The advantage of being first and competition between firms

It is frequently suggested that the first brand in a product market enjoys a price advantage over its imitators due to imperfect information about product quality. This article considers the effect of this advantage on prices and market shares in a dominant firm price leadership model. An established firm with a price advantage faces free entry by firms producing unbranded products (generics). In equilibrium, the first brand enjoys a market share advantage over entrants in entry and post entry periods. If the initial price disadvantage is large, entry will not occur.     

Optimal pricing and advertising strategy for introducing a new business product with threat of competitive entry

The problem of optimal joint pricing and advertising decision making for a new product facing potential competitive entry has received inadequate attention. We propose a model that attempts to find the optimal price-advertising frontier in the face of potential competitive entry that maximizes total discounted profits for pre- and post-entry periods. We find that a firm would charge the price that equates price elasticity to marginal revenue product of advertising (as predicted by [Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P.O. (1954), Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality, American Economic Review, 44(5), 826-836.]) only when the potential effects of pricing and advertising on its market share are not considered. Under optimal conditions, aware that market share is subject to erosion, the firm charges a somewhat lower price than the profit maximizing price, and sets an advertisement expense that is somewhat higher than the profit-maximizing advertising level as predicted by Cournot's monopolistic setting. We illustrate the applicability of our model using business product examples taken from several industries including operating systems, software, pharmaceutical, and telephone switching. Directions for future research with implications for B2B managers (for example, the possible effects of preannouncement to forestall competitive entry) are discussed.     

A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON INDUSTRY R&D AND MARKET STRUCTURE*

This paper aims to shed some new insights on the long‐debated and both extensively and intensively explored relationship between market concentration and industry R&D intensity. In order to do so, this study develops, from a classic Dorfman‐Steiner [1954] model of firm R&D, a model of industry R&D, where consumer preference over quality and price, R&D technology, and the joint distribution of firm‐specific technological competence and market share jointly determine the level of industry R&D intensity. The joint distribution term, which reflects both the underlying distribution of firms‐specific technological competence and the strength of its link with market share, suggests that the concentration‐R&D relationship differs depending on the strength of the link or simply the appropriability of R&D in terms of market share: A positive relationship is predicted for low‐appropriability industries, where market concentration supplements low R&D appropriability, while a negative or an inverted U‐shaped relationship for high‐appropriability industries. An empirical analysis of data, disaggregated at the five‐digit SIC level, on R&D and market concentration of Korean manufacturing industries provides supportive evidence for the predictions.     

The Neoclassical Firm Under Moral Hazard

We develop a model of the neoclassical firm under moral hazard with endogenous capital and employment and perfectly competitive capital, labor and product markets. We assume that effort becomes harder to measure as the firm gets larger and the exogenous parameters are affiliated. The model explains why incentives decline but wages rise with firm size, the mixed evidence on the risk-reward tradeoff, and the positive correlation between wages and profits. In the long run, incentives are increasing in risk via endogenous capital. Finally, the model makes novel predictions about the relationship between incentives and labor market conditions.     

A note on the market share-profitability relationship

This study extends earlier empirical work to determine whether there is a breakpoint or critical level in the frequently observed relationship between firm market share and profit rate. The analysis focuses on the banking industry and uses a sample of 10,690 firms located in 2165 different local geographic markets. Though the results apply directly only to banking, the similarity of findings on various other industrial organization topics in banking and the industrial sector suggests that the results of this study will be broadly relevant to the industrial sector.The main findings of the study are that (1) in general, firm market share is directly related to profitability; (2) the firm market share variable remains positive and significant when controlling for market concentration either with concentration as a separate independent variable or by conducting tests with subsamples of firms that are in markets with similar concentration ratios; and (3) while there is no sharp breakpoint in the market share-profitability relationship, the results indicate that profit rates of firms increase at a decreasing rate up to a share of about 55 percent. Since numerous studies have found that economies of scale are not particularly important in banking, it appears that the observed relationship is not due to greater efficiency with larger shares.     

Evaluating traditional share—Price and residual demand measures of market power in the catsup industry

In this paper we specify a price determination model which can test both the traditional positive interbrand price—share hypothesis and the negative intrabrand relationship predicted by residual demand analysis. We evaluate this relationship empirically using three-dimensional panel data from the catsup industry. We find support for both hypothesized relationships, and conclude that market power exists in this industry. Further, we conclude that the results depend critically on the characteristics of the data set to be analyzed.     

