美国现行反垄断法对软件产业的适用性探析--以搭售和掠夺性定价为例

本文对软件产业的搭售与掠夺性定价行为进行了法律和经济分析。在美国现行的反垄断法体系中，这是属于典型的滥用市场势力的两种行为。但在软件产业却不能凭借传统标准简单地把这两种行为归结为垄断行为，而应从产业本身的特点和竞争环境出发谨慎对待。如一味运用美国现行的反垄断法惩罚软件产业正当的竞争行为，只会从更大程度上抑制竞争，损害消费者福利。在网络经济条件下，反垄断法应该顺应经济和技术的     

制造业外资进入与市场势力波动:竞争还是垄断

对外资市场效应的评估和计量是处理好外资政策、产业政策和反垄断政策关系的重要问题。本文采用中国1999—2010年28个两位数和447个四位数代码制造业面板数据,首先估计了两位数代码制造业的市场势力水平,然后进一步考察外资进入的市场效应,并测度外资引致的福利变动。研究表明:制造业各行业存在显著的市场势力,但金融危机前后市场势力溢价水平波动较大。全样本结果显示制造业市场势力溢价约为6.2%,但金融危机前样本证实市场势力溢价高达22.1%。细分产业中,外资的竞争效应占主导,但在部分产业中外资表现出了反竞争效应。制造业总体层面上,外资进入与市场势力波动之间呈现U形非线性关系,拐点稳定在外资比重为47.3%—54.0%的区间内。从福利角度看,外资进入的竞争效应,使得垄断带来的无谓损失减少了3334.70亿元;但FDI的反竞争效应使得相应行业垄断福利损失增加2407.45亿元。     

Digital monopolies: Privacy protection or price regulation?

Increasing returns to scale in data gathering and processing give rise to a new form of monopoly, referred to here as digital monopoly. Digital monopolies create new challenges for regulators and antitrust authorities. We address two in this paper: market power arising from improved match values and from reduced privacy. The digital monopoly’s profit and social surplus always increase as privacy decreases. However, consumer surplus is non-monotone in privacy. Without privacy, the match value is perfect but completely extracted by the digital monopoly. In contrast, as privacy goes to infinity, match values and social surplus go to zero. With regulated prices, consumer surplus is maximized without privacy protection. As with natural monopolies, price regulation thus remains an appropriate tool in the digital age to capture the social benefits from increasing returns to scale without harming consumers.     

我国行政性垄断的危害——市场势力效应和收入分配效应的实证研究

垄断者所具有的市场势力一般而言将导致高价,从而造成整个社会的福利损失;不仅如此,在我国,由于行政性垄断行业较高的工资福利所导致的收入分配效应也是极大的,即它可能拉大社会各行业职工的收入差距。本文通过对1997—2005年我国行政性垄断行业的福利损失的测算,以及这一研究区间行政性垄断行业与其他行业职工收入差异的分析,实证检验了行政性垄断对我国经济社会的危害,进而强调了打破行政性垄断的必要性和紧迫性。     

Privatization of natural monopoly public enterprises: The regulation issue

The paper presents a simple model that calculates — as a percentage of industry revenues — the welfare gains or losses that might ensue when a public enterprise natural monopoly is replaced by a profit maximizing private monopoly. The model incorporates both the pre-privatization demand elasticity and production efficiency changes subsequent to privatization. The magnitude of the welfare changes suggests that allocative efficiency improvements do not provide a compelling rationale for post-privatization regulation. Greater consideration must be given to other regulatory objectives including distributional concerns and the need to create an institutional environment that encourages investment.     

Considerations of Countervailing Power

The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines set forth the current antitrust enforcement practices but do not address mergers that result in bilateral monopoly. We show that, given the presence of lawful, enduring market power, such mergers may improve social welfare. As a result, these mergers deserve careful scrutiny before condemning them as anticompetitive. In this paper, we address this issue and suggest an economically sound enforcement policy.     

