Determinants of the Incidence and Scale of Seed Capital Investments by Venture Capital Firms

Employing both behavioral decision making and agency theories, our study seeks to identify those factors that influence a venture capital (VC) firm’s decision to undertake seed capital investments and, subsequently, the scale of such activity. Using data on the investments made by 2949 VC funds raised worldwide between 1962 and 2002, we find investor age, timing of investment, and fund location to be of importance. In addition, the size of the fund and the existing number of portfolio firms exert opposite influences on the level of seed capital activity of the VC firm. These results suggest that seed activity is a valuable source of market intelligence for leading VC firms seeking proactively to identify and invest in novel technologies.      

Duration analysis of venture capital staging: A real options perspective

This study takes a real options perspective towards venture capital staging and views the staging decision as a choice between holding the current option to invest and investing now to obtain the option to invest subsequently. It proposes that this staging decision depends on the factors that influence the value of these two options, such as competition and various sources of uncertainty. The empirical results suggest that market uncertainty encourages venture capital firms to delay investing at each round of financing, whereas competition, project-specific uncertainty and agency concerns prompt venture capital firms to invest sooner. This study has useful implications for theory and practice.     

实物期权及其在风险投资中的应用

从广义的期权定义中引出实物期权的概念,对金融期权和实物期权进行比较分析;并借鉴金融期权的定价方法,得出实物期权的定价公式。通过计算风险投资项目中实物期权的价值,比较含有实物期权的风险投资项目与一般投资项目的价值,可以看出在风险投资中引入实物期权的思想,对风险投资家做出正确的投资决策,以及对风险资本的保值增值有重大的指导意义。     

International entrepreneurship, venture capital networks, and reinvestment decisions

Prior research has established that venture capitalists (VCs) may face significant obstacles in financing ventures from emerging or transition economies. Such hurdles are usually attributed to the weaknesses of host countries’ institutional systems, especially regulatory. These institutional pitfalls may thwart VCs’ ability to exit a portfolio company leading to lower returns than expected. Developing this approach, we argue that exit strategies may also be difficult to execute when VCs expand into advanced economies although for different reasons. Thus, we show that both necessity entrepreneurship prevalent in emerging economies and opportunity entrepreneurship prevalent in advanced economies are positively associated with the number of investment rounds received by portfolio companies. In contrast, we establish that VC firm capital and network density are negatively associated with the number of rounds provided to portfolio companies across distinct institutional environments. This suggests that VCs may improve their performance by choosing an appropriate strategy to navigate unfamiliar institutional environments to minimize their liability of foreignness. Finally, we find that the interaction of VC capital and network density is positively related to the number of VCs’ investment rounds. Apparently, resource-rich VC firms may not fully realize the informational benefits of their dense “knowledge networks” due to insufficient collaboration with partners. At the same time, such VCs may no longer enjoy access to free information flows from prospective allies. Hence, network density and superior resources combined may lead to a greater number of investment rounds.     

Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist

This research analyzes the venture capitalist's incentives to maximize the profits of the entrepreneurs of ventures and the limited partners of a venture fund. Venture capital is a professionally managed pool of capital invested in equity-linked private ventures. Entrepreneurs turn to venture capitalists for financing because high-technology startup firms have low or negative cash flows, which prevent them from borrowing or issuing equity. In addition, venture capitalists are actively involved in management of the venture to assure its success. This solves the problem of startup firms that do not have the cash flows to hire management consultants.Venture capital contracts have three main characteristics: (1) staging the commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon, (2) using compensation systems directly linked to value creation, and (3) preserving ways to force management to distribute investment proceeds. These characteristics address three fundamental problems: (1) sorting the venture capital among the entrepreneurial ventures, (2) providing incentives to motivate venture capitalists to maximize the value of the funded ventures, and (3) providing incentives to motivate entrepreneurs to maximize the value of the ventures. Venture capitalists fund only about a dozen projects a year out of a thousand evaluated. Each project may receive several rounds of financing. Payoffs to VCs can be very high or be a complete loss.The typical venture capital (VC) firm is organized as a limited partnership, with the venture capitalists serving as general partners and the investors as limited partners. General partner VCs act as agents for the limited partners in investing their funds. VCs invest their human capital by placing their reputation on the line. The goal is to begin to convert the investment into cash or marketable securities, which are distributed to the partners. VC management companies receive a management fee equal to a percentage (usually 2.5%) of the capital of each fund. They also receive a percentage (15–30%) of the profits of each fund, called carried interest. Periodic reports are made by the VC firm to the limited partners. Usually these are only costs of managing the fund, and so revenues are negative. Most contracts specify the percentage of time that the VC will devote to managing the fund.The analysis of this research deals with the incentives of the VC who has limited attention to be allocated between improving current ventures and evaluating new ventures for possible funding. The analysis shows that the VC, as agent for both the entrepreneur and the general partners, does not have the incentives required to maximize their profits. The VC allocates attention among ventures and venture funds less frequently than required to maximize the entrepreneurs' and limited partners' profits. However, the VC does maximize the total profits of all ventures. Because the VC considers the opportunity cost of attention, the VC's allocation of attention is efficient. The implication of this result is that, although the entrepreneurs and limited partners could be made better off with a different allocation of the VC's time, this would be an inefficient use of the VC's time.     