Firm innovativeness and business performance: The joint moderating effects of market turbulence and competition

To clarify the nature of the effect of firm innovativeness on business performance, this study draws on contingency theory and an interactional perspective to develop a conceptual framework to investigate how the interaction between market turbulence and competitive intensity moderates the relationship between firm innovativeness and business performance. This study used survey data from a sample of 154 high-tech manufacturing firms in Taiwan and employed hierarchical moderated regression analysis to test the hypotheses developed. The results reveal that the effect of firm innovativeness on business performance varies across the different configurations of market turbulence and competitive intensity. Specifically, the performance effect of firm innovativeness is most positive under high market turbulence and high competitive intensity; the performance effect is least positive under low market turbulence and low competitive intensity. However, the performance benefits of firm innovativeness fail to materialize under low market turbulence and high competitive intensity. Overall, these findings highlight that market turbulence and competition jointly influence the direction and strength of the performance effect of firm innovativeness. This study advances firm innovativeness research by identifying the configurational market conditions that augment or limit the value of firm innovativeness.     

Competitive customer poaching with asymmetric firms

Conditioning the pricing policies on purchase history is proven to generate a cutthroat price competition enhancing consumer surplus. This result typically relies on a framework where competitors are assumed to be symmetric. This paper demonstrates that under significant asymmetries of competing firms, the strong firm trades off current market share for future market share and the weak firm does the opposite. This inter-temporal market sharing agreement generates unidirectional poaching and entails new and distinctive welfare implications. In particular, if consumers are sufficiently myopic, price discrimination softens price competition in relation to uniform pricing, overturning the conclusion of previous studies.     

Business strategy,market structure and risk-return relationships: A structural approach

A structural model is proposed which integrates and extends previous findings on the interrelations between risk—return outcomes, market share, firm conduct attributes, and inter-firm rivalry. It is argued that the relative impact of market share and firm conduct attributes on risk—return outcomes depends on the intensity of rivalry. The empirical setting is commerical banking in Indiana (1975–79). Latent variable path analysis (partial least-squares) is used to estimate the model. The effect of market share is found to be quite important, even when possible ‘spurious’ effects due to differences in individual firm attributes are controlled for. Given consistent indications of oligopolistic coordination found in various parts of the model, it is inferred that the measured effect of market share reflects the exercise of market power.     

Equilibrium market share—a measure of competitive strength

If an oligopoly is modelled as a non-zero-sum game, then the market shares associated with an equilibrium solution can be interpreted as measuring the competitive strength of the firms. By comparing afirm's equilibrium market share with its actual market share, one can conclude whether the firm has positive or negative growth potential in terms of market share, which has some implications for its investment strategy.     

Firm Density and Industry R & D Intensity: Theory and Evidence

By deriving a formal model of industry R & D that identifies factors influencing industry R & D intensity, this paper first suggests firm density, defined as the inverse of average firm sales or simply the number of firms divided by industry sales, as a measure of market structure that is appropriate in explaining industry R & D intensity. The model shows that the cost structure of R & D, consumer preference over quality and price, the appropriability of R & D, firm density, and the average level of firm R & D intensity jointly determine industry R & D intensity. In particular, firm density has a positive relationship with industry R & D intensity, implying that firms in higher firm-density industries feel fiercer competitive pressure and thus engage more intensively in R & D. An empirical analysis of panel data on industry R & D activities of Korean manufacturing industries during the period 1991–1996 provides supportive evidence for the predictions of the model including the positive relationship between firm density and industry R & D intensity. The theoretical model and the empirical results are also consistent with the recent survey of U.S. corporate R & D activities by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the National Science Foundation (1999).     

厂商市场份额的品牌经济模型及其现实解释

厂商的市场份额决定了其利润率,从而决定了厂商能否在残酷的竞争中生存、增长与发展。而在经济过剩的条件下,消费者的选择决定了厂商的市场份额,货币价格与品牌及品牌信用度决定的选择成本作为消费者选择和购买过程中的局限条件制约和影响着消费者的选择与购买。本文建立起引入品类需求强度系数、价格、选择成本的需求函数,并以此模型解释了厂商市场份额的决定是通过价格机制与品牌机制共同作用而实现的。在理论分析的基础上,对大量的现实进行了解释,在验证该模型的同时,对未来市场竞争及厂商市场份额做出了预测。同时,本文提出了提高厂商市场份额与定价权的＂品类需求强度—品牌信用度＂二维模型,并分别从开发具有较高品类需求强度的品类市场和提高品牌信用度的品牌建设方面给现实中的厂商提供了相应策略。     

Creating Growth in New Markets: A Simultaneous Model of Firm Entry and Price*

Sales in a new market generally follow a hockey‐stick pattern: After commercialization, sales are very low for some time before there is a dramatic takeoff in growth. Reported sales takeoffs across products vary widely from a few years to several decades. Prior research identifies new firm entry or price declines as key factors that relate to the timing of a sales takeoff in new markets. However, this literature considers these variables to be exogenous and only finds unilateral effects. In the present article, new firm entry and price declines are modeled as being endogenous. Thus, the simultaneous relationship between price declines and firm entry in the introductory period of new markets when industry sales are negligible is studied. Using a sample of new markets formed in the United States during the last 135 years, strong support for a simultaneous model of price and firm entry is found: Price decreases relate to the competitive pressures associated with firm entry, and, in turn, firm entry is lower in new markets with rapidly falling prices. Furthermore, a key driver of firm entry during the early years of a new market involves the level of patent activity, and a key driver of price decreases is the presence of large firms. In contrast to the recommendations from other research, these results indicate that rapid price declines may further delay sales takeoff in industries by dampening new firm entry. Instead, rapid sales takeoffs in new markets come from encouraging greater innovative activity and the entry of large firms.     

