Finance,institutions, and innovation activities in China

Using novel firm-level micro-panel data in China from 2000 to 2009 and data on institutional factors, we study which funding sources effectively finance firm innovation activities in China and how the effectiveness of funding sources varies according to the quality of institutions. We show that institutional factors impact the effectiveness of each funding source in different ways. First, when property rights are better protected against the risk of expropriation by the government, internal financing from net profit—namely, the reinvestment of profit—is more important in financing firm innovation activities. Second, as contracts are enforced more reliably, trade credit finance and bank finance play larger roles in financing firm innovation activities.     

A Comparison of Exit and Voice Relationships Under Common Uncertainty

We consider a repeated interaction between a manufacturing firm and a subcontractor. The relationship between the two parties is characterized (1) by moral hazard, and (2) by the fact that they do not have perfect knowledge about the base cost level of the project, which is carried out by a subcontractor (the parties only have identical a priori beliefs). We consider a two-period model where the players can update their estimate of the base cost level according to incoming information. Exit relationships, where the firm signs one-period contracts with different subcontractors, are compared with voice relationships, where both partners commit to a two-period interaction and (due to information sharing and face-to-face communication between the partners) additional information about the base cost level is generated. It is shown that in such a dynamic framework with common uncertainty the quality of the additional information plays a crucial role in determining the characteristics of the optimal relationship: voice-based strategies governed by long-term contracts are preferable if the precision of the additional information about the base cost level is high. If the precision of the additional signal is low, exit strategies with frequent changes of the subcontractors are optimal for the manufacturer.     

Subjective performance of patent examiners,implicit contracts,and self‐funded patent offices

Self‐funded patent offices should be concerned with patent quality (patents should be granted to only deserving innovations) and quantity (as revenues come from fees paid by applicants). In this context, we investigate what is the impact of the self‐funded constraint on different bonus contracts and how these contracts affect the examiners' incentive to prosecute patent applications. We consider contracts in which a patent office offers bonuses on quantity quotas (explicit contract) and on quality outcome (either an implicit contract or an explicit contract based on a quality proxy). We find that a self‐funded constrained agency should make different organization choices of incentives. For a low quality proxy precision, an agency facing a tight budget operates well with implicit contracts. However, by only relaxing moderately the budget constraint, the agency might be worse off simply because this will preclude implicit contracts. Only very large patenting fees might allow the agency to compensate for the loss of implicit contracts.     

Impacts of revenue sharing,profit sharing and transfer pricing on quality-improving investments

We compare revenue sharing with different profit-sharing rules and constant transfer prices in a buyer-seller setting, in which the incompleteness of contracts causes decentralization costs. Our focus is on a situation where a manufacturing department or a supplier of an intermediate product can invest in a quality improvement of the final product and thereby increase customer demand. We analyze the willingness of the supplier to invest under a revenue-sharing rule, three profit-sharing rules and a transfer-pricing scheme. Our analysis shows that the performance of sharing rules is likely to decrease when the sharing basis consists of fewer cost components. Remarkably, this is not true for the revenue-sharing rule. To the contrary, this less prominent scheme can be shown to maximize total profit under a variety of cost combinations.     

Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types

In this paper, we consider the possibility of identifying peaceful mechanisms such as bargaining protocols, international institutions, or norms that can enable countries to settle disputes in the absence of binding contracts. In particular, we are interested in the existence of mechanisms with zero probability of war. Here, we focus on situations where the countries’ payoffs to war are interdependent or correlated and where efficient settlements are not required but subsidies are unavailable. Most importantly, countries can choose to go to war at any time and can use information learned from the negotiation process in making this choice. We characterize the conditions under which no peaceful mechanisms exist and discuss how weakening our war consistency condition can change this result. We thank Massimo Morelli, Adam Meirowitz, Hein Goemans and two anonymous reviewers for helpful advice and comments and John Duggan and Dan Bernhardt for encouraging this direction of inquiry.     

Privatization of businesses and flexible investment: a real option approach

In this article, we study the situation, where the opportunity is given to invest into a government-owned business by partial privatization to a private company. After payment of an initial installment cost, the private company’s investments are flexible within a range [0, k] until the business is completed. We model the problem in a real option framework, using geometric mean reversion to describe the dynamics of the business. We determine the optimal time for the private company to enter and pay the initial installment cost as well as the optimal dynamic investment strategy that it follows afterward. For the latter, analytic solution cannot be obtained. We use quadratic splines in order to solve the corresponding dynamic programming problem. Finally, we determine the optimal degree of privatization in our model from the government’s perspective.     

A stochastic cash model with deterministic elements

In this paper we present a simple model which gives a solution to a (one period) stochastic cash problem with a fixed cash outlay at the end of the period. We focus on the role of options as insurance contracts, as to value a constraint on the minimum cash level. It is argued that a cash level adjustment is optimal where the sum of the marginal cost of liquidity and the marginal insurance premium (options value) is zero.We like to thank Edwin O. Fischer, Jaap Spronk and three anonymous referees for helpfull comments. Excellent computational assistance by Henk Hofmans is hereby acknowledged. Of course, the usual disclaimers apply.     

Between trust and control: company‐level bargaining on flexible working hours in the Danish and German metal industries

Denmark is often highlighted as a good example of organised decentralisation in which employee bargaining power remains comparatively strong. However, comparative analysis of the Danish case rarely reflects how the social contracts between management and workers' representatives contribute to the bargaining outcome at company level. Drawing on 10 case studies in the German and Danish metal industries carried out in 2005, this article argues that the social contracts at the Danish case companies allow a more efficient use of company‐level agreements on flexible working hours than the social contracts at the German case companies.     

Bayesian inference for the gravity model

This paper seeks to empirically extend the gravity model, which has been widely used to analyze volumes of trade between pairs of countries. We generalize the basic threshold tobit model by allowing for the inclusion of country‐specific effects into the analysis and also show how one can explore the relationship between trade volumes and a given covariate via a non‐parametric approach. We use our derived methodology to investigate the impact of a particular aspect of institutions—the enforcement of contracts—on bilateral trade. We find that contract enforcement matters in predicting trade volumes for all types of goods, that it matters most for the trade of differentiated goods, and that the relationship between contract enforcement and trade in our threshold tobit exhibits some nonlinearities. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Venture Capital Exit Rights

We investigate when and how venture capital contracts use exit rights such as drag‐along and tag‐along rights. Utilizing a data set of venture capital contracts from Germany, we find that almost all contracts allocate exit rights to the venture capitalist (VC) rather than to the entrepreneur. In our data set, the vast majority of exit rights deal with the sale of the entire company to a strategic investors rather than with initial public offerings (IPOs). We show that venture capital contracts include exit rights to mitigate potential hold‐up problems of the VC in the case of exit.     

Who is more aggressive under vertical product differentiation?

In this paper, we introduce quality differences in vertical market and compare the managerial delegation contracts of downstream firms. We find that the owner of a downstream firm that produces low-quality products induces the manager to behave more aggressively when the marginal cost coefficient is low. While when marginal cost coefficient is high, the owner of a downstream firm that produces high-quality products induces the manager to behave more aggressively. It is further found that managerial delegation can improve the profits of downstream firms but reduce the consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Are non‐binding contracts really not worth the paper?

We experimentally investigate behavior in sequential one‐shot transactions which are governed by non‐binding contracts. In a second, incomplete information treatment, contracts are binding for some players. While according to traditional game‐theoretical analysis no trade is expected in the first treatment, full trade should result in the latter. However, we find that trade is even higher in the non‐binding contract treatment. On the one hand, non‐binding contracts—although they are cheap talk—do guide behavior, especially at the beginning of a business relationship, while reciprocal reactions prevail later on. On the other hand, in the treatment with binding contracts cooperative behavior appears to be crowded out. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uniform and nonuniform staggering of wage contracts

This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic substitutes, which provide a powerful rationale for staggering. We show that for realistic parameter values, there is a continuum of possible equilibria with various degrees of staggering of long contracts. If the contracting cost is not too large, then the lowest possible degree of staggering decreases with the contracting cost and increases with monetary uncertainty.     

Drawing from a bottomless well? Exploring the resilience of value-based psychological contracts in voluntary organizations

In an era of increased involvement by the third sector in the delivery of social services due to public sector outsourcing, this paper explores the resilience of employee psychological contracts in voluntary organizations in the context of their close relationship with state funding bodies. The results suggest that value-laden psychological contracts exhibit some resilience when state funding bodies interfere with the organizational mission of voluntary organizations. However, there are clear limits as to how far value-based aspects of the psychological contract compensate for unfulfilled obligations on the economic and socio-emotional dimensions caused by externally driven cost pressures. The paper suggests serious implications for HR practitioners and wider concerns relating to the quality of care delivered to the vulnerable.     

