公司融资结构与委托代理机制设计研究

以现代财经理论为出发点,建立了非对称信息条件下基于融资结构的委托代理模型,并将财务风险和经理持股两个因素纳入模型中,对模型进行了求解,研究了在此背景下的激励机制的设计,并通过对模型的分析,阐述了经理在股权激励和债务约束两种背景下的行为特征。     

The choice of organizational form: Vertical financial ownership versus other methods of vertical integration

Vertical integration is a fundamental corporate strategy of interest to the fields of strategic management and organizational economics. This paper synthesizes theoretical arguments and empirical findings from this literature to identify the underlying advantages and disadvantages of choosing vertical financial ownership relative to vertical contracts. It then suggests that in the absence of agency and transaction costs, vertical financial ownership and vertical contracting are equivalent governance structures for achieving corporate objectives. However, given a world of positive agency and transaction costs, the key theoretic question then becomes predicting when market mechanisms are sufficient, when intermediate forms of vertical contracting become necessary, and when vertical financial ownership becomes the preferred governance structure. The concluding section of the paper provides a framework for making this analysis based on a synthesis of agency and transaction costs perspectives.     

Internal governance mechanisms and firm performance in China

Corporate governance issues arising from concentrated ownership structure in emerging economies have received growing attention. Adopting a principal–principal perspective, this paper employs structural equation modeling to evaluate the independent and interdependent effects of internal governance mechanisms in enhancing firms’ value in China. Based on a 3-year dataset covering 304 publicly listed companies over 2003–2005, our findings suggest that ownership concentration has the most significant governance effect and has impacted negatively on firm performance. Furthermore, the governance role of the board of directors and supervisory boards is found to have been hindered by ownership concentration, rendering them unable to improve firm performance at present.     

How Relevant Is Government Championing Behavior in Technology Development?

Many studies emphasize the importance of government support in technology development. However, this study is among the first to provide empirical findings of the relevance of government roles for the performance of technology development projects. Based on earlier research and the strategic management literature, a theoretical model and hypotheses are developed to study the relevance of government roles and project teams' strategic behavior for technology development projects. Our results show that government championship is an important positive factor for the performance of technology development projects. Government championing behavior overcomes regulatory barriers, enthusiastically promotes the technology's advantages, and gets key decision makers involved. As such, government championship has more impact than government financial/technical assistance on both project performance and benefits to customers. The findings also show that both the proactiveness and defensiveness dimensions of project teams' strategic behavior contribute positively to project performance and benefits to customers. The paper concludes with implications for practice: From a policy perspective, government should extend its technology policies by taking on the role as a champion, while companies should invest in building professional relations with champions in government.     

Alternative Corporate Governance Systems in Japanese Firms: Implications for a Shift to Stockholder-Centered Corporate Governance

In Asia, the recent catastrophic decline in regional stock markets, continuing currency crisis and failures of major financial institutions and industrial corporations have increased domestic and international interest in corporate governance. Nowhere is this greater than in Japan where financial institution reform has catapulted this to the fore. In this paper, we use agency theory and institutional theory, together with comparative case examples, to derive some propositions on the dynamics of changing corporate governance systems in Japanese firms. We argue for the co-existence of stakeholder and shareholder-centered corporate governance systems in Japan. This argument has an important implication for corporate governance research and agency theory. Namely, changes in ownership structure and institutional expectations would force firms to focus on maximizing shareholder value even where the interests of stakeholders are more emphasized. It suggests an environmental selection mechanism to ensure the emergence of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem. Further, the loss of competitiveness and the prolonged poor performance of firms can change the institutional norms to emphasize asset efficiency and transparency rather than stability and business ties.     

Managerial ownership and the role of privatization in transition economies: The case of China

Within transition economies, a popular tactic for revitalizing large and inefficient stateowned enterprises (SOEs) is to privatize them. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence related to this issue is equivocal. This study, therefore, explores more deeply what the relationship may be between privatization efforts of SOEs and their financial performance in transition economies. Specifically, we seek to better understand whether privatization reforms per se, or other corporate governance mechanisms that complement or substitute for this effort, are most effective. Using a panel sample of Chinese state-owned public firms over an eight year period from 1999 to 2006, we find that managerial ownership has a more significant impact on firm performance than privatization does. This finding suggests that internal incentives to managers may be more effective than external market mechanisms in economies transitioning from centralized planning to market control. Our results are robust using a wide variety of performance measures and different model specifications.     

