Regulatory Entry Barriers,Rent Shifting and the Home Market Effect

This paper introduces regulatory entry barriers in a model of the home market effect. The entry barriers generate local rents that have unexpected but significant implications. First, the home market effect is magnified. Second, when countries are sufficiently unequal in size and rents are sufficiently large, symmetric reductions in trade costs reduce welfare in the small country. Third, entry barriers increase the large country's market size and, surprisingly, can increase its welfare. Fourth, a unilateral increase in trade protection shifts foreign rents to the home country. This rent‐shifting effect amplifies the standard production relocation motive for trade policy intervention.     

Tax,credit constraints,and the big costs of small inflation

This paper develops a heterogeneous‐agent overlapping generations model that examines how the neutrality of the tax system with respect to inflation depends on the price elasticity of the housing supply. The model, which endogenises house prices and rents, and which incorporates detailed tax regulations and bank‐imposed credit constraints, shows (a) inflation has large effects on the tenure arrangements of young households irrespective of the housing supply elasticity; and (b) inflation can improve the welfare of some low income young households if the supply is sufficiently elastic. The welfare costs of inflation are reduced by taxing real rather than nominal interest.     

THE PRICING OF JOB CHARACTERISTICS WHEN MARKETS DO NOT CLEAR: THEORY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS*

This article examines nonsequential search when jobs vary with respect to nonpecuniary characteristics. In the presence of frictions in the labor market, the equilibrium job distribution need not show evidence of compensating wage differentials. The model also generates several pervasive features of labor markets: unemployment and vacancies, apparent discrimination, and market segmentation. When workers are homogeneous, restrictions on the range of job offers decrease welfare and cannot reduce unemployment. However, when workers have heterogeneous preferences, such restrictions may lower unemployment, and can even lead to a Pareto improvement in welfare. We consider the impact of policies banning discrimination and regulating working conditions.     

A welfare analysis of tariffs and equivalent quotas under demand uncertainty: Implications for tariffication

Under market demand uncertainty, we show that quotas can result in a welfare advantage over tariffs for an importing country despite that its government does not capture any quota rents. Specifically, the conditions under which an equivalent quota yields higher expected welfare than a tariff are shown to depend on a set of economic variables. These variables include the initial tariff rate, the relative efficiency in production between home and foreign firms, the probability distribution of random demand shocks that make the quota binding or non-binding under uncertainty, as well as the variance of the stochastic market demand. The analysis of this paper has welfare implications for tariffication.     

Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets

Conventionally, rent-seeking activities have been considered to deteriorate social welfare and to distort resource allocation. This paper examines whether rent-seeking behavior can improve social welfare by focusing on the welfare effects of firms’ competitive lobbying efforts when governments can impose market entry regulation against foreign firms. We demonstrate that competitive lobbying efforts can improve social welfare when such lobbying efforts are directed to reduce market entry barriers. In addition, social welfare can be maximized when the government shows the maximum sensitivity to the foreign firm's political contributions while maintaining competitive market structure. Moreover, it is shown that the dominant strategy for a domestic firm is to allocate more resources to R&D sectors while it is optimal for foreign firms is to exert more efforts in lobbying to reduce the market entry barriers when a government makes political economic approach in market entry regulations.     

Optimal policy and the role of social contacts in a search model with heterogeneous workers

This paper develops a search model with heterogeneous workers and social networks. High‐ability workers are more productive and have a larger number of professional contacts. Firms can choose between a vacancy in the regular market and a job opening in the referral market. The model predicts that a larger number of social contacts is associated with a larger wage gap between high‐ and low‐ability workers and a larger difference in the unemployment rates. The net welfare gain of referrals is estimated at 1.2%. There are three reasons for the inefficiency of the decentralized equilibrium. First is the traditional search externality described by Hosios. Second, firms share their profits with workers, whereas the social optimum implies that full surplus should be given to firms in the referral market. This inefficiency can be internalized by means of referral subsidies. Third, there is the “pooling inefficiency” in the regular market. If high‐ability workers are sufficiently more productive they impose a positive externality on low‐ability workers and should be rewarded by positive transfers. On the contrary, if productivity differences are small, high‐ability workers achieve unreasonably high wages by referring each other and reduce employment chances of low‐ability workers. In this latter case, high‐ability workers should be penalized. If optimal policy is implemented the net welfare gain of referrals rises up to 1.8%.     

