The ageing of Europe: Demographic scenarios of Europe's futures

This paper explores the demographic futures of Europe by presenting two scenarios. The ‘silver century’ scenario is based on the continuation of current demographic trends and policies. In this scenario, Europe's population will continue to age and immigration will be limited. As a result younger people will increasingly tend to concentrate in urban areas while the retirees, who are able, will settle in suburban and rural spaces. In the ‘open borders’ scenario, the EU and most of the member states will introduce an open and actively promoted immigration policy. Most immigrants will concentrate in large metropolitan areas. At the same time there will also be some countries and regions with very limited immigration from abroad. At the local scale immigration will contribute to social and spatial segregation. Hence, without the regulation or at least management of types and destinations of immigration, demographic imbalances will not be addressed at the regional level. Furthermore while the freedom of movement may have some macro-economic benefits and address population imbalances in some (mainly metropolitan) areas, pre-existent trends undermining both socio-economic cohesion and sustainable patterns of development are unlikely to be resolved.     

The future of Turkey in the European Union

Turkey's future in the European Union (EU) is a subject of intense debate both in Europe and in Turkey today. Although Turkey first applied to join the EU 45 years ago, it is the only candidate country, which has not yet started accession negotiations. On the one hand, any future enlargement that includes Turkey is a controversial topic for the EU, since Turkey would be the only Muslim member in the EU, which has accepted 10 new members in May 2004. On the other hand, it is too late to exclude Turkey from the future of the EU since it has put the issue of the EU accession at the top of its national agenda and is the only candidate country that has completed the Customs Union with the EU. This article aims to explore future scenarios regarding Turkey's inclusion to or exclusion from the EU and assess their short and long term implications.     

Practising the scenario-axes technique

Studying the future seems a mission impossible, since both the appearance of the future and its underlying dynamics are unknown and unknowable. Nevertheless, the future is being studied by professional futurists. So, professional futurists seem to have found ways to structure ‘the unknown’. The question is, then, how do they do this? Over the years, professional futurists have developed several types of techniques and methods to structure thinking and discussing the future. The scenario-axes technique, which aims to align divergent perspectives on how the future may unfold, is one such structuring device.In the past 2 years, we did ethnographic research at the Netherlands Institute for Spatial Research (RPB) and followed professional futurists constructing and applying scenario axes in their scenario projects. Our observations illustrate how the scenario axes are practised by professional futurists and show that the scenario axes do not function as a unifying structure fostering alignment of different perspectives in the way that scenario theorists and practitioners often suggest. Instead, not one, but three different applications and interpretations of functional meaning of the scenario axes co-existed: the scenario axes as a ‘backbone’, as a ‘building scaffold’ and as ‘foundation’.     

The Namesake: Futures; futures studies; futurology; futuristic; foresight—What's in a name?

The term we used to describe the study of alternative futures is important. Disciplines and discourses do not emerge from a vacuum but have a history and a cultural context; and their names can hide as much as they reveal. This paper examines such terms as ‘futurology’ and ‘foresight’, and argues that to emphasise plurality and diversity the study of the future is best served by the moniker ‘futures studies’. It suggests that remembering the history of futures discourse is necessary to resolve the crisis of identity and meaning, and frequent fruitless reinvention, of the field. Finally, it presents Sardar's four laws of futures studies: futures studies are wicked (they deal largely with complex, interconnected problems), MAD (emphasise Mutually Assured Diversity), sceptical (question dominant axioms and assumptions) and futureless (bear fruit largely in the present).     