基于期权定价理论的风险投资决策

项目评价的传统方法———净现值(NPV)法在应用于风险投资项目时,由于低估了投资价值,往往会使得投资者失去一些有价值的投资机会。结合风险投资的特性,将期权定价理论应用于风险投资决策中,并建立连续及离散两种状态下的决策模型     

Diana: a symbol of women entrepreneurs’ hunt for knowledge,money, and the rewards of entrepreneurship

This article discusses the questions and issues that prompted the founding of the Diana Project, a multi-university research program aimed at identifying factors that support and enable high growth in women-led ventures. Despite the fact that women business owners comprise a significant portion of the economy, women face challenges in acquiring the resources needed to expand their businesses. This article details both the myths and realities associated with women’s entrepreneurship in their quest for growth. In particular, we examine the strategies that women entrepreneurs use to position their firms for growth, especially those strategies related to growth capital. Our results show that women seeking venture capital (VC) have degrees, graduate degrees, and experience that should not preclude them from obtaining financing. We also found that even though women-led businesses are frequently clustered in industries less attractive to financiers, women seeking equity funding are in the appropriate industries. Further, women spend a considerable amount of time using both formal and informal networks in their search for capital and in seeking capital. Because of the importance of the VC industry as a provider of growth capital and its reliance on its network for investment referrals, we also examined the participation and role of women as decision-makers in industry. Women’s participation in the VC industry has not kept pace with industry growth, and women have exited the industry at a faster rate than men, thus creating a significant barrier for women entrepreneurs in that it is less likely that their networks will overlap with the financial supplier networks, despite any effort they may expend networking and seeking capital.

Heterogeneous venture capital,M&A activity,and market response

This study investigates the effects of venture capital (VC) investment on newly listed firms' merger and acquisition activities and takes the lock-up period into consideration. We find that venture capitalists (VCs) tend to postpone M&A activities during a lock-up period, whereas the inhibition role recedes when the lock-up period expires. VCs with a longer investment period dominate this influence. We also illustrate how the market responds to the M&A announcements of VC-backed firms, with the response varying with VCs' investment period.     

The impact of venture capital on the productivity growth of European entrepreneurial firms: ‘Screening’ or ‘value added’ effect?

We aim to ascertain to what extent the better performance of European venture capital (VC)‐backed firms in high-tech industries is due to either ‘screening’ or ‘value added’ provided by VC investors. We compare portfolio firms' productivity growth before and after the first VC round, using a matched control group as benchmark. We show that productivity growth is not significantly different between VC and non-VC-backed firms before the first round of VC financing, whereas significant differences are found in the first years after the investment event. We also find that the value-adding services provided by VC investors ‘imprint’ the portfolio firm.     

Is venture capital socially responsible? Exploring the imprinting effect of VC funding on CSR practices

We study how corporate social responsibility (CSR) is guided by ownership history, specifically whether a company receives venture capital (VC) funding or not. We argue that companies that receive VC funding are less likely to adopt CSR practices due to unique VC imprinting and that temporal and investment orientation moderate this relationship. We find that VC-backed companies have poorer CSR records, which do improve over time, but at a comparatively slower rate than non-VC-backed companies. However, when VC-backed companies receive funding from VC firms that have a responsible investment orientation and a broader stakeholder view, their CSR records are significantly better. This study contributes to our understanding of imprinting boundaries and related repercussions in stakeholder management strategies.     

