Equilibrium price and advertisement distributions

We consider an economy where many sellers sell identical goods to many buyers. Each seller has a unit supply and each buyer has a unit demand. The only possible information flow about prices is through costly advertising. We show that in equilibrium the sellers use mixed strategies in pricing which leads to price and advertisement distributions. With convex advertising costs each seller sends only one advertisement in the market. We also delineate a class of advertising costs which ensures that sellers may send multiple advertisements in equilibrium. Higher prices are advertised more than lower prices.     

Buyer–seller networks with demand shocks and intermediation

We present a model in which buyers and sellers use links to trade with each other. Each seller produces a good which can be one of two types. Buyers are ex ante identical but receive specification or valuation shocks after the links are formed. We show that efficient networks are stable and that severing a link in an efficient network results in a higher price for the buyer but a lower price for the seller. We also examine network intermediation when sellers (buyers) form links sequentially. When sellers form links sequentially, the first seller becomes an intermediary and shares links with other sellers; this makes all sellers better off. However, when buyers form links sequentially, buyers may or may not share links. If links are shared multiple intermediaries result.     

Intermediaries,Credibility and Incentives to Collude

A seller contracts and potentially colludes with a certification intermediary. We investigate the intermediary’s incentives to collude, her pricing strategy, and the extent to which buyers rely on the intermediary’s announcements. The probability of collusion is an endogenous variable, determined by the intermediary’s pricing strategy. The extent to which the market relies on the intermediary’s reports, the certification price and the intermediary’s profit decrease as the intermediary becomes less patient. By making certification mandatory, the intermediary loses her ability to screen out low‐quality sellers, which increases the probability of collusion.     

Random shocks in experimental spot and forward auction markets

Traders face random demand and supply schedules in two experimental auction environments. One is the standard double auction and the other requires sellers to produce and hold inventory before trading. Inventories cannot be held between trading cycles. The endogenous and random cost of inventory disciplines sellers to restrict sales and keep prices relatively high. Anxious buyers may bid up price because total sales cannot exceed inventories. Shocks to the system do not change this behavior except when seller production costs are random. In this treatment, prices converge to the predicted competitive equilibrium. The inventory requirement in all cases increases the earnings of sellers relative to buyers.     

Divergence in Reservation Prices and Its Impact on Housing Market Liquidity: A Theoretical Analysis

In this paper, we build a two-period English auction model to study the relative movements between buyers’ and sellers’ reservation prices in the housing market. We show that changes in sellers’ reservation prices are jointly determined by changes in buyers’ reservation prices, probability of buyers offering a high or low price, and the arrival rate of buyers. When the divergence between the buyers’ and sellers’ reservation prices widens, the probability of sale increases in the upward market and decreases in the downward market, contributing to the increases or decreases in market liquidity.     

Descending price multi-item auctions

We propose a simultaneous descending price auction mechanism to sell multiple heterogeneous items, each owned by a distinct seller, to a number of buyers. Each buyer has known private valuations on items, and wants at most one item. We show that if the sellers follow a descending price offer procedure and the buyers follow a greedy strategy for accepting the offers, the auction results in a nearly efficient allocation, and terminates close to a competitive equilibrium price vector. The descending price offer strategy of the sellers is close to a Nash equilibrium. However, we show that the buyers are better off waiting in our auction. There is a maximum limit (corresponding to the minimum competitive equilibrium price vector) till which they can wait without running into the risk of not winning any item. If the buyers wait within this limit, the prices can be brought arbitrarily close to a uniquely defined competitive equilibrium price vector.     

List price and sales prices of residential properties during booms and busts

This paper investigates the relationship between the list and sale price of residential properties over the housing cycle. In down or normal markets the list price generally exceeds the sales price; however, when the housing market is strong, homes sell for more than their list price. This observation is not consistent with the assumptions made in the standard model of home sellers’ search behavior. We consider alternative models. In one, sellers set list prices based on their expectations of future changes in sales prices and the arrival rate of buyers; however, demand shocks occur. This model partially explains our data from the Belfast, U.K. housing market, but it fails to predict the list to sales price ratio during a sustained housing boom. We next describe a model where sellers’ endogenously select their search mechanism depending on the strength of the housing market. We find support for the conjecture that sellers switch to an auction-like model during housing booms. There also is evidence that during a downturn in the market, sellers’ list prices are sticky.     

