Minimum Wage,International Migration And Their Effects On Welfare

This paper evaluates migration policies for an open economy in the presence of unemployment resulting from a minimum wage. Migration between countries is triggered by an expected wage differential which depends both on the market wage and the level of unemployment. Workers therefore can move in either direction. The paper shows that labor outflow raises employment and welfare. Distortion-ridden free trade with this out-migration is therefore better than distortion-ridden free trade with no migration. It might also be better than autarky. Under the scenario, free migration is an alternative to restricted trade often recommended to deal with this type of distortion. Labor inflow on the other hand generates unfavorable terms of trade, raises national and global unemployment, and reduces welfare. [F 2]     

Entrepreneurs,jobs, and trade

We propose a simple theory of endogenous firm productivity, unemployment, and top income inequality. High-talented individuals choose to become self-employed entrepreneurs and acquire more managerial (human) capital; whereas low-talented individuals become workers and face the prospect of equilibrium unemployment. In a two-country global economy, trade openness raises firm productivity, increases top income inequality, and may reduce welfare in the country exporting the good with lower relative labor-market frictions. Trade openness reduces firm productivity, lowers top income inequality, and necessarily raises welfare in the other country. The effect of trade on unemployment is ambiguous. Unilateral job-creating policies increase welfare in both countries. However, they reduce unemployment and raise top income inequality in the policy-active country; and reduce top income inequality while increasing unemployment in the policy-passive country.     

Downsizing, wage inequality and welfare in a developing economy

This paper focuses on the cost cutting effects of firm downsizing in a developing economy. Using a dualistic production structure to depict a developing economy, the impacts of downsizing on wage inequality and social welfare are examined. Downsizing is revealed to not only narrow the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor but also to raise the level of manufactured output and reduce the unemployment ratio in the urban sector. These effects improve the social welfare of the economy.     

Minimum wage, exports and growth

Using an endogenous growth model in an open economy, we study the impact of minimum wages on growth for an innovator country. We state that a minimum wage shifts efforts from production to R&D, but only in an open economy. Thus, it speeds up long-run growth in proportional to exports. Calibrations suggest the growth surplus can be significant. An empirical study on 11 OECD countries illustrates these results. The impact on welfare is ambiguous because the minimum wage induces unemployment. However, we show that in an open economy, a minimum wage associated with unemployment benefits can Pareto dominate laissez-faire.     

Matching frictions,unemployment dynamics and the cost of business cycles

We investigate the welfare cost of business cycles implied by matching frictions. First, using the reduced form of the matching model, we show that job finding rate fluctuations generate intrinsically a non-linear effect on unemployment: positive shocks reduce unemployment less than negative shocks increase it. For the observed process of the job finding rate in the US economy, this intrinsic asymmetry increases average unemployment, which leads to substantial business cycles costs. Moreover, the structural matching model embeds other non-linearities, which alter the average job finding rate and consequently the welfare cost of business cycles. Our theory suggests to subsidizing employment in order to dampen the impact of the job finding rate fluctuations on welfare.     

Mixed Ownership, Unemployment, and Welfare for a Developing Economy

This paper considers the employment and welfare effects of mixed ownership via partial privatization of state‐owned enterprises for a developing economy. An increase in the private ownership lowers the production and, hence, worsens urban unemployment in the short run. However, in the long run, capital moves to the rural region, alleviating the problem of urban unemployment. The employment effect can have a positive contribution to social welfare in the long run.     

Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision

This paper analyzes a model of private unemployment insurance under limited commitment and a model of public unemployment insurance subject to moral hazard in an economy with a continuum of agents and an infinite time horizon. The dynamic and steady‐state properties of the optimum private unemployment insurance scheme are established. The interaction between public and private unemployment insurance schemes is examined. Examples are constructed to show that for some parameter values increased public insurance can reduce welfare by crowding out private insurance more than one‐to‐one and that for other parameter values a mix of both public and private insurance can be welfare maximizing.     

