Environmental Problems in China-An Overview

China＇s economy develops very quickly; at the same time it faces severe environmental problems. Air and water pollution is the heaviest among them. This paper tries to analyze the reasons of the involving environmental problems in China and the government responses.     

Conflicting Interests in Environmental Policy-making?

This paper focuses on possible conflicts of interests between the political aims of reduced emissions from energy consumption, redistribution of welfare and efficient policy-making. We use the results from a LES estimation to calculate the consumption reductions, compensating variations and excess tax burdens of three different tax schemes: one linear and two non-linear. Unless the tax scheme is optimally designed to correct for externalities, there is a conflict of interests between the aims of reduced consumption and efficient policy-making. When ranking different tax schemes, there is a conflict between the aims of redistributing welfare and reduced consumption if we are concerned with the well-being of individual households, but not if we are concerned only with the mean household in different parts of the income distribution.     

Does Environmental Policy Necessarily Discourage Growth?

This paper analyzes the long-run impact of an environmental policy on economic growth. A growth model with vertical innovation is modified by including intermediate goods as a source of pollution. Taxation on pollution reduces profits of intermediate firms as well as final outputs. However, it increases their mark-ups and alleviates profit losses. In this setting, profit losses are offset by the general equilibrium effect; thus, the tax enhances R&Ds which drive economic growth while it reduces pollution. If the government provides an R&D subsidy, the growth rate will be accelerated.     

International Environmental Agreements—The Role of Foresight

The present paper attempts to bridge the gap between the cooperative and the non-cooperative approach employed to examine the size of stable coalitions, formed to address global environmental problems. We do so by endowing countries with foresightedness, that is, by endogenizing the reaction of the coalition’s members to a deviation by one member. We assume that when a country contemplates withdrawing or joining an agreement, it takes into account the reactions of other countries ignited by its own actions. We identify conditions under which there always exists a unique set of farsighted stable IEAs. The new farsighted IEAs can be much larger than those some of the previous models supported but are not always Pareto efficient.     

Is Environmental Protection Beneficial for the Environment?

We analyze a simple endogenous growth model with environmental interactions. Economic production generates emissions of pollutants whose environmental impact is mitigated by abatement activities financed by government expenditure; environmental quality affects preferences but does not play any productive role. We show that government intervention, by reallocating resources from capital accumulation to environmental preservation activities, allows the economy to achieve a sustainable balanced growth path. Along such a path, softer environmental policy regimes lead to win–win outcomes, fostering economic growth and improving environmental quality. Such a result needs to be interpreted as a long run outcome, but it clearly shows that the compatibility between economic growth and environmental improvement is far from automatic. Indeed, in the long run it could paradoxically be the case that both the economy and the environment benefit from low levels of environmental protection.     

Environmental market creation: saviour or oversell?

In recent years considerable attention has been paid to the notion of market creation for the conservation of environmental assets. Market creation establishes a market in the external benefit or cost in question (e.g. biodiversity or pollution reduction) and leaves the relevant parties to adjust their behaviour accordingly. While most attention has been paid to market creation through tradable permits and taxes (the polluter-pays), it is less easy to secure a perspective on beneficiary-pays initiatives. Both polluter-pays and beneficiary-pays initiatives are examples of modified Coaseian bargains in which governments intervene in the bargains to lower transactions costs, establish property rights, deal with public goods issues, or act on behalf of disadvantaged groups. This paper reviews four major initiatives in this respect - debt-for-nature swaps, bioprospecting and the Global Environment Facility at the global level, and the Costa Rican Forest Law at the local level. It finds that while there is much to applaud in initiatives in these new markets, serious questions remain about the modest flows of funds associated with such global bargains, and the extent to which they secure environmental improvements relative to the baseline of business-as-usual.JEL Classification: D49, D62, H41, O19, Q57, Q2I am indebted to members of the Wildlife Conservation Research Unit at Oxford University and to David Simpson of Resources for the Future and University College London for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. Any remaining mistakes are entirely my responsibility.     

Is Ecolabelling a Reliable Environmental Policy Measure?

