浅谈上市公司关联交易中小股东利益救济

上市公司中,大股东利用非公允关联交易侵害中小股东利益时有发生,中小股东的权益,在资本多数决背景下难以得到有效的维护,中小股东利益救济问题便成为公司治理中的一大弊病。本文,从法律控制角度,探讨我国上市公司非公允关联交易中小股东的利益救济问题,试图提出制度建议。     

中小股东参股联营公司的股利政策选择

参股联营公司的中小股东,如何实现对公司经营的有效监督,怎样减少利益被大股东侵占风险和促进投资资本顺利回收,是中小股东参股联营公司要解决的现实问题。本文对中小股东参股联营公司的股利政策做了分析,提出了中小股东选择累积优先股现金股利政策的建议。     

控股股东—中小股东冲突、公司治理对非效率投资的交互影响

中国的资本市场,控股股东普遍存在,控制权和现金流权的分离使得控股股东有通过非效率投资侵占上市公司资源的动机,公司治理是制约大股东侵占中小股东利益、减少非效率投资的重要机制,公司治理是否能很好地抑制大股东非效率投资?公司治理的抑制作用是否会受到大股东持股的影响?这是本文研究的主要问题。通过分析式研究发现:公司治理会弱化利益冲突对非效率投资的影响,利益冲突也能抑制公司治理对非效率投资的作用。实证检验的结果基本支持上述结论,公司治理会抑制公司的非效率投资,而公司治理的抑制作用在大股东控制权较低和不存在两权分离时表现更好。     

大股东侵占、公司声誉与公司绩效——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

外部大股东一方面具有减少管理者机会主义行为的积极效果,另一方面又会利用控制权侵占小股东和其他利益相关者的利益影响公司绩效;约束大股东行为、保护中小投资者利益成为公司治理的核心问题。在诸多约束大股东侵占的机制中,公司声誉机制被认为是约束大股东利益侵占的有效机制。本文采用2004年1261家上市公司为研究对象,对大股东侵占度和公司声誉制约机制对上市公司绩效的影响进行了实证分析,结果表明,大股东侵占度对公司绩效的影响不显著,公司声誉对公司绩效产生了显著的正面效应。此外,我们还发现法律环境对公司绩效产生积极影响。     

第一大股东关联交易对上市公司绩效的影响分析

由于我国特殊的政治、经济等环境,很多上市公司都存在着大股东通过关联交易活动来转移上市公司资源、侵占中小股东利益的现象,严重干扰了上市公司的正常运营,导致公司质量不高,影响投资者的信心.本文对我国第一大股东关联交易的总体状况以及第一大股东关联交易的主要类型进行分析,并选择2010-2012年深圳交易所发生关联交易的上市公司为样本数据,对第一大股东的关联交易与上市公司绩效进行回归分析,从实证方面证明第一大股东对上市公司的侵占行为,并得出相应结论.     

上市公司多个大股东股权结构研究综述

近年来,越来越多的研究发现,各国的资本市场上普遍存在多个大股东股权结构,但是关于该股权结构下第二大股东的存在究竟是能够有效地抑制还是加剧控股股东侵占中小股东利益仍存在争议。因此,本文基于近年来关于多个大股东股权结构的研究对现有文献进行分类归纳,以期为我国上市公司多个大股东股权结构的后续研究提供参考。     

上市公司大股东与小股东的利益博弈

近年来,公司治理的研究问题从经理人和股东之间的委托代理关系,转移到大股东对小股东的利益侵占分析。本文通过博弈模型对大股东和小股东的利益关系进行了分析,首先选用智猪博弈说明小股东的“搭便车”心理,然后对大小股东的完全信息下的博弈分情况讨论,解释了“用脚投票”的现象,最后根据博弈分析结论提出建议。     

中小股东保护的升级——试析公司法修改对股东利益平衡问题的处理

大股东和中小股东之间存在利益冲突。在原公司法中,大股东对董事会以及对公司人事和管理的控制会容易就演变侵占中小股东利益的权利滥用,这严重损害了股东间的利益平衡。基于此,去年底新修改的公司法从保护中小股东利益的角度出发,双管齐下,制约大股东的权利,并从管理、监督以及法律救济三大方面对中小股东的权利和其保护做了全方位的改进。尽管仍存在不足,但是修改后的公司法在处理大股东和中小股东利益平衡的问题上确实卓有成效。     

我国上市公司大小股东的博弈分析

我国上市公司大、小股东在博弈的过程中存在着两种现状，即：小股东“搭便车”从中获利和大股东利用其控制权对小股东利益的侵占。本文基于博弈论对这种现状进行分析并提出一些建议。     

股权价值决定：一种基于经济权力的证券资产定价模型

本文在Nash讨价还价模型的基础上，以企业要素所有者博弈入手，以资源和经济权力禀赋为视角，重新演绎了非对等资源禀赋和权力结构下的股权定价模型。指出，股权价值取决于股东的资源和权力禀赋结构。即股东资源价值越大，则控制权越大、剩余分配越多，该股东实际股权价值越高；股东间资源禀赋越不对等，控制权结构越不平衡，企业利益侵占越严重，弱势股东的实际股权价值越低；在现实经济中，股票并非天然体现“同股同权，同股同价”特性。     

掏空、支持与上市公司经营业绩关系研究

以1998-2003年的非金融类上市公司为样本,以大股东占款为研究对象,检验了我国上市公司大股东掏空与支持行为对上市公司经营业绩的影响,研究发现大股东的掏空行为对上市公司的经营业绩具有显著的降低作用,大股东的支持行为对上市公司以会计指标表示的经营业绩具有显著的提高作用,但对以市场指标表示的经营业绩的提高作用不显著,大股东占款程度与上市公司业绩具有显著的负线性关系。     

