Investitionsanreize unter RPI-X-Regulierung und die angemessene Höhe von Kostendurchreichungen

In the classic view, the fundamental decision between a rate-of-return and price-cap regime depends upon the aim of regulatory action: a rate-of-return is considered to more likely induce infrastructure investment while a price-cap regime is expected to increase managerial effort in reducing costs. While an asset-based regulation may lead to the unwanted Averch-Johnson effect, efficiency-oriented regulation such as RPI-X may decrease the company’s incentive to invest. To avoid this behaviour, RPI-X-regimes do often exempt certain costs from regulation, e.g. by allowing for pass-throughs for capital expenditures. Starting with the finding that efficiency-based regulation may lead to postponement or abandonment of investment projects in a real options based model, a fair rate of capital cost pass through is derived to mitigate the negative effects on investment projects. This ‘regulation-adjusted’ cost-pass-through depends on the regulatory X the regulator imposes on the regulated industry. Given the valuation of the investment project and the efficiency-value, a cost-pass-through can be calculated which is less or equal than the risk free interest rate as long as the pass-through itself is risk-free.     

The Political Economy of Price Cap Regulation

The last decade has witnessed a dramatic substitutionof price cap regulation for rate-of-return regulationin the telecommunications industry. The 1996Telecommunications Act empowers state regulators toset the terms of competitive entry in local telephonemarkets. We investigate whether the form of regulationendogenously affects the regulator's behavior withrespect to competitive entry. The evidence revealsthat regulators in price cap jurisdictions tend to setmore liberal terms of entry in comparison withregulators in rate-of-return jurisdictions. Thissuggests that price cap regulation suffers fromincomplete contracting, undermining the potentiallysuperior incentive properties of this importantregulatory reform.     

中国工业行业市场扭曲程度的测定

本文将市场扭曲界定为由于市场的不完善所导致的资源配置对帕累托最优状态的偏离,并根据其在生产可能性曲线上的不同状态,把市场扭曲分为三类:技术扭曲、产品市场的价格扭曲、要素市场的价格扭曲。在此基础之上,本文选取1996—2007年的年度数据,建立一个包含全国36个工业部门的Panel Data模型来统一测度我国工业行业市场的扭曲程度,并将数据在时间上划分为三个阶段,进一步研究我国市场扭曲程度随时间变化的趋势。计量分析结果表明:我国工业行业的市场扭曲程度在不同的时间段内差异很大,但总体上呈现出下降的趋势;转轨阶段国有企业的体制变化和国家的产业政策是影响我国市场扭曲的重要因素;由于我国传统意义上的垄断行业形成的特殊性,垄断行业的市场扭曲程度在这三个阶段里并没有发生明显的变化。因此,应通过深化经济体制改革,特别是对垄断行业的企业体制和价格体制改革,以及完善现行的产业政策,建立充分竞争的市场机制,来降低我国工业行业市场扭曲的程度。     

Economic efficiency,antitrust and rate-of-return

This paper examines the economic consequences of using excessive rates-of-return to detect and prosecute cartels. We find that this policy leads to inefficient factor utilization, but always increases output and welfare. The rate-of-return policy may yield greater social gains than a welfare-based antitrust policy.     

An Empirical Analysis of Electricity Regulation on Technical Change in Texas

To evaluate the impact of regulation on the innovativeness of firms, this studyconsiders the unusual case of electric utilities in the state of Texas. In the currentera of deregulation, the electric utility industry in Texas is unique because itsregulation was relatively limited until 1975, after which time Texas legislatorsimposed rate-of-return regulation. Utilizing a translog cost framework on annualdata covering the years 1965 to 1985, this study is thus able to compare the rateof technological change both before and after the imposition of rate-of-returnregulation. The findings indicate that before the implementation of rate-of-returnregulation, costs decreased significantly because of technological progress. Afterthe implementation, however, the findings indicate that costs increased significantlydue to technological regress brought on by regulation.     

Internet telephony: Costs,pricing, and policy

This article analyzes Internet Service Provider costs and regulatory and policy issues raised by Internet telephony. Transport and non-technical items such as customer service, sales and marketing, represent a substantial portion of an ISP’s costs with Internet telephony. Pricing models and yield management techniques supporting Internet voice services might be employed for other Internet differentiated services as well. An integrated regulatory framework will be required, because of convergence, to formulate policies for multimedia services. We conclude that governments should develop appropriate policies without introducing economic and technical distortions into the nascent Internet telephony market.     