二手房价格评估系统设计与研究

针对二手房交易过程中普遍存在的买卖双方信息不对称的问题,设计了一套基于B/S层次化结构的二手房价格评估系统。该系统首先通过网络爬虫从二手房网站收集公开的实时性数据信息,随后对这些数据进行预处理并建立层级化数据库。随后通过非参数回归算法对二手房价格进行评估。实验证明,本系统能够为购房者提供综合、直观的二手房趋势信息,并进行较为准确的估价。对于购房者以及售房者的决策都具有重要的参考价值。     

Buyer information and the hedonic: The impact of a seller disclosure on the implicit price for airport noise

Revealed preference methods like the hedonic model generally assume economic agents have access to publicly available information and use it effectively. In the housing market, the recent proliferation of seller disclosure laws suggests that policymakers perceive buyers to be less than “fully informed,” presumably since they face higher information acquisition costs than sellers. The introduction of an airport noise disclosure in the residential housing market surrounding the Raleigh–Durham International Airport is used as a quasi-random experiment to analyze the impact of this type of information asymmetry between buyers and sellers on housing prices. The results from a regression analysis that controls for potential spatial and temporal confounders, suggest that the airport noise disclosure reduced the value of houses most heavily impacted by airport noise by 2.9 percent. This represents approximately a 37 percentage point increase in the implicit price of airport noise. The results provide evidence that publicly available information, such as that available for airport noise, may not be adequately considered by all buyers. They also suggest that the information environment should be carefully considered when using housing data and the hedonic model to value urban amenities and disamenities.     

Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment

A competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have private information about their own private use value for the commodity being traded. In addition the commodity has a common value to all buyers, perhaps represented by the future resale value of the commodity. A competitive equilibrium in mechanisms is described. In every such equilibrium it is shown that sellers must offer mechanisms that are allocationally equivalent to English ascending price auctions. The reservation prices that sellers set are shown to be below their ex post cost of trading the commodity. Received: 24 April 1998 / Accepted: 8 March 1999     

Optimal Two‐Part Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a risk‐averse monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty. The firm produces a single good at a constant marginal cost. To facilitate sales, the firm uses a two‐part pricing contract that includes a membership fee and a selling price per unit. The good is sold to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who are subject to a common demand shock. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion are to push the unit price closer to the constant marginal cost and to shrink the market coverage so as to limit the firm’s risk exposure to the demand uncertainty. The more risk‐averse firm as such charges a higher membership fee to consumers. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to lower (raise) the unit price, to raise (lower) the membership fee, and to shrink (enlarge) the market coverage under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm’s optimal two‐part pricing contract, however, is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving‐spread increase in the demand uncertainty induces the firm to lower the unit price, to raise the membership fee, and to shrink the market coverage under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. The firm’s risk preferences as such play a pivotal role in determining the optimal two‐part pricing under demand uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can boundedly rational sellers learn to play Nash?

How does Nash pricing compare to pricing with adaptive sellers using reinforcement learning (RL)? We consider a market game similar to Varian’s model (Am Econ Rev 70:651–659, 1980) with two types of consumers differing by the size of their fixed sample search rule and derive the Nash search equilibrium (NSE) strategy (the density, the mean and the variance of the posted price distribution). Our findings are twofold. First, we find that the RL price distribution does not converge in a statistical sense to the NSE one except when competition is à la Bertrand. Second, we show that the qualitative properties of the NSE with respect to a change in buyers‘ search behavior are still valid for the RL distribution. The average price and the variance of both price distributions exhibit similar variations to a change in buyers’ search.     

Cross‐hedging and forward‐contract pricing of electricity in the Pacific Northwest

This paper develops a linear regression model for using actively traded NYMEX natural gas futures as a cross‐hedge against electricity spot‐price risk in the Pacific Northwest and for pricing the forward contracts in the presence of temperature and hydro risks. Our approach comports with reality and provides power purchasers with an effective instrument through which they can hedge their electricity bets through natural gas futures. It also demonstrates the sharp month‐to‐month variations in the natural gas futures' optimal hedge ratios and hedge effectiveness. Finally, it finds significant risk premiums in the Pacific Northwest forward prices, supporting the hypothesis that forward‐contract buyers are relatively more risk‐averse than sellers. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian

We show that a profit maximizing monopolistic intermediary may behave approximately like a Walrasian auctioneer by setting bid and ask prices nearly equal to Walrasian equilibrium prices. In our model agents choose to trade either through the intermediary or privately. Buyers (sellers) trading through the intermediary potentially trade immediately at the ask (bid) price, but sacrifice the spread as gains. A buyer or seller who trades privately shares all the gains to trade with this trading partner, but risks costly delay in finding a partner. We show that as the cost of delay vanishes, the equilibrium bid and ask prices converge to the Walrasian equilibrium prices. Received: 2 February 1996 / Accepted: 28 March 1997     

