Wealth Effects on Self-insurance

This paper considers the wealth effects on self-insurance investment that reduces loss. Wealthier individuals can bear the risk better, and invest less in self-insurance with two states of the world. Self-insurance, like insurance, is thus an inferior good. This known result does not extend to many states. The reason is that an increase in self-insurance does not necessarily reduce final wealth in good states and increase it in bad states. Self-insurance thus may not act as insurance, and wealthier individuals may not necessarily invest less in self-insurance. The paper proposes a condition under which self-insurance is inferior, and a condition under which it is normal.     

Non-expected utility and the robustness of the classical insurance paradigm

This paper uses the tools and techniques of generalized expected utility analysis to explore the robustness of some of the classical basic results in insurance theory to departures from the expected utility hypothesis on agents' risk preferences. The areas explored consist of individual demand for coinsurance and deductible insurance, the structure of Pareto-efficient bilateral insurance contracts, the structure of Pareto-efficient multilateral risk-sharing agreements, and self-insurance and self-protection. Most, though not all, of the basic results in this area are found to be quite robust to dropping the expected utility hypothesis.     

To Insure or Not to Insure?: An Insurance Puzzle

The selection of a deductible level in insurance is governed by the willingness to limit the risk borne by risk-averse agents at an acceptable cost, given the deadweight insurance loading. We examine the demand for insurance in a simple lifecycle model with a liquidity constraint and no serial correlation in the insurable risk. This allows for consumers to follow a time-diversification (self-insurance) strategy by accumulating buffer stock wealth. We conclude that insurance would only be demanded for catastrophic risks, or by people that are currently liquidity constrained. The added value of the insurance sector is thus surprisingly low in such an economy.     

Wealth Effects on Self-Insurance and Self-Protection against Monetary and Nonmonetary Losses

This paper considers the wealth effects on self-insurance and self-protection activities against possible losses of monetary wealth such as properties and nonmonetary wealth such as health. Increased initial income or monetary wealth decreases the demand for self-insurance against monetary wealth loss under the decreasing absolute risk aversion assumption, and has an ambiguous effect on self-protection. However, increased initial monetary wealth increases both self-insurance and self-protection against health loss, explaining empirical trends, if wealth and health are complements. When multiple self-insurance activities against both types of losses are considered, the effect of an increase in initial monetary wealth on self-insurance against health loss remains the same, but the effect on self-insurance against wealth loss depends on the preferences. JEL Classification No: D81, G22     

Captives zur Absicherung von Extremrisiken? Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel der OIL Insurance Limited

The use of captive insurance companies (captives) is quite common among big and international companies. Generally, captives are used to insure against high frequency/low severity risks. However, we can find captives which have been founded to deal with extreme risks as well. An example is the OIL Insurance Limited (OIL Insurance). In this context, we examine from a theoretical perspective whether captives are suitable for insurance against catastrophe risks. We show that regarding actuarial aspects captives have advantages in comparison to internal self-insurance and disadvantages in comparison to external insurance. The foundation of industry captives through the association of several companies can solve some of the problems, but further criteria especially costs have to be considered. Based on the developed arguments, we analyse whether our case example OIL Insurance is an appropriate instrument to transfer extreme risks.     

Income Risk, Coping Strategies, and Safety Nets

Poor rural and urban households in developing countries facesubstantial risks, which they handle with risk-management andrisk-coping strategies, including self-insurance through savingsand informal insurance mechanisms. Despite these mechanisms,however, vulnerability to poverty linked to risk remains high.This article reviews the literature on poor households' useof risk-management and risk-coping strategies. It identifiesthe constraints on their effectiveness and discusses policyoptions. It shows that risk and lumpiness limit the opportunitiesto use assets as insurance, that entry constraints limit theusefulness of income diversification, and that informal risk-sharingprovides only limited protection, leaving some of the poor exposedto very severe negative shocks. Public safety nets are likelyto be beneficial, but their impact is sometimes limited, andthey may have negative externalities on households that arenot covered. Collecting more information on households' vulnerabilityto poverty—through both quantitative and qualitative methods—couldhelp inform policy.      

Borrowing constraints,the cost of precautionary saving and unemployment insurance

When it is costly for individuals to save or to borrow, unemployment insurance (UI) provides an alternative source of liquidity that smooths consumption over time and leads individuals to spend longer unemployed searching for a suitable job. We show in a tractable life-cycle model how the optimal unemployment replacement ratio and the fall in consumption on job loss depend on the cost of self-insurance and the cost of borrowing. This implies that the value of UI depends on age at job loss, consumption needs (such as the presence of children), discount rates, the return on saving, access to credit and the presence of other social insurance programmes. Optimal replacement rates vary substantially with plausible variation in these factors (from less than 20 percent to almost 60 percent).     