Vertical Foreclosure Using Exclusivity Clauses: Evidence from Shopping Malls

Exclusive contracts are one of the most controversial topics in the economic analysis of antitrust. Yet, very few empirical papers analyze the determinants and the consequences of exclusive contracts. In this paper, I study exclusive contracts between hamburger restaurants and Israeli shopping malls, in which mall owners commit to prohibiting additional hamburger restaurants from entering their malls. I investigate the determinants of these exclusive contracts and examine how such contracts affect the number of hamburger restaurants and their sales. I show that exclusive contracts are less likely to be adopted in larger malls, in malls that face more competition from other malls, and in malls that opened before 1993, when McDonald's and Burger King entered the Israeli market. I then use the mall's opening year—before or after 1993—as an instrumental variable to estimate a negative effect of exclusive contracts on the number of restaurants and on total mall hamburger sales. My findings are generally consistent with anti‐competitive vertical foreclosure models.     

TrAffic LIght system for systemic Stress: TALIS3

For the purposes of financial stability, identifying financial institutions that, when in distress, could have a significant adverse impact on financial markets is important. A TrAffic LIght System for Systemic Stress (TALIS-cube) is proposed that provides a comprehensive color-based classification for grouping companies according to both the stress reaction level of the system when the company is in distress and the company’s stress level. TALIS³ can integrate multiple signals from the interaction between different risk metrics. Starting from specific risk indicators, companies are classified by combining two loss functions—one for the system and one for each company—evaluated over time and as a cross section. An aggregated index is also obtained from the color-based classification of companies. TALIS³ can be used to enhance the performance and robustness of existing systemic risk measures. An empirical analysis of the U.S. market is also provided.     

基于服务质量的物流外包决策研究

降低物流成本和提高物流服务水平是企业选择物流外包所考虑的两个主要原因,因此物流服务外包价格和物流商能提供的物流服务水平很大程度上影响着企业的外包决策。文章从制造商的角度出发,引入外包服务质量,建立企业物流外包模型,选择若干参数分析在不同的物流合同下,制造商应该如何运作以达到不同的经营目标,为制造业进行物流外包提供建议。     

Disclosure Policy in a Mixed Market

This paper investigates the optimal disclosure strategy for private information in a mixed duopoly market, where a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a joint-stock company compete to supply products. I construct a model where the two firms compete in either quantity or price, and uncertainty is associated with either marginal cost or market demand. The model identifies the optimal disclosure strategies that constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by type of competition and uncertainty. In Cournot competition, both firms disclose information under cost uncertainty, while only the SOE or neither firm discloses information under demand uncertainty. Alternatively, in Bertrand competition, only the joint-stock company discloses information under cost uncertainty or demand uncertainty. Recently, developed countries have required the same level of disclosure standards for SOEs as for ordinary joint-stock companies. The findings described in this paper warn that such mandatory disclosure by SOEs can trigger a reaction by joint-stock companies, putting the economy at risk of a reduction in welfare.     

Accruals quality,information risk,and institutional investors’ trading behavior: Evidence from the Korean stock market

This study analyzes the effect of firm-specific information risk, measured by accruals quality, on the cost of capital using institutional investors’ trading behavior. Institutional investors in firms with lower accruals quality increase their net selling in later years. Furthermore, these investors’ net selling is relevant to the innate and discretionary factors of accruals quality. This relationship is stronger for foreign institutions than for domestic institutions, and it is mostly observed under favorable macroeconomic conditions. We do not observe this relationship for large business groups connected by shares.     

Tender evaluation and supplier selection methods in public procurement

The EU procurement directives stipulate that public contracts be awarded to the lowest bidder or to the bidder with the economically most advantageous tender; the latter requiring that a scoring rule be specified. We provide a simple theoretical framework, based on standard microeconomic theory, for tender evaluation (scoring and weighing) and discuss the pros and cons of methods such as highest quality (beauty contest), lowest price and price-and-quality-based evaluations. We argue that the most common method, price-to-quality scoring, is inappropriate for several reasons. It is non-transparent, making accurate representation of the procurer's preferences difficult. It is often open to strategic manipulation, due to dependence on irrelevant alternatives, and it tends to impose particular and unjustified non-linearity in bid prices. The alternative quality-to-price scoring method, where money values are assigned to different quality levels, is a better alternative. However, when the cost of quality is relatively well-known and several providers can offer optimal quality, lowest price is the preferable supplier selection method, while beauty contests may be preferred when purchasing budgets are inflexible.