美国企业界的哈佛——通用电气克劳顿管理学院

GE的董事长兼首席行政官杰克·韦尔奇曾说:“我要以克劳顿管理学院,以及‘克劳顿式的学习过程’在GE掀起一场文化革命。”本文介绍了GE的领导艺术学院及决策者大本营-克劳顿管理学院的历史及在GE辉煌发展史中所起的作用。     

Why change programs don't produce change

Faced with changing markets and tougher competition, more and more companies realize that to compete effectively they must transform how they function. But while senior managers understand the necessity of change, they often misunderstand what it takes to bring it about. They assume that corporate renewal is the product of company-wide change programs and that in order to transform employee behavior, they must alter a company's formal structure and systems. Both these assumptions are wrong, say these authors. Using examples drawn from their four-year study of organizational change at six large corporations, they argue that change programs are, in fact, the greatest obstacle to successful revitalization and that formal structures and systems are the last thing a company should change, not the first. The most successful change efforts begin at the periphery of a corporation, in a single plant or division. Such efforts are led by general managers, not the CEO or corporate staff people. And these general managers concentrate not on changing formal structures and systems but on creating ad hoc organizational arrangements to solve concrete business problems. This focuses energy for change on the work itself, not on abstractions such as "participation" or "culture." Once general managers understand the importance of this grass-roots approach to change, they don't have to wait for senior management to start a process of corporate renewal. The authors describe a six-step change process they call the "critical path."     

The turnaround value of values

John Thorbeck is an executive with a ten-year career history of successes--and a sense of repeated failure. Just out of business school, he was marketing director at the Aspen Skiing Company for three years and helped to reverse thirteen seasons of decline. At the Timberland shoe company in the mid-1980s, he led a marketing strategy that tripled sales. At the Bass shoe company, where he was CEO from 1987 to 1990, he took the company from big losses to big profits. Now he is president, CEO, and part owner of a third shoe company--Geo. E. Keith--that is surely the oldest, perhaps the smallest, and arguably the finest shoemaker in the United States. But the high points of Thorbeck's résumé conceal a leadership education that led him only slowly to abandon confrontational management in favor of management by history, values, competence, and what he calls organizational coherence. In his first two marketing jobs, he fought wars with his opponents and won. Then at Bass, he tried to recapture the company's proud past. He revived company folklore and history, gave workers back their pride in workmanship, and used this rejuvenated company spirit to meet and win new markets. Yet he was trying to take Bass someplace its owners simply wouldn't let it go, and he left the company profitable but divided, the work force eager to go one way, owenership another. In each of his jobs, Thorbeck overlooked some vital part of the organizational community.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

A time for growth: an interview with Amgen CEO Kevin Sharer. Interview by Paul Hemp

Fast growth is a nice problem to have--but a hard one to manage well. In this interview, Kevin Sharer, the CEO of biotech giant Amgen, talks about the special challenges leaders face when their companies are on a roll. Sharer, who was also head of marketing at pre-WorldCom MCI and a division head and a staff assistant to Jack Welch at GE, offers insights drawn from his own experience--and from his own self-proclaimed blunders: "I learned the hard way that you need to become credible and enlist support inside the company before you start trying to be a change agent. If you think you're going to make change happen simply by force of personality or position or intellect, you'd better think again." And change there was: Under Sharer's leadership, Amgen overhauled its management team, altered its culture, and launched a couple of blockbuster products. How do chief executives survive in that kind of dizzying environment? "A CEO must always be switching between different altitudes--tasks of different levels of abstraction and specificity," Sharer says. "You might need to spend time working on a redesign of your organizational structure and then quickly switch to drafting a memo to all employees aimed at reinforcing one of the company's values." Having a supportive and capable top team is also key: "A top management team is the most revealing window into a CEO's style, values, and aspirations.... If you don't have the right top team, you won't have the right tiers below them. [The] A players won't work for B players. Maybe with a company like GE, the reputation of the company is so strong that it can attract top people to work for weaker managers. In a new company like Amgen, that won't happen."     

Leading change when business is good. Interview by Paul Hemp and Thomas A. Stewart

Lou Gerstner's was a hard act to follow. As CEO in what were arguably IBM's darkest hours, Gerstner brought the company back from the brink. After nearly ten wrenching years, in which the big-machine manufacturer remade itself into a comprehensive software, hardware, and services provider, business was looking good. So the challenge for Sam Palmisano, when he took over as CEO in 2002, was to come up with a mandate for a second act in the company's transformation. His primary aim was to get different parts of the company working together so IBM could offer customers "integrated solutions"--hardware, software, services, and financing--at a single price. As part of this effort, he asked all of IBM's 320,000 employees, in 170 countries, to weigh in on a new set of shared corporate values. Over a 72-hour period, thousands of IBMers throughout the world gave Palmisano and his executive team an earful in an intranet discussion dubbed "Values-Jam," an often-heated debate about the company's heart and soul. Twenty-four hours into the exercise, at least one senior exec wanted to pull the plug. The jam had clearly struck a chord with employees, but it was a dissonant one, full of rancor and discontent. Palmisano let the discussion continue, and the next day, the mood began to shift. The criticism became more constructive. Out of the million words generated by the jam grew a set of values that, as Palmisano explains in this interview, are meant to guide the operational decisions made by IBM's employees-and, more important, to serve as Palmisano's mandate to continue the reinvention of the company.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ETHICS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Effective corporate leadership involves more than developing a good strategic plan and setting high ethical standards. It also means coming up with an organizational design that encourages the company's managers and employees to carry out its business plan and maintain its ethical standards.
In this article, the authors use the term organizational architecture to refer to three key elements of a company's design:

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  the assignment of decision-making authority–who gets to make what decisions;

       
  
  

The path to corporate responsibility

Nike's tagline,"Just do it," is an inspirational call to action for the millions who wear the company's athletic gear. But in terms of corporate responsibility, Nike didn't always follow its own advice. In the 1990s, protesters railed against sweatshop conditions at some of its overseas suppliers and made Nike the global poster child for corporate ethical fecklessness. The intense pressure that activists exerted on the athletic apparel giant forced it to take a long, hard look at corporate responsibility--sooner than it might have otherwise. In this article, Simon Zadek, CEO of the UK-based institute AccountAbility, describes the bumpy route Nike has traveled to get to a better ethical place, one that cultivates and champions responsible business practices. Organizations learn in unique ways, Zadek contends, but they inevitably pass through five stages of corporate responsibility, from defensive ("It's not our fault") to compliance ("We'll do only what we have to") to managerial ("It's the business") to strategic ("It gives us a competitive edge") and, finally, to civil ("We need to make sure everybody does it"). He details Nike's arduous trek through these stages-from the company's initial defensive stance, when accusations about working conditions arose, all the way to its engagement today in the international debate about business's role in society and in public policy. As he outlines this evolution, Zadek offers valuable insights to executives grappling with the challenge of managing responsible business practices. Beyond just getting their own houses in order, the author argues, companies need to stay abreast of the public's evolving ideas about corporate roles and responsibilities. Organizations that do both will engage in what he calls"civil learning".     

Back where we belong

If you were the CEO of Pitney Bowes, the postage meter maker, how would you envision the future of the business? The company has an undeniable core competence in the solutions it provides to high-volume postal service users. But with snail mail on the decline, some would say that core has about as much future as the buggy whip. In this article, Pitney Bowes chairman and CEO Michael Critelli gives us a glimpse of how he leads his company's strategy development--and how that development has supported a counterintuitive return to the company's core after decades of diversification. He and others in the company begin the process by tapping into deeply knowledgeable people and organizations to understand key trends in the business and the rate at which change is occurring. Then, it's a question of the firm reshaping the environment in which it does business, whether through R&D investments or work with regulators and policy makers who influence market forces; this is especially important in emerging markets. Focusing on a core business area enables a company to find adjacent high-margin opportunities and to offer comprehensive solutions to customers. What stands out most sharply in this account, however, is the importance of having a strategist's mind-set. Whether Critelli is reading the day's news, visiting a key account, or spending an hour with his own people working in the context of a customer mail room, he is constantly extrapolating possible long-term competitive implications from the immediate facts. Often inspired by strategic thinkers, Critelli believes that the greatest thing he can do for his organization is to shift the terms of the debate. "Rarely am I credited with sterling words or bold, symbolic actions", he writes. "Instead, I help people to see the business we are in differently and to reach a shared vision as to where we want to end up. And, little by little, things move in the right direction".     

The ultimate creativity machine. How BMW turns art into profit

Many companies face the challenge of balancing art with commerce. The conflict between corporate pragmatism and artistic passion and quality is persistent: designers chafe under corporate requirements, budgets, and deadlines, and nondesigners struggle to understand the business value of artistic choices. At German carmaker BMW, the fanaticism about design excellence is matched only by the company's driving desire to remain profitable. Global design director Chris Bangle presides over the intersection of art and commerce at BMW, managing the often-strained relationships among the designers, engineers, and business managers. Bangle goes to great lengths to protect his designers from the unproductive commentary of others in the company, literally posting "Stop: No Entry" signs on the design studio doors. He also protects the design process, making sure that time-to-market pressures do not harm the designs by shifting the focus to engineering too soon. As a mediator, Bangle appeals to the core values of the company and a deeply held sense about BMW-ness--a pride of product shared by everyone in the company that expresses itself in the classic quality of the cars. Every employee, designer and nondesigner alike, understands that if a car doesn't meet this standard of excellence, it's simply not a BMW--and customers won't buy it. Managing at the intersection of art and commerce means translating the language of art into the language of the corporation. In this First Person account, the author describes his inventive techniques for getting the best from his artists--and getting his ideas across to corporate managers.     

Balancing act: how to capture knowledge without killing it

Everyone knows that the way things are formally organized in most companies (their processes) is not the same as the way things are actually done (their practices). The difference between the two creates tension that can be very difficult for managers to handle. Lean too much toward practice and new ideas may bubble up and evaporate for lack of a structure to harness them. Lean too much toward process and you may get no new ideas at all. The goal, then, is to tap into the creativity at work in every layer of an organization with a combination of process and practice. Take, for example, the community of people who fix Xerox machines. Large machines, it turns out, are not as predictable as Xerox's documentation would suggest. So when following the service manual is not enough, the reps come together--over breakfast, at breaks, at the end of the day--and talk about their own best practices. So far so good. But Xerox goes a step further. It has set up a process similar to an academic peer-review system to gather, vet, and share those best practices across the company. The reps get much-welcome recognition for their creativity, and local best practices are deployed companywide. Dot-com companies are a hotbed of innovative practices. But as they mature, they, like Xerox, may find that they need seasoned managers who can harness those practices through the judicious application of constructive processes.     

Crisis prevention: how to gear up your board

Today's critics of corporate boardrooms have plenty of ammunition. The two crucial responsibilities of boards-oversight of long-term company strategy and the selection, evaluation, and compensation of top management--were reduced to damage control during the 1980s. Walter Salmon, a longtime director, notes that while boards have improved since he began serving on them in 1961, they haven't kept pace with the need for real change. Based on over 30 years of boardroom experience, Salmon recommends against government reform of board practices. But he does prescribe a series of incremental changes as a remedy. To begin with, he suggests limiting the size of boards and increasing the number of outside directors on them. In fact, according to Salmon, only three insiders belong on a board: the CEO, the COO, and the CFO. Changing how committees function is also necessary for gearing up today's boards. The audit committee, for example, can periodically review "high-exposure areas" of a business, perhaps helping to prevent embarrassing drops in future profits. Compensation committees can structure incentive compensation for executives to emphasize long-term rather than short-term performance. And nominating committees should be responsible for finding new, independent directors--not the CEO. In general, boards as a whole must spot problems early and blow the whistle, exercising what Salmon calls, "constructive dissatisfaction." On a revitalized board, directors have enough confidence in the process to vigorously challenge one another, including the company's chief executive.     

The performance measurement manifesto

The leading indicators of business performance cannot be found in financial data alone. Quality, customer satisfaction, innovation, market share--metrics like these often reflect a company's economic condition and growth prospects better than its reported earnings do. Depending on an accounting department to reveal a company's future will leave it hopelessly mired in the past. More and more managers are changing their company's performance measurement systems to track nonfinancial measures and reinforce new competitive strategies. Five activities are essential: developing an information architecture; putting the technology in place to support this architecture; aligning bonuses and other incentives with the new system; drawing on outside resources; and designing an internal process to ensure the other four activities occur. New technologies and more sophisticated databases have made the change to nonfinancial performance measurement systems possible and economically feasible. Industry and trade associations, consulting firms, and public accounting firms that already have well-developed methods for assessing market share and other performance metrics can add to the revolution's momentum--as well as profit from the business opportunities it presents. Every company will have its own key measures and distinctive process for implementing the change. But making it happen will always require careful preparation, perseverance, and the conviction of the CEO that it must be carried through. When one leading company can demonstrate the long-term advantage of its superior performance on quality or innovation or any other nonfinancial measure, it will change the rules for all its rivals forever.     

The case of the machinists' mutiny

"You can't be serious!" Mike Trail, the president and fourth-generation owner of Trail Manufacturing, stared at five older men standing in his office. "I'm afraid we are, Mike." Sandy, the most senior of the five, was polite but firm. "We won't switch over to the new equipment." Trail Manufacturing was a small Midwestern company trying to define itself in a new world of competition. Working with engineering chief Marco Duncan, Mike Trail, its young CEO, developed a program to revolutionize the company's manufacturing capability by installing six computerized machining centers. The $4 million automation program was proceeding smoothly, or at least it seemed to be, until the sixth of eight production teams, whose members included the company's most respected machinist, refused to continue participating. Mike canvased his colleagues for suggestions. "We can't let any screw machines remain in operation," Marco insisted. "The problem wasn't just old machines. The problem was--and is--the whole company. We need a clean break with the past." Shop manager Darrell Montgomery didn't necessarily disagree, but he worried about alienating Sandy. "You know what Sandy means to this place," he said. "If it wasn't for him, we never would have survived the startup." Bob Block, the company's CFO, went a step further. He questioned Marco's all-or-nothing vision and counseled compromise. "With half the new cells up, the screw machines are running a lot fewer jobs," he noted. "But they still account for over half our sales and even more of our profits. Maybe these guys are right." Four experts on change examine the crisis at Trail Manufacturing and debate Mike Trail's next step.     

Holes at the top. Why CEO firings backfire

When a company does well, its CEO is showered with money and adulation. When it does poorly, the CEO gets the blame--and the boot. For better or worse, investors now view chief executives as the primary determinant of corporate performance. But the reality is that most companies perform no better after they dismiss their CEOs than they did in the years leading up to the dismissals. Worse, the organizational disruption created by a rushed firing can leave a company with deep and lasting scars. Far from being a silver bullet, the replacement of a CEO often amounts to little more than a self-inflicted wound. The blame for such poor results, the author argues, lies squarely with boards of directors. Boards often lack the strategic understanding of the business necessary to give due diligence to choosing a replacement CEO. Concern over restoring investor confidence quickly--rather than doing what's right for the company--drives the selection process. And all too often, companies continue to be dogged by the same old problems after the new CEOs come on board. But a good board can make a CEO replacement pay off if its members first develop a better understanding of the business context, worry less about pleasing the investment community and more about a replacement's strategic fit, and take an active role in overseeing the new CEO and the performance and direction of the company. In the long run, such approaches are likely to foster stability at the helm--making it less likely a company will have to fire its CEO in the first place.     

A SENIOR MANAGER'S GUIDE TO INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT

This paper provides an overview of corporate risk management for senior managers. The author discusses the integrated risk management framework, emphasizing that a company can implement its risk management objectives in three fundamental ways: modifying its operations, using targeted financial instruments, or adjusting its capital structure. "Integration" refers both to the aggregation of all risks faced by the firm into a net exposure and to the coordinated use of these three risk management techniques. The author provides a functional analysis of integrated risk management using a wide-ranging set of case illustrations to show how the risk management process influences, and is influenced by, a company's overall strategy and business activities. Based on such analysis, the article concludes by sketching a framework intended to help managers design a value-maximizing, enterprise-wide corporate risk management system.     

After the layoffs, what next?

Harry Denton, the CEO in this fictional case study, has been caught off guard. As the head of Delarks, a venerable department-store chain in the Midwest, he has engineered a remarkable turn-around in only a year. Sales have rebounded, and Wall Street is applauding. Sure, a few trees were felled in the process--to make room for new growth, Denton had to clear out 3,000 pieces of what he privately refers to as "dead-wood"--but he'd saved the company. Didn't people understand that? Not exactly. When Delarks's head of merchandising defects to a competitor, Denton is shocked to realize that many of the survivors, in fact, have had it with him and with the company. The last straw was the recent closing of the Madison store, which Denton announced without warning to anyone--not even the company's head of HR, Thomas Wazinsky, a supposedly trusted adviser. In the wake of that coup, store employees from Wichita to Peoria are wondering, Are we next? The rumor mill says that many of them are considering leaving before Denton can inflict the next blow. And senior managers are not immune to the fear and anger. Even Wazinsky, one of the few links to Delarks's proud past, confesses to Denton, "I'll bet you're thinking of firing me." Denton has to act--and fast. He calls a "town meeting" for the 600 employees of the St. Paul store. The plan: rally the troops. Instead, Denton is routed. Angry questions are hurled at the CEO, and he is forced to beat a hasty retreat through the back door. Five experts offer advice on how to revive morale at the successful but troubled company.     

Gilded and gelded. Hard-won lessons from the PR wars

A golden statue of a winged youth once perched on the roof of AT&T's old headquarters. But when AT&T lowered the 24-foot-high statue for regilding so that it could be placed in the company's new headquarters, the chairman was shocked to discover that the figure was anatomically correct. So he decreed that it also be gelded. The altered "Golden Boy" thus became a metaphor for AT&T's recent embattled history, and it serves as a cautionary symbol for all companies operating in today's brutal business environment, where perception can be as important as reality. While image consultants and executives work to gild a company's image, special interest groups and the media can geld a company with countless little cuts. The author, a former executive vice president of public relations for AT&T, provides an insider's view of some of the company's most painful public-relations scrapes. They include the collapse of two apparent CEO succession plans, AT&T's inability to meet heightened expectations after Mike Armstrong was appointed CEO, and the racially charged furor over a cartoon in an employee publication. The author offers four lessons: Don't become hypnotized by your own buzz; understand the way the business media think; address the needs of all your stakeholders; and be sensitive to the possible emotional resonance of what appear to be straightforward facts. To illustrate the final point, the author mentions AT&T's elimination of 40,000 jobs in 1996. Wall Street was impressed, but NBC's Tom Brokaw said the workforce reduction might signal "another long, anxious year for the American middle class." No rational argument from AT&T could overcome the layoffs' symbolic impact. Wounded but wiser after numerous public-relations battles, the company eventually learned to stop aggregating job-reduction information for the media.     

