Is the accrual anomaly robust to firm-level analysis?

This study investigates whether firm-level accrual mispricing exists and if such mispricing is persistent. Our results show both under and overpricing of accruals that persevere. Specifically, we show that a trading strategy going a dollar long (short) in underpriced (overpriced) accrual firms yields significant abnormal returns in most years investigated. We examine whether firm characteristics such as size, analyst following and real activities management can explain why some firms are mispriced and others not. Our findings show that firm-level mispricing differs from that documented at the country-level. Whilst the country-level anomaly seems to have diminished; the firm-level accrual anomaly remains.     

Financial distress and the accrual anomaly

We find that the accrual anomaly is concentrated in healthy firms and is absent in financially distressed firms. The differential persistence between accruals and cash flows is the main driver of the relationship. Prior studies propose two explanations for the accrual anomaly: (1) accounting distortions of accruals and (2) investment mispricing. Our empirical evidence supports the former and challenges the latter. Our findings also disagree with the idea that the accrual anomaly is distress risk premium in disguise.     

Analyst cash flow forecasts and pricing of accruals

This paper investigates how analyst cash flow forecasts affect investors' valuation of accounting accruals. We find that the strength of the accrual anomaly documented in Sloan (1996) is weaker for firms with analyst cash flow forecasts, after controlling for idiosyncratic risk, transaction costs and firm characteristics associated with the issuance of cash flow forecasts. We further show that this reduction in mispricing of accounting accruals is at least partially attributed to the improved ability of investors to price earnings manipulations imbedded in accruals. We investigate several non-mutually exclusive alternative explanations for this improvement in investors' ability and demonstrate that the increased investor attention and the improved accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts both contribute to the mitigation of the accrual anomaly.     

Exchange-traded fund ownership and underlying stock mispricing

In response to the increasing proliferation of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and a warning from the Wall Street hero Michael Burry that passive investing has put the stock market into ‘bubble’ territory, we examine the relation between stock ownership by ETFs and mispricing from 2002 to 2018. We find that increased ETF ownership induces overpricing in underlying stocks. We then identify three mechanisms for this relationship: the overpricing of stocks attributable to increased ETF ownership is stronger for stocks that experience an increase in passive ETF ownership; during periods characterised by high investor sentiment; and for illiquid stocks. Our results are robust to a battery of tests including alternative measures for all key variables and are not confounded by the global financial crisis. Additional analyses show that mispricing caused by ETF ownership change is not driven by firm fundamentals and does not exacerbate stocks' information environment around earnings announcement.     

Accrual anomaly and mandatory adoption of IFRS: Evidence from Germany

This study examines the effect of mandatory adoption of IFRS on the accrual anomaly in Germany. Using the setting in Germany between 2002 and 2008, we find that the accrual anomaly occurs between 2002 and 2004 (pre-IFRS period) but disappears between 2006 and 2008 (post-IFRS period). Results are consistent after extending the test period to 2010 and controlling for analysts' cash forecasts. We also find that German firms with more significant improvements in analysts following, forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion, and earnings management following mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 have greater decline of the accrual anomaly between 2006 and 2008. Overall, our findings suggest that IFRS adoption together with improved reporting enforcement significantly reduces the accrual anomaly in Germany.     

IPO限价发行与新股二级市场价格泡沫——论股票市场“弹簧效应”

本文通过对比2009年7月1日至2014年6月30日IPO市场化定价发行阶段与2014年7月1日至2018年6月30日IPO限价发行阶段共1950个IPO样本,发现IPO限价发行对于新股在二级市场股价表现具有“弹簧效应”:即抑制股票一级市场发行价格会造成新股在二级市场价格短期内超涨,限价发行新股的二级市场定价显著高于市场化定价发行新股的二级市场定价。限价发行引起的过高二级市场定价最终导致股票长期回报率低下。另外,创业板公司“弹簧效应”显著强于主板公司。这些实证结果都可以被本文提出的一级市场价格压抑造成二级市场非理性投资者上涨预期一致、盲目追涨的理论模型所解释。本文的研究指出抑制股票一级市场定价虽然形式上可以解决新股发行价过高问题,但是却造成二级市场更大的价格扭曲。这一发现为进一步完善我国IPO发行定价机制提供了依据。     

Does Accrual Management Impair the Performance of Earnings‐Based Valuation Models?