Cost and benefits from infrastructure competition. Estimating welfare effects from broadband access competition

Competition between parallel infrastructures incorporates opposing welfare effects. The gain from reduced deadweight loss might be outweighed by the inefficient duplication of an existing infrastructure. Using data from broadband Internet access for western Europe 2000–04, this paper investigates which effect prevails empirically. Infrastructure competition between DSL and cable TV had a significant and positive impact on the broadband penetration. However, comparing the additional social surplus attributable to cable competition with the cable investments, it can be concluded that, in the absence of significant positive externalities, infrastructure competition has probably not been welfare enhancing.     

电信主导运营商价格压榨的竞争效应

在纵向相关市场结构下,电信在位主导运营商的价格压榨行为是一种恢复纵向垄断市场势力和获取纵向一体最大化垄断利润的策略性行为,它会严重伤害下游市场的竞争,并降低社会总福利。在反垄断执法中,判定反竞争的价格压榨行为需要分析市场结构条件和进行竞争伤害检验,本文提出了基础的归因检验规则和具体的四种不同类型价格压榨检验方法。基于上述分析,对中国电信和中国联通网络接入价格歧视行为反垄断审查的结构条件和归因检验进行了分析,并认为不合理接入管制政策是价格压榨长期存在的重要原因。     

Telecommunication in the US: From Regulation to Competition (Almost)

Alfred E. Kahn was an observer and practitioner of telecommunications regulation as technology changed the industry from a natural monopoly to a platform-based oligopoly among telephone, cable, satellite, and wireless carriers. Regulation and legislation were slow to recognize these changes, and large welfare losses occurred, some of which could have been avoided if regulators, legislators and economists had followed Fred’s economic advice: Prices must be informed by costs; the relevant costs are actual incremental costs; costs and prices are an outcome of a Schumpeterian competitive process, not the starting point; excluding firms from markets is fundamentally anticompetitive; a reliance on imperfect markets subject to antitrust law is preferable to necessarily imperfect regulation; and a regulatory transition to deregulation entails propensities to micromanage the process to generate preferred outcomes, visible competitors, and expedient price reductions.     

A Tiger Without Teeth? Regulation of Administrative Monopoly Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law

We identify in this paper the sources and types of administrative monopoly and the possible harms that administrative monopoly causes to the Chinese economy in its current institutional environment. We review the arguments for and against the inclusion of provisions on administrative monopoly in the ambit of the Anti-Monopoly Law and explain the weaknesses of such provisions. After analyzing the clauses against administrative monopoly in some countries?? antitrust laws and two recent litigation cases on administrative monopoly in China, we detail the challenges in practicing anti-administrative monopoly law and provide a number of suggestions as to how the law and its enforcement can be improved.     

The Social Cost of Rent Seeking by Labor Unions in the United States

The conventional welfare loss to trade unions and collective bargaining has been put at some fraction of 1.0 percent. Added to this should be the costs of resources deployed by the parties as they compete for monopoly gains. These additional social costs turn out to be on the same order as the conventional welfare loss. The analysis finds in passing that the investment by union members in paying dues yields very handsome dividends.     

A measurement of the welfare loss in the terminal equiphint makket

This arlicie allempts to estimate the wellare loss in the terminal equipment market due to the existence of monopoly power and entry barriers. The welfare loss consists of two parts, one due to price above marginal cost, and the second due to product voids. By using certain upper and lower bound measurements, we obtain an estimate of the minimum welfare loss of $35 million and a maximum welfare loss of $639 million for a one year time period.     

行政垄断制度选择的一般分析框架——以我国电信业行政垄断制度的动态变迁为例

行政垄断是政府机构利用行政权力对竞争进行限制和排斥，会造成资源配置扭曲、社会福利损失、收入分配不均以及地方保护和区域市场分割等问题。但现实中行政垄断是客观并普遍存在的．在特定的经济环境中．行政垄断作为资源配置的一种手段发挥了市场调节无法实现的作用。本文借鉴新比较经济学的社会制度选择分析框架，建立了行政垄断制度选择的一般分析框架．并以此来重新思考行政垄断制度选择问题．最后应用该一般分析框架分析我国电信产业行政垄断制度的动态变迁过程。为我国行政垄断制度的改革提供一个一般分析框架和相应的理论指导乃本文目的之所在。     

Looking at the Cost Side of “Monopoly”

Welfare loss under oligopoly is defined as that part of consumer surplus which is lost and not regained by higher profits. In a model with asymmetric firms, this implies that the total welfare loss consists of the deadweight loss triangle plus a cost side inefficiency effect, due to the fact that in imperfect markets not all firms utilize the lowest cost technique. Using a flexible CV-model we calculate these effects empirically for two relatively homogeneous industries (pulp/paper and cement). The deadweight loss triangles are shown to be smaller than the cost difference effect (“the staircase”) for these industries.     