The leadership journey

It isn't always easy to change leadership hats or to alter the way you assess a business problem. Under pressure, most executives fall back on the management style or approach that worked in the last crisis they faced. But old approaches rarely work in new and demanding situations. Just ask Leonard Schaeffer, chairman and CEO of WellPoint Health Networks, one of the country's largest and most successful managed-care companies. In this account, he describes how he consciously adopted three very different styles of leadership at critical points during his 30-year career, depending on the business challenges at hand. Schaeffer headed up the U.S. Health Care Finance Administration during the Carter years--and led the charge toward more efficient work practices at that agency. Then he transformed Blue Cross of California from a floundering bureaucracy losing close to $1 million each day into a strong public company, WellPoint. The dire circumstances at Blue Cross had dictated that Schaeffer initially be an autocratic leader, which he considers the managerial equivalent of being an emergency room surgeon--forced to do whatever it takes to save a patient's life. But as the company rebounded, the CEO shed that "any decision is better than no decision" style. He has become a participative, hands-off leader-setting strategies and goals from above but letting WellPoint's line managers and executives figure out how best to achieve those goals. Most recently, Schaeffer has turned into a reformer--a leader who works with one foot outside the company to spur changes in health care and society. There are pitfalls in switching leadership styles, Schaeffer admits, but this flexibility is necessary for realizing corporate- and personal-success.     

If you want honesty, break some rules

We've all heard, or perhaps even told, the "organizational lie"; We're customer centric; everyone's performance is above average; we're the darling of our industry, coming up with one innovation after another. That last one was true of Advanced Cardiovascular Systems (ACS) in the past, but not when Ginger Graham took over as CEO. From that first moment in 1993, Graham chose to tell the truth about ACS's situation--that R&D was practically at war with product development, yields were down, and customers were disgruntled. And ever since, she's seen the benefits of exploding organizational lies. Truth telling is something that's hard to argue with but difficult to do. And, indeed, ACS instituted some radical practices to create its culture of honesty. Every senior manager was assigned a coach from the ranks who regularly solicited feedback from everyone, high and low, about the executive's performance. To get the truth, though, ACS executives learned that they had to offer it up themselves--the whole truth about the company's financial state, its problems, and its triumphs. When they did, they found that, in return, they could ask their employees for help in solving the problems, and passive complainers became active partners in the company's fortunes. ACS management spreads the word about the virtues of honesty through vivid stories of corporate history and quirky rituals. Every quarter, it holds companywide meetings in which the faults of top managers are examined--to keep them honest and tough enough to go on telling the truth. In fact, in the process of openly owning up to problems and jointly fixing them with employees, the entire company grew more powerful, nimble, and tough-minded, able to respond quickly to change, both internal and external.     

Matrix management: not a structure, a frame of mind

In many of the world's leading corporations, strategic thinking has outdistanced organizational capability. As business challenges have grown more complex over the past 20 years, most companies have avoided the trap of one-dimensional strategic responses-stick to your knitting, stick to the big markets. But many of them have fallen into a second, structural trap and adopted elaborate organizational matrices that actually impair their ability to implement sophisticated strategies. Keeping a company light on its feet strategically while still coordinating its activities across divisions, functions, even continents, means eliminating parochialism, improving communications, and weaving the decision-making process into the company's social fabric. Altering formal structure from the top down is a poor way to achieve these goals. It is easier to work from the bottom up, focusing on the attitudes and behavior of individual managers. The companies that have made best use of this focus-among them NEC, Philips, and Unilever-employ three techniques to capture the capabilities and commitment of each manager: 1. They communicate a clear, consistent corporate vision. 2. They use training and career-path management to broaden individual perspectives and increase identification with corporate goals. 3. They co-opt individual energies and ambitions into the broader corporate-wide agenda. The goal is to build a matrix of corporate values and priorities in the minds of managers and let them make the judgments and negotiate the deals that make strategy pay off.