基于买卖价差的我国股票市场流动性调整的风险价值研究

由于我国股票市场是一个典型的订单驱动型市场,存在报价深度不充分的问题,传统的买卖价差不能真正反映流动性风险,针对这一情形,文章以个股日最高价与最低价之间的价差为度量指标,结合经流动性调整的风险价值模型（BDSS）,考察了沪市25个行业的25只样本股票面临的流动性风险值。实证表明,我国股市存在较大的流动性风险,个股之间的流动性层次区分度不高,呈现出较大的趋同性,流通股本数与流动性风险值呈显著的负相关,而流通市值与流动性风险值呈显著的正相关关系。     

Identifying Participants in a Price-fixing Conspiracy: Output & Market Share Tests Reexamined

If there is a cartel agreement among a subset of firms in an industry, it should be predicted that all firms in that industry will increase prices. Nevertheless, industry prices alone should not indicate that a particular firm is guilty of that conspiracy. According to the output test and its market share variant – proposed by Blair and Romano – if the output or the market share of the firm that claims to be innocent in the collusive activity rises in response to the price increase, that firm's claim should be accepted as true. Using a collusive variant of the dominant firm model, this paper shows that these are not robust tests to reveal either innocence or guilt, and characterizes cases where they may pardon a guilty firm (Type I error) or indict an innocent firm (Type II error). This paper also shows that a market share test can not be used to prove a dominant firm's intent for predatory pricing.     

Predatory intent under uncertainty

Current analyses of predatory behavior neglect uncertainty. Its presence complicates a firm's evaluation of profits and risks associated with various pricing strategies. Using a price leadership model (with the supply of the competitive fringe not known in advance), we show that a risk averse dominant firm will price lower than the price which maximizes expected profits. Such behavior could be misconstrued as being predatory if marginal and average variable cost rules are used for establishing the proof of predation.     

Taking industry structuring seriously: A strategic perspective on product differentiation

Given legal impediments to consolidation and collusion, firms often resort to product differentiation to attain market power. This paper provides a formal analysis of product differentiation as a tool for such industry structuring at both the firm and industry level. We examine: how industry structure differs when firms collaborate on their differentiation decisions, and when the profitability of such collaboration is greatest; how an individual firm's differentiation decisions affect subsequent market outcomes under price competition, such as margin, market share, and profit; how mere differentiation differs from a ‘differentiation advantage’; and how changing a firm's differentiation affects its rivals through both positive externalities (by restraining rivalry) and negative externalities (by shifting competitive advantage). Our results have implications for empirical research, strategy theory, and pedagogy.     

DO OLIGOPOLISTS POLLUTE LESS? EVIDENCE FROM A RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKET*

Electricity restructuring has created the opportunity for producers to exercise market power. Oligopolists increase price by distorting output decisions, causing cross‐firm production inefficiencies. This study estimates the environmental implications of production inefficiencies attributed to market power in the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland electricity market. Air pollution fell substantially during 1999, the year in which both electricity restructuring and new environmental regulation took effect. I find that strategic firms reduced their emissions by approximately 20% relative to other firms and their own historic emissions. Next, I compare observed behavior with estimates of production, and therefore emissions, in a competitive market. According to a model of competitive behavior, changing costs explain approximately two‐thirds of the observed pollution reductions. The remaining third can be attributed to firms exercising market power.     

The market share-profitability relationship: An empirical assessment of major assertions and contradictions

While previous research on the relationship between market share (MS) and business profitability (BP) has found a positive relationship, its nature (i.e. direct versus spurious), its context-specificity, and the validity of MS as a predictor of BP have not been adequately addressed. Employing path analysis, this study examined the nature of this relationship across a taxonomy of homogeneous environments. The major findings were that (1) the association between MS and BP is context-specific; (2) both direct and spurious relationships exist, and their relative strengths vary across environments; and (3) the validity of MS as a predictor of BP is context-specific. Further, key firm conduct variables accounting for the spuriousness have been identified. Finally, implications of these findings for managers pursuing market share as a goal are discussed.     

Competitive behavior in the European mobile telecommunications industry: Pioneers vs. followers

This paper studies the relationship between competitive strategy and improvement in the competitive position of pioneers and followers in the mobile telecommunications industry. The analysis uses a panel of data comprising all the actions of European firms operating in the digital mobile telecommunications industry with GSM 900 and/or DCS 1800 networks. The results show that competitors gain market share when they follow competitive strategies that are different from those of other firms. The paper also finds that price reduction actions represent the best approach for followers, while differentiation actions are the most effective strategy for pioneers.