Mark-to-market accounting and liquidity pricing

When liquidity plays an important role as in financial crises, asset prices may reflect the amount of liquidity available rather than the asset's future earning power. Using market prices to assess financial institutions’ solvency in such circumstances is not desirable. We show that a shock in the insurance sector can cause the current market value of banks’ assets to fall below their liabilities so they are insolvent. In contrast, if values based on historic cost are used, banks can continue and meet all their future liabilities. We discuss the implications for the debate on mark-to-market versus historic cost accounting.     

Liquidity risk and syndicate structure

We decompose syndicated loan risk into credit, market, and liquidity risk and test how these shape syndicate structure. Commercial banks dominate relative to non-banks in loan syndicates that expose lenders to liquidity risk. This dominance is most pronounced when borrowers have high levels of credit or market risk. We then tie commercial banks’ advantage in liquidity risk to access to transactions deposits by comparing investments across banks. The results suggest that risk-management considerations matter most for participants relative to lead arrangers. Links from transactions deposits to liquidity exposure, for instance, are more than 50% larger at participants than at lead arrangers.     

Banks' Use of Accounting Discretion and Regulatory Intervention: The Case of European Banks' Impairments on Greek Government Bonds

This paper analyzes troubled banks' use of accounting discretion and its interaction with regulatory intervention in a time of financial distress. We analyze impairment losses that Europe's largest banks recognized on Greek Government Bonds (GGB) during 2011, the time during which GGB were considered impaired. Our findings reveal considerable variation in the impairment ratios across banks. Banks with larger GGB exposures, for which a full impairment would deplete a large share of regulatory capital, recognize significantly lower impairment ratios. Furthermore, we find that troubled banks delay full impairments until state aid is provided. Troubled banks recognize significantly lower impairment ratios in the quarter before they are provided with state aid, but substantially increase their impairment ratios afterwards. This pattern is consistent with the notion that troubled banks initially understate impairments to conceal the full extent of their financial difficulties from less sophisticated non-regulator outsiders (e.g., depositors and the general public), which increases regulators' ability to practice forbearance by not intervening immediately.     

Banks, Payments, and Coordination

Banks are modeled as Bryant/Diamond-Dybvig "insurers" against the risk of early consumption. Consumption claims must be verified by clearing and settlement. A clearinghouse does this efficiently as long as banks are sufficiently liquid. If liquidity requirements cannot be enforced against all banks then the threat of panics is necessary to induce banks to hold sufficient liquidity. If the clearinghouse can issue emergency currency, then banks can coexist with less liquid institutions. However, if banks′ return to holding reserves is low during "normal times," then there must be times when the return to liquidity is abnormally high. We associate these episodes with the panics of the National Banking Era. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 042, 311, 314.     

The impact of bank FinTech on liquidity creation: Evidence from China

This paper examines whether and how bank FinTech affects liquidity creation. Using panel data from Chinese commercial banks over the period 2008–2019 and bank-level FinTech indices constructed by a textual analysis method, we find robust evidence that banks with greater FinTech development create more liquidity for the public. This effect operates through deposit inflow, risk management, and cost efficiency channels. Furthermore, we find that the positive effect of bank FinTech on liquidity creation is more pronounced for banks with non-state ownership, unlisted status, and less liquidity creation.     

The impact of competition on the operations of foreign banks in Australia in the post-deregulation period

In 1985, Australia removed its long-standing embargo on the entry of foreign banks. The Australian market therefore provides an opportunity to study the factors influencing multinational bank expansion in a new host country. This paper tests a model of the size of multinational banking operations in Australia in the post-embargo period. One major finding is that a push for market share in a highly competitive environment led to risky lending practices in the global boom-bust economic climate of the late 1980s, which adversely affected the foreign banks’ performance. Another is that competition from home country banks had a significantly negative effect on foreign banks’ asset volumes.     

