Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies

Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies are analyzed in a duopoly model of trade and vertical product differentiation. We first show that the incidence of trade liberalization is sensitive to whether firms in transition economies are producers of low or high quality. Second, we find that neither free trade nor the absence of a domestic subsidy are optimal: Both a tariff and a subsidy increase price competition and while the former extracts foreign rents the latter results in quality upgrading. Third, there exists a rationale for a government to commit to a socially optimal policy to induce quality leadership by the domestic firm when cost asymmetries are low. Finally, we establish an equivalence result between the effects of long-run exchange rate changes and those of trade policy on price competition (but not on social welfare).     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Economies of Scale and Product Variety*

It is well known that laissez faire may not be the ‘first-best’ policy in a closed economy where economies of scale are present. Corden has shown that this conclusion can carry over into an open economy, though under his assumption that imported goods are perfect substitutes for home-produced goods, interference with international trade could not raise real income. We have shown that where there are economies of scale, and imported goods are not identical to the home produced goods, interference with trade could raise real national income, though such a form of intervention would not normally be optimal. Further, it could even be desirable to support home production of more than one ‘variety’. Measurements of ‘costs of protection’ that aggregate several varieties into one may mislead not only regarding the size of the cost but even regarding its sign.     

The Pattern and Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade in Australian Manufacturing

This paper presents the pattern and determinants of intra-industry trade (IIT) in Australian manufacturing since the late 1970s. The results point to a sharp rise in IIT from the mid 1980s which appears to be linked with an outward-oriented policy. Industry-level analysis indicates that industries which experienced a sharp fall in protection are the industries with the higher levels of IIT. These include textiles, garments, rubber products, and machinery and equipment. An increasing trend in IIT suggests that the short-term adjustment costs associated with trade liberalisation are likely to be lower, and that liberalisation can proceed without huge short-term adjustment costs. Using a logit model the determinants of IIT are investigated. Results indicate that IIT is positively related to product differentiation and scale economies, and negatively related to the levels of protection and foreign ownership in the pre-liberalisation period. In the post-liberalisation period, however, scale economies explain the inter-industry variations in IIT. R&D intensity and close economic integration appear to have no impact on IIT regardless of the nature of the policy regime.     

Economies of scale and trade policy: The median voter model revisited

Why do some political economy models perform so poorly in predicting actual trade policy? Do scale economies provide the missing puzzle to our understanding of the anti-trade bias? By integrating economies of scale in production, this paper theoretically reinstates the median voter model as in Mayer [Mayer, W. (1984). Endogenous tariff formation. The American Economic Review, 74, 970–985] as a suitable political economy model in predicting trade policy. The modified model generates the scope for the anti-trade bias and predicts that sometimes economic, rather than political, considerations may lead to restrictive trade.     

What Determines Sectoral Trade in the Enlarged EU?

In this paper, we estimate a sectoral gravity model for trade within a heterogeneous trade bloc, the enlarged EU, comprised of a high‐income group (wealthiest EU), a middle‐income group (Greece, Portugal and Spain), and a low‐income group (new Central and Eastern European member countries). The estimation was conducted on sectors with different degrees of scale economies and skill‐intensities in the presence of transport costs. The results offer support for the call to incorporate trade theories based on both endowments and scale economies. In addition, whilst integrating poorer countries is beneficial for all of the participants in the bloc, there is still a role for a redistribution policy, such as the EU's Regional Policy, which should comprise a mix of policies, focusing on both income and education/skills, together with infrastructure development.     

International Economies of Scale and the Gains from Trade

In this paper, we present a two-country trade model with external economies of scale that emerge on an international level but are partially localized in each country. First, we show that the larger country exports the good produced in an industry with external economies of scale in the trading equilibrium. Second, we investigate the welfare effects of trade for the following two cases: (I) the case where external economies are completely localized in autarky; (II) the case where external economies are internationally effective in autarky. In case (II), it is shown that trade can be welfare-decreasing for both countries.     

Trade and Industry Policy

This article consists of a review of changes in trade and industry policy, along with discussions of the determinants of change and the major problem areas. Policy between 1965 and 1985 is summarised, and the growth of unemployment in the 1970s is suggested as a key determinant of change. Higher protection in certain industries, and moves to more quantitative methods ot protection can be related to unemployment, in Australia as in other countries. Theory and empirical evidence suggest that protection is likely to prove ineffective in reducing unemployment. The reliance on protection in particular cases is ascribed to a wish by governments to preserve specific jobs, not to increase overall employment. Policy can have a role in facilitating or restricting structural change which can arise from several sources, such as changing trade patterns and preferences. The devices of policy are considered briefly to determine whether they are likely to facilitate change or not. It is concluded that they often provide incentives to avoid change. The scale problem is considered, and it is suggested that the cost of protection could be high in industries subject to significant scale economies. Scale and adjustments are considered in the light of two industries, motor vehicles and whitegoods, and the role of industry plans is examined. The actuality of trade and industry policy often differs from announced intentions, and this ambiguity can give rise to uncertainty which itself has a cost.     

Paired difference analysis of size economies in UK credit unions

This study utilizes a paired difference approach to investigate for the existence of scale economies in UK credit unions. The analysis is conducted for both credit unions in aggregate as well as a number of sub-groups with the latter defined in terms of the trade organization to which credit unions are affiliated. This decomposition was viewed as particularly important in that the respective umbrella organizations have different growth strategies. The analysis revealed that significant efficiency gains are available through credit unions adopting a policy of asset growth. This finding held good irrespective of the umbrella organization to which credit unions belong although the analysis also revealed that the opportunity for efficiency gains was not so pronounced for the members of one of the trade organizations - the National Federation of Credit Unions. This finding was due to the NFCU's much more overt emphasis on self-help and community development, particularly in areas of economic disadvantage.     

Factor Endowments,Democracy, and Trade Policy Divergence

We develop a stochastic model of electoral competition in order to study the economic and political determinants of trade policy. We model a small open economy with two tradable goods, each of which is produced using a sector‐specific factor (e.g., land and capital) and another factor that is mobile between these tradable sectors (labor); one nontradable good, which is also produced using a specific factor (skilled labor), and an elected government with the mandate to tax trade flows. The tax revenue is used to provide local public goods that increase the economic agents’ utility. We use this general equilibrium model to explicitly derive the ideal policies of the different socioeconomic groups in society (landlords, industrialists, labor, and skilled workers). We then use those ideal policies to model the individual probabilistic voting behavior of the members of each of these socioeconomic groups. We use this model to shed light on how differences in the comparative advantages of countries explain trade policy divergence between countries as well as trade policy instability within countries. We regard trade policy instability to mean that, in equilibrium, political parties diverge in terms of the political platforms they adopt. We show that in natural resource (land)–abundant economies with very little capital, or in economies that specializes in the production of manufactures, parties tend to converge to the same policy platform, and trade policy is likely to be stable and relatively close to free trade. In contrast, in a natural resource–abundant economy with an important domestic industry that competes with the imports, parties tend to diverge, and trade policy is likely to be more protectionist and unstable.     

Networks of Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements as a network formation game. We consider an n‐country model in which international trade occurs between economies with imperfectly competitive product markets. In each country, the labor market is either unionized or non‐unionized. We show that, if all countries are non‐unionized, the global free trade network is both the unique pairwise stable network and the unique efficient network. If all countries are unionized, the global free trade network is pairwise stable and the unique efficient network among the class of symmetric networks. If some countries are unionized while others are non‐unionized, other networks apart from the global free trade network may be pairwise stable. However, the efficient network is still the global free trade network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur. Moreover, starting from the network in which no country has signed a free trade agreement, all sequences of networks due to continuously profitable deviations do not lead (in most cases) to the global free trade network, even when global free trade is stable.     

Exports,investment and policy uncertainty

Building on a literature that underscores the value of delaying investment in the face of uncertainty, we study how policy uncertainty in 18 large economies affects exports to these economies. We decompose aggregate bilateral trade flows from 1995 to 2013 into intensive and extensive margin components and employ a gravity specification to assess the impact of policy uncertainty on each margin separately. Consistent with theory, increases in policy uncertainty decrease both trade values and the extensive margin but, if anything, increase the intensive margin. In further tests, we use various proxies for sunk export costs and demonstrate that the effects of policy uncertainty are more pronounced where sunk costs are higher.     

International Outsourcing and Unemployment in a Minimum‐wage Economy

To explore the impact of international outsourcing on unemployment and social welfare, the conventional trade model is extended by including both economies of scale and a minimum‐wage constraint in the unskilled‐labor market. In the paper, the scale economies are linked with the production of the most skill‐intensive good. It is shown that within such a framework, there is a trade‐off between a more socially desirable endowment allocation and a greater level of employment. Therefore, even though outsourcing could raise aggregate employment, this benefit is at the cost of further exacerbating the resource misallocation. In this way, the extensions to the traditional framework explored in the paper generate new insights as to why outsourcing may cause a net welfare loss to the home country.     