The labour market effects of financial crises

This paper examines how the 2008–2009 financial crisis affected labour markets in Europe, and how this impact depended on employment protection laws. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, our estimates isolate the effect of the lack of credit on the labour market from that of the general decline in aggregate economic activity. We find large and negative impacts of the credit shock on total employment, particularly on temporary, unskilled and young workers. These impacts were significantly larger in countries with stronger legal protection of permanent workers from dismissal. This suggests that the differential impact of the crisis across countries was not entirely driven by the heterogeneity of the credit shock, but also by labour regulations. Given regulatory inflexibility in adjusting the permanent workforce, firms responded to tightening financial constraints by disproportionately laying off temporary workers (who tend to be younger and less skilled than permanent workers).     

Information production, banking industry structure and credit allocation

We analyse credit allocation when limited-liable banks can engage in costly information production about borrowers. When perfectly diversified credit portfolios cannot be constructed, we show that credit allocation depends on bank capital and the number of banks that can operate in the same market. A concentrated banking industry, one where bank capital is held by few banks, is shown to lead to credit allocation closer to the social optimum. Moreover, in the absence of banking industry consolidation, we find that the removal of intra-state entry barriers reduces welfare and not all independent banking organizations that were viable in formerly protected markets remain so when markets are integrated.     

Tax distortions, household production, and black-market work

This paper studies an economy with high- and low-productivity households. Household services are produced either by households themselves or are purchased in a white or black market. Black market work is inefficient (efficient) when it otherwise would have been done in the white market (within the household). With low (high) tax wedges, the black market reduces (increases) welfare by competing with white-market production (own-household production). With intermediate tax wedges, the welfare effect of a black market is ambiguous: welfare is improved (reduced) when black services are demanded by low- (high-) productivity households. An increase in the tax wedge may then reduce the benefits from a black service market.     

Cash Transfers to the Poor and the Labor Market: An Equilibrium Analysis

This paper studies the effects of cash transfers to the poor on the labor market. This is investigated in a matching model with endogenous labor market participation and job destruction. Depending on their productivity, workers might want to stay in the job, become unemployed, or leave the labor market; in addition, workers out of the labor force might decide to search for a job. Cash transfers are introduced to all agents with income below a given level. Two qualitative results are found: (i) The size of cash transfers has a negative effect on the employment rate, but an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate; and (ii) the coverage of this welfare program has a positive effect on the employment rate, and an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate. The numerical simulations also show that: (i) if the government target is to reduce inequality and poverty, the more efficient policy is to increase the level of benefits instead of increasing the eligibility of the program; (ii) compared with a welfare program that condition eligibility to labor market participation, the “unconditional” cash transfer program has a stronger impact on inequality and poverty, but with a reduction in labor market participation and output.     

SYNCHRONISING DEREGULATION IN PRODUCT AND LABOUR MARKETS

Deregulation typically comes with redistribution of rents and thus with opposition from the losing interest groups. We show that, by exploiting complementarities, synchronising deregulation across markets makes this opposition lower. Indeed, a particular deregulation may reduce rents for one interest group, but may result in gains for another interest group. Synchronising reforms can therefore offer a way out of the ‘sclerosis’ of especially European markets. For this effect, we build a microeconomic model based on two assumptions: Cournot competition à la Vives in the product markets and firms hiring workers in accordance with an efficiency wage in the labour markets. As being particularly relevant for European economies, we focus on product market regulation that determines the degree of market integration and labour market regulation that determines the degree of employment protection.     

Evaluating international financial integration under leverage constraints

The global financial crisis has undermined many economists' views about the benefits of open financial markets. Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that financial linkages may propagate shocks during crises. This paper develops a simple two-country model in which financial liberalisation across countries takes place in the presence of credit market distortions within countries. Countries may be subject to macro risk coming from productivity shocks and direct shocks to the credit system (‘financial shocks’). Three different degrees of financial linkages between countries are examined. It is shown that the type of financial integration is critical for both macroeconomic outcomes and welfare. In particular, financial integration in bond markets alone may increase aggregate consumption volatility and reduce welfare. Financial integration in both bond and equity markets generates high positive co-movement across countries, but is welfare-improving.     

ON THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS

This article studies the welfare effects of credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, credit arrangements can be welfare reducing, because high consumption by credit users drives up the price level, reducing consumption by money users who are subject to a binding liquidity constraint. By adopting an optimal trading mechanism, however, these welfare implications can be overturned. Both price discrimination and nonlinear pricing are essential features of an optimal mechanism.     