The potential of actuarial decision models: Can they improve the venture capital investment decision?

Venture capitalists (VCs) are considered experts in identifying high-potential new ventures—gazelles. VC-backed ventures survive at a much higher rate than those ventures backed by other sources Kunkel and Hofer 1991, Sandberg 1986, Timmons 1994. Thus, the VC decision process has received tremendous attention within the entrepreneurship literature. Nonetheless, VC-backed firms still fail at a surprisingly high rate (20%). Moreover, another 20% of the VC's portfolio fails to provide any return to the VC. Therefore, there is room for improvement in the VC investment process.The three staged investment process often begins with venture screening. First, VCs screen the hundreds of proposals they receive to assess which deserve further consideration. Those ventures that survive the initial stage are then subjected to extensive due diligence. Finally, the VC and entrepreneur negotiate terms of the investment. Considering the amount of time that due diligence and negotiation of terms may take, it is imperative that VCs minimize their efforts during screening so that only those ventures with the most potential proceed to the next stage. Yet, at the same time, the screening process should also be careful not to eliminate gazelles prematurely. VCs are in a quandary. How can they efficiently screen venture proposals without unduly rejecting high potential investments? The answer may be to use actuarial decision aides to assist in the screening process.Actuarial decision aides are models that decompose a decision into component parts (or cues) and recombine those cues to predict the potential outcome. For example, an actuarial model about the VC decision might decompose a venture proposal into decisions about the entrepreneurial team, the product, the market, etc. The sub-component decisions are than recombined to reach an overall assessment of the venture's potential. Such models have been developed in a number of decision domains (e.g., bank lending, psychological evaluations, etc.) and been found to be very robust. Specifically, these models often outperform the very experts that they are meant to mimic.The current study had 53 practicing VCs participate in a policy capturing experiment. The participants examined 50 ventures and judged each venture's success potential; would the venture ultimately succeed or fail. Likewise, identical information about each venture was input into two different types of actuarial models. One actuarial model—a bootstrap model—used information factors that VCs had identified as being most important to making a good investment decision. The second actuarial model was derived by Roure and Keeley (1990). The Roure and Keeley model best distinguished between success and failure in a study of 36 high-technology ventures. The bootstrap model outperformed all but one participating VC (he achieved the same accuracy rate as the bootstrap model). The Roure and Keely model, although less successful than the bootstrap model, outperformed over half of the participating VCs.The implications of this study are that properly developed actuarial models may be successful screening decision aides. The success of the actuarial models may be attributed to their consistency across different proposals and time. The models always weight the information cues the same. VCs, as are all human decision makers, may often be biased by differing salient information cues that cause them to misinterpret or ignore other important cues. For example, a VC may overlook product weaknesses if (s)he is familiar with the entrepreneur putting forth a particular proposal. Although the current study developed a generalized actuarial model, each VC firm could create screening models that fit it's particular decision criteria. The models could then be used by junior associates or lower level employees to perform an initial screen of received venture proposals thereby freeing senior associates' time.     

Signaling and initial public offerings: The use and impact of the lockup period

To reduce information asymmetries for potential investors considering investment in an IPO venture, owners can signal the firm's longer-term viability and quality in several ways. The lockup period, is one signal that can be offered. We investigated the lockup period of a sample of 640 ventures going through the IPO and find that a longer lockup period acts as a substitute signal to venture capital (VC) and prestigious underwriter backing. Furthermore, we find that ventures which have a going concern issue can reduce the amount of underpricing at the time of the IPO by accepting a longer lockup period.     

风险投资对风险企业IPO功效研究——以我国深市中小板为例

风险投资是专业化投资过程,IPO是参与各方首选退出方式。我国风险投资起步晚、发展缓慢,基于发达国家资本市场得出的有关风险投资的结论未必适用于我国。本文使用深交所中小板相关数据检验风险投资在我国风险企业IPO过程中的具体作用,并对检验结果进行分析。通过对风险投资与风险企业IPO关系研究,为我国风险投资的发展提出合理化建议。     

New venture internationalization: The role of venture capital types and reputation

This study examines how different types of venture capital relate to new venture internationalization. Using a sample of 646 U.S. new ventures that executed IPOs between 1995 and 2010, we find that ventures with foreign or corporate venture capital have higher levels of international intensity. We also investigate the moderating role of VC reputation on the relationship between foreign venture capital and international intensity and corporate venture capital and international intensity. Our results suggest that VC reputation weakens the positive relationship between corporate VC and international intensity.     

