Mergers of complements and entry in innovative industries

I study a merger between producers of complement inputs facing potential entry, with investment by the incumbents in deterministic cost reduction and by the entrants in probabilistic innovation, and then competition in prices. The merger solves Cournot complementarity problems in investment and pricing, which is what makes it profitable but also potentially anti-competitive. When the demand is inelastic the merger harms consumers by reducing R&D of the entrants if the incumbents are efficient enough (always when bundling is adopted). Instead, with a demand elastic enough, the merger increases consumer surplus (even with bundling).     

Spectrum Licensing,Policy Instruments and Market Entry

Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), setting aside licenses and providing bidding (price and quantity) credits for potential entrants, and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than there are incumbent firms (excess licenses). The empirical analysis assesses the effectiveness of these policy instruments on encouraging entry. The econometric results show that the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry.     

Exclusionary Pricing When Scale Matters

We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers, and both being able to price discriminate. The good has positive value to buyers only if the network size exceeds a certain threshold. The incumbent's installed base guarantees this critical size to the incumbent, while the entrant needs to attract enough ‘new’ buyers to meet this threshold. We show that price discrimination (in the various forms it may take) reduces the set of achievable socially efficient entry equilibria, and discuss the policy implications of this result.     

Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts

We show that loyalty discounts create an externality among buyers because each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. This externality can enable an incumbent to use loyalty discounts to effectively divide the market with its rival and raise prices. If loyalty discounts also include a buyer commitment to buy from the incumbent, then loyalty discounts can also deter entry under conditions in which ordinary exclusive dealing cannot. With or without buyer commitment, loyalty discounts will increase profits while reducing consumer welfare and total welfare as long as enough buyers exist and the entrant does not have too large a cost advantage. These propositions are true even if the entrant is more efficient and the loyalty discounts are above cost and cover less than half the market. We also prove that these propositions hold without assuming economies of scale, downstream competition, buyer switching costs, financial constraints, limits on rival expandability, or any intra-product bundle of contestable and incontestable demand.     

ADVERTISING SUNK COSTS AND CREDIBLE SPATIAL PREEMPTION

Large sunk investments in advertising allow managers to credibly preempt potential entrants by introducing new products prior to anticipated increases in market growth. Previous investment in advertising can lower a firm's cost to introduce new products allowing it to credibly preempt potential entrants. Entrants may not have enough residual share to find it profitable to enter later, and incumbents find it profitable to keep new products in the market even if entrants choose to enter. I present empirical evidence from the RTE cereal industry.     

产品兼容、网络效应与企业竞争力

在网络效应较强的产业中，技术设置的兼容性是左右企业成长的关键因素。随着技术进步、新兴产业的发展和市场竞争的加剧，产品兼容、网络效应对企业竞争力具有越来越重要的意义。在计算机、电信、银行、旅游、媒体、软件等产业中，用户在购买时十分注重产品或服务的兼容性和网络效应。本文以差异产品竞争模型为基础，考察了产品兼容、网络效应对企业竞争力的影响，就在位企业和新进入企业如何利用这两个产品差异变量增强其竞争力进行了分析。     

企业兼容竞争的博弈分析

本文以双寡头博弈模型为基础，考察了产品兼容对企业价格和利润的影响，就在位企业和新进入企业如何利用兼容策略增强其竞争力进行了分析。本文的结论是，借助于历史销售优势和适当的兼容策略，优势企业可以设置策略壁垒来阻止潜在进入者的进入和胁迫市场内的竞争对手退出市场，劣势企业也可以凭借生产兼容性能相当优越或单向兼容的产品参与市场竞争。     

Why Do Suppliers Charge Larger Buyers Lower Prices?

The phenomenon of input suppliers charging larger buyer firms, relative to smaller buyer firms, lower prices is commonly explained in terms of supplier economies of scale, supplier competition for larger buyers, and the larger bargaining power of larger buyers. This paper provides an alternative explanation, and shows that the observed direction of differential pricing can benefit the supplier by lowering the level of tacit collusion its buyers can sustain in their output market. This result also provides a new mechanism through which a ban on price discrimination by input suppliers may lower consumer welfare.     