Funding liquidity risk: Definition and measurement

Funding liquidity risk has played a key role in all historical banking crises. Nevertheless, a measure for funding liquidity risk based on publicly available data remains so far elusive. We address this gap by showing that aggressive bidding at central bank auctions reveals funding liquidity risk. We can extract an insurance premium from banks’ bids which we propose as a measure of funding liquidity risk. Using a unique data set consisting of all bids in all auctions for the main refinancing operation conducted at the ECB between June 2005 and October 2008 we find that funding liquidity risk is typically stable and low, with occasional spikes especially around key events during the recent crisis. We also document downward spirals between funding liquidity risk and market liquidity. As measurement without clear definitions is impossible, we initially provide definitions of funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk.     

How loan portfolio diversification affects risk, efficiency and capitalization: A managerial behavior model for Austrian banks

The aim of this paper is to analyze how diversification of banks across size and industry affects risk, cost and profit efficiency, and bank capitalization for large Austrian commercial banks over the years 1997–2003. Employing a unique dataset, provided by the Austrian Central Bank, we test for several different types of managerial hypotheses, formalized according to a modified version of the Berger and DeYoung model [Berger, A.N., DeYoung, R., 1997. Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 849–870]. We find that, although diversification negatively affects cost efficiency, it increases profit efficiency and reduces banks’ realized risk. Finally, diversification seems to have a positive impact on banks’ capitalization.     

The eurosystem money market auctions: A banking perspective

This paper analyzes the individual bidding behavior of German banks in the money market auctions conducted by the ECB from the beginning of 2000:IIIQ to the end of 2001:IQ. Our approach takes a variety of characteristics of the individual banks into account, particularly variables that capture the different use of liquidity and the different attitude towards liquidity risk of the individual banks. It turns out that these characteristics are reflected in banks’ bidding behavior. Thus, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of the way liquidity risk is managed in the banking sector.     

The marketability of bank assets, managerial rents and banking stability

Financial innovation and greater information availability have increased the tradability of bank assets and have reduced banks’ dependence on individual bank managers. We show that this can have two opposing consequences for banking stability. First, the hold-up problem between bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks’ capital structure needs to be less concerned with disciplining the management. Deposits – the most effective disciplining device – can be reduced, increasing banks’ resilience to adverse return shocks. However, limiting the hold-up problem also diminishes bank managers’ rents, reducing their incentives to properly monitor and screen borrowers, with adverse implications for asset quality. Thus, the default risk of banks does not necessarily decline. We argue that this delivers a novel explanation for the origin of the recent subprime crisis.     

The dark side of liquidity regulation: Bank opacity and funding liquidity risk

We evaluate how the liquidity coverage rule affects US banks’ opacity and funding liquidity risk. Banks subject to the rule become significantly more opaque and funding liquidity risk increases by $245 million per quarter. Higher funding liquidity risk is more pronounced among banks that are subject to the rule’s more stringent liquidity buffers, and systemically riskier banks. Rising opacity reflects an increase in banks’ holdings of complex assets whose value is difficult to communicate to investors. The evidence highlights the unintended consequences of liquidity regulation and is consistent with theoretical models’ predictions of a trade-off between liquidity buffers and bank opacity that exacerbates funding liquidity risk.     

On the importance of retail banking relationships

We use proprietary data to analyze the importance of retail banking relationships to commercial banks and their depositors when banks underwrite securities. We find lead underwriters’ retail customers benefit as they demand and end up with significantly more of the highly underpriced issues. We find it is actual underpricing beyond that predicted by grey markets that drive the differential demand from the lead bank retail clientele, suggesting that banks pass on information about underpriced initial public offerings to their retail depositors. We analyze banks’ incentives for such behavior and find evidence of banks benefiting through retail cross-selling—both brokerage accounts and consumer loans increase significantly.     

Bank business models and liquidity creation

Using a large panel of US bank holding companies from 2001 to 2015, this study investigates the association between functional diversification and bank liquidity creation. I document evidence of lower liquidity creation for higher diversification. The effect of moving into nontraditional activities on liquidity creation is more apparent with large banks and less pronounced with small banks. The impact of diversification on liquidity creation is less significant during the late stage of crisis and is more clearly observed in small and medium-sized banks. Low liquidity creation banks, leveraged by a higher share of non-interest income, are more likely to further decrease their liquidity creation. The study is of interest to regulators and policymakers who are concerned about bank business models.     