FDI in agricultural land, welfare and unemployment in a developing economy

The paper purports to examine the consequences of foreign direct investment (FDI) in agricultural land in a developing economy using a three-sector general equilibrium model with simultaneous existence of unemployment of both skilled and unskilled labour. The analysis finds that FDI in agriculture does not only improve national welfare unequivocally but also mitigates the unemployment problem of both types of labour. The paper theoretically justifies the desirability of flow of FDI in agriculture in the developing economies.     

Public firms' merger,employment, and welfare in developing countries: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper examines the effect of a merger of state‐owned firms on wage gap, employment, and social welfare in a general equilibrium setting. For a developing economy with state‐owned firms in the urban sector, a merger via a reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can reduce the cost of capital. It then lowers the skilled wage rate through the factor‐substitution effect, while it raises the unskilled wage by the inflow of capital to the rural sector and hence lowers urban unemployment. In addition, the reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can yield a scale effect to the firms. The beneficial effects on higher urban output and less urban unemployment can improve social welfare of the developing economy.     

Wage bargaining, labor-tax progression, and welfare

This paper analyzes the effect of labor-tax progression on employment and welfare in an economy with a unionized labor market. The government influences wage bargaining through its tax policies. Wages can be reduced by increasing the marginal labor-tax rate. If there are no restrictions on profit taxation, a first-best optimum with full employment is realized; this first-best optimum can always be implemented by a progressive tax schedule. If profit taxation is restricted, unemployment may arise. For this case, we show that the welfare-maximizing degree of tax progression is influenced by a variety of factors, in particular the wage elasticity of labor demand, the distribution of bargaining power, and the existence of unemployment benefits. Examples are given for both progressive and regressive tax structures. Comparative-static analysis reveals that a decline in union bargaining power, an increase in unemployment benefits, and an increase in the overall work force reduce the efficient degree of tax progression.     

Financial liberalization,urban unemployment and welfare: some implications of the artificial low interest rate and the high wage rate policies in LDCs

This paper investigates how the low interest rate policy in the commercial banking sector affects the urban unemployment in a small open Harris-Todaro model. The rate of urban unemployment unambiguously declines. The volume of it shrinks if the rural-to-urban employment rate and the urban unemployment rate are sufficiently high relative to the wage elasticity of agricultural labor demand. The national income increases if agriculture is dominant in the domestic production. In such an economy, the “financial liberalization” advocated by the Mckinnon-Shaw school may aggravate the welfare even if it eliminates the “financial repression”.     

Can regional policy in a federation improve economic efficiency?

In the European Union and in many federal and non-federal countries, the central government pays subsidies to poor regions. These subsidies are often seen as a redistributive measure which comes at the cost of an efficiency loss. This paper develops an economic rationale for regional policy based on economic efficiency. We consider a model of a federation consisting of a rich and a poor region. The economy is characterized by imperfect competition in goods markets and unemployment. Firms initially produce in the rich region but may relocate their production to the poor region. We show that a subsidy on investment in the poor region unambiguously increases welfare if labour markets are competitive. If there is unemployment in both regions, the case for regional subsidies is weaker.     

The German Unemployment Compensation System: Effects On Aggregate Savings And Wealth Distribution

The effects of the German unemployment compensation system on aggregate savings and the distribution of wealth are studied in a general equilibrium 60–period OLG model. The distribution of wealth is derived as an endogenous function of the parameters characterizing the unemployment compensation system, which comprises unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld), unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), and welfare payments (Sozialhilfe), the latter two being subject to a means test. As our main results: (i) both aggregate savings and wealth equality are a monotone decreasing function of unemployment benefits; (ii) optimal unemployment compensation declines over the spell of unemployment; (iii) asset–based means tests are shown to reduce welfare if the allowable wealth level is below the average wealth in the economy.     

Environmental Protection in the Presence of Unemployment and Common Resources

This paper examines the effects of an export tax (on a processed resource good), the number of harvesters and an afforestation policy in a small, open economy with urban unemployment. The export tax increases the urban unemployment rate, but improves the quality of the environment. Here, the optimal export tax is lower than the adjusted marginal environmental damage. Reducing the number of harvesters has a similar resource allocation effect to that of an export tax. However, the afforestation policy can resolve the trade‐off between urban unemployment and the quality of the environment and may also improve the welfare of a country.     