Problematizing international business futures through a ‘critical scenario method’

This paper proposes the need for change in how managers in international business (IB) determine organisational objectives and what criteria they use in addressing complex problems. We propose a move from a largely firm-centric focus; on profit maximization and shareholder value; to a broader societal and environmental view. We see the educational context as the locus for initiating such a shift. However, we see obstacles within the canon of mainstream IB textbooks, with their focus on exposition of normative models of managerial action, illustrated by case studies of successful multinational enterprises (MNEs). Whilst we acknowledge their incorporation of critical issues, we view the lack of substantive critical reflection on the wider implications of IB activity as underpinned by an implicit assumption of the ‘good’ of IB. We posit that the normative structure of mainstream texts militates against students understanding the full range of possible futures for IB practice, and against developing the capability to cope with situations of uncertainty and ambiguity. Seeking to promote a critical pedagogy that accommodates consideration of both mainstream approaches and critical responses to these, we propose one approach to teaching and learning about IB futures that is based upon development of what we term ‘critical scenario method’. This offers a basis for active investigation of complex problems in the ‘real’ world from a range of perspectives, beyond that of profit maximization. We provide a worked, case example of our new method and demonstrate how it will enhance perceptions/understandings of involved and affected actors’ interests and their likely (re)actions as a particular scenario unfolds. The theoretical grounding for this approach is based upon contemporary social science interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of phronēsis, or ‘practical wisdom’.     

Anticipating the future: ‘Biotechnology for the poor’ as unrealized promise?

This article analyses visions of the future articulated by proponents of ‘biotechnology for the poor’, those who claim that an embrace of transgenic technology in agriculture is critical to alleviating poverty in developing countries. Specifically, we analyse how such ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents represent a future with or without transgenic crops. Such representations include visions of a beckoning (promising) future, where much is to be gained from an embrace of transgenic technology in agriculture, and an onrushing (threatening) future, where much will be lost if the technology is not embraced. The article shows that claims about a beckoning or onrushing future by ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents are based upon unexamined or problematic assumptions about the poor and poverty. As such, poverty becomes merely a moral backdrop against which visions of a future are articulated. Furthermore, ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings do not engage in dialogue with alternative voices in articulating their perspectives on the future, losing a key opportunity to democratize debate about this crucial issue. We conclude by considering the policy consequences (in regulatory and institutional terms) of ‘biotechnology for the poor’ depictions of the future, particularly for the global South where such consequences will be felt.     

Futurist networks: cases of epistemic community?

This article analyses the concept of epistemic community focusing the attention on two aspects, which contribute to define this ‘actor’: knowledge and capacity of acting under the conditions of uncertainty. The link between these two issues and the ‘nature of future studies’ is considered and the possibility of considering some organisations and institutions as future epistemic communities is explored. The case of the World Futures Studies Federation is examined in detail.In 1992, Peter Haas defined an ‘epistemic community’ as follows: “an epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; shared notions of validity—that is, inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and a common policy enterprise—that is a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence” [1].In ancient Greek, the term ‘episteme’ has a meaning which belongs to the philosophical sphere; ‘community’ is a concept which comes from the religious tradition and, more recently, has been the objective of sociological studies. Epistemic community links the two terms to indicate a ‘new’ and in some aspects, atypical political actor. At etymological level we already have a first sort of indication with respect to what is meant: politics as a synthesis of religion (faith), sociology (the decisions taken by policy makers have consequences on the whole society) and philosophy (intended as Weltanschaung). The German term Weltanschaung means the idea, concept or the ‘vision’ of the world and life. It is the way in which an individual or a social group considers the position of the human being in the world and the attitudes and actions they develop on the basis of a particular vision of the cosmos.In addition to this formal definition, Haas identifies other characteristics: “members of an epistemic community share inter-subjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared causal beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices and have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge” [1].This definition could be analysed in several ways with particular attention to one or more of the indicated criteria. We could assume that the expression ‘possible policy actions and desired outcomes’ is to be understood as the ‘long term implications, expected, possible, probable and desired’ of a decision taken or that which will be taken, and this would already represent a linkage between the policy, the futures studies and an epistemic community; moreover, usually ‘the policy choices concern consequences, which can only be partially anticipated’ [2]. This gives rise ‘to the desire for information, which is not so much based on purely technical knowledge but rather information, which is the product of human interpretation’ [1]. Epistemic communities, national or trans-national, are one possible provider of such information.At this stage, and considering only this aspect of the whole definition, we could argue that a network of experts active in the field of future studies would represent the perfect portrait of what we are looking for: a multi-person actor able to ‘anticipate’, using knowledge, various backgrounds and expertise. To anticipate, in this context, might be specified as to understand or comprehend global and local changes. In general, futurists work within the framework of complexity and uncertainty, try to re-define problems in broader context and attempt to comprehend ‘change’ using knowledge.An example could be helpful: the change we are experiencing in Eastern European countries appears as multi-dimensional: in less than 15 years those countries have moved from a