Concentrating Too Hard? Foreign and Corporate Venture Capital Involvement in Syndicates

We investigate the relationship between investment of corporate venture capital (CVC) and foreign venture capital (FVC), and the concentration of investors involved in a financing round. As forms of venture capital distinct from independent venture capital, CVC and FVC can offer different value to new ventures. However, having FVC or CVC investors in the syndicate can also pose additional risks to other investors. We find that a corporate venture capital or a foreign venture capital affiliation is related to lower concentration of investors. Our results suggest that the investors evaluate not only the venture but also their syndicate partners in determining their relative share of round investment.     

Requisite expertise,firm reputation,and status in venture capital investment allocation decisions

Drawing together research in the upper echelon perspective, strategy, and organizational sociology, this paper examines (1) the relationship between the finance expertise of a venture capital (VC) firm's management team and investment selection, and (2) the moderation of this relationship by the VC firm's social position. We find that while finance expertise is associated with a lower proportion of early-stage investments, this relationship is weaker for firms with high reputation and stronger for firms with high status. We conclude with a discussion of the importance and nuances of external image considerations on investment decisions as well as insights into the importance of the requisite nature of expertise.     

Venture Capital Investment Duration

This paper examines cross‐country evidence on the duration of venture capital (VC) investment. We formulate a theory of VC investment duration based on the idea that venture capitalists exit when the expected marginal cost of maintaining the investment is greater than the expected marginal benefit, and thereby relate VC investment duration to entrepreneurial firm characteristics, investor characteristics, deal characteristics, and institutional and market conditions. VC investment duration data in Canada and the United States lend strong support to the theoretical predictions developed herein.     

Singapore Venture Capitalists (VCs) Investment Evaluation Criteria: A Re-Examination

The Venture capital (VC) industry in Singapore is of recent origin. However, funds under management in Singapore have grown from S$45 million in 1983 to S$7.86 billion in 1996. These developments together with the recent announcement of government's vision of Singapore becoming a hub for venture capital in the region provide an opportunity for an examination of the venture capital industry in Singapore. The VC industry originated in the Western Hemisphere in response to the need for risk capital for high technology industries. In the light of the differences in investment opportunities around Singapore, and the nature of industrial developments in South East Asia in general, the authors anticipated that the investment criteria employed by Venture Capital Firms (VCs) in Singapore would differ. The results however reveal that criteria adopted by Singapore VCs are not very different from those adopted by VCs in other countries including U.S. The results also confirm that the entrepreneur's characteristics or the top management's capabilities are seen as being primary indicators of the venture's potential. Further examination of VCs investment process revealed that the investment criteria adopted by successful VCs were no different from those adopted by less successful VCs. This confirms that investment selection is a multi-stage process wherein venture assessment is only one of the steps in this process. Before VCs evaluate a venture they screen investment proposals based on their investment preferences or investment strategies. VCs in our sample had definite ideas about where to invest and in what types of firms. How do VCs select appropriate investment strategies, however, has not been adequately dealt in the literature and is a fitting subject for further studies.     

基于实物期权理论的风险投资项目评价

期权理论在金融领域的应用十分广泛,实物期权理论也被用于企业投资项目评价之中。针对风险投资项目的特殊性,以期权理论为基础,阐述风险投资项目的期权特征,进而以实例分析Black—Scholes期权定价模型在风险投资项目评价中的应用,并与NPV法所得出的结果进行对比,从而达到对投资和管理进行决策的目的。     

The influence of R&D investment on the use of corporate venture capital: An industry-level analysis

We consider how internal research and development (R&D) influences the use of corporate venture capital (CVC) and how this relationship varies across industries. We find that, in general, R&D investments increase the number of CVC deals in an industry. We also find that R&D investment has a particularly strong influence on the use of CVC in industries that are growing rapidly and changing technologically. Our analysis provides greater clarity on the relationships involving R&D and CVC in the presence of contingencies by integrating insights of absorptive capacity and real options reasoning.