Corporate Social Responsibility and Governance: The Role of Executive Compensation

This article examines the relationship between corporate governance and corporate sustainability by focusing on an essential component of companies' governance structure: executive compensation programs. We propose an original empirical strategy based on a large set of the biggest capitalizations in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries over the period 2004–2018, with explicit measures of how companies integrate into executive managers' remuneration precise criteria of corporate social responsibility, an incentive scheme called corporate social responsibility (CSR) contracting. Our results show that proposing executive compensation programs including CSR criteria has a negative impact on financial performance, and a large positive impact on extra-financial performance based on the following dimensions: relationship with customers and suppliers, and community involvement. Second, we explore the moderating role of the corporate governance model by distinguishing the impact between firms with a shareholder or stakeholder corporate governance model and reveal significant differences in the impact of CSR contracting. For firms with a stakeholder corporate governance model, CSR contracting is no longer associated with a fall of financial performance and has a large positive impact on human resources, environmental, and human rights performance. On the other hand, CSR contracting has a negative impact on financial performance but no impact on extra-financial performance for firms with a shareholder corporate governance model.     

上市公司治理结构对信息性盈余管理的影响研究

为了有效监督公司内部利害关系各方的行为,有效降低基于各种委托代理关系的代理成本,在阐述国内外盈余管理文献的基础上,假设拥有健全公司治理结构的上市公司管理者更愿意进行信息性盈余管理,通过构建合理的并可度量的信息性盈余管理衡量方法,使用沪、深两市全部A股上市公司2014—2016年公司季度财务数据,实证研究了信息性盈余管理视角下公司治理对盈余管理的影响。结果表明,市场监管者和投资者需要关注两种不同的盈余管理行为,投机性盈余管理更倾向于误导投资者,信息性盈余管理则是通过盈余管理的手段向投资者传递有用的内部信息。股权制衡对上市公司的信息性盈余管理行为具有明显促进作用,促使管理层进行信息性盈余管理,就要优化股权结构,形成产权多样化的股东制衡机制,实现股权结构的合理优化。拥有健全公司治理结构的上市公司管理者更愿意进行信息性盈余管理,公司治理结构对管理者进行信息性盈余管理具有积极的影响,健全的公司治理结构能够提高财务报告透明度和盈余信息含量。因此,保障财务报告的真实性和可靠性,以信息性盈余管理为动机探究公司治理对盈余管理的影响具有现实意义。     

预算信息公开是提高财政透明度的重要途径

一个民主的、负责任的、有能力的、高效率的、透明的政府对经济社会全面的可持续发展具有举足轻重的地位。政府预算作为整个财政工作的核心和财政政策的主要工具,预算信息更是对整个预算过程预算管理的重要的载体。预算信息的公开可以强化政府的公共受托责任、推进依法治国与国际标准接轨,以及转变政府执政理念,提高公民参与公共治理的积极性,是提高财政透明度和实现善治必要途径。     

The effect of cultural differences in perceptions of transactions costs on national differences in the preference for international joint ventures

This study presents a theoretical explanation of why the cultural trait of power distance represents greater perceptions of transaction costs and lower perceptions of governance costs across societies. It demonstrates that cultural differences in perceptions of transactions and governance costs as represented by Hofstede's (1980) power distance index explain national differences in the preference for international joint ventures after market size, government limitations on sole ownership and uncertainty avoidance have been controlled. The study concludes that cultural differences in transaction costs provide an important extension to the transaction costs theory of joint ventures.     

The influence of ownership on performance: An empirical study

This research examines the relationship between ownership structure and financial performance in the context of the agency theory. It improves upon previous research by presenting an improved risk-adjusted performance measure, by using a larger sample size than prior work and also by controlling for firm size differences. The results suggest that ownership is significantly related to firm financial performance even after controlling for size.     

Mutual commitment to support exchange: relation‐specific IT system as a substitute for managerial hierarchy

This paper examines the effects of information technology (IT) on the governance of vertically related firms. We propose that a highly relation‐specific IT system in inter‐firm transactions plays a key role in the resulting inter‐firm governance as a mutual sunk‐cost commitment, in terms of leading to both less vertical integration (i.e., a change in governance mode as a first‐order effect) and a smaller number of suppliers (i.e., a change within a governance mode as a second‐order effect). As a result, this highly relation‐specific IT system (bilateral investment) can be an alternative governance mode of electronic integration that acts as a substitute for managerial hierarchy and vertical financial ownership. From a strategic management perspective, this paper provides transaction costs and resource‐based explanations on IT systems' impact on the organizational boundary decision and its impact on the likelihood of the firm achieving sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