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socialist economy (closed and planned), to a

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‘Western economy’ (the so-called market economy), to a

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technological one as a consequence of globalisation and, lastly,

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to the learning economy.

The first step (socialist economy), recalls other sectors in which the ‘ideas’ were closed and planned. The society was divided into classes and the dominant concept was ‘war’. In this context, every single action was intended as a possibility to demonstrate the points of strength of a system: sports, culture and economy were part of the battle and the vision of the future was mostly influenced by the possibility to destroy or to be destroyed. Examples of these considerations could be seen in the choice made by the USA government in its participation at Olympic Games in Moscow (1980), the USSR’s answer in 1984 (Los Angeles Olympic Games) and the proliferation of nuclear holocaust movies such as The Day After. These ideas were strongly present amongst the people of the Eastern countries, but after 1989, things changed and ‘gradually’ the new paradigms based on ‘Western values’ and, for a few, Western lifestyles, emerged. Probably these changes caused shocks in the local societies, shocks that have had consequences also in the way these societies now see their futures. The third step, the shift to a technological economy, has been faster and wider, thanks largely to the new communication technologies and the Internet. In understanding and developing alternative futures for Eastern Europe, futurists have to take account of the fact that all the three economies exist side by side—Eastern Europe does not represent one or the other economies, it is a complex mix of all the three economies. This complexity is further augmented by the fact that Eastern European societies have not had enough time to understand their present in order to be able to desire possible, alternative futures. Further, economic competitiveness is now based more and more on the capacity to develop and apply knowledge [3]. Thus, futures of Eastern Europe are a function of its capacity to develop relevant new forms of knowledge. Futurists cannot afford to ignore this connection between the knowledge and alternative futures.Thus, the concept of epistemic community and the theory of ‘knowledge economy’ have a great deal in common. If we consider that the so-called ‘decision-makers’ are (in democratic countries) elected by the people, we can argue that that section of the people able to disseminate consciousness of problems, possible solutions and long term implications, posses a form of power. Without engaging with this power, we cannot shape viable and meaningful futures.Are there any trans-national networks of expert where it is possible to identify these characteristics of an ‘embryonic’ epistemic community? In some respect this could be the case of the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF), or of the Washington-based World Future Society (WFS) or, at regional level, of the Namur-based euroProspective or the Finland Futures Research Centre, where we have structured networks of the experts coming with different experiences, from different backgrounds, a common interest (to analyse the society from different perspective, but all future oriented), a shared task (to disseminate the use of futures studies not only as a tool but also as a way of thinking) and diversity in knowledge, which is what keeps them together. Moreover, for most of the members, the idea of knowledge economy is already their reality and the capacity to understand trends, possible (or even better) probable futures is the aim of their professional activities.If we briefly consider those organisations, we could assume that they already posses some aspects related to the concept of epistemic community: the WFS for example “strives to serve as a neutral clearinghouse for ideas about the future, membership is open and the Society includes 30,000 people in more than 80 countries from Argentina to Zimbabwe. Members come from all walks of life, they include sociologists, scientists, and educators” [4]. If the WFS’s main strength is in trans-national partnership and different backgrounds of its members, the regional experience that euroProspective is carrying out is mostly based on the construction of a European network of experts. The inter-exchange of ideas and a common ‘mission’ are the two elements, which could let us consider this organisation as futures epistemic communities. Another example, at national/regional level, is the one provided by the Finland Futures Research Centre; the link with epistemic community is offered by the activity and the nature of some projects of this institution such as ‘sustainable energy development in developing countries’, ‘Russian energy and global climate’, ‘collisions of nature and culture in transport policy’, ‘professional delphiscan, an expert system’ [5]—all of these projects or tools (delphiscan is a software) are aimed at producing a relationship between political power and future and knowledge power.There are several reasons why we cannot consider the WFSF by itself as an epistemic community. Perhaps the most important is that it does not have a direct link with the political power; neither does the Federation seek any kind of influence on public authorities or on the decision-making process. But in as much as the Federation is concerned with managing change, it could be considered as an actor able to help people and the institutions understand the on-going processes of change. In the coming years, it will probably be forced to become an epistemic community as it will be necessary to ‘represent and clarify the relation between knowledge management, ICT usage and experts in futures studies as mediators between the complexity of political decision and the tendency of institutions to became advanced learning organisation’ [6] and [7].We also need to study the role the futures studies can play in clarifying those ‘shadow zones’ between the political power and the complexity of the decision-making processes. In this respect, it has to be underlined that the demand for the expert advice is a common phenomenon in policy-making processes, at local, national and international level. All this processes have a concrete objective, which would offer the possibility to exploit the added value of a ‘federation intended as a sort of epistemic community’: the credibility of the futures studies and, consequentially, the credibility of the experts active in this field, depends on this. The debate and the progress of these considerations should be developed in a multi-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary way with respect to several subjects and research areas, but this is only a logical consequence of the ‘nature and the different backgrounds’ already represented in the Federation.A theme (which emerged during the conference held in Brasov), which allows us to identify a relationship between an epistemic community and the social needs is globalisation. While globalisation is difficult to pin down, it is quite evident that we are living through a phase of transition. But as futurists and a potential epistemic community, our goal ought to be to develop an understanding of, and perspectives on, post-globalisation societies. This suggests that we need to identify the relationships between an epistemic community, the futures studies and the organisations active in this field such as WFSF and euroProspective.The analytical tools offered by the concept of epistemic community seem appropriate under the current prevailing conditions of uncertainty and ignorance. Understanding uncertainty and bringing multi-faceted expertise and knowledge to analyse difficult problems and propose future solutions are the two fundamental characteristics of futurists. The constitution of a network of experts coming from different backgrounds is already a reality inside the Federation but, at the moment, there is no linkage with the traditional and democratic forms of power. To become an active epistemic community, the WFSF has to realise its potential and develop these much needed linkages.     

Exploring client scenarios associated with scenario planning

All scenario planning projects have a ‘client’ and one of the most challenging tasks facing a scenario planner is the client's role or position in the way projects are conceptualized, delivered and received. The scenario planner has to establish and manage a ‘successful client relationship’—but what actually constitutes that for a scenario planning project?The client acts as the conduit between the scenario planner and the organization for which the scenario planning project is being undertaken.The ‘client as conduit’ implies several challenges for the scenario planner including:

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The client's awareness and understanding of scenario planning as a method for their organization to learn from the future [1].

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The client's level of commitment to learning from the future.

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The size and context of the scenario planning project.

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The position of the client within a network of people and/or resources required to run a scenario planning project.

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The client's involvement or position within the scenario building team created in the project.

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The benefits and risks accruing to the client through the execution of the scenario planning project.

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The client organization's capacity to act strategically; its power to perform.

This paper will explore, through storytelling, different pictures of client relationships associated with scenario planning. The stories are developed from a deep and extensive well of scenario practitioner and consulting experience over the last 15 years to explore and discuss these client issues, and how clients for scenario planning projects have evolved, and how they may enhance or restrict scenario planning projects in the future.     

How futuring bush mechanics seek to transform the world

In today's complex and turbulent world it is vital to have futurists who can collaborate on collective projects, focus on action codified in exemplar projects and validate actions towards a better world. Unfortunately, current ‘education’ systems focus almost exclusively on the individual learner and have separated the learner from the praxis of the lived life. Furthermore, classrooms separate the learner from design, production and integration of learning into community life. The author argues that overcoming this separation of thinking and doing is one of the key challenges for modernity in future, in particular.This paper argues that a way in which we may be able to meet this challenge is known by the term ‘bush mechanics’ in Australia—innovative individuals who look forward wisely and solve collective problems today through applying their ingenuity with what is available, thus integrating thinking, doing and being in what in ancient times was called poiesis and in Medieval times ‘artificing’ and today can be seen in action learning and the bush mechanic. The four principles, as well as examples, of the bush mechanic approach are discussed including their exemplar projects. Finally, the importance of the bush mechanic approach to ‘futuring’ and creating living breathing examples today of a future our children can live with is emphasised and collaboration sought.     

Bounding the future: The use of scenarios in assessing climate change impacts

This paper investigates the contribution of socio-economic scenarios to improve decisions and policies in climate assessments. We specifically looked at adaptation projects in the Dutch Climate changes Spatial Planning programme. Based on the four decision failure criteria neglect of internal information, bounded rationality, insufficient expansion of existing mental models and stickiness and lack of friction of information and knowledge, it was concluded that in these projects, socio-economic scenarios appear to generate useful data, but that their full potential to reduce decision failure is not likely to be exploited. Therefore adaptation options suggested by these studies may not be ‘future-proof’: they may be appropriate in some future societies, but fail in others. We believe similar results would be obtained in other contexts. Possible decision failures are caused by neglecting socio-economic developments, limiting the number of storylines generated by scenario studies to one or two, lack of stakeholder involvement in the scenario development and ignoring discontinuities.     

A new state in Europe? Scenarios for Catalan self-determination

Historically, the political structure of Spain has been a source of conflict: peripheral regions as Catalonia and the Basque country have questioned the centralized power of the state and have claimed a higher level of decentralization in view of their distinct history, cultural identity and language. Recently, political and social discontent has escalated in Catalonia, leading to the unilateral announcement of a Catalan self-determination referendum for November 2014. Regardless of political or ethical preferences, it will be necessary to foresee the consequences of this process for Catalonia, Spain and elsewhere. A scenario approach focuses on possible outcomes of the current debate rather than on the arguments put forward in the controversy. Those in favour of Catalan independence have depicted a future for their country with a booming economy that will situate it at currently unattainable levels of prosperity. Opponents of secession argue that Catalonia will become a failed state. These future visions of an independent Catalonia can be described as scenarios, the underlying assumptions and plausibility of which can be analysed. EU membership and the effect of borders on international trade are identified as key variables. The alternative scenarios will also be crucial to evaluate the broader impact of “a new state in Europe”.     

The impact of firms' internationalization on financial statement presentation: Some French evidence

Historically, the format of financial statements has varied from one country to another. Recently, due to the attractiveness of their capital markets, the strength of their accounting professions and the influence of their institutional investors, Anglo-American countries have seen a steady increase in the impact of their accounting practices on other nations, even influencing the actual format of financial statements. Given that French accounting regulations allow a certain degree of choice in consolidated balance sheet format (‘by nature’ or ‘by term’) and income statement format (‘by nature’ or ‘by function’), this study examines a sample of 199 large French listed firms in an attempt to understand why some of these firms choose not to use the traditional French formats (‘by nature’ for the balance sheet and ‘by nature’ for the income statement), instead preferring Anglo-American practices that we call ‘alternative’ (‘by term’ format for the balance sheet and ‘by function’ format for the income statement). We first analyze the balance sheet and income statement formats separately using a logit model, then combine the two and enrich the research design with a generalized ordered logit model. Our results confirm that opting for one or two alternative formats is related to internationalization, influenced by several factors: size, international auditor, accounting standards, foreign listing and international sales. When distinguishing the decision to adopt at least one versus two alternative-format financial statements, our findings also provide evidence that not all variables play the same role: ‘Accounting standards’ and ‘Foreign listing’, which are important in explaining the use of at least one alternative format, are irrelevant in explaining the use of two alternative-format financial statements.     

Projections for the geopolitical economy of oil after war in Iraq

How are events surrounding the latest Iraq war shaping the future global political economy of oil? The saliency of Iraq's oil resources suggests a trend towards intensified great-power competition to dominate energy-rich provinces and transportation corridors. Yet, the nature of the oil trade, Iraq's insurrection, and Sino-American economic interdependence indicate barriers to unilateral attempts to control energy supplies. Based on examination of the Iraq conflict's unintended stimulus to terrorism and to China's search for foreign oil supplies, this paper assesses three possible scenarios: ‘multiple energy insecurity’ (great-power competition and violent non-state reaction); ‘mutual energy securitisation’ (inter-state collusion against non-state resource claimants); and ‘multiple energy security’ (great-power curtailment of geographically expansive energy consumption). It finds that the increasing problems associated with the first two alternatives are inducing decision-makers to contemplate policy options consistent with the third scenario.     

Is there a postnormal time? From the illusion of normality to the design for a new normality

Ziauddin Sardar's characterization of ‘postnormal times’ elegantly captures the mood of despair, uncertainty and insecurity in the West due to the multiple shocks of terrorism, economic recession and climate change. However, the prevailing mood in India, most of Asia and developing countries in general is confidence and optimism for the future. The label ‘postnormal times’ is inappropriate for resurgent Asia and other ‘emerging markets’. Similarly, these countries - as illustrated by examples from India - need more modernization and efficiency to save and improve the lives of their citizens. This paper argues that the seeming normality of twentieth century in the West was an illusion arising out of the ignorance and neglect of environmental and health consequences of unbridled industrial growth. The distorted assumptions of neoclassical economics are largely to blame for this. It is now time to pay back for those excesses. A new normality will emerge only by addressing these distortions and by creating democratic global institutions that can reflect the changed global balance of power of the 21st century. The intellectuals, opinion-makers and leaders of the world have to exercise their ethical responsibility and creative imagination to enable this new normality to emerge.     

Can internally generated futures accelerate organizational learning?

After many years of scenario planning, this paper takes a moment to reflect on its use within, and value to, organizations. The author states that ultimately the benefit of scenario planning must result from ‘changed and more skilful action by the organization within its business environment.’ Navigating through the business environment is discussed as taking on two forms, that of strategising and learning where the former is dominated by ‘knowing by gaining control’ and the latter by ‘knowing by participation’ and reflection. Taking this logic a step further, van der Heijden sees the purpose of scenario planning as being categorisable along two dimensions content/process and thinking/action producing a matrix of four categories of purpose. Although he sees these four reasons for using scenario planning as harbouring different degrees of difficulty and likelihood of success, he advocates above all that organizations think carefully about which category is appropriate for them and ensure that the process of scenario planning is designed to support this goal.     

European territories confronted with climate change: Awaiting the events or timely preparation?

Today, climate change is viewed as one of the main global challenges. The EU has become a major player in the political arena and seeks to reach worldwide agreements on ‘mitigation’ policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite speaking with one voice at the global scale, the effects of climate change on European territories vary widely according to local circumstances. The ESPON scenarios explore what those impacts could be, and what effect EU climate change adaptation policies would have. The first scenario envisions an EU policy limited to emergency funds following extreme events like floods and droughts. In the second scenario, the EU takes a much more proactive stance by funding radical and costly adaptation strategies. The exercise demonstrates the difficulty in identifying the cost-effectiveness of each approach. Territorial effects are often indirect and affect a variety of economic, social and ecological systems. Moreover, a great deal of uncertainty exists surrounding their magnitude and timing.     

