEs. This contrasts with recommendations from clinical guidelines for neuropathic pain, which place more equal weighting on improvements in efficacy and tolerability as value drivers.     

DO MONETARY REWARDS CROWD OUT THE INTRINSIC MOTIVATION OF VOLUNTEERS? SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR ITALIAN VOLUNTEERS

ABSTRACT 1 : The paper studies the determinants of regular volunteering, taking its cue from the previous literature on extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. Its main contribution lies in the analysis of the role of monetary rewards in influencing intrinsic motivation. It uses frameworks that allow empirical hypotheses to be made about the effects of monetary rewards, intrinsic motivation and the combined term on volunteer labour supply. With an Italy‐based survey, the paper shows, controlling for endogenous bias, that monetary payments as well as intrinsic motivation have roles in the real‐life decision to supply volunteer work, but monetary rewards do not crowd out intrinsic motivation.     

THE COMPLEX RESPONSE OF MONETARY POLICY TO THE EXCHANGE RATE

We estimate a flexible non‐linear monetary policy rule for the United Kingdom to examine the response of policymakers to the real exchange rate. We have three main findings. First, policymakers respond to real exchange rate misalignment rather than to the real exchange rate itself. Second, policymakers ignore small deviations of the exchange rate; they only respond to real exchange under‐valuations of more than 4% and over‐valuations of more than 5%. Third, the response of policymakers to inflation is smaller when the exchange rate is over‐valued and larger when it is under‐valued. None of these responses is allowed for in the widely used linear Taylor‐type rules, suggesting that monetary policy is better analysed using a more sophisticated model, such as the one suggested in this paper.     

United we stand: on the macroeconomics of a Fiscal union

In this paper, we apply dynamic tracking games to macroeconomic policy making in a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear two-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union for analyzing the interactions between two fiscal (governments: “core” and “periphery”) and one monetary (central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate numerical solutions for cooperative (Pareto optimal) and non-cooperative games (feedback Nash). We show how the policy makers react to adverse demand shocks. We investigate the consequences of three scenarios: decentralized fiscal policies controlled by independent governments (the present situation), centralized fiscal policy (a fiscal union) with an independent central bank (pure fiscal union), and a fully centralized monetary and fiscal union. For the latter two scenarios, we demonstrate the importance of different assumptions about the joint objective function corresponding to different weights for the two governments in the design of the common fiscal policy. We show that a fiscal union with weights corresponding to the number of states in each of the blocs gives better results than non-cooperative policy making. When one bloc dominates the fiscal union, decentralized policies yield lower overall losses than the pure fiscal union and the monetary and fiscal union.     

Contagion of Self‐Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

We examine how group decision‐making affects other‐regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision‐making and whether the difference in decision‐making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision‐making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision‐making.     

Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies

This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance. We show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits, the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium. The paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives. We also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear-quadratic payoffs.     

THE SUPERIORITY OF MONETARY OVER BARTER EXCHANGE: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

William Stanley Jevons suggested that monetary exchange is socially superior to barter exchange because agents' optimization is simplified by the use of money. We experimentally study how subjects perform under monetary and barter exchange and find that a majority of subjects achieve a higher utility level in the monetized economy. The individual choices are statistically analyzed in order to track important elements of suboptimal decision making like the tendency to under‐ or over‐react to price signals. Our laboratory findings indicate that, at a minimum, government may have a role in promoting a common unit of account.     

Illusion of control and the pursuit of authority

We measure participants’ willingness to pay for transparently useless authority—the right to make a completely uninformed task decision. We further elicit participants’ beliefs about receiving their preferred outcome if they make the decision themselves, and if another participant makes the decision for them. We find that participants pay more to make the decision themselves if they also believe that they can thus increase the probability of getting their preferred outcome. Illusion of control therefore exists in a controlled laboratory environment with monetary incentives and is connected to peoples’ pursuit of authority.     

Is it my money or not? An experiment on risk aversion and the house-money effect

The house-money effect, understood as people’s tendency to be more daring with easily-gotten money, is a behavioral pattern that poses questions about the external validity of experiments in economics: to what extent do people behave in experiments like they would have in a real-life situation, given that they play with easily-gotten house money? We ran an economic experiment with 122 students to measure the house-money effect on their risk preferences. They received an amount of money with which they made risky decisions involving losses and gains; a randomly selected treatment group received the money 21 days in advance and a control group got it the day of the experiment. From a simple calculation we found that participants in the treatment group only spent on average approximately 35 % of their cash in advance. The data confirms the well documented results that men are more tolerant to risk than women, and that individuals in general are more risk tolerant towards losses than towards gains. With our preferred specification, we find a mean CRRA risk aversion coefficient of 0.34, with a standard deviation of 0.09. Furthermore, if subjects in the treatment group spent 35 % of the endowment their CRRA risk aversion coefficient is higher than that of the control group by approximately 0.3 standard deviations. We interpret this result as evidence of a small and indirect house money effect operating though the amount of the cash in advance that was actually spent. We conclude that the house money effect may play a small role in decisions under uncertainty, especially when involving losses. Our novel design, however, could be used for other domains of decision making both in the lab and for calibration of economic models used in micro and macroeconomics.     

Search by committee

We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop is made by a committee and show that a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium exists given a log concave distribution of rewards. We compare search by committee to the corresponding single-agent problem and show that committee members are less picky and more conservative than the single agent. We show how (i) increasing committee size holding the plurality fraction constant and (ii) increasing the plurality rule affect the equilibrium acceptance threshold and expected search duration. Finally, we show that unanimity is optimal if committee members are sufficiently patient.     

Monetary policy and efficiency in over‐the‐counter financial trade

We develop a monetary model that incorporates over‐the‐counter (OTC) asset trade. After agents have made their money holding decisions, they receive an idiosyncratic shock that affects their valuation for consumption and, hence, for the unique liquid asset, namely money. Subsequently, agents can choose whether they want to enter the OTC market in order to sell assets and thus boost their liquidity or to buy assets and thus provide liquidity to other agents. In our model, inflation affects not only the money holding decisions of agents, as is standard in monetary theory, but also the entry decision of these agents in the financial market. We use our framework to study the effect of inflation on welfare, asset prices and OTC trade volume. In contrast to most monetary models, which predict a negative relationship between inflation and welfare, we find that inflation can be welfare improving within a certain range, because it mitigates a search externality that agents impose on one another when they make their OTC market entry decision. Also, an increase in the holding cost of money will lead to a decrease in asset prices, a regularity that is well documented in the data and often considered anomalous.     

Monetary policy design and transmission asymmetry in EMU: Does uncertainty matter?

In this paper, we consider how uncertainty affects the choice between federal monetary policy based on national and union-wide aggregate data under conditions of asymmetry in the transmission of monetary policy. We find that the uncertainty about the transmission process sustains (and, in some cases, even reinforces) the need to take into account information about national economies in the formulation of monetary policy. Also the forecasting process matters when uncertainty is additive: in particular, when union-wide forecasting is more accurate than national-based forecasting, this advantage can compensate for the welfare loss from using union-wide aggregation. There is, however, a strong case for using national information in the optimal design of common monetary policy.