DO-IT-YOURSELF AND GDP*

Do-it-yourself activities are, by definition, those for which a choice must exist between doing it oneself or hiring someone else. This means they typically involve the own account production of services, but whereas it is customary to include most goods produced on own account in GDP services are conventionally excluded. In principle, however, it is possible to envisage a comprehensive and unique measure of the total final output of all the goods and services produced within an economy whether for sale or own use. Such a measure would be better than GDP as an indicator of long term changes in economic welfare, being independent of any shifts in the ratio of market to non-market production. Moreover, it would be a homogeneous measure with clearly defined limits in contrast to improvised indices of welfare which mix economic and non-economic variables in arbitrary and subjective ways. However, the need for a measure of market output, or something very close to it such as GDP, is still as strong as ever as soon as attention is switched from measurement of long term growth to problems associated with market disequilibria, such as unemployment and inflation.     

Equilibrium unemployment, search behaviour and unemployment persistency

Unemployment persistency and high equilibrium unemployment isoften assumed to be caused by rigidities and low search efficiencyin the labour market, especially in European welfare stateswith generous income replacement schemes. These arguments aretested on data from Sweden, an old welfare state with a longperiod of full employment that has changed into a situationwith high unemployment. Data show a clear and very strong unemploymentduration dependency, but it is not possible to prove that thisis a result of low employability among the long-term unemployed.Getting a job is most of all associated with relative qualifications,recall expectations and local labour market conditions, andnot with search behaviour or high wage demands. It is arguedthat unemployment duration when unemployment is high can bestbe understood as a selection process rather than a search process,and that econometric estimations of equilibrium unemploymentare too pessimistic about the potential for an expansive economicpolicy. It is also argued that an active labour market policyis a more efficient compliment to such a policy than changesin income replacement ratios.     

Monopolistic Competition and North–South Trade

This paper examines the consequences of opening to international trade for a developing economy with open urban unemployment and rural–urban migration, where the urban sector is monopolistically competitive. It is shown that there exists a threshold level of urbanization prior to which increases in product variety will be reflected in increased urban unemployment, that opening to intra‐industry trade with a high‐wage economy (i.e. North–South trade) will reduce the rate of urban unemployment by a greater amount than intra‐industry trade with a similar economy, and that trade intervention in the South may lower welfare by reducing varieties produced in the North.     

Foreign Capital, Urban Unemployment, and Economic Growth

A three-sector endogenous growth model, is used to study the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the dynamics of urban unemployment, labour income, and capital income as well as national welfare in a Harris–Todaro economy. It is shown that more FDI can affect the economy's dynamics and national welfare positively or negatively. The paper derives conditions as to how the growth rate and welfare effects of FDI relate to the intersectoral mobility of capital, the destination of FDI, the elasticities of substitution, and the factor intensities of the final good production.     

Cost of policy choices: A microsimulation analysis of the impact on family welfare of unemployment and price changes

This paper calculates the welfare cost to families of an unemployment shock. Using U.S. data, we find an average annualized expected dollar equivalent welfare loss of $1,156 when the unemployment rate rises by one-percentage point. Relative to single families, the welfare loss is greater for married families and increases with education. We also estimate that a loss in purchasing power of 1.8% generates the same amount of welfare loss as a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate. Additionally, the magnitude of the shock to purchasing power that a family is willing to endure to avoid a one percentage point increases in the aggregate unemployment rate rises with income. The results in this paper informs policy makers about the distributional implications of decisions likely to affect labor markets.     

INCENTIVES AND THE COST OF FIRING IN AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LAYOFFS*

I study the effects of firing costs in an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard. Layoff is an incentive device, modeled as termination of the optimal long‐term contract. When the economy’s stock of firms is fixed, firing costs could reduce layoffs and increase worker welfare. In the long run when firms are free to enter and exit the market, firing costs generate not only lower employment, longer unemployment durations, and lower aggregate output, but also lower welfare for both employed workers and new labor market entrants.