Inventory management under uncertainty: A financial theory for the transactions motive

This paper examines the effects of risk aversion and output market uncertainty on optimal inventory policy decisions for a transactions demand for inventory using the capital asset pricing theory. The paper shows that (1) the optimal order quantity of the risk-adjusted value-maximizing firm is smaller than that of the expected-profit-maximizing one and (2) the greater the firm's output market uncertainty, the smaller its optimal order quantity, where the output market uncertainty is defined as the relative volatility of the demand for the firm's output.     

Optimal Two‐part Pricing under Cost Uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal two‐part pricing under cost uncertainty. We consider a risk‐averse monopolistic firm that is subject to a cost shock to its constant marginal cost of production. The firm uses two‐part pricing to sell its output to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion on the firm's optimal two‐part pricing are to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to raise (lower) the unit price and lower (raise) the fixed payment under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm's optimal two‐part pricing is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving spread increase in cost uncertainty induces the firm to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Production and hedging in futures markets with multiple delivery specifications

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under price uncertainty. To hedge the price risk, the firm trades unbiased commodity futures contracts with multiple delivery specifications from which delivery risk prevails. We show that the firm optimally produces less in the presence than in the absence of the delivery risk. We show further that the concept of expectation dependence that describes how the delivery risk is correlated with the random spot price plays a pivotal role in determining the firm’s optimal futures position. Specifically, an under-hedge is optimal if the random spot price is positively expectation dependent on the delivery risk. The firm’s optimal futures position becomes indeterminate if the random spot price is negatively expectation dependent on the delivery risk.     

Hedging and the competitive firm under correlated price and background risk

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under correlated price and background risk when a futures market exists for hedging purposes. We show that imposing the background risk, be it additive or multiplicative, on the firm has no effect on the separation theorem. The full-hedging theorem, however, holds if the background risk is independent of the price risk. In the general case of the correlated price and background risk, we adopt the concept of expectation dependence to describe the bivariate dependence structure. When the background risk is additive, the firm finds it optimal to opt for an over-hedge or an under-hedge, depending on whether the price risk is positively or negatively expectation dependent on the background risk, respectively. When the background risk is multiplicative, both the concept of expectation dependence and the Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk aversion are called for to determine the firm’s optimal futures position.     

Comment: further sufficient conditions for an inverse relationship between productivity and employment

Extant empirical studies document that productivity gains due to technological progress often lead to reductions in employment. This paper rationalizes the stated empirical finding within the context of the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty. We show that technological progress affects employment adversely if the firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion is no less than unity and its production technology exhibits non-decreasing returns to scale. On the other hand, technological progress unambiguously increases output if the firm’s preference has non-increasing absolute risk aversion.     

Firms,shareholders, and financial markets

We study the influence of the financial market on the decisions of firms in the real market. To that end, we present a model in which the shareholders’ portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly traded firms are integrated through the market process. Financial access alters the objective function of the firms, and the market interaction of shareholders substantially influences firms’ behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership structure. The participation from investors in the financial market also limits the firms’ ability to manipulate real prices, i.e., there is a loss of market power in the real sector. Note that, while the loss of market power changes expected profits, it is not detrimental to shareholders since the expected return of equity share depends on the variance (and not the mean) of profits. Indeed, any change in expected profits is absorbed by the financial price. We also show that financial access increases production, thereby altering the distribution of profits. In particular, financial access induces firms to take on more risk. Finally, financial access makes the relationship between risk-aversion and risk-taking ambiguous. For example, it is possible that an increase in risk-aversion leads to more risk-taking, i.e., the variance of real profits increases.     

Interdependent capital structure choices and the macroeconomy

This study shows that capital structure choices of US corporations are interdependent across time. We follow a two-step estimation approach. First, using a large cross-section of firms we estimate year-by-year average capital structure choices, i.e., the average firm’s percentage of new funding that is secured through debt, its term composition, and the percentage of new equity represented by retained earnings. Second, these time series are included in a Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive model in which three factors representing real economic activity, expected future funding conditions, and prices, are included. We test for the interdependence between optimal capital structure decisions and for the influence exerted by macroeconomic conditions on these decisions. Results show there is a hierarchical order in which firms make capital structure decisions. They first decide on the share of debt out of total new funding they will hire. Conditional on this they decide on the term of their debt and on their earnings retention policy. Of outmost importance, macroeconomic factors are key for making capital structure decisions.     