Regulatory risk,investment, and welfare

This paper assesses the allocative and distributional effects of uncertain regulatory constraints on rate of return, on price, and on competitive entry. A profit-maximizing firm responds to rate-of-return risk by substituting variable factors for sunk investment, but expands capacity when faced with either price risk or entry risk. Investors gain from the elimination of regulatory risk, a result that parallels Peltzman's contention that regulators could raise investor wealth by reducing risk. Consumers benefit from price and entry risk, but only under severe restrictions on tastes and technology. An inherent feature of government intervention, regulatory risk should be taken into account when comparing alternative policies for regulating (or deregulating) an industry.     

中国劳动要素配置扭曲程度的测量

本文测算了我国及省际的劳动力资源配置扭曲程度。全国总体劳动力配置扭曲程度、城乡劳动力扭曲程度大致呈现波浪式下降,城市内劳动力扭曲程度则呈现阶段性增加的态势,城乡劳动力扭曲是导致劳动力配置扭曲的主要因素;从全国劳动力配置扭曲贡献因素来看,各产业间劳动边际生产力的差异直接反映了劳动力资源配置扭曲,而各产业内部所形成的劳动资源扭曲在总体上具有消减作用;进一步观察各产业内和产业间的扭曲状况,可见第一、三产业内劳动力资源扭曲程度长期并不高,但近年来增加态势明显,第二产业扭曲程度较高,但有下降趋势,而部门间的扭曲程度则呈现缓慢增长特点。从省际来看,各省份总体和城乡劳动力扭曲程度呈下降趋势,而城市则呈现增加态势,在扭曲特点上,一方面存在收敛性特点,另一方面又存在东部、中部和西部地区差别。进一步将人力资本因素考虑进去,可以发现,我国劳动力资源配置扭曲程度会有所下降。通过上面的研究,可以得到一些有益的政策启示。     

Flawed Competition Policies: Designing ‘Markets’ with Biased Costs and Efficiency Benchmarks

Rather than the endogenous, tournament-type regulation based on mean costs proposed by Shleifer almost twenty years ago, regulators have opted for market designs based on exogenously determined efficiency comparisons reflected in fixed productivity adjustments. These productivity assessments are based only on estimates of technical efficiency improvements derived from estimated production frontiers. Utilities’ prices and potential profits are driven by this externally determined market. This paper examines the impacts on utility efficiency rankings from variations in peer group frontier regulation in Europe and Australia as well as in its use in the U.S. Despite the potential for distortions caused by long periods with non-market prices, these regulatory applications measure only technical efficiency, leaving moot the assessment of optimal input selection. We examine both technical and allocative efficiency variations among firms from the different cost specifications employed by regulators involving output, factor inputs, and costs. How are rankings impacted when only subsets of total costs (e.g., O&;M, not capital or system losses) are used to gauge efficiency? Does the use of partial measures of capital relying on physical specifications impact efficiency rankings? Are rankings affected when comparisons are made independently one input at a time? Is the efficiency frontier stable? Finally, we compare alternative yardstick measures to a simple ranking on relative (total) cost per unit.     

Total factor productivity measures for Hong Kong telephone

Since the early 1960s, the Hong Kong Telephone Company (HKTC)—the dominant firm in Hong Kong's local telephone market—has undergone several regulatory reforms. The company has been subject to price control, rate-of-return regulation and price-cap regulation. This paper estimates the total factor productivity (TFP) growth of HKTC. The empirical results show that the estimated TFP growth of HKTC was 2.31–3.56% per year between 1964 and 1998. TFP growth varied substantially under different regulatory regimes, and the importance of the scale effect relative to the technological effect diminished over time.     

Endogenous Regulatory Constraints and the Emergence of Hybrid Regulation

Models of public utility regulation are often framed, alternatively, as rate-of-return or price-cap regulation. In practice, however, regulators have increasingly adopted a variety of hybrid regulatory constraints that embody elements of both these, and other, regulatory forms. In this paper, we draw upon elements of both the positive economic theory of regulation and standard efficiency-based economic analysis of regulation to develop a model that endogenously yields hybrid regulatory constraints as a regulatory optimum. In this context, the paper further demonstrates that a commonly observed side payment–profit sharing–enhances regulator welfare. The results provide a plausible basis for understanding the pattern of modern regulatory constraints.     

Changes in trade and domestic distortions affecting China’s agriculture

This paper assesses the implications of China’s trade and domestic policies for incentives to producers in China. It uses a price comparison methodology (nominal rates of assistance—at the border and the farmgate), with adjustments for exchange rate distortions in the first part of the sample period (1981–1994). On average, distortions to agricultural incentives have been reduced. In the early 1980s, on average, China’s domestic prices were far below international prices. There were substantial variations, however, between imported (which were being protected) and exported goods. During the 1980s and 1990s the gap between domestic and international prices for both imports and exports narrowed initially mainly due to the elimination of domestic policy distortions. Between the mid-1990s and 2004, trade liberalization policy furthered narrowed the gap between world and China farmgate prices. By the mid-2000s, China’s agriculture was operating with only small price distortions.     

