美国金融监管制度改革的新趋势及启示

本文基于美国国会于2010年7月15日通过的《金融监管改革法案》,比较了次贷危机前后美国金融监管制度的异同,特别是针对美国在反思其传统监管模式基础上从预防系统性风险角度出发所进行的金融监管改革的新趋势,提出了美国金融监管制度改革对我国金融业未来发展以及金融监管改革的启示。     

美国金融监管改革法案的内容、影响与启示

美国金融监管改革法案的出台,被视为美国金融监管体系改革的重大成果,该法案的生效将对美国及全球金融体系产生深远的影响.本文主要介绍了法案在有效防范系统性金融风险、消费者金融保护与加强对金融衍生品的监管三大核心内容和具体措施,在此基础上阐述了该法案的影响及对中国的借鉴与启示.     

后危机时代美国金融监管制度改革及对我国的启示

由于历史与具体国情的差异,我国与美国的金融监管制度不尽相同,但是金融业的混业经营现状需要宏观审慎监管,这是今后国际金融监管制度改革的方向。危机前美国金融监管制度的历史沿革(一)危机前美国金融监管制度概况《金融服务现代化法案》确立了美国的伞形金融监管分业机制,1999年颁布的该法案总结了美国金融监管的历史,消除了银行与证券之间不可逾越的     

美国金融监管改革及启示

金融监管不力被认为是导致本轮金融危机的主要原因之一。为此,美国在危机后出台了金融监管改革法案,该法案势必对未来国际金融监管规则的制定和金融发展理念产生深远的影响,对我国进行金融监管改革也具有重要的启示和借鉴意义。     

美国金融监管改革法案的影响及其对我国的启示

金融危机的全面爆发,加快了美国金融监管改革的进程。2010年正式签署的金融监管改革法案必将对美国乃至全球造成深远影响。法案的出台表明美国金融监管的标准全面提高,监管范围涉及更广,注重宏观审慎监管的理念也势必将影响深远。我国应当汲取金融危机的教训,借鉴法案中体现的监管经验,从加强国有银行监管,注重衍生品的监管,保护消费者等方面完善我国金融监管框架。     

美国金融监管改革新动向——以《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和个人消费者保护法案》为视角

面对金融危机,各国政府相继推出金融监管改革方案.美国金融监管改革法案的出台,为我们提供了对现有金融监管体系进行反思与借鉴的素材.经过金融危机的"大考",国内监管部门更应坚持和完善中国特色的金融监管理念和目标,并在实践中不断完善和健全我国的金融监管制度.     

美国金融监管改革法案:历程、内容、影响和借鉴

<正>2010年7月21日,经奥巴马总统签署,《金融监管改革法案》正式成为法律。虽然围绕着法案中的相关规定,未来数月乃至数年,美国各金融监管部门还需要完成数百项新规则的制定,导致该法的实际实施效果尚有待进一步观察和评判,但不可否认,《金融监管改革法》是美国政府和国会对2008年爆发的金融危机全面反思的集中体现,被认为是自20世纪30年代大萧条之后《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔商业银行法》颁布以来,对美国金融业影响最深远、最全面的金融监管改革法案。     

美国金融监管改革和投资银行发展趋势分析

2010年7月21日,美国总统奥巴马签署金融监管改革法案,历时近两年的美国金融监管改革立法完成.此次金融监管改革,对我国金融体制改革和证券公司发展具有十分重要的借鉴意义.本文全面分析了美国此轮金融监管改革及投资银行经营模式转型过程,总结了本次美国金融监管改革的实质结果.     

美国金融监管改革法案的实施效果及对我国的启示

美国金融监管改革法案于2010年7月21日正式签署实施,新法案致力于保护消费者,解决金融业系统性风险等,被认为是＂大萧条＂以来最严厉的金融改革法案。本文从消费者保护、系统性风险防范、处置机制等多方面综述了新法案的主要内容,并指出美国金融监管改革法案的出台对美国国内金融机构和国际监管改革的重大影响,文章最后分析了新法案预示的国际金融监管改革趋势给我国金融监管带来的启示。     

美国金融改革改什么？

金融危机之后，美国国会中的民主党议员推出了金融监管改革法案。但是，迄今为止，美国没有任何一个政府机构能够成为华尔街的克星.     

Government auditing in China: Problems and reform

This paper evaluates the current government auditing system in China and the proposal to move it from the control of the executive body (the State Council) to the control of the legislature (the National People's Congress). Interviews with government auditors, government and people's congress officials, and leading academics identify the problems caused by lack of audit independence. Although audit independence can be increased by moving the control of government auditing to the legislature, many of our interviewees considered such a move as infeasible in the current political climate. To smooth the reform toward a legislature-led audit system, we propose a “Dual-Track System” in which the different audit responsibilities currently undertaken by the government auditing system are separated. The responsibility for auditing the use and control of fiscal budgets by the central and regional governments would be under the control of the legislature as this area of government auditing has a clear need for audit independence. Other audit functions including economic responsibility auditing, special purpose funds auditing, financial service auditing and state-owned enterprise auditing would remain under the control of the government. This dual track approach would, we argue, be a politically acceptable compromise as it would strengthen audit independence where it is most needed but also enable the government to maintain strong economic control.     