Modelling the effect of buyer and seller power on the margins of commodity plastics

In the last decade, large sectors of the chemical and plastics industries in the U.S.A. and West Europe have suffered drastic declines in price and gross margin during periods of low use of industry capacity. This paper shows that the major changes in gross margin observed for some commodity plastics can be modelled successfully in terms of the balance between buyer power and seller power. These industries have visibility of prices and industry occupacity and comparable concentrations of sellers and important buyers. The modelling follows Burgess (1982) in expressing buyer and seller power as simple functions of buyer and seller concentrations, industry occupacity and ‘cohesion’ between sellers. This work provides a first practical test of this new approach. It is shown that the model fits the observed data best if the ‘cohesion’ declines as occupacity declines. It is suggested that the approach would be useful in understanding the behaviour of other ‘near-commodity’, capital-intensive businesses, and in helping to distinguish between those businesses where margins are likely to remain relatively stable and those which might face drastically declining margins if the industry occupacity declines or new entrants change the balance between sellers and buyers.     

Strategic entry and potential competition: Evidence from compressed gas fuel retail

We provide novel evidence on the effect of the threat of potential competition on the timing of entry in a new and growing industry. Exploiting a change in regulation in the Italian retail fuel market that generates exogenous variation in the number of potential entrants in the emerging Compressed Natural Gas segment, we show that markets with a higher number of potential entrants witness speedier entry decisions. We document that this result is likely driven by an increase in the incentives to preempt the market due to heightened risk of being anticipated by competitors.     

苯乙烯行业发展前景预测

介绍了国内苯乙烯行业的发展情况,运用SWOT(机会、威胁、优势、劣势)分析法和五力模型(同行业竞争、原料供应、客户市场、市场新进入者和替代产品)等分析方法和工具,分析了华东地区苯乙烯市场的发展前景。对苯乙烯行业未来发展进行了预测,并提出了发展建议。     

Facilities to service based competition,not service to facilities based,for broadband penetration: A comparative study between the United States and South Korea

As a fundamental infrastructure in the Era of Information, a broadband network has a significant impact on democracy, economy, and society, indicating the importance of policy to increase broadband penetration. Considering the characteristics of broadband as a network, many governments introduced service-based competition, which is assumed to lower entry barriers by allowing entrants to lease incumbents' facilities, as a stepping stone to facilities-based competition.Questioning this unidirectional approach, the present study examines how the direction of policy implementation, that is service- to facilities-based versus facilities- to service-based, affects broadband diffusion. Through the case study of the U.S. and South Korea which experienced both modes of competition in opposing temporal sequences, this research concludes that facilities- to service-based competition might contribute to higher and faster broadband diffusion than service- to facilities-based competition. Rather than impose unbundling obligations against incumbents, facilities-based competition with financial support of the government to entrants seems to induce an earlier peak in broadband penetration. Additionally, consistent commitment of the government enforcement appears to be critical in implementing service-based competition.Though limited to the cases of the U.S. and Korea, this study suggests that service-based competition may be neither a necessity to facilitate broadband diffusion nor a precondition to introduce facilities-based competition. Moreover, service-based competition policy can function to deter overbuild of facilities and lessen the financial burden of broadband service providers if adopted after an initial period of facilities-based competition policy, which includes government investment in broadband facilities, that seems to help promote competition and give incentives to construct networks.Contrary to the literature, the present study raises a new perspective of the role of service-based competition as an enhancer for service quality and that of facilities-based competition with government investment as a booster of early and rapid broadband diffusion.     

Brand-specific tastes for quality

This paper develops a model of nonlinear pricing with competition. The novel element is that each consumer's willingness to pay for quality is private information and is allowed to differ across brands. The consumer's preferences are represented by a multidimensional type containing the marginal value of quality for different products. Buyers with high willingness to pay for quality also display strong preferences for particular brands, and require higher discounts in order to switch away from their favorite product. Therefore, competition is fiercer for buyers with lower tastes for quality, and hence more elastic demands. This is in sharp contrast to earlier models in which competition is fiercer for higher-taste, more valuable buyers. In equilibrium, firms either compete intensively for the entire market (providing strictly positive rents to all consumers) or shut down the least profitable segment of the market. Quality levels are distorted downwards for all buyers, except for those with the highest type. The number of competing firms and the degree of correlation across brand preferences enhance the efficiency of the allocation.     

ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN LOCAL HOSPITAL MARKETS*

We extend the entry model developed by Bresnahan and Reiss to make use of quantity information, and apply it to data on the U.S. hospital industry. The Bresnahan and Reiss model infers changes in the toughness of competition from entry threshold ratios. Entry threshold ratios, however, identify the product of changes in the toughness of competition and changes in fixed costs. By using quantity data, we are able to identify separately changes in the toughness of competition from changes in fixed costs. This model is generally applicable to industries where there are good data on market structure and quantity, but not on prices, as for example in the quinquennial U.S. Economic Census. In the hospital markets we examine, entry leads to a quick convergence to competitive conduct. Entry reduces variable profits and increases quantity. Most of the effects of entry come from having a second and a third firm enter the market.     

Sunk costs, windows of profit opportunities, and the dynamics of entry

This article adds two elements to a standard model of monopolistic competition: First, the number of potential entrants is limited in each period and increases only over time. Second, the potential entrants differ with respect to the consumers’ valuation of the variant they could offer. The resulting simple model exhibits a rich dynamic structure covering the product life cycle, a path dependent equilibrium and the traditional textbook case of entry. The welfare analysis confirms the view that there cannot be too much entry. Even entry of ‘inefficient’ firms improves welfare.     

Potential competition and the factors influencing banking concentration

Multiple regression analysis is used to study the factors influencing market concentration in urban banking markets. The results indicate that independentde novo entry and shifts in population from the central city to the suburbs can be important deconcentrating factors in urban banking markets. In terms of the potential competition doctrine, the results suggest that attractive banking markets are likely to attract enough actual and potential entrants to mitigate any problems associated with a leading bank acquisition by a potential entrant. On the other hand, potential competition is more likely to be an issue in less attractive banking markets where the probability of entry is low.     

Branding importance in business-to-business markets: Three buyer clusters

With the growth of e-commerce and global competition, business-to-business (B2B) marketers are showing increased interest in the potential of branding, especially at the corporate level. This paper describes branding in the context of B2B markets, and examines its perceived importance to buyers. A review of relevant literature and the development of a conceptual model enables a cluster analysis of data from a survey of industrial buyers. The exploratory analysis examines to whom branding is important, and in what situations. Three clusters of buyers are found: branding receptive, highly tangible, and low interest. The practical implications for managers are explored.     

Competing buyers,rent extraction and inefficient exclusion

The article illustrates how a seller profitably can prevent entry of a potential competitor, even when entry would increase industry profit. Entry is prevented by offering exclusive contracts to the buyers. The buyers are assumed to be differentiated firms, competing in a downstream market. Exclusion occurs in equilibrium as long as there is some degree of competition among the downstream firms, and even when there are no economies of scale in upstream production.     

Multinational Companies and Entrant Start-up Size: Evidence from Quantile Regressions

This paper analyses the impact of foreign multinationals on the start-up size ofdomestic entrants in Irish manufacturing industries. We use the regression quantileestimator, which allows us to take account of the heterogeneity of entrants' start-upsize. Estimation results show that the presence of foreign multinationals in a sectorimpacts negatively on the start-up size of domestic entrants of all sizes in modernsectors and on the start-up size of large domestic entrants in traditional sectors. Thisnegative effect may be attributed to competition of domestic plants with foreignmultinationals and other domestic plants in the final goods and/or the intermediategoods market.     

Complementarities and competition: Unpacking the drivers of entrants' technology choices in the solar photovoltaic industry

Entrants in new industries pursue distinct technologies in hopes of winning the technology competition and achieving sustainable competitive advantage. We draw on the complementary assets framework to predict entrants' technology choices in an emerging industry. Evidence from the global solar photovoltaic industry supports our arguments that entrants are more likely to choose technologies with higher technical performance and for which key complementary assets are available in the ecosystem. However, diversifying entrants are more likely to trade off superior performance for complementary asset availability whereas start‐up entrants are more likely to trade off complementary asset availability for superior performance. This difference is largely due to diversifying entrants with pre‐entry capabilities related to the industry. The study offers a novel illustration of how complementarities and competition shape entry strategies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.