结构重组、规制滞后与纵向圈定——中国电信、联通“反垄断”案例的若干思考

以反垄断机构对中国电信和中国联通两家公司,在互联网骨干网接入环节"接入歧视行为"的反垄断调查为线索,本文的经验研究发现,2007年中国电信产业重组后所形成的不对称寡头垄断结构,使部分一体化运营商在接入和互联环节获得了一定的垄断势力,可以通过接入的价格或质量歧视,对上下游的竞争者产生一定的圈定效应。这种行为由于获得了行业规制者的许可,也限制了《反垄断法》发挥作用的范围和效力。     

Introduction to the RIO Special Issue on Antitrust and the Platform Economy

The emergence of large technology platforms has raised fundamental questions about antitrust enforcement. These questions, which are the subject of this RIO special issue, are now challenging scholars and policy makers. The topics covered here include the role of economics and the consumer welfare standard in antitrust; lessons from historic antitrust cases; the role of big data in antitrust analysis; antitrust analysis of multi-sided markets; and the interplay between competition and privacy regulation.

     

Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control

This paper considers the political economy environment that an antitrust agency is operating in and asks under what circumstances a consumer surplus standard yields higher welfare than a welfare standard. In particular, we address how institutional settings—such as transparency and accountability—interact with the choice of an appropriate standard. We consider a framework in which the antitrust agency can be influenced by third parties (at a cost in terms of real resources) and in which the agency is imperfectly monitored. A welfare comparison between the two standards reveals that neither standard dominates. The consumer surplus standard is attractive relative to a welfare standard, when lobbying is efficient, when accountability is low, where mergers are large and when a marginal increase in merger size is highly profitable.     

产品异质条件下市场势力估计与垄断损失测度——运用新实证产业组织方法对白酒制造业的研究

作为政府经济管制和反垄断的基础,市场势力的定量测度以及福利损失的有效估算是至关重要的基本问题。由于产品异质性带来的模型设定陷阱,之前陈甬军,周末(2009)使用的新实证产业组织模型仅适用于测度少数产品差异很小的产业的市场势力。本文在Klette和Desouza的基础上给出了一种更具一般性的,可以在异质性产品市场测度市场势力和垄断损失的方法,克服了不可观测的产品异质性和技术冲击导致的影响。随后,采用全国规模以上工业企业数据库数据,估计了产品差异非常大的白酒制造业市场势力溢价,并以此为依据,计算了由于市场势力溢价带来的福利净损失,验证了模型的有效性和稳健性。计量结果证明尽管白酒制造业市场结构较为分散,但是具有极强的市场势力,2008年白酒制造企业运用市场势力带来的福利净损失高达180.97亿元。     

China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare Standard?

China??s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) sets forth the country??s antitrust enforcement policies. We investigate the welfare standard that the AML seeks to maximize by examining both its stated language and, via revealed preference, the antitrust actions taken by the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority.     

A comment on Bradburd: “Privatisation of natural monopolies”

In a recent issue of this journal, Ralph Bradburd (1995) argues that the efficiency gains of privatising a natural monopoly are likely to outweigh any loss of allocative efficiency. However, a trade-off based on a definition of the total surplus which includes profits but not internal rents is flawed. Correcting the analysis shows that even stronger conditions have to be met before privatising a natural monopoly is beneficial. The same is true if demand schedules are iso-elastic rather than linear. Recent evidence on demand elasticity and efficiency differences suggests that privatisation would be likely to reduce welfare even according to Bradburd's approach.