A Search Model of Money and Circulating Private Debt With Applications To Monetary Policy

A search-theoretic model is used to examine the coexistence of money and circulating private debt. Money is still valued even though there coexists credit which circulates among agents and dominates in the rate of return. When there coexist multiple equilibria, the equilibrium with credit Pareto dominates the one without credit if money supply is not extremely plentiful. This article also provides some predictions about the effects of monetary policies. A policy of open market operations whereby government discounts less for second-hand debt decreases the value of money, credit, and interest rate prevailing in the market. This policy can also improve welfare by making credit trade feasible when the only equilibrium entails no credit without intervention.     

不完全劳动市场、政府干预与失业率

本文针对我国不完全的劳动市场,建立了一个短视一搜寻模型,目的是要说明,第一,虽然政府直接干预下的就业率高于无政府干预的劳动市场的均衡就业率,但是后者的社会总福利水平高于前者,而且,无政府干预情形下失业者的福利水平不会低于政府干预时在低工资岗位上的就业者的福利水平.这说明政府直接干预劳动市场虽然有可能降低失业率,但可能导致整个社会福利损失,也不利于提高低收入人群的福利水平.第二,我国现行的社会保障制度、户籍制度以及地方保护政策妨碍城乡劳动力自由流动,造成城市居民一般占据了工资较高的岗位,农村居民一般只能找到工资较低的岗位.这种匹配过程达到的劳动市场均衡,虽然有可能最大限度降低城镇失业率,但不是使得全国总失业率最低的均衡.     

Finance and unemployment: new panel evidence

The effect of credit market imperfections on unemployment is largely investigated in the context of financial crises. This paper shifts the focus toward financial development and structure in a panel of advanced and developing countries. Some important findings emerge. Unemployment increases with financial development and concentration in banking markets but decreases with market orientation, the effect is stronger in magnitudes for young workers than female ones. More rigid market regulation increases unemployment. These findings are particularly pronounced for countries with higher income, better developed financial sectors, lower income inequality, greater trade openness, higher democracy, and common-law systems.     

外资银行进入对发展中国家银行信贷可得性的影响研究

如何引导外资银行增加东道国的信贷可得性,尤其是中小企业的信贷可得性,是目前理论和政策界争论的焦点问题之一。本文通过构建一个理论模型,分析了外资银行进入和国内信贷供给的关系,从市场均衡结果、社会福利、成本效率等几个角度对外资银行进入发展中的东道国的影响进行综合分析。模型结果表明,外资银行的进入并不必然增加一国的总体信贷水平、也并不必然提高东道国银行业的成本效率和整体社会福利,甚至在某些特定条件下,结果可能适得其反。     

PRODUCE OR SPECULATE? ASSET BUBBLES,OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE,AND EFFICIENCY*

We study the effects of rational asset bubbles in an overlapping‐generations economy where asset trading requires specialized intermediaries and agents freely choose between working in the production or the financial sector. Frictions in the market for deposits create rents in the financial sector that affect agents’ occupational choices. When rents are large, the private gains associated with trading bubbles lead too many agents to become speculators, causing bubbles to lose their efficiency properties. Moreover, if speculation can be carried out by skilled labor only, then bubbles displace skilled workers away from the productive sector and raise income inequalities.     

Credit and inflation under borrower?s lack of commitment

In this paper we study the effects of monetary policy on privately supplied credit in model economies where money is needed for transaction purposes and agents who default on their loans cannot participate in the credit market but are allowed to accumulate money. In our deterministic benchmark economy where agents alternate in productivity, credit has the role of smoothing consumption. We show that deflation crowds out credit completely. The reason is that deflation increases the value of being excluded from the credit market and eliminates the incentive to repay loans. When inflation is positive but low, credit, consumption smoothing and welfare increase with inflation, until inflation reaches a threshold at which the allocation is efficient and money becomes superneutral.     

The impact of trade on employment,welfare, and income distribution in unionized general oligopolistic equilibrium

This paper sets up a multi-sector general oligopolistic equilibrium trade model in which all firms face wage claims of firm-level unions. By accounting for productivity differences across industries, the model features income inequality along multiple lines, including inequality between firm owners and workers as well as within these two groups of agents, and involuntary unemployment. We use this setting to study the impact of trade liberalization on key macroeconomic performance measures. In particular, we show that a movement from autarky to free trade with a fully symmetric partner country lowers union wage claims and therefore stimulates employment and raises welfare. Whether firms can extract a larger share of rents in the open economy depends on the competitive environment in the product market. Furthermore, the distribution of profit income across firm owners remains unaffected, while the distribution of wage income becomes more equal when a country opens up to trade with a fully symmetric trading partner. We also analyze how country size differences and technological dissimilarity of trading partners affect the results from our analysis.