Real liquidity and banking

In an economy where banks take numeraire goods, so called money, as deposits, money allows depositors suffering preference shocks to withdraw from banks prematurely without liquidation of real investment. If real liquidity, defined as the real value of the monetary base, is low, the amount of payment liquidity, constrained by the velocity of money, limits the short-term price level of investment goods before banks can settle their long-term loan contracts. This leads to an attractive nominal long-term investment return and over-investment. Allowing for inside money, that is, bank deposits, to be used for payment can improve social welfare but cannot fully resolve the liquidity shortage problem as the short-term interest rate offered by banks is constrained by the threat of bank runs. In the presence of systemic liquidity shocks, the price-adjustment mechanism cannot take full effects with insufficient payment liquidity, which can lead to non-zero profits for banks. Exchanging investment goods for numeraire goods through international trade can improve social welfare.     

Funding liquidity and bank risk taking

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.     

Openness, profit opportunities and foreign banking

Using new data from the World Bank and OCC surveys, we show correlations across a wide range of countries between foreign banking and domestic economic, financial and bank regulatory conditions. Foreign banking tended to be more prevalent in countries that were more open to foreign ownership of their banks, more open to banks’ engaging in a wider range of financial activities and more open to international trade. Restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic banks that were in place in the late 1970s reduced the current extent of foreign banking. Foreign banking was negatively correlated with current restrictions on banks’ securities, insurance and real estate activities. Countries that had more international trade tended to have more foreign banking. Foreign banking was more pervasive in countries where banking was more profitable and where the domestically-owned banking sector was smaller relative to GDP.     

Money and liquidity in financial markets

We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered investors. Empirical tests on the stock market are supportive. Tighter interbank markets are associated with relatively more volume in more liquid stocks; selling pressure, especially in more liquid stocks; and transitory negative returns. We control for market-wide uncertainty and in the process also contribute to the literature on portfolio rebalancing. Our general point is that money matters in financial markets.     

Which bank is the “central” bank?

Liquidity flows through a financial network cannot be accurately described using external processing constraints alone. Behavioral aspects of participants also matter. A method similar to Google's PageRank procedure is used to produce a ranking of participants in the Canadian Large Value Transfer System in terms of their daily liquidity holdings. Accounting for differences in banks’ processing speeds is essential for explaining why observed distributions of liquidity differ from the initial distributions, which are determined by the credit limits selected by banks. Delay tendencies of banks are unobservable in the data and are estimated using a Markov model.     

Alternatives to blanket guarantees for containing a systemic crisis

This paper seeks to explain how policy actions undertaken at the outset of recent crises—particularly the issuance of extensive liquidity support and government guarantees—absorb off-budget fiscal resources and inappropriately constrain officials’ subsequent options for restructuring their country’s troubled financial and corporate sectors. Empirical evidence supports the commonsense view that the damage a crisis works on a country’s financial sector and on its real economy is lessened by taking market-mimicking actions that promptly estimate and allocate losses during the early stages of a crisis. The most important steps are to plan to call a timeout to separate hopelessly insolvent institutions from potentially viable ones and to provide haircuts, guarantees, and liquidity support in ways that protect taxpayers and avoid subsidizing insolvent institutions’ longshot gambles for resurrection.     

Bank market power,asset liquidity and funding liquidity: International evidence

Our investigation of the association between bank market power and liquidity in 101 countries reveals that a bank's initial gains of market power lead to increases in bank liquidity, but does so at a diminishing rate. Beyond an empirically determined threshold, further increases in market power are inversely associated with bank liquidity. From a cross-sectional viewpoint, banks that lack market power hold more liquid assets and are net lenders in the interbank market. In contrast, dominant banks hold less liquid assets and are net interbank borrowers. For a given level of market power, ceteris paribus, developed nation banks hold less asset liquidity and obtain more interbank funding liquidity than their developing country peers. These results remain equally relevant during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC).