政府R D补贴、技术创新与中国工业转型升级——基于门槛效应的研究

利用2005—2016年省级面板数据实证分析了政府R&D补贴与技术创新、政府R&D补贴、技术创新与中国工业转型升级的关系。结果发现:政府R&D补贴对技术创新的影响存在着基于政府R&D补贴强度的双重门槛效应,其影响作用随着政府RD补贴强度的增加而减少;政府R&D补贴通过技术创新对工业转型升产生正向影响,政府R&D补贴对工业转型升级的间接影响存在着基于政府R&D补贴强度的双重门槛效应,其影响大小呈现先上升后下降的趋势。基于此,地方政府应当确定合适的政府补助强度,使政府R&D补贴强度位于合理区间内,以最大限度发挥政府R&D补贴的激励作用。     

政府补贴、研发激励与新能源汽车创新

通过政府补贴激励企业自主创新,是长期以来政府扶持新兴产业发展的主要方式。但现有研究对该模式能否起到研发激励效用仍然存在争议,特别是在信息不对称的情况下,骗补问题突出,使产业政策有效性再次成为焦点。在梳理新能源汽车产业政策历史沿革的基础上,根据政策特性把补贴分为研发补贴和生产补贴两个阶段,并通过计量检验和倾向得分匹配等实证方法评估其政策实施对新能源汽车企业研发的激励效果。结果发现,强度较高的“生产补贴”研发激励效用远低于强度较低的“研发补贴”,两种政府补贴方式都符合边际效用递减规律。最后,结合产业政策实施15年来的现实情况,提出补贴政策缓慢性退坡、建立可信的惩戒机制等政策建议。     

ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS, SUBSIDIES AND THE WTO EXEMPTION

Owing to the World Trade Organization (WTO) exemption that allows governments to subsidize arms exports, the arms trade is one of the few remaining areas of trade where we observe export subsidies. This paper examines the effect of arms controls, in the form of licensing delays, on the incentives to subsidize arms exports and conversely the effect of the WTO arms trade exemption on the incentives to break arms control agreements. Our main result is that arms controls and free trade commitments re‐enforce each other. Licensing delays reduce the incentive to subsidise and free trade without subsidies reduces the benefits of a unilateral abrogation of arms controls. Transparency actually worsens the Nash inefficiencies at play in that incomplete information leads to lower subsidies and lower arms exports.     

Subsidizing charitable contributions: a natural field experiment comparing matching and rebate subsidies

We report the results of a field experiment conducted in conjunction with a mailed fundraising campaign of a nonprofit organization. The experiment is designed to compare the response of donors to subsidies in the form of matching amounts or rebated amounts. Matching subsidies are used by many corporations as an employee benefit; the US federal tax system encourages giving using a rebate subsidy by making donations tax deductible. The design includes a control group and two levels of subsidy of each type. Our main result is that matching subsidies result in larger total donations to charities than rebate subsidies, a result that is qualitatively similar to the lab findings. The estimated price elasticities for the matching subsidy are very similar to (and insignificantly different from) the lab experiments, while rebate subsidies lead to lower contributions in the field than in the lab. Since rebates in the field involve substantial lags and additional complications as compared with the “instant rebates” of the lab, this latter difference is not unexpected. The matching results are an important step in validating lab estimates of responsiveness to subsidies of charitable giving.

---

Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

不同融资约束背景下政府研发补助效应研究

运用倾向得分匹配法检验了政府研发补贴对企业自身研发投入的影响,以及不同融资约束背景下政府研发补贴诱导效应的差异。实证结果显示,政府研发补贴对企业自身研发投入具有诱导作用;在强融资约束背景下,政府研发投入补助能够更有效地刺激企业加大自身研发力度,诱导效应更强。     

Public policies,pressure groups,and dead weight costs

This paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence. Each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies, where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies. The dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model. An increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers, while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients. Various applications of the analysis are discussed.     

Unions, progressive taxes, and education subsidies

Progressive income taxes moderate distortionary wage demands by trade unions and thereby reduce unemployment, and at the same time underlie disincentives to acquire skills and decrease labour productivity. Governments can respond by combining progressive taxes with subsidies to investment in human capital. A system of generous education subsidies and steep progressive tax rates is more likely to emerge, the greater the market power of trade unions and the better the ability of governments to influence private education decisions. Empirical analysis for several OECD countries provides results consistent with these propositions. A policy mix of high education subsidies and relatively progressive income taxes is found in countries where union membership is significant.     

The more subsidies,the longer survival? Evidence from Chinese manufacturing firms

How do government subsidies affect firm survival? By using Chinese firm‐level data for 1998 to 2007, we show that, on average, there is a positive and significant impact of government subsidies on firm survival. We also investigate the heterogeneous effects of government subsidies with different intensities on firm survival, and find that moderate‐intensity government subsidies exert a positive impact on firm survival, while high‐intensity government subsidies increase the exit probabilities, the underlying mechanisms via subsidy‐seeking investment and innovation incentive weakening are supported by empirical evidence. Furthermore, we explore the role of governance institutions in the subsidy–survival relationship, and find that the positive impact of government subsidies on firm survival is more pronounced in regions with better governance institutions.     

基于可持续发展视角的财税补贴绩效研究

基于可持续发展视角对财税补贴运用产生的经济绩效与社会绩效进行实证分析。实证结果表明:财税补贴资金对提高企业经济绩效并不显著,仅在短期内提高公司的偿债能力与盈利能力,对成长性影响并不明显;社会绩效相对较为显著,即补贴资金有助于企业增加就业和保护环境等社会责任的履行。因此,要创新财税补贴资金的运用方式,细化补贴资金名目与落实方向,加大对补贴资金使用的后续管理和监督等,促进财政补贴绩效的提高。     

Subsidy Schemes and Charitable Contributions: A Closer Look

This article replicates and “stress tests” a recent finding by Eckel and Grossman (2003) that matching subsidies generate substantially higher Charity Receipts than theoretically comparable rebate subsidies. In a first replication treatment, we show that most choices are consist with a “constant (gross) contribution” rule, suggesting that inattention to the subsidies’ differing net consequences may explain the higher revenues elicited with matching subsidies. Results of additional treatments suggest that (a) the charity dimension of the decision problems has little to do with the result, and (b) extra information regarding the net consequences of decisions reduces but does not eliminate the result.     

Is migration a good substitute for education subsidies?

Assuming a given educational policy, the recent brain drain literature reveals that skilled migration can boost the average level of schooling in developing countries. In this paper, we introduce educational subsidies determined by governments concerned by the number of skilled workers remaining in the country. Our theoretical analysis shows that developing countries can benefit from skilled emigration when educational subsidies entail high fiscal distortions. However when taxes are not too distortionary, it is desirable to impede emigration and subsidize education. We then investigate the empirical relationship between educational subsidies and migration prospects, obtaining a negative relationship for 105 countries. Based on this result, we revisit the country specific effects of skilled migration upon human capital. We show that the endogeneity of public subsidies reduces the number of winners and increases the magnitude of the losses.     

Frontiers of Climate Change Economics

The potential of taxes to correct environmental externalities has long been recognized among economists. Yet, this welfare-enhancing policy commonly faces strong opposition by citizens. Conversely, externality-correcting subsidies frequently enjoy high public support. We conduct a lab experiment to explore public support for Pigouvian taxes and subsidies. In an experimental market with a negative externality, participants vote on the introduction of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies under full or reduced information concerning how the tax revenues will be spent and the subsidy paid for. Theoretically the two instruments should produce identical outcomes. However, we find substantially greater support for subsidies than for taxes. This can partially be explained by the participants’ expectation that the subsidy will increase their own payoffs more than a tax, but not because it is expected to be more effective in changing behavior. Furthermore, we find that with greater uncertainty, the preference for subsidies is even stronger, a result which is consistent with loss aversion.     

International trade agreements, environmental policy, and relocation of production

This paper studies the influence of free trade agreements on national environmental policies and location strategies of polluting firms. It is shown that banning export subsidies makes relocation of production more attractive for firms. When export subsidies are banned relocation is profitable because: (1) the rival firm reduces output due to more stringent emission regulation in the host country of the investment and (2) relocation leads to lower emission tax rate in the original home country of the investing firm. When export subsidies are used, the first effect is absent because the host government is able to use the export subsidy to compensate the negative effect of more stringent emission taxation on domestic shareholders.     