Modeling Cultural Barriers in International Trade

The paper presents a model that analyzes the role of cultural differences in international trade. The decision to study foreign cultures and languages is incorporated into a simple trade model, which captures basic properties of cultural and language barriers. First, cultural costs differ from physical ones in that they can be eliminated by learning. Secondly, learning a language has economies of scale, thus smaller countries tend to invest more into learning. Thirdly, learning decisions within one country impose an externality on trading partners, since learning by one party makes communication easier also for the other one. This implies that learning decisions are in general inefficient, and the paper derives the connection between the equilibrium and optimal outcomes. Finally, because of the substitutability of learning among countries, a policy where a country subsidizes learning in the other nation—“cultural protectionism”—can be rationalized. Under certain conditions, such a policy can improve the welfare of both countries, in contrast to the case of regular export subsidies.     

Trade liberalization and industrial structure in Spain: An applied general equilibrium analysis

We empirically evaluate the aggregate welfare effects and structural adjustment for the Spanish economy that would follow from trade liberalization with the European Economic Community. Recent theory suggests that the classical gains form more liberal trade relations could be amplified substantially if EEC liberalization permits Spanish industries to realize economies of scale. These effects depend upon the extent of trade creation and trade diversion resulting from preferential liberalization, which in turn depend on the existing patterns of Spanish resource allocation, trade, and comparative advantage. The estimated results are derived from disaggregated microeconomic model of the Spanish economy. We find that increasing returns can actually be beneficial or detrimental, depending upon the interactions between trade and policy toward domestic industry.     

Does free trade promote environmental technology transfer?

We investigate how environmental and trade policies affect the transfer of environmental technology in a two-country model with global pollution. By comparing free trade and tariff policy with or without commitment, the following results are obtained. First, firms avoid the implementation of environmental tax by contracting technological transfer. Second, there is a case in which free trade is preferable to a tariff policy for both countries when there is no commitment to a tariff level. Third, free trade is not Pareto-preferred to a tariff policy when there is a commitment.     

The Intervention Principle

This paper investigates efficient policy interventions in market economies, establishing a general policy intervention result and explaining why more general results are not possible. The paper shows the applicability of the methodology to a number of new results in the theory of international trade, including policy intervention in the presence of increasing returns to scale. The analytical tools are not based on calculus, but set theory, agent optimization, and market clearing. They apply to discrete comparisons as well as for small changes.     

Distance measures between free trade and autarky for the world economy

We develop a methodology to determine numerically how globalized the world economy is. We present a global general equilibrium model capturing major OECD economies and a residual rest of world for which alternative metrics of distance between observed, free trade and autarky equilibria can be developed. We use data for 2000 and report a number of distance measures between the 2000 observed trade restricted equilibrium and both free trade and autarky equilibria noting the absence of prior literature on metrics of distance between equilibria. The measures are used to determine the degree to which the world economy is globalized.     

Dynamic Interactions in Trade Policy in a Differential Game Model of Tariff Protection

This paper develops a two‐country dynamic game model of tariff protection to reconsider optimal trade policies and their implications for welfare. The authors show that an import subsidy is optimal in the feedback Nash equilibria, which results in a curious possibility that the domestic market is monopolized by the foreign firrm. However, welfare comparisons among Nash equilibria, free trade, and autarky reveal that feedback Nash equilibria involve higher welfare than both autarky and free trade, i.e. dynamic noncooperative choices of policy serve as tacit policy coordination and ensure larger trade gains relative to free trade.     

Trade union power and jobs: theory and policy

This paper looks at the relationship between trade union power and jobs in a capitalist economy. It is argued that trade unions, as they threaten profitability, may hinder the functioning of capitalist economies. But, any adverse effects of trade unions on jobs arise because of the constraints imposed on trade union activity by the state and capitalists. In alternative forms of economic organization, trade unions are not likely to reduce the number of jobs. The implications of this argument for policy towards trade unions are also discussed.     

Do Geographic Scale Economies Explain Disturbances to Heckscher–Ohlin Trade?

This paper examines whether "geographic scale economies" explain the trade that remains unexplained by the Heckscher–Ohlin model. The paper develops a theoretical specification that integrates geographic scale economies into the Heckscher–Ohlin model, and develops a statistical method for detecting geographic scale economies in the distributional features of a disturbance term. The units of analysis are US states. The findings reveal that empirical support for the Heckscher–Ohlin theory is improved by accounting for geographic scale economies within states; geographic scale economies do not generate differences in Rybczynski effects across states; and the scope of geographic scale economies is contained within states.