不确定性条件下董事会监督管理层行为研究

董事会是代替股东监督管理层的主要机构,根据管理层的能力、努力程度和业绩作出监督决策。但在实际监督中,一方面信息不对称导致道德风险和逆向选择,另一方面不确定性因素也会影响监督决策强度,进而影响业绩。文章由不确定性理论研究出发,通过对2011年上市公司截面数据分析,用直接监督行为（董事会次数）和监督结果（高管薪酬、盈余管理）以及ROA作为被解释变量,从内部不确定性和外部不确定性两方面考察不确定性条件下董事会监督管理层的行为以及对业绩的影响。实证结果显示团队异质性与高管薪酬显著负相关,与业绩负相关;业务复杂性和规模与高管薪酬和业绩负相关;独立董事构成对监督和业绩影响不显著。而董事会会议和盈余管理与这些变量没有表现出相关关系。此外,财务危机导致的不确定性对监督强度和业绩都有显著负相关关系。总体说来,不确定性弱化了监督强度,与业绩负相关。     

OPTIMAL DIVIDEND POLICY WITH MEAN-REVERTING CASH RESERVOIR

Motivated by empirical evidence and economic arguments, we assume that the cash reservoir of a financial corporation follows a mean reverting process. The firm must decide the optimal dividend strategy, which consists of the optimal times and the optimal amounts to pay as dividends. We model this as a stochastic impulse control problem, and succeed in finding an analytical solution. We also find a formula for the expected time between dividend payments. A crucial and surprising economic result of our paper is that, as the dividend tax rate decreases, it is optimal for the shareholders to receive smaller but more frequent dividend payments. This results in a reduction of the probability of default of the firm.     

Subcontracting bargaining power and the trade policy

In this paper, we consider that the split of surplus from a subcontracting deal depends on the relative bargaining powers of domestic and foreign firms. The finding shows that a domestic optimal export policy is a tax (subsidy) if the bargaining power of the domestic firm is sufficiently small (large). We also demonstrate that a domestic firm’s higher bargaining power increases (may decrease) domestic profit if the export policy is exogenous (endogenous). In the presence of an outsider option, the domestic optimal export policy will be threatened by the outsider option if the domestic firm’s bargaining power is sufficiently small, and thus a large bargaining power increases the optimal export tax. At the same time, the foreign firm may still subcontract to the domestic firm even if the domestic firm has a higher total marginal cost of the intermediate good than the outsider option.     

Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?

Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition, however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm’s expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding this result is that segmentation leads to consumer remixing. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result prevails in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood.     

Manufacturer encroachment with competing dual-purpose online retail platforms

This study investigates the manufacturer encroachment strategy within a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and multiple competing dual-purpose online retail platforms who value profit and consumer surplus. We examine the strategic interactions among manufacturer encroachment, platform dual-purpose concern, and retail competition. Some interesting results are obtained. First, with a single platform, the manufacturer's encroachment incentive exhibits a non-monotonic relationship with respect to the platforms' concern of consumer surplus. However, with multiple competing platforms, the increased concern of consumer surplus and retail competition intensity dampen the manufacturer's encroachment incentive. Second, manufacturer encroachment benefits platforms (supply chain) only when the platform's concern of consumer surplus is low and commission fee is moderate (low enough). Moreover, the increased retail competition intensity and the platform's concern of consumer surplus further aggravate the detrimental effect of manufacturer encroachment on the platforms and supply chain. Third, the dual-purpose concern of the platforms may hurt consumer surplus, whereas the increased retail competition intensity may contrarily alleviate this adverse effect to some extent. Finally, the profits for the platform and supply chain and consumer surplus are non-monotonic with respect to the platform's concern of consumer surplus.     

Long‐term Investments and Financial Structure

This paper examines how the financial structure of a firm affects the incentives of managers to act myopically. The paper shows that managers tend to choose investments that pay off too quickly if there is a possibility that shareholders will fire the managers in the future. However, this problem can be avoided if firms are appropriately financed. Since the gains from firing the managers accrue first to the creditors, the shareholders’ incentive to fire the managers is reduced when the firm increases its debt ratio. The firm should thus choose an optimal financial structure to ensure that the level of incentive for shareholders to dismiss managers is appropriately controlled.     

Power imbalance and the pattern of exchange in dyadic negotiation

We investigate how a key structural aspect of negotiation—power—combines with aspiration level to affect the interaction pattern of negotiators. Conflicting research findings have revealed that in most cases negotiators with anequal balance of power reach agreements of higher joint gain than negotiators with an unequal power balance, but in some instances the opposite result has been found. We suggest that it is important to consider the interaction between the negotiators to explain these varying findings. We propose that when unequal power negotiators are able to reach agreements of high joint gain it is due to the efforts of the low power party. In addition, we argue that the low power player will be most likely to drive the search for a solution of high joint gain when he or she also has high aspirations. We tested these proposals in a market negotiation with integrative potential. To examine the pattern of negotiation, all offers and counter-offers were written. The results indicated that overall, equal power dyads achieved higher joint outcomes than unequal power dyads. Under unequal power, the hypothesis that higher joint outcomes would be obtained when the low power player had high aspirations received partial support. In addition, support was found for the hypothesis that in unequal power dyads low power players would be responsible for driving solutions of higher joint gain.