International tenders and futures hedging

This paper examines the optimal bidding and hedging decisions of a risk‐averse firm that takes part in an international tender. The firm faces multiple sources of uncertainty: exchange rate risk, risk of an unsuccessful tender, and business risk. The firm is allowed to trade unbiased currency futures contracts to imperfectly hedge its contingent foreign exchange risk exposure. We show that the firm shorts less (more) of the unbiased futures contracts when its marginal utility function is convex (concave) as compared with the case that the marginal utility function is linear. We further show that the curvature of the marginal utility function plays a decisive role in determining the impact of currency futures hedging on the firm's bidding behavior. Sufficient conditions that ensure the firm bids more or less aggressively than in the case without hedging opportunities are derived. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal Two‐Part Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a risk‐averse monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty. The firm produces a single good at a constant marginal cost. To facilitate sales, the firm uses a two‐part pricing contract that includes a membership fee and a selling price per unit. The good is sold to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who are subject to a common demand shock. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion are to push the unit price closer to the constant marginal cost and to shrink the market coverage so as to limit the firm’s risk exposure to the demand uncertainty. The more risk‐averse firm as such charges a higher membership fee to consumers. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to lower (raise) the unit price, to raise (lower) the membership fee, and to shrink (enlarge) the market coverage under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm’s optimal two‐part pricing contract, however, is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving‐spread increase in the demand uncertainty induces the firm to lower the unit price, to raise the membership fee, and to shrink the market coverage under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. The firm’s risk preferences as such play a pivotal role in determining the optimal two‐part pricing under demand uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cournot duopoly and insider trading with two insiders

We study the effect of competition among insiders in an extension of the static Kyle [Kyle, A. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, 53, 1315–1335] model of insider trading introduced by Jain and Mirman (JMC) [Jain, N., & Mirman, L.J. (2002). Effects of insider trading under different market structures. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 42, 19–39]. In the JMC model competition in the real sector is introduced. In this paper we introduce competition in the stock sector in the JMC model by assuming that there is a manager who is responsible for making the real decisions of the firm as well as an ‘owner’ who has the same information as the manager but has no managerial responsibilities. In this way we can study the interaction between competition in the real sector and competition in the financial sector. We show that the stock price set by the market makers reveals more information than in the JMC model and that the expected equilibrium values of the manager’s profits sometimes decline and sometimes increase depending on the exogenous parameters of the model. Moreover, we prove that due to the competition in the financial sector, the level of output produced by the firm is less than in JMC. Finally, we also study the effect of financial competition in the case in which the market makers receive only one signal and analyze the comparative statics in this case.     

Endogenous trading in credit default swaps

We introduce a real options model in order to quantify the moral hazard impact of credit default swap (CDS) positions on the corporate default probabilities. Moral hazard is widely addressed in the insurance literature, where the insured agent may become less cautious about preventing the risk from occurring. Importantly, with CDS the moral hazard problem may be magnified since one can buy multiple protections for the same bond. To illustrate this issue, we consider a firm with the possibility of switching from an investment to another one. An investor can influence the strategic decisions of the firm and can also trade CDS written on the firm. We analyze how the decisions of the investor influence the firm value when he is allowed to trade credit default contracts on the firm’s debt. Our model involves a time-dependent optimal stopping problem, which we study analytically and numerically, using the Longstaff–Schwartz algorithm. We identify the situations where the investor exercises the switching option with a loss, and we measure the impact on the firm’s value and firm’s default probability. Contrary to the common intuition, the investors’ optimal behavior does not systematically consist in buying CDSs and increase the default probabilities. Instead, large indifference zones exist, where no arbitrage profits can be realized. As the number of the CDSs in the position increases to exceed several times the level of a complete insurance, we enter in the zone where arbitrage profits can be made. These are obtained by implementing very aggressive strategies (i.e., increasing substantially the default probability by producing losses to the firm). The profits increase sharply as we exit the indifference zone.     

The impact of operating and financial risk on equity risk

This paper empirically investigates a complete theoretical model relating the operating characteristics of a firm to the total, systematic, and unsystematic risk of its equity. The degree of operating leverage, the ratio of net profits to firm value, and the variability of unit output are all found to be positively correlated with each of the three risk measures. The degree of financial leverage, while positively related to total and unsystematic risk, does not appear to be related to systematic risk. After controlling for the business risk of the firm, no evidence can be found of an interaction between the degree of operating leverage and the degree of financial leverage.     

The financial investment decision of non-financial firms in China

This paper constructs a portfolio model to analyze the determinants of the financial investment decision of non-financial firms in China. Unlike the literature assuming that financial investments are riskless, our model allows risks in both fixed and financial investments. We show that this extension provides an analytically similar but economically different model from the literature. In particular, it is relative risk and risk-adjusted return gap, not pure risk and simple return gap that enter into firms’ financial investment decision model. Using firm-level panel data of 1902 firms listed in Chinese stock market over the period from 2006 to 2016 with semi-annual frequency, we find that the ratio of fixed investment risk over total risk dominates financial investment decisions of non-financial firms. However, rates of risk-adjusted return gap between financial and fixed investments play no role in Chinese firms’ financial investment decisions, which is in stark contrast to the results using a model assuming riskless financial investments. The baseline findings are robust to alternative measures of financialization and investment risk and different firm sizes, ownership structures and time periods.     