Well-intended policies

Market failures provide a rationale for policy intervention. But policies are often hard to alter once in place. We argue that this inertia can result in well-intended policies having sizable negative long-run effects on aggregate output and productivity. In our theory, financial frictions provide a rationale for providing subsidized credit to productive entrepreneurs to alleviate the credit constraints they face. In the short run, such targeted subsidies have the intended effect and raise aggregate output and productivity. In the long run, however, individual productivities mean-revert while individual-specific subsidies remain fixed. As a result, entry into entrepreneurship is distorted: The subsidies prop up entrepreneurs that were formerly productive but are now unproductive, while impeding the entry of newly productive individuals. Therefore aggregate output and productivity are depressed. Our theory provides an explanation for two empirical observations on developing countries: idiosyncratic distortions that disproportionately affect productive establishments, and temporary growth miracles followed by growth failures.     

政府补贴对我国战略性新兴产业内部R&D投入影响的实证研究

构建回归模型,依据Hausman检验的方法和原理,分析了政府直接补贴和间接补贴与国内战略性新兴产业内部R&D投入的相互关系。研究结果显示:不同类型的政府补贴对整个战略性新兴产业内部R&D投入的影响存在显著差异;政府补贴对不同战略性新兴产业的内部R&D的影响也存在明显不同。     

政府补贴、行业竞争与企业出口技术复杂度

政府补贴作为经济发展的"有形之手",在我国出口技术结构升级中扮演何种角色呢?其内在影响机制又是如何呢?文章基于中国工业企业数据和中国海关统计数据库,利用倾向得分匹配法(PSM)和倍差法考察了政府补贴和行业竞争对企业出口技术复杂度的影响效应及渠道.研究表明:政府补贴抑制了企业出口技术复杂度的提升,而行业竞争促进了企业出口技术复杂度的提升;不同竞争程度的企业样本中,政府对低竞争行业的企业出口技术复杂度的抑制效应显著高于中高竞争行业,这说明行业竞争度的提高有利于纠正政府补贴对出口技术复杂度的抑制效应.进一步的影响机制分析表明:政府补贴促进出口技术结构升级的渠道为研发激励效应,且这种激励效应只在中高竞争行业样本中是显著存在的;从成本渠道考察发现,政府补贴有利于企业出口价格指数的降低,从而对出口技术复杂度的提升产生显著的成本扭曲效应.文章的结论意味着,不能一味地对企业进行补贴,而应该构建有效的激励机制与成本倒逼机制,让企业通过内生动力而非价格竞争形成企业出口技术复杂度的升级.     

Education,Innovation and Long‐Run Growth

We extend a second‐generation Schumpeterian growth model to incorporate human capital accumulation to clarify the general equilibrium effects of subsidy policies on human capital accumulation and R&D activities in a unified framework. Despite the conventional argument that subsidies always stimulate these growth‐promoting activities, we find that subsidies asymmetrically affect human capital accumulation and R&D activities. Our theoretical results suggest that research using standard models of human capital might find false negative relationships between education subsidies and economic growth.     

知识产权保护政府补贴与经济增长

文章构建了三部分模型,分析了知识产权保护、政府补贴对经济增长的作用,研究发现:知识产权保护对经济增长的作用是不确定的,根据本国自主创新的程度而异;政府补贴份额的增加有助于放大严格的知识产权保护对经济增长的正面效应或减缓严格的知识产权保护对经济增长的负面效应;政府补贴与经济增长休戚相关,政府补贴份额越高,越有利于经济增长;严格的知识产权保护会放大或消弭政府补贴对经济增长的正面效应;技术应用成本与经济增长呈现反向关系,技术应用成本越高,越不利于经济增长,较高的政府补贴份额会减缓技术应用成本对经济增长的负面影响;严格的知识产权保护会放大或减缓技术应用成本对经济增长的负面效应。     

Hiring subsidies, job creation and job destruction

We quantify the effects of hiring subsidies using the model of Mortensen and Pissarides (2003). The job creation effect can be large in a weak labor market. However, in the long-run, subsidies raise the wage and equilibrium unemployment.     

溢出效应、R&D合作及政府补贴

为了纠正技术研发的负外部性(溢出效应),政府一般可以选择3种政策工具,即专利制度、R&D合作以及政府补贴。对厂商进行R&D合作和向厂商R&D提供补贴的情况进行了比较分析,发现:考虑3种博弈情况(即R&D竞争、R&D合作和垄断),当溢出率较小时,最优R&D补贴提高了R&D的水平、增加了研发产出和厂商利润。