Consumer durables and risky borrowing: The effects of bankruptcy protection

There exist substantial differences in the generosity of bankruptcy protection across U.S. states. This paper exploits cross-state variation in exemption levels to assess the dual role of durable goods as informal collateral for unsecured debt and self-insurance against bad shocks to earnings. The generosity of bankruptcy protection is found to change both the incentives and the ability of households to accumulate durable wealth. The gains from a high level of insurance are reduced by the effect of tighter credit constraints, so that the net effects of a change in exemption are very small. A more generous bankruptcy regulation reduces net durable wealth in the first half of the life cycle. In addition, the optimal level of exemption is positive but low.     

The Welfare State in a Changing Environment

We analyse how the welfare state, i.e., social insurance that works through redistributive taxation, should respond to increases in risks and to increases in the cost of operating the welfare state. With respect to risks, we distinguish between risks that can be insured and such that cannot (background risks). Insurable risks can be reduced by costly individual self-insurance and by costly social insurance. We show: (i) Self-insurance will be higher the more costly is the welfare state and the larger are background or insured risks. (ii) Full social insurance can only be optimal in a costless welfare state. (iii) The optimal welfare state is not necessarily larger the less costly it is. (iv) The welfare state need not optimally expand when risks increase that it insures. (v) It should, however, expand when risks increase that it does not insure.     

Self-insurance and self-protection: A nonexpected utility analysis

This paper studies the comparative statics of self-insurance and self-protection for individuals with rank-dependent expected utility preferences. In particular, proportional wealth risks, background risk, and limited liability are considered. Limited liability has a major impact on self-insurance and self-protection. It can reverse seemingly robust comparative static results for the case of self-insurance and can eliminate some puzzling ambiguities for the case of self-protection.     

Explaining Insurance Policy Provisions via Adverse Selection

In this article, we show that common insurance policy provisions—namely, deductibles, coinsurance, and maximum limits–can arise as a result of adverse selection in a competitive insurance market. Research on adverse selection typically builds on the assumption that different risk types suffer the same size loss and differ only in their probability of loss. In this study, we allow the severity of the insurance loss to be random and, thus, generalize the results of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] and Wilson [1977]. We characterize the separating equilibrium contracts in a Rothschild-Stiglitz competitive market. By further assuming a Wilson competitive market, we show that an anticipatory equilibrium might be achieved by pooling, and we characterize the optimal pooling contract.     

The Probationary Period as a Screening Device: The Monopolistic Insurer

Stiglitz [1977], considering asymmetry of information in a monopolistic insurance market and the monetary deductible as a screening device, shows that an equilibrium is always of a separating type. High risks buy complete insurance whilst low risks buy partial insurance. In this paper, we show that a pooling equilibrium may exist if a probationary period, rather than the partial coverage in monetary terms, is used as a screening device.JEL Classification No.: D42, D82     

Pooling and Separating Equilibria in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection and Distribution Costs

In the Rothschild-Stiglitz [1976] model of a competitive insurance market with adverse selection, pooling equilibria cannot exist. However in practice, pooling contracts are frequent, notably in health insurance and life insurance. This is due to the fact that distribution costs are nonnegligible and increase rapidly when more contracts are offered. We modify accordingly the Rothschild-Stiglitz model by introducing such distribution costs. We find that, however small these costs may be, they entail possible existence of pooling equilibria. Moreover, in these pooling equilibria, it is the high-risk individuals who are rationed, in the sense that they would be willing to buy more insurance at the current premium/insurance ratio.     

人寿保险行业市场结构及影响因素研究

准入退出壁垒、市场集中度、规模经济和范围经济以及产品差异化等是影响人寿保险业市场结构的主要因素。中国保险市场准入、退出的行政性政策壁垒较高,市场集中度较高,属于寡占 III 型市场结构;寿险业保费规模、保险密度、保险深度、保险资产总额占 GDP 的比重、保险资产总额占整个金融资产的比重较低;寿险产品同质化现象较严重。鉴此,应降低市场进入壁垒,建立市场退出机制,达到优化市场结构,提高资源配置效率目的。     

Die Marktabgrenzung im Versicherungskartellrecht am Beispiel der Berufshaftpflichtversicherungen