The rationale of ecolabelling is to enable firms to reap the willingness-to-payfor the environmental attributes of goods by helping consumers toidentify ``green' products. By so doing, ecolabelling is expected tostimulate spontaneous environmental innovation and to reduce aggregatedpollution. Our analysis however outlines situations under whichecolabelling could induce perverse effects, namely increased investment inconventional technologies before the labels are awarded, and examineswhether restricting the issue of labels could constitute an antidote.     

Analysis on the Environmental Pollution Problem of China

The paper introduces the basic environmental pollution situation of China and points out that environmental pollution is bottleneck of China＇s economy development. Then it puts forward the main environmental pollution problems of China. At last, it brings forward the countermeasures to environmental pollution.     

Review on Chlorobenzoic Acids Biodegradation and Their Environmental Impacts

Chlorobenzoic Acids are toxic organic compounds largely distributed in soils and sediments. They can be degraded to various products by microorgans. This paper is a review of the literature on biodegradability of the chlorobenzoic acids. The degradation pathways, degradation genes, role of transposable elements, and construction of strains are discussed. A brief introduction is given on the environmental impacts and the pollution control.     

Environmental regulation and MNEs location: Does CSR matter?

We investigate whether firms with relatively low environmental standards are more often located in countries that are poor, corrupt or have weak environmental regulations. We find new empirical evidence in favor of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, which states that MNEs are transferring their dirty operations to countries with weak environmental regulation. Our findings suggest that these are not necessarily the poorest or most corrupt countries. We establish that MNEs with strong social responsibility avoid locating their operations in countries with weak environmental regulation.     

Service and Responsibility： Reinforcing the Environmental E-government of China

Environmental E-government plays an important role in the progress of uniting the harmonious development between human and nature, and building the environment-friendly-society. This paper discusses the relationship between environmental E-government and government function of the environmental management. To develop environmental E-government can better the executive ability of the government to manage the environment and serve the public. It can realize the over-all covering of environmental information beyond time and space. Also, it can enhance the mutual action between the society and the government, and improve the effectiveness of the government to manage the environment as well.     

What Prevents Firms from Advancing in their Environmental Strategy?

The aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the strategic environmental behavior of firms and, more specifically, the external and internal barriers that limit and sometimes even prevent the environmental adaptation. The analysis focuses on a sample of industrial firms that have at least three workers and that are located in Aragón, a region situated in the northeast of Spain. In order to achieve this objective, first the theoretical literature on the topic is reviewed. Subsequently, from the firms which were sampled, the existence of an underlying structure among the totality of barriers is studied. Finally, this structure is analyzed in order to determine if it has any influence on the degree of proactivity of the firm’s environmental strategy.

Charitable Donations: Evidence of Demand for Environmental Protection?

Using data from the 2001 Giving and Volunteering in the United States survey, I examine household charitable donations to environmental organizations. Household income has a positive impact on environmental giving. While the tax price affects overall charitable contributions, it does not affect environmental giving. More education, being female, homeownership, and voting are also associated with a greater likelihood of contributing to the environment. African-Americans and Latinos are less likely to contribute to the environment, although conditional on giving, Latinos give more. Retired persons and households with children are less likely to contribute to the environment. Larger households give less to the environment. Households from the Northeast are the most likely to make environmental contributions while households from the South are the least likely.

Environmental regulation and trade pattern：a case of China

As a growing number of countries, including both developed and developing countries, have in recent yearstaken environmental regulation at different levels, a question of great concern has been raised： can the regulation alterthe existing trade volume and trade pattern, and ultimately drive pollution-intensive industries to countries with low-levelregulations or even those without regulations at all？ Starting from the three different propositions concerning therelationship between environmental regulation and trade pattern, this paper applies cointegration analysis and errorcorrection model to empirically testing the relationship between environmental regulation and trade in China during theperiod of 1985-2005. Our empirical results indicate that in the short run the collection of pollution discharge fees bearsa positive impact on the export share of clean products of total exports. Thus, higher pollution discharge fees raise theratio of clean products exports to total exports. This further indicates that more stringent environmental regulationpromotes the exports of clean products. In the long run pollution discharge fees are positively correlated with the exportshare of clean products but negatively associated with their import share. Such correlations imply that environmentalregulation tends to facilitate the international specialization in line with comparative advantages.     

Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?

When politicians negotiate in international climate conventions they may suffer from incomplete information for each other’s preferences for reaching an agreement. As is known, this may cause failure to reach an efficient cooperative agreement. We study the role of cross border abatement provisions in the likelihood of such failure. For instance, the clean development mechanism was introduced in the context of the Kyoto Protocol to allow countries to make efficiency-enhancing use of cross-country low-cost mitigation opportunities. We use a simple bargaining framework to uncover why this mechanism may reduce the likelihood of reaching an efficient cooperative climate agreement.     

Test–Retest Reliability of Choice Experiments in Environmental Valuation

The paper presents the results of the first test–retest study on choice experiments in environmental valuation. In a survey concerning landscape externalities of onshore wind power in central Germany, respondents answered the same five choice sets at two different points in time. Each choice set comprised three alternatives described by five attributes, and the time interval between the test and the retest was eleven months. The analysis takes place at three different levels, investigating choice consistency at the choice task level and repeatability of the latent construct utility at the level of parametric models as well as at the level of willingness-to-pay estimates. At the choice task level we observed 59?% identical choices. The parametric analysis shows that the test and retest estimates are not equal, even when we control for scale, that is, differences in the error variance. However, comparing the marginal willingness-to-pay estimates among test and retest reveals only a statistically significant difference for one of the attributes. Overall, this indicates a moderate test–retest reliability taking into account that consistency at the choice task level overlooks the stochastic nature of the process underlying discrete choice experiments.     

Information Disclosure Policies: When Do They Bring Environmental Improvements?

There has been a growing interest among policy makers on the use of information disclosure policies for pollution control. This paper theoretically assesses the consequences of information disclosure policies and identifies the conditions under which such policies are likely to bring environmental improvements. Based on a dynamic game framework, the paper shows that both eco-labeling and more general full information disclosure policies may not always result in pollution reduction. Full information disclosure policies are likely to be effective if the product is not heavily polluting and if the minimum quality standard is set quite low. The paper also identifies the conditions under which all consumers are strictly better off with information disclosure policies.

Does International Harmonization of Environmental Policy Instruments Make Economic Sense?

Harmonization of the instruments used in environmental policy has beenconsidered necessary to guarantee fair competition in internationalmarkets. We examine the economic costs of harmonizing paper recyclingstandards in countries where the urgency of the waste disposal problemsdiffer. Using data of seven European countries we estimate thetechnologically feasible input combinations of pulp and waste paper forpaper production. Short-term effects of two environmental policy measures,minimum content requirement and utilization rate target, are analyzed. Bytranslating the two administrative instruments into taxes and subsidies, weshow that the shadow costs of the harmonization vary considerably betweencountries. The difference in the domestic availability of waste may explainthe variation, and a modification of the policy measures to incorporate thisaspect is suggested.     

Longevity,Fertility and Economic Growth: Do Environmental Factors Matter?

Our study examines the effect of environmental factors on the economic decisions regarding fertility. We incorporate health‐damaging pollution into a three period overlapping generations model in which life expectancy, fertility and economic growth are all endogenous. We show that environmental factors can cause significant changes to the economy's demographics. In particular, the entrepreneurial choice of less polluting production processes, induced by a tax on emissions, can at some point in time lead to such changes as higher longevity and lower fertility rates. Thus, we provide a novel explanation on the positive relation between fertility rates and pollution. According to this, the causality on this relation may also work from the latter to the former. Furthermore, our model can account for the empirically observed N‐shaped correlation between pollution and income per capita.     

Are Uniform Solutions Focal? – The Case of International Environmental Agreements

The application of uniform solutions has several drawbacks, notably their lack of cost efficiency and their inability to guarantee individual rationality. A proper specification of uniform solutions, however, reveals that uniform solutions that satisfy individual rationality always exist. When all countries hold private information about their own reduction costs, there only exists one solution that always satisfies individually rationality without use of side payments and the requirement of dominant strategy implementation: The solution that selects the smallest individually preferred uniform reduction which also give a theoretical explanation of the lowest common denominator effect.