Are ‘true’ preferences revealed in repeated markets? An experimental demonstration of context-dependent valuations

This paper reports a new and significant experimental demonstration that market participants adjust their bids towards the price observed in previous market periods when—by design—individuals’ values should not be affiliated with the market price. This demonstration implies that market prices may not adjust as standard comparative statics predicts and emphasizes the significance of social aspects even in market contexts. Hence, the present study shows that market behaviour is not anomaly-free. Indeed, market behaviour does not reveal the underlying true preferences but rather context-dependent preferences.     

Market experience eliminates some anomalies—and creates new ones

We report two experiments which investigate whether experience of decision making in repeated markets purges behaviour of preference reversals. We investigate two behavioural mechanisms that may be shaping bids in repeated auctions: A tendency to adjust bids towards previously observed market prices, and a tendency to reduce bids following bad market outcomes. We find little support for the former but strong support for the latter. Also, whilst ‘just enough’ market exposure eliminates the typical preference reversal phenomenon, continued exposure fosters the mirror image anomaly. Therefore, although market experience shapes behaviour, in our experiments, it does not generally promote consistency with standard preference theory.     

Hybrid allocation mechanisms for publicly provided goods

Motivated by efficiency and equity concerns, public resource managers have increasingly utilized hybrid allocation mechanisms that combine features of commonly used price (e.g., auction) and non-price (e.g., lottery) mechanisms. This study serves as an initial investigation of these hybrid mechanisms, exploring theoretically and experimentally how the opportunity to obtain a homogeneous good in a subsequent lottery affects Nash equilibrium bids in discriminative and uniform price auctions. The lottery imposes an opportunity cost to winning the auction, systematically reducing equilibrium auction bids. In contrast to the uniform price auction, equilibrium bids in the uniform price hybrid mechanism vary with bidder risk preferences. Experimental evidence suggests that the presence of the lottery and risk attitudes (elicited through a preceding experiment) impact auction bids in the directions predicted by theory. Finally, we find that theoretically and experimentally, the subsequent lottery does not compromise the efficiency of the auction component of the hybrid mechanisms.     

Extraction rights allocation with liquidity constraints

We study the optimal allocation of a resource in a second-best world in which parties may be liquidity-constrained due to credit frictions and capital market imperfections. In this setting, common to various natural resource industries, agents are unable to bid more than their budget regardless of their valuation. While auction markets are widely used mechanisms for allocating natural resource extraction rights and conservation contracts, we show that in these circumstances the competitive market –which allocates items based on rank order of bids– fails to achieve the first-best allocation. The market outcome is welfare-dominated by a hybrid mechanism consisting of random assignment followed by resale in a secondary market. Via the initial lottery, the hybrid-mechanism allocates the items with positive probability to high-valuation low-wealth individuals who would not have been able to afford them in a competitive market. High-valuation high-wealth agents, on the other hand, acquire the items in the secondary market if they do not receive them in the initial lottery. Therefore, equity in the allocation of access to the resource may be justified not only by distributional concerns but also by economic efficiency. We illustrate our model using data from buybacks of harvesting rights in the seafood industry.     

Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers

We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of private-value auctions for differentiated goods. New buyers and new objects may arrive at random times. Since objects are imperfect substitutes, buyers? values are not persistent. Instead, each buyer?s private value for a new object is a new independent draw from the same distribution.We consider the use of second-price auctions for selling these objects, and show that there exists a unique symmetric Markov equilibrium in this market. In equilibrium, buyers shade their bids down by their continuation value, which is the (endogenous) option value of participating in future auctions. We characterize this option value and show that it depends not only on the number of buyers currently present on the market and the distribution of their values, but also on anticipated market dynamics.     

Bidder collusion

We analyze bidder collusion at first-price and second-price auctions. Our focus is on less than all-inclusive cartels and collusive mechanisms that do not rely on auction outcomes. We show that cartels that cannot control the bids of their members can eliminate all ring competition at second-price auctions, but not at first-price auctions. At first-price auctions, when the cartel cannot control members’ bids, cartel behavior involves multiple cartel bids. Cartels that can control bids of their members can suppress all ring competition at both second-price and first-price auctions; however, shill bidding reduces the profitability of collusion at first-price auctions.     

Towards equilibrium offers in unit commitment auctions with nonconvex costs

We compare two types of uniform-price auction formats commonly used in wholesale electricity markets—centrally committed and self-committed markets. Auctions in both markets are conducted by an independent system operator that collects generator bids and determines which generators will operate and how much electricity each will produce. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a startup cost and a variable energy cost. Self-committed markets force generators to incorporate their startup costs into a one-part energy bid. The system operator in a centrally committed system ensures that each generator recovers the startup and energy costs stated in its two-part bid, while no such guarantees are made in self-committed markets. The energy cost ranking and incentive properties of these market designs remains an open question. While the system operator can determine the most efficient dispatch with a centralized market, the auction mechanism used to solicit generator data compels generators to overstate costs. Self commitment might involve less efficient dispatch but have better incentive properties. We derive Nash equilibria for both market designs in a symmetric duopoly setting. We also derive simple conditions under which the two market designs will be expected cost-equivalent.     