This study examines how accrual manipulations affect firm valuation in the years surrounding the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). We compare the absolute percentage pricing errors of RIM and DCF valuation models for a group of US firms suspected to have engaged in accrual manipulations to avoid a small loss or a small earnings decline vs. ‘Normal’ firms matched on industry, year and size. We find that RIM can better estimate intrinsic value than DCF for the matched Normal firms in the pre‐SOX period, but not so for accrual manipulators, and that SOX mitigates the harmful effect of accrual manipulations, completely eliminating the difference in RIM's accuracy advantage over DCF between Normal firms and accrual manipulators. As a further analysis, we redefine Suspect firms as real‐activity manipulators and find a significant across‐group difference in accuracy wedge in both sample periods, implying that SOX has prompted firms to favor real‐activity manipulations over accrual manipulations.     

Why do firm fundamentals predict returns? Evidence from short selling activity

This study uses short selling activity to test whether the relation between fundamentals and future returns is due to rational pricing or mispricing. We find that short sellers target firms with fundamental performance below market expectations. We also show that short selling activity reduces the return predictability of fundamentals by speeding up the price adjustments to negative fundamental signals. To further investigate whether the returns earned by short sellers reflect rational risk premia or mispricing, we exploit a natural experiment, namely Regulation of SHO, which creates exogenous shocks to short selling by temporarily relaxing short-sale constraints. Evidence from the experiment confirms that the superior returns to short sellers result from exploiting overpricing. Overall, our study suggests that the return predictability of fundamentals reflects mispricing rather than rational risk premia.     

Mispricing firm-level productivity

This paper provides a mispricing-based explanation for the negative relation between firm-level productivity and stock returns. Investors appear to underprice unproductive firms and overprice productive firms. We find evidence consistent with the speculative overpricing of productive firms driven by investor sentiment and short sale constraints. Investors erroneously extrapolate past productivity growth and its associated operating performance and stock returns, despite their subsequent reversals. Such mispricing is perpetuated because of limits to arbitrage and is partially corrected around earnings announcements when investors are surprised by unexpected earnings news. Decomposition analysis indicates that extrapolative mispricing and limits to arbitrage explain most of the return predictability of firm-level productivity.     

Earnings management and accrual anomaly across market states and business cycles

This paper examines if the conditioning on market states is important to earnings management behaviors and profitability of accrual hedge strategy. This paper discusses four findings. First, accrual profits are consistently positive across both market states and significantly higher in DOWN markets. Second, while earnings management exists in both market states, the management effort is less effective and short-lived in the DOWN state. Third, this paper finds that the accrual effect exists but varies across industries. Finally, this paper examines how business cycles associate with accrual anomaly and show that accruals mispricing cannot be fully captured by macroeconomic model predicted returns.     

An integrated analysis of the association between accrual disclosure and the abnormal accrual anomaly

We find no evidence of accrual mispricing for firms that disclose accrual information at earnings announcements. For these firms, the market differentiates the discretionary from the nondiscretionary components of the earnings surprise. In contrast, the market fails to distinguish between the discretionary and the nondiscretionary components of the earnings surprise for firms that do not disclose accrual information at earnings announcements. These firms experience some stock price correction around the filing date. However, the correction is only partial, resulting in a post-filing drift.

The valuation impact of reconciling pro forma earnings to GAAP earnings

Regulation G requires all companies to quantitatively reconcile pro forma earnings with GAAP earnings. This paper provides three findings related to the impact of reconciliations on mispricing of pro forma earnings. First, prior to Reg G, we find that mispricing of pro forma earnings is limited to firms with low reconciliation quality. There is no evidence of mispricing for firms with high reconciliation quality. Second, we find no evidence of mispricing after Reg G. Third, there is a cross-Reg G reduction of mispricing for firms whose reconciliation quality improves, and there continues to be no mispricing for firms that have high reconciliation quality both before and after Reg G. Together, our results support the notion that better reconciliations reduce the extent of mispricing.     

