One market, one number? A composite indicator assessment of EU internal market dynamics

We consider the lack of consensus about an appropriate theoretical framework linking sub-indicators as a defining characteristic of composite indicators. This intrinsic feature implies uncertainties about the appropriate normalization and aggregation of the raw data. The two are related: index theory offers some valuable guidelines about their connection. Yet these do not fully solve the basic problem of expert disagreement. We embed such (residual) disagreement in the aggregation method itself. Specifically, we apply an impartial benefit-of-the-doubt weighting procedure, where weight restrictions incorporate the available information on experts’ opinions. We apply this procedure to the dynamic performance assessment of EU Internal Market effects, thereby highlighting its capacity to disaggregate member states’ observed performance shifts into changes relative to benchmarks and performance changes of the benchmarks (i.e. catching up versus genuine progress). Our results indicate that the latter factor is more important in explaining the observed progress.     

Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations

This paper provides a formal model of endogenous border formation and choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. We examine both the case of democratic governments and of dictatorships. The model is consistent with three observations. First, breakup of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflicts. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the breakup of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace dividend (the reduction in defense spending in a more peaceful world) is limited by the process of country breakup.     

Trade negotiations, domestic policies, and the Most Favored Nation clause

Abstract.  This paper illustrates how restricting trade instruments to non-discrimination links trade agreements to non-trade agreements and, under certain conditions, helps governments further lower tariffs and/or domestic standards (policies). These conditions are: (i) governments' objective functions are sufficiently concave with respect to domestic standards (policies); (ii) domestic standards are sufficiently valued; and (iii) policies are strategic complements. These can then be used as a rationale for restricting safeguard measures to non-discrimination.     

The Southeast Asian Economies in the Age of Discontent

This paper investigates the effects on and responses of five middle‐income Southeast Asian economies to the current global environment of authoritarian populism, the retreat from economic liberalism, and the appeal of anti‐globalization movements. While the political histories and institutional capabilities of the five – Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam – vary greatly, these economies have a history of at least moderately fast economic growth for extended periods, and of increasing regional and global economic integration. We argue that most of the factors behind the discontent with globalization in the rich economies are not present to the same degree in these countries, and that there has therefore been no major retreat from the economic policy settings that have underpinned their past economic success. However, there are no grounds for complacency. Economic growth is slowing in some of the countries, economic insecurity remains widespread, and the development of durable independent institutions has lagged economic growth.     

Time-consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and a balanced government budget

Abstract .  This paper analyzes optimal, time consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and with a balanced government budget. When tax revenue is used for publicly provided consumption or lump-sum transfers, leisure would be higher than its social optimum. Pareto optimal taxation requires taxing capital income more heavily than labour income and subsidizing investment at the same rate of the tax. Also, it requires either subsidizing labour at the same rate as a consumption tax or subsidizing consumption at the same rate as a labour income tax, and hence it is not a practical guide to policy. Further, a consumption tax, or equivalently a uniform income tax with investment subsidies at the same rate, can be improved on by taxing capital income more heavily than labour income.     

A golden rule of public finance or a fixed deficit regime?: Growth and welfare effects of budget rules

In this paper, we compare growth and welfare effects of various budget rules within an endogenous growth model with productive public capital, utility enhancing public consumption and public debt. We find that introducing a fixed deficit regime does not affect the long run growth rate compared to a balanced budget while establishing a golden rule results in higher growth. Simulations of welfare effects indicate that a golden rule leads to highest welfare followed by a balanced budget and a fixed deficit regime. A maximum fraction of deficit financed public investment is derived. Varying the intertemporal elasticity of substitution shows that economies populated by households who have a strong tendency to smooth consumption should adhere to a balanced budget from a welfare point of view.     

What is the optimal rate of R&D investment to maximize productivity growth?

