银行内部管理道德风险防范探析

近年来,数额庞大的不良资产一直是国有银行挥之不去的一块\"心病\".造成银行高不良资产比率难以遏制的原因,除了银行一般特征所伴随的风险以外,银行内部经营者的主观违规行为,即道德风险是更具根本性的.道德风险问题已日渐成为国有商业银行的主要金融风险.因此,强化银行内部管理中的道德风险防范已成为当务之急.     

金融系统防范道德风险浅谈

近年来，国内外大量金融案例表明，道德风险已成为主要金融风险。所谓道德风险，就是由于银行员工职业道德低下，职业纪律性差，职业责任感缺乏，违章违纪操作，违法违规经营或其他违法活动而导致资产损失的可能性。面对即将加入WTO的形势和日益激烈的金融竞争，必须防范和化解金融风险，保证金融改革发展和社会稳定。因此，金融系统防范道德风险已成为当务之急。     

信贷风险管理中的道德风险及其防范模型

在银企之间的信贷关系中,存在着不对称信息和交易成本,使得银行在进行信贷管理时面临着道德风险管理的问题。道德风险的存在,严重影响了贷款的质量,侵害了银行的利益。本文通过建立激励模型,引导企业从自身利益出发,作出对银行有利的行动选择。     

谈金融道德风险防范机制的构建

金融道德风险引发的职务犯罪近年来屡屡发生,不仅给党和国家造成了重大经济损失,严重扰乱了金融秩序,损害了金融队伍形象,而且也给本人和家庭带来了灾难性后果。在实际工作中,金融道德风险问题已经引起金融系统各级领导的普遍重视。要预防金融职务犯罪,防范金融道德风险,必须着     

新形势下如何防范金融道德风险

金融业是一个高风险行业,而其中道德风险又是造成金融风险的重要原因.在我国加入世贸组织和社会主义市场经济日益深化的新形势下,金融业必然与国际金融惯例接轨,我国金融业和金融从业者将面临新的机遇和新的挑战,如何防范和化解金融道德风险,是我国金融业当前面临的重要问题和经济金融界人士关注的一个课题.     

道德风险强化内控制度建设切实防范道德风险

本对商业银行经营管理中如何防范道德风险进行了探讨，就完善商业银行内部组织结构，强化监督检查职能，切实防范道德风险，确保银行资产安全提出几点建议。     

存款保险制度的道德风险研究

存款保险制度有效的维护了存款人的信心,保护了存款人的利益,但是实施过程中产生的道德风险严重影响了存款保险制度的效率,本文研究了存款保险制度中道德风险产生的原因及规避措施。     

强化内控制度建设 切实防范道德风险

本文对商业银行经营管理中如何防范道德风险进行了探讨,就完善商业银行内部组织结构,强化监督检查职能,切实防范道德风险,确保银行资产安全提出几点建议。     

国有银行道德风险的成因及防范建议

在近年来的金融改革进程中，发生在国有银行领域的腐败案件不断见诸报端。而对这些案件进行仔细分析可以发现，都与银行经营过程中产生的道德风险有一定关系。随着国有银行改革的不断深入，道德风险已成为业内普遍关注的热点问题。     

农险市场中的保险公司道德风险研究

在过往十余年我国农业保险的跨越式发展中,保险公司的道德风险问题日益凸显。本文通过微观案例界定保险公司道德风险的内涵与类别,基于博弈视角分析其产生机理,结果发现:在政府和保险公司的委托代理关系中,由于二者的目标诉求不同,若政府对保险公司的农业保险业务不能给予有效监管,则保险公司不遵守经营规范所得收益要大于其遵守经营规范所得收益,从而导致保险公司出现违规经营业务的道德风险问题;相关部门可以通过完善监管政策、整合监管资源、优化协办机制、加大监管力度、设置差异化保险合约等措施来减少农业保险市场中保险公司的道德风险。     

On Optimal Insurance in the Presence of Moral Hazard

This paper expounds on the importance of identifiabilty of subjective probabilities in agency theory with moral hazard. An application to insurance is examined.     

Deposit Insurance and Forbearance Under Moral Hazard

We study the efficacy of forbearance using a real options approach. Our model endogenizes moral hazard embedded in credit risk undertaken by the bank. The bank's interest rate risk is modeled as duration mismatch. Other modeling improvements over previous studies include such features as stochastic interest rates and deposits, continuous interest payments on an ongoing deposit portfolio, and a stochastic forbearance period. We find that the bank does have an incentive to engage in undue risk taking. Even in the presence of moral hazard, however, forbearance can still be a desirable course of action in reducing the FDIC's expected liability. In addition, the capital ratio plays an extremely important role in determining the fair insurance premium. Finally, using the mismatch of asset and deposit durations as the correct measurement of interest rate risk, our model reveals that an optimal asset variance may exist for a particular bank, contrary to what the contingent claims framework would predict. Therefore, we resolve the puzzle that banks in practice do not increase asset risk to take full advantage of the limited liability.     

Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring

The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.     

Effects of Deposit Insurance Reform on Moral Hazard in US Banking

In cross sections of US banks before the deposit-insurance system was reformed in the early 1990s, bank risk-taking was positively associated with bank size and negatively associated with the value of bank charters and bank capital. These empirical associations have an easy theoretical interpretation. Bank size is positively related, while charter value and capital are negatively related, to the moral hazard associated with flat insurance premiums and other aspects of a laxly administered system. Hence the observed associations of risk-taking with size, charter value, and capital reflected the expected positive relation between moral hazard and risk-taking. We test the hypothesis that the three associations became weaker after reform. In the case of unsystematic risk, we find no evidence of significant changes for any of the three. In the case of systematic risk, we find that risk-taking associated with lower charter values and larger size is indeed significantly weaker after reform. Risk-taking associated with capital ratios is also weaker after reform, though not significantly so. Since systematic risk is undoubtedly the more appropriate measure, reform seems to have reduced moral hazard.     

公司管理中道德风险防范研究

经典的财务金融理论认为公司金融决策的外部市场环境是一个效率市场,不存在委托一代理问题.但现实的市场总是偏离有效市场,公司金融决策需要考虑到代理人的道德风险问题.本文采用回归技术分析了公司资本结构对过度投资和在职消费这两种道德风险的影响作用,为我国公司加强公司治理、防范道德风险提供了依据和借鉴.     

商业银行道德风险的形成机制与防范途径

商业银行的经营管理中存在着各种各样的风险,包括市场风险、信用风险、操作风险、流动性风险等等。从风险控制角度来讲,市场风险、信用风险、操作风险的控制应该有系统的规章制度可以遵循,或者有比较成熟的风险管理体系加以约束,还有国外先进的管理思想和方法可以借鉴,吸引进先进的系统工具可以衡量和分析。但商业银行对道德风险的认识,特别是在风险管理体系中,道德风险管理体系的缺失,以及道德风险控制的软约束,越来越成为金融风险频发、群发、骤发的重要因素。     

责任保险:市场失灵、立法强制与道德风险管理

责任保险看起来能够解决安全事故受害者的补偿问题,但单靠市场力量很难形成有规模的责任保险交易.为保证对受害人的赔偿,政府可以在一些关乎百姓生存权的领域实行强制责任保险.不幸的是,强制责任保险会带来被保险人(致害人)的道德风险问题,从而可能降低整个社会的安全水平.鉴于保险人控制被保险人(致害人)道德风险的目标与社会安全目标的一致性,政府和社会应该允许保险人使用社会已有的风险监控系统、支持建立有效的信息共享系统、给予保险人拒绝承保的权利以及由保险人对特殊行业进行强制风险监控.     

实行显性存款保险制度的必要性和可行性分析

无论隐性和显性存款保险制度,在增强公众信心,维护金融体系稳定的同时,都增加了银行的道德风险。从隐性存款保险制度向显性存款保险制度转变是否具有可行性?本文从银行的特许权价值、显性存款保险的可信性、被保险存款占负债总额的比例、“大而不倒”的现实性、不良贷款水平等角度分析这一转变过程中银行道德风险的变化。