The definition of the relevant market is crucial to the application of European and German competition law and especially difficult when dealing with insurance markets. Generally, the product and geographic market comprises all products or services that are regarded as substitutable by consumers. In addition, the supply-side substitutability can be taken into consideration. In defining insurance product markets, the supply-side substitutability is decisive, because insurance products are seldom interchangeable from a policy holder’s point of view. Applying the concept of supply-side substitutability to professional indemnity insurances leads to product markets correlating with the different professional groups: Indemnity insurances for physicians constitute a product market; insurances for lawyers, notary publics, tax advisers and public accountants form another market and insurances for architects and construction engineers another one. These product markets are still national markets. Professional indemnity insurances are extensively shaped by the differing legal systems, namely by national insurance contract law, by liability provisions and by a legal obligation to insure. Consequently, policy holders cannot substitute their indemnity insurance with foreign insurance products and insurers are confronted with market entry barriers. However, the proposed directive on services on the internal market and the adopted directive on insurance mediation could result in community-wide markets in the near future.     

Regulator performance,regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets

In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provide incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive market outcome. Using biographical data on insurance regulators, economic and state specific market structure and regulatory variables, and state premium and loss data on the personal automobile insurance market, we find no evidence consumers in prior approval states paid significantly different “unit prices” for insurance than consumers in states that allow competitive market forces to determine equilibrium prices during the time period 1985–2002. We do, however, find evidence regulators who obtained the position of insurance commissioner by popular election and those who seek higher elective office following their tenure as insurance commissioner allow higher overall “unit prices” relative to competitive market states. The “unit price” of insurance in regulated states is not statistically different from the competitive market outcome for regulators that make lateral moves back into state government and it is mildly higher for regulators who enter the insurance industry following their tenure. Finally, we find some evidence regulators who describe themselves as consumer advocates are successful reducing the price of insurance in favor of consumers in regulated markets. Overall the results are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information in the regulatory process that agents use to enhance their career aspirations.     

Product Ratings as a Market Reaction to Deregulation: Evidence From the German Insurance Market

This study provides the first investigation of information markets as a reaction to deregulation of product forms in insurance markets. The article studies the case of Germany, where insurance product ratings entered the market after relaxation of product regulation in 1994. The ratings’ potential for enhancing the performance of a deregulated insurance market is analyzed by considering both market structure and governance characteristics of the rating market, since the theoretical literature predicts that both are important determinants of rating outcomes. Data from a unique panel data set containing disability insurance ratings from the three major rating agencies are also examined in light of theoretical predictions. Results suggest that market governance and competition characteristics are favorable for the production of unbiased and informative ratings. Ratings for disability insurance support this interpretation, since the characteristics of the ratings conform to theoretical predictions about ratings in well‐functioning rating markets.     

Actuarial pricing of deposit insurance

Using a pricing formula for options on coupon bonds (Jamshidian [1989], El Karoui and Rochet [1990]) we are able to compute the actuarial pricing of deposit insurance for a commercial bank. Our formula takes into account the maturity structure of the bank's balance sheet, as well as market parameters such as the term structure of interest rates and the volatilities of zero coupon bonds. The relation with asset liability management methods is explored.     

强制保险能否提高保险市场效率分析

本文以社会福利为衡量保险市场效率的标准,分析了实施强制保险是否有助于保险市场效率的提高。文章首先证明了在信息不对称的保险市场中存在着市场失灵现象;然后通过比较实施强制保险前后社会福利的差异,得出结论:实施强制保险有助于社会福利的改善,从而可以提高保险市场效率。     

Empirical Evidence for Advantageous Selection in the Commercial Fire Insurance Market

De Meza and Webb (2001) indicated that individuals with a higher degree of risk aversion would demand more insurance and invest in self-protection to reduce risk probability when both the preference type and investment in self-protection are hidden from insurers. They referred to the negative correlation between market insurance and risk type as advantageous selection. However, the relationship between risk type and the degree of risk aversion is debatable in both theoretical and empirical research. This paper therefore proposes that advantageous selection could be supported from another angle by directly examining the relationships that exist among market insurance, self-protection, and risk probability. By focusing on the commercial fire insurance market, information on the purchase of market insurance, investment in self-protection, and fire accident records is hand-collected by means of a unique survey. It is found that firms purchasing market insurance have a greater tendency to channel efforts into self-protection. It is also found that firms expending effort on self-protection are less likely to suffer a fire accident. Furthermore, it is found that firms with commercial fire insurance have less chance of suffering a fire accident than those without such insurance. Each of the above three findings jointly supports the view that advantageous selection could play a critical role in the commercial fire insurance market.