Governments in modern economies devote much policy attention to enhancing productivity and continue to emphasize its drivers such as investment in R&D. This paper analyzes the relationship between productivity growth and levels of R&D investments. The econometric analysis shows that more than 65 per cent of productivity growth variance is due to its dependence on gross domestic expenditure on R&D expressed as percentage of GDP (GERD). Economic analysis shows that productivity growth = f(GERD) is a concave function downwards due to diminishing returns to research investments. In addition, the research shows that the range of GERD between 2.3 per cent and 2.6 per cent maximizes the long-run impact on productivity growth and it is the key to sustained productivity and technology improvements that are becoming more and more necessary to modern economic growth.     

An instrumental variables approach to estimating tax revenue elasticities: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper exploits the significant response of real GDP growth of Sub-Saharan African countries to exogenous international commodity price and rainfall shocks to construct instrumental variables estimates of the tax revenue elasticity IV estimates yield that a 1% increase in GDP increases tax revenues by up to 2.5%.     

Social polarization, fiscal instability and growth

We present a dynamic model of fiscal policy in a simple growth framework where social polarization (of preferences) plays a central role in the evolution of fiscal instability and growth collapse. In a highly polarized society, a deficit occurs endogenously, fiscal spending path becomes more volatile, output collapses, and economic growth rate is reduced along the transition path to a new lower level of output. One novel feature is that the size of fiscal deficit, the magnitude of fiscal volatility, and the size of reduction in output and growth rate are explicitly shown to be increasing functions of the degree of social polarization. This is because of the positive relationship between the polarization of preferences and the incentive for policymakers (or socio-economic groups) to overexploit the government resources in a common pool setting (polarization effect). Thereby, we offer a fiscal instability channel that negatively links social polarization and growth, which is an alternative yet distinct explanation for the empirical finding that social polarization is harmful to growth. Moreover, we fully distinguish the incentive to engage in such short-term policies under political uncertainty from that under polarization. Polarization and political uncertainty are shown to be distinct yet critical to the dynamic coordination failure in the common pool setting.     

Vibert's European union: A United Nations or a United States?

In his book, Europe: A Constitution for the Millennium, Frank Vibert explores every major issue that will arise in the design of a constitution for a European political union. Can the theoretical constructs of constitutional economics be used to aid in the practical design of a European constitution? This is what Vibert attempts to do in his book. This review contains a more detailed discussion and analysis of a few of Vibert's main theses. In particular, it focuses, on several key issues that will be the major determinants of whether the European Union will achieve lasting success.     

REFORM CREATING REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: APPLICATIONS FOR EAST ASIA

Abstract. We estimate the investment creation and diversion effects of RTAs by using an extended gravity equation focusing on domestic reform as a commitment device for RTA membership. As a case study, we estimate the impact of proposed East Asian RTAs on inward FDI. We find that: (i) reform creating RTA membership, larger market size, better skilled labour and lower trade costs all contribute positively and significantly to inward FDI; and (ii) most of the proposed East Asian RTAs promote intra‐bloc FDI. In particular, both South–North and North–North RTAs prove to be more preferable membership combinations to South–South RTAs in East Asia.     

War, peace, and the size of countries

This paper studies the relationship between international conflict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargaining and nonpeaceful confrontations are possible. We show how the size distribution of countries depends on the likelihood, benefits, and costs of conflict and war. We also study the role of international law and show how better defined international ‘property rights’ may lead to country breakup and more numerous local conflicts.     

On the robustness of laissez-faire

This paper considers a model economy in which agents are privately informed about their type: their endowments of various goods and their preferences over these goods. While preference orderings over observable choices are allowed to be correlated with an agent's private type, we assume that the planner/government is both uncertain about the nature of this joint distribution and unable to choose among multiple equilibria of any given social mechanism. We model the planner/government as having a maxmin objective in the face of this uncertainty.Our main theorem is as follows: Once we allow for this kind of uncertainty and assume no wealth effects in preferences, the uniquely optimal social contract is laissez-faire, in which agents trade in unfettered markets with no government intervention of any kind.