Information and transparency in wholesale electricity markets: evidence from Alberta

We examine the role of information transparency in Alberta’s wholesale electricity market. Using data on firms’ bidding behavior, we analyze whether firms utilize information revealed in near real-time through the Historical Trading Report (HTR), which is released 10 min after each hour and contains a complete (de-identified) list of every firms’ bids into the wholesale market from the previous hour. We demonstrate that firms are often able to identify the offers of specific rivals by offer patterns adopted by those firms. For one of these firms, these patterns are associated with higher offer prices. This is consistent with allegations by Alberta’s Market Surveillance Administrator that firms may be utilizing unique bidding patterns to reveal their identities to their rivals to elevate market prices. We show that certain firms respond to rival offer changes with a lag consistent with responding to information revealed through the HTR, and that they respond differently to different firms, suggesting that they are able to infer identification.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.      

All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction

This paper completely characterizes the set of equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there are at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive bids below the maximum valuation. In this class, above a threshold value all bidders bid truthfully on all units. One of the bidders bids at the threshold for any unit for which his valuation is below the threshold; the other bidders bid zero in this range. In the second class of equilibria there are as many bids at or above the maximum valuation as there are units. The allocation of these bids is arbitrary across bidders. All the remaining bids equal zero. With any positive reserve price equilibrium becomes unique: Bidders bid truthfully on all units for which their valuation exceeds the reserve price.     

Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis

This paper studies the implementation of quotas in matching markets. In a controlled laboratory environment, we compare the performance of two university admissions procedures that both initially reserve a significant fraction of seats at each university for a special subgroup of students. The first mechanism mimics the sequential procedure currently used by the central clearinghouse for university admissions in Germany. This procedure starts by allocating reserved seats among eligible students and then allocates all remaining seats among those who were not already assigned one of the reserved seats in the first part of the procedure. The second mechanism is based on a modified student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm in which all seats are allocated simultaneously. In theory, the two mechanisms should lead to similar outcomes. Our experimental results, however, suggest that, relative to the sequential procedure, the simultaneous mechanism significantly improves the match outcomes for the beneficiaries of reserved seats.     

BIDS AND COSTS IN COMBINATORIAL AND NONCOMBINATORIAL PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS—EVIDENCE FROM PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC CLEANING CONTRACTS

Combinatorial procurement auctions enable suppliers to pass their potential cost synergies on to the procuring entity and may therefore lead to lower costs and enhance efficiency. However, bidders might find it profitable to inflate their stand‐alone bids in order to favor their package bids. Using data from standard and combinatorial procurement auctions, we find that bids on individual contracts in simultaneous standard auctions without the option to submit package bids are significantly lower than the corresponding stand‐alone bids in combinatorial auctions. Further, no significant difference in procurer's cost as explained by auction format is found. (JEL D44, H57, L15)     

Integrating econometrics: A modern undergraduate economics capstone experience

Angrist and Pischke (2017) call for a pedagogical paradigm shift by pointing out that econometrics courses often do not align with modern empirical approaches employed by economists. This article's authors propose a modern capstone experience, designed to address these concerns by integrating econometrics into the traditional capstone approach. They couple a full econometrics course with a traditional capstone course by weaving a cohesive econometrics-heavy research paper through the two courses. They feel this approach addresses the lack of econometrics skills among economics majors while simultaneously making some necessary improvements to undergraduate econometrics content. They hope this article will be a valuable resource for programs changing course requirements or revamping their curriculum to better fit the increasing demand for data analysis skills in the job market.     

Costless discrimination and unequal achievements in an experimental tournament

We investigate the emergence of discrimination in an experiment where individuals affiliated to different groups compete for a monetary prize, submitting independent bids to an auctioneer. The auctioneer receives perfect information about the bids (there is no statistical discrimination), and she has no monetary incentive to favor the members of her own group (the bidders are symmetric). We observe nonetheless some discrimination by auctioneers, who tend to assign the prize more frequently to a member of their own group when two or more players put forward the highest bid. Out-group bidders react to this bias and reduce significantly their bids, causing an average decay of their earnings throughout the game, with cumulative effects that generate unequal outcomes. Because the initial bias is costless, such mechanism can survive even in a competitive market, providing a rationale for the long-run persistence of discrimination.     

Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats

The prevalent term “auction fever” visualizes that ascending auctions – inconsistent with theory – are likely to provoke higher bids than one-shot auctions. To explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally, we design four different strategy-proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo-endowment effect arguments (psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept). Observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values (the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value). A control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory. Another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one-shot auction with real endowments. We conclude that, when bidders are uncertain about their valuations, auctions that foster pseudo-endowment may raise bids and revenues.     

Betting on weight loss … and losing: personal gambles as commitment mechanisms

Professional bookmakers rarely accept bets from individuals who directly control the outcome of the bet. We analyse a unique exception to this rule and a potential policy innovation in the battle against obesity: a weight loss betting market. If obese individuals have time-inconsistent preferences then commitment mechanisms, such as personal gambles, should help them restrain their short-term impulses and lose weight. Correspondence with the bettors confirms that this is their primary motivation. However, it appears that the bettors in our sample are not particularly skilled at choosing effective commitment mechanisms. Despite payoffs of as high as $7350, approximately 80% of people who spend money to bet on their own behaviour end up losing their bets. Empirical analysis of the betting market yields further insights. Males are treated very differently compared to females: being male is considered equivalent to having an extra 6 months to lose the same amount of weight. Movements in the market price also confirm the belief that rigidity is preferred to flexibility in setting successful weight loss targets.     

The Male-Female Pay Gap Driven by Coupling between Labor Markets and Mating Markets

Synopsis Males often get paid more than females for the same work. This male-female pay gap has been observed throughout the world over many years. The most commonly cited explanations focus on gender oppression and workplace discrimination. We agree that discrimination contributes significantly to the pay gap; however, other factors may play important roles in how the sexes compete in the labor market. We use observations from psychology and concepts from biology to show how aspects of mate choice may influence labor markets. With a mathematical model, we analyze how mating preferences for partner wages affect the differences in wages between males and females, and in turn how wage differences affect mating preferences. If some extrinsic force, such as discrimination, creates an initial bias in wages, then coupled feedback between mating preferences and wages creates and maintains excess mating preference and wage biases. This model demonstrates how coupling between labor markets and mating markets can lead to outcomes that do not occur when analyzing either market in isolation from the other.     

Strategic take-back programs when consumers have heterogeneous environmental preferences

We look at the strategic introduction of take-back programs (TBPs) which offer consumers a discount on their next purchase (reward) when they drop off previous purchases. In a Hotelling duopoly, consumers are heterogeneous not only in terms of their location on the Hotelling line but also in terms of their recycling preferences. Firms introduce TBPs to obtain a market share advantage (reward effect) and/or to recover the intrinsic value of the recycled units (recycling effect); their choice of the optimal reward balances these two effects: for instance, a firm might be willing to introduce a TBP, even if this means losing money on each recycled unit, in order to prevent the competitor from gaining a too large market share advantage. Comparing the level of TBP uptake at the market equilibrium to the one that maximizes social welfare, we show that a lower or higher TBP uptake can be socially desirable, depending, among other, on the weight that is given to the environmental benefits of TBPs. Several extended producer responsibility policies are discussed in terms of their potential to encourage TBP uptake and their overall impact on social welfare.     

Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain

We consider the problem of efficiently allocating several indivisible objects between agents who are to receive at most one object and whose preferences are private information. We examine this standard “assignment” problem from the perspective of mechanism design giving up the usual assumption of linear preferences and instead using a full preference domain (with indifferences permitted). We characterize two classes of mechanisms: (i) Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rules by Essential Single-Valuedness, Pareto Indifference, Strategy-Proofness and Non-Bossiness; and (ii) all selections from Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rules by Single-Valuedness, Efficiency, Strategy-Proofness and Weak Non-Bossiness. We compare the outcomes from the (Bi-polar) Serially Dictatorial Rules with the outcomes obtained using a market based approach, namely the “core” of the market. We show that all strongly efficient outcomes in the core can be generated using Serially Dictatorial Rules. Moreover, we argue that Serially Dictatorial Rules have an advantage over the market based approach in that they yield strongly efficient solutions for all preference profiles, making it possible to use randomization to restore equity. When preferences are private information, this type of ex ante equity cannot be implemented using the market based approach.     

Skill transferability,regret and mobility

After graduation many students start working in sectors not related to their field of study or participate in training targeted at work in other sectors. In this article, we look at mobility immediately after graduation from the perspective that educational choices have been made when these pupils had little experience of the actual working life in these professions. We develop a model where students accumulate partially transferable human capital but also learn about their professional preferences at the university and during the first years in the labour market. As a consequence of this newly acquired insight, these young workers might realize that working in another occupational field would better fit their preferences, although they are better equipped to work in their own field. The empirical analysis reveals that if wages are 1% lower due to lower skill transferability, the probability that a graduate who regrets his choice actually switches decreases by 1.4 percentage points, while those who switch on average take 0.3 months additional education.