The impact of revolving door practice and policy on nonprofessional investors’ perceptions of auditor independence

This study investigates whether an ex-auditor’s employment with an audit client impairs nonprofessional investors’ perceptions of auditor independence, and whether the strength of the US revolving door policy improves their perceptions of auditor independence. Despite nonprofessional investors owning over one-third of the US equity holdings, the literature has not examined how revolving door policy impacts their perceptions of auditor independence. Two between-subjects experiments examine these issues. The first experiment finds that investors perceive the ex-auditor’s integrity to be significant in explaining the firm’s decision to manage earnings, irrespective of the firm’s previous working relationship with the ex-auditor. The results from experiment two indicate that strengthening the revolving door policy above that of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ policy does not improve perceptions of auditor independence. Academics may be interested in triangulating the independence ‘in appearance’ results of this study to the independence ‘in fact’ results of other studies, since the Securities and Exchange Commission asserts that both facets of independence are equally important. The results may also be of interest to academics and practitioners, as prior research suggests that restricting auditors’ moves to management positions with the client impairs firms’ abilities to hire quality auditors.     

Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries

This paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in OECD countries. We use quarterly data in the 1980.1–2005.4 period and exclude EMU countries. Our Taylor-rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time-variant index of central bank independence with government ideology. The results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short-term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low. In contrast, short-term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high. The effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible. Our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments, in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies, have pushed market-oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers.     

印美医疗保障体系私有化比较

美国和印度都是医疗保障体系高度私有化的国家,对我国未来医疗保障适度私有化之路具有借鉴意义。通过梳理和比较,本文得出印美医疗保障体系私有化的3个异同点:(1)政府责任定位:印度政府的目标是建立初级保健水平的全民医疗,美国政府则给予弱势群体较好的医疗保障;(2)私营医疗保障体系结构:美国的非营利、营利和公立医疗机构三足鼎立,印度的营利机构占有重要地位,而非营利机构比重甚至低于公立医院;(3)公私合作意愿:印度医疗服务提供方面公私合作意愿强,美国意愿相对较弱。     

美国联邦政府单一审计制度及其借鉴意义

单一审计制度是美国联邦政府的一项重要审计制度。《单一审计法》对美国联邦政府转移支付审计制度进行了详细的规定。本文介绍了单一审计制度,同时结合我国转移支付审计的实际情况,提出了我国在转移支付审计方面应注意的问题,以及如何进一步改进的建议。     

The value of independent directors: Evidence from sudden deaths

We investigate contributions of independent directors to shareholder value by examining stock price reactions to sudden deaths in the US from 1994 to 2007. We find, first, that following director death stock prices drop by 0.85% on average. Second, the degree of independence and board structure determine the marginal value of independent directors. Third, independence is more valuable in crucial board functions. Finally, controlling for director-invariant heterogeneity using a fixed effect approach, we identify the value of independence over and above the value of individual skills and competences. Overall, our results suggest that independent directors provide a valuable service to shareholders.     

Is there an association between director option compensation and the likelihood of misstatement?

Oversight bodies in the United States (US) have addressed the issue of director independence in recent years. Bebchuk et al. [Bebchuk, L., Grinstein, Y., Peyers, U. (2006). Lucky directors. (Working paper Harvard University Law School) SSRN # 952239.] found that director oversight may be impaired if directors receive option grants under favorable terms because these grants may create a mutuality of interest between directors and managers. We assess whether option grants to independent directors reduce oversight of financial reporting. Using a sample of 105 US firms that misstated their revenue matched with a sample of non-misstatement firms, we find that companies whose independent directors do not receive stock options are less likely to misstate revenues than companies who meet the Sarbanes-Oxley definition of independence. Our results show that compensating outside directors with stock options may weaken their independent oversight.     

Determinants of board structure: Evidence from Australia

Linck et al. (2008) investigate the determinants of board structure in the US, an environment that features high litigation risk and low ownership concentration. In contrast, using a hand-collected data set that includes information from more than 1000 firms, this paper investigates the determinants of board structure in Australia, an environment that features low litigation risk and high ownership concentration. Multivariate analyses suggest that whereas board size and board independence increase with firm size, CEO duality decreases with firm size. Additional tests suggest that high ownership concentration increases board size, decreases board independence and increases CEO duality. These results imply that if high litigation risk against directors (as in the US) plays a monitoring role in corporate governance, ownership concentration appears to offer an alternative governance mechanism in countries such as Australia, which feature low litigation risk.     

Contagion of Capital Markets in CEE Countries: Evidence from Wavelet Analysis

We employed wavelets technology to investigate how and when contagion occurred on 10 Central and Eastern European financial markets in relation to Western European and US financial markets during 2000–2016 and their different reactions on the background of changes in their regulatory framework. We found that most of Central and Eastern European (CEE) capital markets showed contagion in relation to both Western European and US markets between 2005 and 2009, while Slovakian and Estonian markets showed no contagion. However, during 2010–2016, Croatian market showed de-contagion in relation to Western European market, while Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, and Polish markets showed de-contagion in relation to US market, increasing their independence.     

Fiscal Policy Shocks in the Euro Area and the US: An Empirical Assessment*

We analyse the impact of fiscal policy shocks in the euro area as a whole, using a newly‐available quarterly data set of fiscal variables for the period 1981–2007. To allow for comparability with previous results on euro‐area countries and the US, we use a standard structural vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, and study the impact of aggregated and disaggregated government spending and net‐tax shocks. In addition, to frame euro‐area results, we apply the same methodology for the same sample period to US data. We also explore the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of variables aiming to control for underlying financial and fiscal conditions. The main new findings are that: expansionary fiscal shocks have a short‐term positive impact on GDP and private consumption, with government spending shocks entailing, in general, higher effects on economic activity than (net) tax reductions; output multipliers to government expenditure shocks are of similar size in the euro area and in the US; the persistence of a fiscal spending shock is higher in the US than in the euro area, which appears to be related to military spending in the US; and fiscal multipliers have increased over the recent past in both geographical areas.