Rent seeking and the allowed rate of return: A recursive model

In this paper, we estimate a three-equation recursive model of the rate-of-return phase of the regulatory hearing process. Separate equations are estimated for the firm's requested rate of return, the staff's recommended rate of return, and the commission's approved rate of return. The sample used in this estimation contains 122 observations of actual rate cases that were decided between 1980 and 1984. There are 73 electric companies and 37 states represented in this sample. The model differs from prior work in this area by (1) incorporating a separate equation to explain the commission staff's recommended rate of return, and (2) including the regulated companies' actual expenditures on the hearing process as a variable in all three equations.     

Was there policy “reform”? Evolution of EU domestic support for processed fruits and vegetables

Policy “reform” in agricultural markets is often associated with less government regulation and expenditures, or a shift towards more efficient interventions. The European Union (EU) adopted major policy changes for processed fruits and vegetables in 2001 and again in 2008, and we employ a simulation model to examine the effects of the three policy regimes in place before and after each of the changes. Our analysis incorporates the heterogeneity of processing firms in the EU and considers how they responded to the different policy regimes. Simulation results indicate that the EU subsidies increased EU tomato production by 3.8% for the regime that began in 2008 and 9.1% for the regime that began in 2001 compared to no subsidies. The policy regime that was in place from 2001 through 2007 led to the greatest distortions in global processing tomato markets, in part because it directed more of the benefits to EU growers and less to EU processors and consumers. Thus changes in 2001 “reformed” policy by redistributing gains within the EU, while changes in 2008 “reformed” policy by reducing distortions in global markets.     

Labor market power and the distorting effects of international trade

This article examines how final product trade with China shapes and interacts with labor market imperfections that create market power in labor markets and prevent an efficient market outcome. I develop a framework for measuring such labor market power distortions in monetary terms and document large degrees of these distortions in Germany's manufacturing sector. Import competition only exerts labor market disciplining effects if firms, rather than employees, possess labor market power. Otherwise, increasing export demand and import competition both fortify existing distortions, which decreases labor market efficiency. This widens the gap between potential and realized output and thus diminishes classical gains from trade.     

Accelerated Product Introductions and Emerging Managerial Accounting Perspectives: Implications for Marketing Managers in the Technology Sector

Rapid changes in manufacturing and design technologies coupled with increased competition domestically and internationally have led to shorter product life cycles and compressed lead times for product introductions in the technology sector. Traditional cost accounting systems, which assume labor to be the major cost component in the production process, have resulted in distortions in cost information. Samuel Rabino and Arnold Wright describe emerging cost accounting approaches that more adequately address the changing competitive and technological environments and facilitate an improved evaluation of product launch programs.     

Pricing distortions in multi-sided platforms

We consider the reasons why a monopoly multi-sided platform may price differently from a social planner. The existing literature has focused only on the classical market power distortion and a distortion in the spirit of Spence. We show two additional distortions appear in the presence of cross-group network effects, which we call the displacement distortion and the scale distortion. We show conditions under which the displacement distortion exactly offsets the Spence distortion, and provide an example in which the total of these different distortions results in monopoly prices per user that are lower than the social planner’s on both sides. Our results have implications for regulatory policy, which we briefly discuss.     

The dual ladder: motivational solution or managerial delusion?

The 'Dual Ladder' reward system has been used for years by industry as an incentive system to motivate technical performance. Its effectiveness has been called into question on many occasions. The paper will report the results of a survey of nearly 1,500 engineers and scientists in nine U.S. organizations. In this survey, engineers were asked to indicate their career preferences in terms of increasing managerial responsibility, technical ladder advancement or more interesting technical work. Responses indicate marked age-dependent differences in response, particularly a strong increase in the proportion preferring more interesting project work over either form of advancement.
Conversations which one of the authors has had recently with managers of the thirteenth company question its status as an exception.     

Dual Agent Distortions in Real Estate Transactions

This article investigates price distortions in dual agent real estate transactions. Consistent with the literature, we find that, on average, dual agent has a null effect on sale price. However, dual agent distortions on sale price emerge after controlling for the ownership of the property. Dual agent is associated with a 6.35% price premium on agent‐owned properties, but a 25.10% price discount on government‐owned properties and a 5.14% discount on bank‐owned properties. In addition, market conditions also play an important role in such price distortions.     

Reflections on Learner's index of monopoly power

Lerner's index of monopoly power is considered in light of four axioms or principles the index should exhibit. The index is then defined for various types of market, involving externality, dynamics, increasing returns to scale, multiproduction, price discrimination and non-zero cross-elasticities of demand. The role of monopoly profit as opposed to non-competitive distortions becomes more important with greater generality. A supplementary index is defined to measure rents to technology.