Ordering sellers in sequential auctions

We examine how buyers’ behaviors, sellers’ profits and the social welfare (the total surplus of all sellers and buyers) vary with the order of sellers in sequential auctions where sellers have different reservation values. First, when reserve prices are exogenously set to be sellers’ reservation values, a social planner would order sellers from low to high based on their reservation values, which yields a uniquely efficient order that maximizes the social welfare. However, an auctioneer charged with maximizing the total profit of all sellers would want to reverse the increasing order in certain situations. Second, when reserve prices can be endogenously selected in addition to the order of sellers, the auctioneer would always want to adopt the increasing order for the optimally chosen reserve prices. Sequential auctions with optimally chosen reserve prices and an increasing order are shown optimal among the class of voluntary and incentive-compatible mechanisms.     

Towards a theory of platform dynamics

I introduce a dynamic framework to analyze platforms. The (single) platform owner sets prices at the beginning of each period. Agents (buyers, sellers, readers, consumers, merchants, etc.) make platform membership decisions occasionally. I show that an optimal platform pricing addresses two externalities: across sides and across time periods. This results in optimal prices which depend on platform size in a nontrivial way. By means of numerical simulations, I examine the determinants of equilibrium platform size, showing that the stationary distribution of platform size may be bimodal, that is, with some probability the platform remains very low or takes very long to increase in size. I also contrast the dynamics of proprietary versus nonproprietary (i.e., zero‐priced) platforms, and consider the specific case of asymmetric platforms (one side cares about the other but not vice versa).     

Wealth creation from high-tech divestitures

We measure the change in value to sellers and buyers of divested high-tech assets. Sellers and buyers experience favorable announcement effects in response to high-tech divestitures. However, buyers of divested high-tech assets experience more favorable announcement effects than sellers, which is opposite of the related research findings on other types of divestitures. Based on a cross-sectional analysis, the announcement effects for sellers of high-tech assets are more favorable when there is an investment bank advisor, the transaction price is disclosed, and the size of the divestiture is large. The announcement effects for buyers of high-tech assets were also more favorable when there was an investment bank advisor during the tech-bubble period. Overall, the results suggest that the stock price behavior in response to divestitures of high-tech assets is distinctly different from that of other types of divestitures.     

The effects of barriers to entry on monopolistic intermediary online services: The case of a digital library

Online intermediaries (OIs) are becoming increasingly important market institutions. They have low marginal costs and display the indirect network effect, which suggests that the benefit of an intermediary to sellers (buyers) increases with the number of buyers (sellers) connected to that intermediary. OIs may be further characterized by the levels of barriers to entry they face and the direct network effect, i.e., the benefit to a seller decreases with the number of sellers connected to the intermediary. This paper models a digital library where creators sell their works to information users. It is found that a monopolistic digital library with the above characteristics over-serves its creators, which leads them to over-invest in creation, and over-supply information products to consumers. Furthermore, the over-investment is more severe when the barriers to entry in the digital library sector are lower. A counter-intuitive policy implication is that removing barriers to entry in monopolistic markets with the above characteristics does not improve, but rather worsens, social welfare.     

Endogenous search,price dispersion,and welfare

This paper studies the welfare cost of inflation in a frictional monetary economy with endogenous consumer search. Equilibrium entails price dispersion, where sellers compete for buyers by posting prices. We identify three channels through which inflation affects welfare. The real balance channel is the source of welfare loss. Its interaction with the price posting channel generates a welfare cost larger than Lucas (2000). The search channel reduces the welfare cost by more than one half through general equilibrium effect. The aggregate effect of these three channels on welfare is non-monotonic. Additionally, the welfare cost of inflation fluctuations is negligible.     

Random Advertising and Monopolistic Price Dispersion

We investigate the role of price advertising in a market where consumers are imperfectly informed about prices. We consider a monopolist whose demand depends on price and advertising expenditure. This demand function is derived from optimizing behavior of consumers. Uninformed consumers may pay a cost to visit the seller and obtain price information. Advertising enables the monopolist to increase the number of informed consumers. In equilibrium the uninformed consumers form rational price expectations, and the seller necessarily adopts a random pricing and advertising strategy.