Do WTO members have more liberal trade policy?

This paper uses 68 measures of trade policy and liberalization to ask if membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is associated with more liberal trade policy. Almost no measures of trade policy are significantly correlated with GATT/WTO membership. Trade liberalizations, when they occur, usually lag GATT entry by many years, and the GATT/WTO often admits countries that are closed and remain closed for years. The exception to the rule is that WTO members tend to have slightly more freedom as judged by the Heritage Foundation's index.     

国际贸易政策的两难问题与GATT/WTO体制--GATT/WTO的政治经济学

国际贸易是受政治因素影响最大的经济领域之一，GATT／WTO的规则和体系实际上也反映了这种经济与政治交织的复杂性。国家利益的驱动使得各国政府在贸易政策运用方面处于选择偏向自由贸易或贸易保护的“两难境地”。GATT／WTO在倡导贸易自由化、建设开放的多边贸易体制过程中也不得不兼顾保障各国国家利益的要求，从而形成了以务实、折衷以及规则导向为特征的GATT／WTO理念，来支持和推动国际贸易发展中渐进的但又是持续的贸易自由化取向。     

Modelling the Extensive Margin of World Trade: New Evidence on GATT and WTO Membership

Recent literature has argued that, contrary to the results of a seminal paper by Rose (2004), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) membership does promote bilateral trade, at least for developed economies and if membership includes non‐formal compliance. We review the literature to identify open issues. We then develop a simple extension of the gravity model that gives rise to an extensive country margin of trade separating positive trade from zero trade country pairs. The model is used to identify WTO membership effects at both the intensive and the extensive margins. Empirical estimation of this model, based on Poisson pseudo‐maximum likelihood methods with exporter and importer fixed effects, allows us to readdress the empirical issue of whether GATT/WTO membership does or does not promote trade. We find that GATT membership was successful on the extensive margin of world trade but not on the intensive margin. For the recent WTO episode (1995–2008), we find consistent and robust evidence for a substantial trade‐creating role of membership which is driven primarily by the intensive margin. WTO membership results in higher bilateral trade of about 40 per cent.     

The effect of WTO on the extensive and the intensive margins of trade

We use 6-digit bilateral trade data to document the effect of WTO/GATT membership on the extensive and intensive product margins of trade. We construct gravity equations for the two product margins motivated by Chaney (2008). The empirical results show that standard gravity variables provide good explanatory power for bilateral trade on both margins. Importantly, we show that the impact of the WTO is concentrated almost exclusively on the extensive product margin of trade, i.e. trade in goods that were not previously traded. In our preferred specification, WTO membership increases the extensive margin of exports by 25%. At the same time, WTO membership has a negative impact on the intensive margin. Based on novel comparative statics results about how fixed and variable trade costs impact the product margins of trade, our results suggest that WTO membership works by reducing primarily the fixed rather than the variable costs of trade.     

The value of making commitments externally: Evidence from WTO accessions

This paper studies the value of external commitment to policy reforms in the case of WTO/GATT accessions. The accessions often entail reforms that go beyond narrowly defined trade liberalization, and have to overcome fierce resistance in the acceding countries, as reflected in protracted negotiations. We study the growth and investment consequences of WTO/GATT accessions, with attention to a possible selection bias. We find that the accessions tend to raise income, but only for those countries that were subject to rigorous accession procedures. Policy commitments associated with the accessions were helpful, especially for countries with poor governance.     

In search of WTO trade effects: Preferential trade agreements promote trade strongly, but unevenly

The literature measuring the effects of WTO membership on trade flows has produced remarkably diverse results. Rose (2004) reports a wide range of empirical specifications that produce no WTO effects. Tomz et al. (2007) use Rose's data but include de facto WTO membership, to find positive WTO trade effects. Rose (2005) also produced positive WTO trade effects after accounting for the diverse trade effects produced by individual preferential trade agreements (PTAs). When Subramanian and Wei (2007) emphasize general equilibrium trade effects by controlling for multilateral resistance, they find strong WTO trade effects only for industrialized countries. Subramanian and Wei (2007), however, account neither for unobserved heterogeneity among trading partners, nor for differences in trade effects across PTAs (which could inflate WTO estimates). We unify the Rose, Tomz et al., and Subramanian and Wei specifications in one comprehensive approach that minimizes omitted variable bias to show that all specifications produce one consistent result: WTO effects on trade flows are not statistically significant, while PTAs produce strong but uneven trade effects. Extending the gravity model to address specific avenues in which WTO may have affected trade flows, we find that WTO membership boosts trade prior to PTA formation and increases trade among proximate developing countries (at the expense of distant trade). An augmented gravity model that accounts for WTO terms-of-trade theory shows that countries with greater incentives to bargain for tariff reductions before WTO accession experience positive and significant subsequent WTO trade effects.     

Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes

Developing countries have been increasing their participation in the formal institutions and proceedings of the multilateral trading system. A prominent example is their more frequent involvement as defendants and plaintiffs in GATT/WTO trade disputes. This paper provides an initial economic appraisal of developing country performance in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. We measure the economic resolution of these disputes through trade liberalisation gains, and our results suggest that developing country plaintiffs have had more success under WTO disputes than was the case under the GATT. We also document evidence on potential determinants of this success: the capacity for plaintiffs to make credible retaliatory threats and the guilty determinations by GATT/WTO panels. Finally, there is also some evidence that developing countries have recognised the importance of retaliatory threats and have responded by changing their pattern of dispute initiation under the WTO to better take advantage of the instances in which they have sufficient leverage to threaten retaliation and induce compliance with GATT/WTO obligations.     

GATT/WTO与管理贸易

现实中的国际贸易不是自由贸易，国际贸易体制中一直都是自由贸易和贸易保护同时并存，以1GATT／WTO也不是自由贸易组织。管理贸易是指介于纯粹自由贸易和完全贸易保护之间的各种情形，其特点是规则导向、有较大兼容性以及可塑性。管理贸易的发展可以有两个完全相反的方向，而GATT／WTO倡导的贸易自由化实质上是在自由贸易和贸易保护两种成分并存的国际贸易体制中抑制贸易保护、提高贸易自由的程度。     

The ‘Real’ Impact of GATT/WTO – a Generalised Approach

Rose’s result in 2004 that GATT/WTO has no significant impact on bilateral trade triggered off a series of empirical studies. Each of those studies augments Rose’s paper in one specific methodological aspect with the general finding that GATT/WTO significantly fosters members’ trade, although the estimated impact varies between 2 per cent and 195 per cent of trade creation. We combine the methodological contributions of previous studies to overcome these isolated approaches, to account for possible interactions and to develop a more general view on the impact of GATT/WTO. In particular, we find that GATT/WTO promotes members’ trade by around 86 per cent.     

The Effect of GATT/WTO on Export and Import Price Volatility

Despite much interest and discussion concerning the trade‐promoting effects of membership in multilateral trade agreements, little is known about the effect of membership on world trade prices. This paper fills this gap by studying the effects of membership on export and import price volatility. We document a surprisingly strong and robust empirical regularity: GATT/WTO membership reduces the volatility of prices over time for both import and export countries, with similar results found for free trade agreements. We show that results are not driven by sample selection or endogeneity concerns and that the effect is captured by members subject to rigorous accession procedures.     

The WTO trade effect

This paper re-examines the GATT/WTO membership effect on bilateral trade flows, using nonparametric methods including pair-matching, permutation tests, and a Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis. Together, these methods provide an estimation framework that is robust to misspecification bias, allows general forms of heterogeneous membership effects, and addresses potential hidden selection bias. This is in contrast to most conventional parametric studies on this issue. Our results suggest large GATT/WTO trade-promoting effects that are robust to various restricted matching criteria, alternative GATT/WTO indicators, non-random incidence of positive trade flows, inclusion of multilateral resistance terms, and different matching methodologies.     

GATT第24条关于关税同盟和自由贸易区的实体内部标准研究

GATT/WTO多边贸易体制关于关税同盟和自由贸易区的纪律规定于GATT第24条。然而,在GATT缔约之日起,直至如今,GATT第24条一直是人们苦恼和迷惑之源。人们认为,由于充满"模糊"和"含糊其词的用语",该条的规定"极端宽松"、"异乎寻常地复杂"、"充满漏洞";有人甚至批评说该条是"荒谬的"和"自相矛盾的"。GATT第24条诸款中,引起争议最大的莫过于该条的第8款,该款规定了关税同盟和自由贸易区内部深度区域自由化的义务,本文称之为实体内部标准。本文首先探讨了GATT第24条关于区域贸易安排法律制度的逻辑框架和实体纪律。重点就"深度区域自由化的义务"(内部标准)尽可能全面地加以评释。     

Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade

We develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature (bilateral or multilateral) of trade liberalization are endogenously determined. To determine whether and how bilateralism matters, we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis. We find that when countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus, there exist circumstances where global free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements. By contrast, under symmetry, both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade.     

Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process

I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular, I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has amended the GATT escape clause (Article XIX), and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that resembles a court of law under the WTO. Using this framework, I interpret the weakening of the reciprocity principle under the Agreement on Safeguards as an attempt to reduce efficiency-reducing trade skirmishes. The DSB is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that announces its opinion about the state of the world when a dispute arises among member countries. I demonstrate that the reforms in the GATT escape clause should be bundled with the introduction of the DSB, in order to maintain the incentive compatibility of trade agreements. The model implies that trade agreements under the WTO lead to fewer trade skirmishes but this effect does not necessarily result in higher payoffs to the governments. The model also implies that the introduction of the WTO court, which has no enforcement power, can improve the self-enforceability of trade agreements.     

《关贸总协定》第24条的再解读--规则、案例和展望

《关贸总协定》第24条所规定的区域贸易安排是世贸组织框架下最惠国待遇的例外。区域贸易安排一方面有贸易促进的积极作用,另一方面又因其集团间歧视的特征,一旦被滥用,就会侵蚀世贸组织的非歧视原则,背离关贸总协定/世贸组织实现全球贸易自由化和一体化的目标。《关贸总协定》第24条、乌拉圭回合的《谅解》以及土耳其案的专家组、上诉机构的论述都显示了世贸组织对区域贸易安排越来越多的关注,但现有的制度仍有一些不足,文章从对规则的分析入手,从区域贸易安排与世贸组织的关系定位、争端解决机制、区域贸易协定审查委员会的审查等方面对世贸组织框架下区域贸易安排的完善提出若干建议。     

论WTO的“硬法”约束与“软法”治理

在全球治理的理念指导下,晚近国际组织经常采取一种"软硬兼施"的立法模式或治理方式,WTO就是其中的一个典型代表。作为推动贸易自由化的国际组织,WTO更多地表现了它对GATT的发展和扬弃,体现了"硬法"约束的法律权威性。这主要表现"一揽子"协议的安排模式、对"祖父条款"的废除、较强的执行力。为了协调各成员方的利益,使WTO更具吸引力,同时也使WTO的判决更具时代性和先进性,WTO采用了"软法"治理的机制,这主要表现在:第一,"法庭之友"的介入,客观上实现了WTO机制对贸易与环境、贸易与人权等议题的采纳与接受;第二,国际标准被"柔性"地添加到WTO的规则之中;第三,宽泛、模糊的例外条款对过于"刚性"的义务起到了很好的"缓冲"作用;第四,模糊的优惠条款留给发达成员方权利与自由;第五,WTO对某些敏感问题的"软处理"态度,使得有关成员方有机会挑战WTO的制度约束。为了最大限度地保护本国外贸利益,中国应当学会利用WTO这种"软硬兼施"的治理模式:积极参加WTO各项议题的谈判,积极主导或参与国际标准的制定,大力发展本国非政府组织、积极参与非政府间国际组织的活动。     

The Role of GATT/WTO as a Commitment Device in the Presence of a Time Lag: Free Trade,Time‐consistent Tariff Policy and Market Size

We consider whether a free trade policy is superior to tariff policies in the presence of a time lag between production and trade decisions. We show that the preferable choice between a free trade policy and a time‐consistent tariff policy depends on the market size of the importing country. However, because a free trade policy itself is not necessarily credible in the presence of a time lag, the importing country requires an international organisation such as GATT/WTO as a commitment device. Accordingly, employing a non‐cooperative game approach, we analyse under what conditions becoming a member of such an international organisation is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and show that free trade under the GATT/WTO regime is Pareto improving for the importing and exporting countries.     

Aid for trade and trade policy in recipient countries

ABSTRACT

This article explores the impact of Aid for Trade (AfT) flows on trade policy in 123 recipient countries over the period of 2002 to 2015. It shows empirical evidence that AfT interventions are conducive to trade policy liberalization. These results apply to both the entire sample and to the sub-sample of least developed countries (LDCs). Additionally, the analysis shows that the lower the development level, the higher the positive impact of AfT inflows on recipient countries’ trade policy liberalization, although above the US$ 4,885.40 threshold of real per capita income, AfT inflows exert no significant impact on trade policy.     

The GATT and gradualism

This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be achieved, if punishment for deviation from an agreement is limited to a ‘withdrawal of equivalent concessions’ and if initial deviation from an agreement is also limited. The paper shows how (sufficiently patient) countries have an incentive to deviate in a limited way when operating under GATT dispute settlement procedures.