The office: The weakness of numbers and the production of non-authority

It often seems to be taken for granted that numbers produce effects and that practices of accounting enhance authority. This also goes for accounting and the environment. This paper shares this belief and argues that practices of accounting have been a crucial technology for taking nature or ‘the environment’ into account in the post-war era. Nevertheless, the ‘constitutive turn’ in the studies of accounting should not tempt us to leave unexplored the limitation of accounting practices and the inabilities to govern by numbers. With a point of departure in a pollution control agency, the paper explores the making of a non-authoritative office. It points to the emergence of what is labelled ‘accounting intimacy’ rather than the exertion of government at a distance. The paper also points to the ways in which the agency, rather than building a separate and distinct authority, came to reproduce the actor subjected to being governed, i.e., the polluting factory, within its own office. The author argues that this can be related to the investment in a shared ‘technical interest’ and the belief that the right (emission) number in itself would be sufficient to move the factory. The paper then explores the conditions for which numbers nevertheless came to have effects. The argument is that this should be seen as inextricably linked to the emergence of an ‘interesting object’, i.e., ‘the environment’ and an environmental interest, within the office. Thus, we need to pay attention to the formation of interests, and as accounting scholars turn to ‘the environment’, the latter should not be taken for granted.     

The Museums' future

‘The Museums' Future’ argues that through the effects of the postmodernisation of museums, art has been ceded variously to culture, commerce, politics, values and to experience. In this scenario, political culture has surrendered to cultural politics.It asks whether a museum project of the future can be envisaged in which history and experience are not replaced entirely by spectacle, and memory is not banalized? Can the museum contribute to reconfigurations of the Subject and Other and to identity and difference without falling into the traps of a politics of identity? Can the museum find ways of reaffirming universal principles without running the risk of imposing a new order dominated by a single culture?     

‘Exploratory landscape scenarios’ in the formulation of ‘landscape quality objectives’

The European Landscape Convention (ELC) calls for the definition of ‘landscape quality objectives’ (LQO) as “the formulation by the competent public authorities of the aspirations of the public with regard to the landscape features of their surroundings”. However, it is not yet defined how the integration of the visions of the public should be carried out. Notably in regions with poor participatory culture and in rural landscapes abandoned by people and consequently by their activities, dealing with the future does not seem a straightforward task. In these marginal rural landscapes the role of agriculture is being altered under the influence of the new rationale of the Common Agriculture Policy, so it may have to assume different functions in the future. Thus, this paper aims at showing how the development of ‘exploratory landscape scenarios’ can be a useful tool, firstly to find plausible landscape futures, and secondly to trigger discussions with the public regarding their aspirations for their landscape. The development procedure for ‘exploratory landscape scenarios’ builds on the ‘intuitive logics’ approach that focuses on the production of a variety of scenarios as starting point for discussion about the future rather than on finding an optimal one, which can limit the options unnecessarily from the beginning. The methodological approach is illustrated at a local scale by using the case study of Mértola in southeast Portugal. The results of the scenario exercise point out the adequateness of the methodology in the development of futures that are perceived as plausible by local stakeholders and, thereby, able to bring out their desires and threats towards the future of their landscape.     

Welcome to postnormal times

All that was ‘normal’ has now evaporated; we have entered postnormal times, the in-between period where old orthodoxies are dying, new ones have not yet emerged, and nothing really makes sense. To have any notion of a viable future, we must grasp the significance of this period of transition which is characterised by three c's: complexity, chaos and contradictions. These forces propel and sustain postnormal times leading to uncertainty and different types of ignorance that make decision-making problematic and increase risks to individuals, society and the planet. Postnormal times demands, this paper argues, that we abandon the ideas of ‘control and management’, and rethink the cherished notions of progress, modernisation and efficiency. The way forward must be based on virtues of humility, modesty and accountability, the indispensible requirement of living with uncertainty, complexity and ignorance. We will have to imagine ourselves out of postnormal times and into a new age of normalcy—with an ethical compass and a broad spectrum of imaginations from the rich diversity of human cultures.