WT0体制下行业协会的应对策略——以反倾销为例

加入WTO，对我国政府尤其是传统的以政府为主体的行业管理体制，提出了严峻的挑战。未来的产业治理，是政府、市场、企业间非正式组织、行业协会等各种治理机制相互合作、替代和补充的一种治理结构。在WTO体制下，行业协会对保障国内产业安全将起越来越重要的作用。本文以反倾销为例，从全球贸易一体化出发，就行业协会的功能扩展、行业协会的现有功能及其障碍、今后行业协会的应对策略等问题进行了深入研究。     

Ownership and its Impact on Coping with Financial Crisis: Differences in State-, Mixed-, and Privately-Owned Enterprises in Thailand

Corporate turnarounds have been studied widely in Western contexts, but few empirical studies detail turnaround experience in non-western countries, especially those undergoing or recovering from financial crisis. An assumption in recent privatization policies has been that change in ownership triggers a form of performance reversal or turnaround. Here, we compare firms with three different forms of ownership two years after the financial crisis in Thailand. This study assesses the impact of ownership differences on the level of corporate entrepreneurship, human resource management practices, and worker effort among state-, mixed- and privately-owned enterprises in Thailand. The results suggest cautious optimism about changes in ownership as a potential means for triggering organizational changes that lead to increased productivity for threatened economies. Mixed ownership may be an effective substitute for private ownership or, alternately, an effective transitional form of restructuring state enterprises in preparation for private ownership.     

Corporate Governance and returns on information technology investment: evidence from an emerging market

Prior studies have reported mixed findings on the impact of corporate information technology (IT) investment on firm performance. This study investigates the effect of corporate governance, an important management control mechanism, on the relation between IT investment and firm performance in the Taiwanese electronics industry. Specifically, we explore board independence and foreign ownership, which have increasingly become salient factors concerning corporate governance in emerging markets. We address their roles across firms of different sizes and in industries where degrees of competitiveness run a wide gamut. Our results show a positive moderating effect of board independence on the IT investment‐firm performance relation, especially when competition intensifies. Furthermore, we find that the greater the foreign ownership in small firms, the more positive the IT investment‐firm performance relation, suggesting that foreign investors may bring IT expertise to help small firms reap the benefits of using IT. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

技术创新的资源与激励的不匹配性及其治理

中国不同所有权工业在技术创新的资源配置和创新激励的配置上具有明显的不匹配性,这对技术创新绩效差异有重要的影响。本文提出了技术创新双重约束模式,认为中国工业技术创新的企业治理约束和资源配置约束是决定技术创新绩效的根本力量,据此解释了技术创新不匹配性的产生机理。因此,建立技术创新资源要素配置与激励匹配的制度体制是提高企业和产业的技术创新绩效的根本途径。     

Multiple agency perspective,family control,and private information abuse in an emerging economy

Using a comprehensive sample of listed companies in Hong Kong this paper investigates how family control affects private information abuses and firm performance in emerging economies. We combine research on stock market microstructure with more recent studies of multiple agency perspectives and argue that family ownership and control over the board increases the risk of private information abuse. This, in turn, has a negative impact on stock market performance. Family control is associated with an incentive to distort information disclosure to minority shareholders and obtain private benefits of control. However, the multiple agency roles of controlling families may have different governance properties in terms of investors’ perceptions of private information abuse. These findings contribute to our understanding of the conflicting evidence on the governance role of family control within a multiple agency perspective.     

环境治理中政府机制有效性的制度分析

长期以来,传统观点一直认为,当环境治理的市场机制与社会机制失灵时,利用政府机制可以有效弥补二者的缺陷。然而,环境治理的政府机制是否总是有效,在环境治理的理论研究中,很少有涉及到对此问题的深入研究。通过利用制度分析的框架对环境治理中政府机制的作用机理、有效性、作用条件等展开了广泛的探讨,并就提高政府机制在环境治理中的有效性,给出了具体对策。     

改制对企业绩效影响的实证分析

本文运用来自竞争性行业的451家样本企业(1994—1999年)的数据研究了改制对企业经营绩效的影响。通过产权结构作为连续变量的分析，发现国有产权对企业绩效具有显著的负作用，而非国有资本具有积极的绩效效应，其中个人资本具有最为显著的提高效益的正相关作用。在不同资本控股权的分析中，个人资本相对控股权分组的利润率显著高于国有资本相对控股权的分组，并且经营者持股比例的增加可以显著提高改善经营绩效的可能性。