Capital Structure and Labour Demand: Investigations Using German Micro Data

The paper analyses the interaction between capital structure and employment decisions of firms. For this purpose, a theoretical model is developed in which a firm determines employment along an optimal path taking into account financial considerations. The empirical analysis using West German micro data proves that a negative relationship exists between employment and the debt asset ratio of the firm. We also demonstrate that as real wages (sales) increase, employment decreases (increases).     

Corporate hedging and input price risk

Input price variability is an important source of risk for corporations that process raw commodities. Models of optimal input hedging are developed in this paper based on the maximization of managerial expected utility. The relationship between hedging strategies and output decisions is examined to assess the impact of the ability to set output prices on futures market participation. As a firm's ability to set output prices diminishes in the short run, input futures positions increase although the optimal hedge ratio may either increase or decrease. For a perfectly competitive firm, however, shifts in output price caused by input price changes provide a natural cash market hedge of input price risk and reduce the firm's optimal input futures position.     

The peer-firm effect on firm’s investment decisions

This study investigates the effect of peer firms on firm investment strategies. We test the peer group effect hypothesis along differing levels of financially constrained firms as well as differing degrees of industry competition. Using idiosyncratic equity returns as the instrument variable, we use 2-stage least squares regression to identify the influence of peer firms’ investment decisions on a firm’s own investment policies. Our analyses empirically confirm that there is a peer group effect in making firm investment decisions. More financially constrained firms show greater dependency on peers’ investment decisions. Tests of peer sensitivity to the increase in industrial competition, however, displayed a U-shaped quadratic curve, which shows that firms have the lowest peer group effect in medium-competition markets. We claim that imitative behavior in investment is presumably weak in the mid-competition market because firms are yet to be distinguished in this market.     

Distressed exchange,bargaining power,and prior capital structure

Financially troubled companies often make Distressed Exchange (DE) offers to its creditors, to postpone costly bankruptcy reorganization. We derive the optimal terms and timing of a DE offer consisting of debt reduction and an equity stake in the restructured firm. The DE terms and timing are affected by shareholder bargaining power, with greater shareholder bargaining power resulting in earlier DE offer, smaller debt reduction and smaller equity stake. The impact of shareholder bargaining power is greater when bankruptcy cost is larger and tax rate is higher. We also show that renegotiability of debt increases ex-ante firm value and results in a higher optimal leverage ratio. Both firm value and optimal leverage ratio are decreasing functions of shareholder bargaining power.     

Learning by a dominant firm

This paper is concerned with the optimal output decisions of a dominant firm in the presence of imperfect information about the rival's reactions. The model is multi-period with the profits in each period being independent of those in other periods. Consequently, if the rival's reaction parameter were known to the dominant firm, a myopic policy would be optimal, In the presence of imperfect information about the rival's unknown reaction parameter, the dominant firm acts in a Bayesian manner by updating its prior distribution based on the observations of the rival's outputs. Because of the multiplicative shape of the rival's reaction function, the Bayesian updating rule is a function of the dominant firm's decision variable, i.e. its output decisions. This creates a dependence of the future value of the dominant firm on the present output decision, and hence a myopic policy is not, in general, optimal. It is shown that through output experimentation the dominant firm will tend to overproduce and, consequently, will increase its expected discounted profits (market value).     

A pareto optimal collaboration period: The role of financial,industrial and macroeconomic conditions in liquidation decision and timing

In this paper, the author highlights the nexus of interactions among financial, industrial and macroeconomic factors determining the Pareto optimal date on which the firm’s claimants stop collaborating and force the firm into liquidation. The condition for optimal liquidation time summarizes the effects of volatility of the aggregate consumer income and the overall price level, demand elasticity, the industry’s concentration level and depreciation on the firm’s going-concern value. It also takes into account the effects of the firm’s level of indebtedness, foregone interest on alternative usages of the financial resources extended to the firm and the costs of risk bearing perceived by the firm’s claimants from continued collaboration.     

Equilibrium in collateralized asset markets: Credit contractions and negative equity loans

We address a general equilibrium model with collateralized debt, credit contractions, and financial market segmentation. Restrictions on credit access make borrower’s optimal payment strategies–coupon payment, prepayment, and default–sensitive to idiosyncratic factors, even though the only payment enforcement is the seizure of collateral guarantees. We prove equilibrium existence, characterize optimal borrower’s payment strategies, and provide a numerical example illustrating our main results. A remarkable feature of our model is that it rationalizes the prevalence of negative equity non-recourse loans.