证券市场新旧投资理念更替过程研究：一个基于演化视角的分析

本文借助惯例演化博弈模型来分析证券市场新旧投资理念的更替过程。本文的主要结论如下。选择现有投资理念的个体所占比重以及选择新投资理念的相对效用决定了现有投资理念实现ESS均衡的难度；现有投资理念的ESS均衡不是随机稳定均衡(SSE)，而新投资理念的ESS均衡是惟一的SSE；在特定投资者空间分布和信息交换模式下，选择新投资理念的成员规模和协同效应的限定程度决定了新投资理念能否扩散。     

外部掠夺下的国防开支与经济增长

本文建立了一个国际冲突环境中的一国经济长期增长模型。模型假定国际环境为霍布斯状态,一国不得不时刻面临外部掠夺,而阻止外部掠夺的唯一途径是投资国防。掠夺者、政府和家庭的动态博弈均衡决定了长期增长路径。分析表明,国际和国内因素两个层次的均衡决定了长期均衡增长路径;均衡增长路径可分为屈服均衡、容忍均衡和完全防卫均衡三个阶段;政府不同的国防战略会导致不同的增长图景,经济持续增长将导致国防战略的内生调整。     

论凯恩斯的"萧条经济学理论体系"

在凯思斯的经济学说中,一国短期的均衡就业量和收入水平,决定于有效需求,而有效需求又是由消费需求和投资需求构成的.消费需求是由消费倾向所决定的;投资需求是由资本边际效率与利息率决定 的.由消费需求和投资需求构成的总需求和现有生产要素所决定的总供给,决定一国短期均衡的就业和收入 水平.凯恩斯是由就业不足引到有效需求不足、引到投资不足与消费不足乃至货币不足,构成了被人们称之为"萧条经济学体系".在资本主义出现有效需求不足、经济萧条和严重失业时,凯恩斯主张采取积极财政政策,直接增加政府的支出和公共投资,以刺激经济增长,解决失业问题.因为消费倾向在短期内是相对稳定的,因而要实现充分就业就必须从增加投资需求着手.     

外部掠夺下的国防开支与经济增长

本文建立了一个国际冲突环境中的一国经济长期增长模型。模型假定国际环境为霍布斯状态,一国不得不时刻面临外部掠夺,而阻止外部掠夺的唯一途径是投资国防。掠夺者、政府和家庭的动态博弈均衡决定了长期增长路径。分析表明,国际和国内因素两个层次的均衡决定了长期均衡增长路径;均衡增长路径可分为屈服均衡、容忍均衡和完全防卫均衡三个阶段;政府不同的国防战略会导致不同的增长图景,经济持续增长将导致国防战略的调整。内生     

浅论现行汇率决定理论

本文结合国内外相关理论分别从基于购买力平价的汇率决定理论、局部均衡框架下的均衡汇率决定理论和一般均衡框架下的均衡汇率决定理论三方面分析了现行汇率决定理论,在此基础上浅析了中国汇率制度选择的相关问题。     

税收竞争、经济集聚与地区投资行为

中国财政分权体制下的地区间招商引资竞争广泛存在。本文通过一个纳入经济集聚因素的新古典投资决策计量模型,考察了税收激励对投资地域选择的影响。研究发现目前在中东部地区经济集聚可为地方财政带来一定的集聚租金,这使地区间税收激励政策呈现为差异化竞争策略;投资的流动性、地区经济基础、投资的产权性质等均对地区的税收激励政策选择有重要影响。本文的研究意味着,实现区域均衡发展需要构建稳定的地区间财力分享制度、改善欠发达地区的产业发展基础。     

新形势下中国企业对外投资的区位选择综合决策模型

对外直接投资的区位选择是跨国公司管理决策的关键点,在很大程度上决定着投资的成败,现有理论在解决了众多为何要对外投资的问题,但在向何处投资的问题上却没有理论和模型可以全面解释。本文建立了新的对外直接投资的区位选择决策二级系统模型,将影响因素按影响效果和属性分类,利用模糊优选方法解决了非量化因素的量化可比性问题。并将本国与外国因素融入同一模型,同时解决了是否要进行对外投资和向何处投资两个问题。     

动物精神、投资与国际资本移动

在债务危机后的一个时期里,发展中国家努力把外逃资本吸引回国和恢复国内私人投资。但是,在许多情况下随着时间的推移,投资及与其相关的资本流入仍令人失望且极不均衡。本文提出了这些国家的投资与资本流出入的模型。论文的主要点是将对本国资本的财政报酬递增引入标准的动态最优化模型。由此得到的系统可以显示出多重稳定状态与令人惊异的动态行为。在选择经济收敛的均衡时,初始条件与预期对其都会有影响。对于某些初始条件而言,“动物精神”能够决定投资与资本流动的进程。围绕一个次福利均衡将会出现一个极限循环。     

考虑税收因素的投资机会一般均衡分析

一、引言 本文的目标是给出在考虑税收因素时,投资者对不同的投资机会选择的均衡机制.本文所指的投资机会的均衡是指投资者在政府债券、公司债券、公司股票、实物投资这四种投资方式间达到的种均衡状态.均衡时在投资者的投资组合中没有进一步的改进可以在降低投资者风险的同时提高投资者的收益.     

政府研发投资与长期经济增长

本文在一个资本积累和创新相互作用的增长框架中引入政府研发投资,考察了政府研发投资对经济增长的影响。通过分析知道,政府研发投资通过影响休闲劳动选择、消费投资(包括物质资本积累和研发投资)选择,从而影响经济增长;政府研发投资规模越大,经济增长率越高。本文还就我国1980—2006年间政府研发投资对经济增长的影响进行了实证研究。通过协整检验,发现我国政府研发投资与经济增长之间存在长期均衡关系,政府研发投资可以促进经济增长。此外,本文发现政府研发投资对民间物质资本投资和民间人力资本投资也有直接的促进作用。     

Social norms and trust among strangers

We study the development of a social norm of trust and reciprocity among a group of strangers via the “contagious strategy” as defined in Kandori (1992). Over an infinite horizon, the players anonymously and randomly meet each other and play a binary trust game. In order to provide the investors with proper incentives to follow the contagious strategy, there is a sufficient condition that requires that there exists an outside option for the investors. Moreover, the investorsʼ payoff from the outside option must converge to the payoff from trust and reciprocity as the group size goes to infinity. We show that this sufficient condition is also a necessary condition to sustain any sequential equilibrium in which the trustees adopt the contagious strategy. Our results imply that a contagious equilibrium only supports trust if trust contributes almost nothing to the investorsʼ payoffs.     

企业资源配置战略与盈余价值相关性*

本文基于资源配置战略视角，以我国2007—2016年非金融类A股上市公司为样本，实证探究不同资源配置战略下的盈余价值相关性差异。研究发现：从整体看，经营主导型公司的净利润较投资主导型公司更具有价值相关性；从构成看，核心利润的价值相关性在经营主导型公司中更强、投资收益的价值相关性在投资主导型公司中更强。综上表明，资源配置战略是影响公司盈余价值相关性的重要因素。本文丰富和扩展了有关盈余价值相关性的研究，为投资者解读公司的盈余信息提供了一种新视角，对投资决策具有一定的借鉴意义。     

Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly

Summary. Consider an oligopolistic industry composed of two groups (or populations) of firms, the low cost firms and the high cost firms. The firms produce a homogeneous good. I study the finite population evolutionarily stable strategy defined by Schaffer (1988), and the long run equilibrium in the stochastic evolutionary dynamics based on imitation and experimentation of strategies by firms in each group. I will show the following results. 1) The finite population evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) output is equal to the competitive (or Walrasian) output in each group of the firms. 2) Under the assumption that the marginal cost is increasing, the ESS state is the long run equilibrium in the stochastic evolutionary dynamics in the limit as the output grid step, which will be defined in the paper, approaches to zero. Received: September 19, 1997; revised: June 18, 1998     

On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models

We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, 72.     

The power of ESS: An experimental study

Abstract. Our experimental design mimics a traditional evolutionary game framework where players are matched pairwise to play a symmetric 33 bimatrix game that has two Nash equilibria. One equilibrium is an evolutionary stable state, or ESS; the other is an equilibrium in dominated strategies. Our primary experimental result is the observation that the ESS becomes extremely attractive when subjects have minimal information about the payoff functions, although the dominated equilibrium assures the highest equilibrium payoff. The attractiveness of the ESS is only moderate when players are completely informed about the 33 payoff matrix. Correspondence to: S.K. Berninghaus     

A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium

It is shown that the equilibrium notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) does have predictive power for standard models of Bertrand competition. This is in contrast to a recent claim by Qin and Stuart (1997). The claim is based on the observation that the solution concept ESS behaves discontinuously when finite (discrete) action games approach an infinite (continuous) action game in the limit. Furthermore, it is argued that from a model-theoretic point of view evolutionary stability in prices (i.e. in the Bertrand model) is quite different from evolutionary stability in quantities (i.e. in the Cournot model).     

Portfolio choice, attention allocation, and price comovement

This paper models the attention allocation of portfolio investors. Investors choose the composition of their information subject to an information flow constraint. Given their expected investment strategy in the next period, which is to hold a diversified portfolio, in equilibrium investors choose to observe one linear combination of asset payoffs as a private signal. When investors use this private signal to update information about two assets, changes in one asset affect both asset prices and may lead to asset price comovement. The model also has implications for the transmission of volatility shocks between two assets.     

异质性预期、投资者行为与房价波动：上海和广州的双城记?

房地产市场中存在大量的投资者,其市场行为会使房价出现大幅的波动,从而引起市场不稳定。文章在引入投资者异质性预期假设的基础上,构建了包含房地产消费者、投资者、供给者在内的房地产市场均衡模型,分析了房地产市场中基本面型投资者和趋势型投资者的异质性行为对房价变动的影响,并利用上海和广州两个一线城市的实际数据进行了对比分析。研究结果表明：在房地产市场中,两类投资者对于未来房价不同的预期以及投资行为会引起房价的变动;上海投资者的行为整体上会使上海的房价始终处于不断上涨的趋势中,而广州投资者的行为会随着投资策略的转变而使静态下的“整体上推动房价趋势型变化”转变为“整体上将房价‘拉回’基本面价格”;房地产市场中的投资者占比会显著影响房价的变动趋势,当基本面型投资者占比上升时,房价偏离度和房价变动率降低,而当这类投资者占比达到峰值时,房价会出现拐点;投资者之间的策略转换速度也会通过引起基本面型投资者占比的变化,引起房价的频繁波动,而且策略转换速度越快,房价波动越频繁。     

转型环境下创业战略与新创企业竞争优势关系研究

创新战略有利于企业构建新的价值链，模仿战略是对市场已有价值链的补充，现有研究主要关注创新战略，对模仿战略关注不足，实践中很多新创企业通过模仿战略实现创业成功。特别地，中国转型环境下制度不完善造成的不良竞争环境会制约创新战略，促进模仿战略。然而，实践中这两种战略对新创企业均存在积极影响，选择创新战略还是模仿战略事关新创企业创业成败。考察技术、市场环境和制度环境特征，剖析不同技术和市场环境下不良竞争对创新战略和模仿战略的调节作用。利用153份新创企业样本研究发现：创新战略和模仿战略均有利于竞争优势，但不同环境特征下作用效果存在差异。不良竞争对模仿战略的影响与技术、市场环境特征不相关；对创新战略的影响与技术、市场环境特征相关。创新战略和模仿战略并不存在孰优孰劣，是一定约束条件下新创企业战略决策的结果。     

The possibility of informationally efficient markets

A rational expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist under fully revealing asset price—contrary to a wide-held conjecture. Whereas a continuum of investors is inconsistent with fully revealing equilibrium, finitely many investors with average portfolios demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size in an additive signal-return model. More information diminishes the expected excess return of a risky asset so that investors who only have a choice of portfolio composition or whose asset endowments strongly differ from the average portfolio are worse off. Under fully revealing price, information market equilibria both with and without information acquisition are Pareto efficient.