Buy Smart,Time Smart: Are Takeovers Driven by Growth Opportunities or Mispricing?

Excessively high pricing by bidders and targets can be explained by new growth opportunities created by the merger or by irrational overpricing in financial markets. We integrate both explanations through a new decomposition of firm value and investigate whether it is “true” growth value or mispricing that drives takeover waves. We find that “bidders buy smart.” Bidders primarily have high market values because of growth opportunities and overpricing, and select targets that are less overpriced with similar fundamental growth value. Bidders also seem to “time smart.” Takeover activity increases when bidders are more overpriced, in order to cushion against price corrections.     

SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND STOCK RETURNS

We examine relations between sustainable growth and stock returns over 1964–2007. Findings indicate that high sustainable growth firms tend to have low default risk, low book‐to‐market ratios, and low subsequent returns. Of the four sustainable growth components, we find that the net profit margin is the major determinant of subsequent returns. Results persist after controlling for asset growth and capital expenditure growth. Additional tests indicate that the sustainable growth effect is attributable to risk and not to mispricing.     

Mispricing of Research and Development Investments in a Rapidly Emerging and Electronics-Dominated Market

This paper documents prevailing mispricing of research and development (R&D) investments in the Taiwan stock market, a rapidly emerging and electronics-dominated market. Applying stock return data from July 1988 to June 2005, we observe that R&D-intensive stocks tend to outperform stocks with little or no R&D. The R&D-intensity effect cannot be attributed fully to firm size and seasonal effects. The R&D-associated anomaly not only exists but also persists for up to three years. The market apparently undervalues R&D-intensive firms and overvalues non-R&D-intensive firms. Finally, the R&D anomaly is clearer for firms in the electronics industry after 1996.     

Finding diamonds in the rough: Analysts’ selective following of loss‐reporting firms

Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.     

An Analysis of the Theories and Explanations Offered for the Mispricing of Accruals and Accrual Components

Numerous accounting studies claim that investors fail to rationally price accrual‐related information and that investors are functionally fixated. This study documents the importance of performing robustness tests when testing economic or behavioral explanations for apparent accounting‐related security mispricing. We find that performing robustness tests that exclude a small number of firm‐year observations (approximately 200 firm‐year observations or about 1% of the entire sample) reveals an inverted U‐shaped relation between buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns and total accruals. An inverted U‐shaped relation is inconsistent with the functional fixation (earnings fixation) hypothesis. We conduct similar robustness tests for the abnormal accrual anomaly and the net operating assets anomaly proposed by other investigators, and also find an inverted U‐shaped relation between buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns and abnormal accruals and net operating assets. These findings are inconsistent with the explanations put forth by those investigators. Such evidence leads us to conclude that the accrual‐related anomalies are unlikely to be due to investors' inability to process accounting information, as suggested by the functional fixation hypotheses tested.     

Analysts’ pre-tax income forecasts and the tax expense anomaly

This paper examines whether analysts’ pre-tax income forecasts mitigate the tax expense anomaly documented by Thomas and Zhang (J Account Res 49:791–821, 2011). They find that seasonal changes in quarterly income tax expense are positively related to future returns after controlling for the earnings surprise and conclude that investors underreact to value-relevant information in tax expense. When analysts issue both earnings and pre-tax income forecasts, they implicitly provide a forecast of income tax expense. We posit that this implicit forecast helps investors recognize the persistence of current tax expense surprise for future earnings. Accordingly, we expect that mispricing of tax expense will be less severe for firms with earnings and pre-tax income forecasts. As expected, we find that the presence of pre-tax income forecasts significantly weakens the positive relation between tax expense surprise and future returns, consistent with analysts’ implicit forecasts of tax expense mitigating the tax expense anomaly.     

Earnings persistence, accruals and managerial share ownership

We investigate the relationship between earnings persistence and a broad measure of total accruals (TACC). We propose and find that in Australia, TACC is less persistent than cash flows. We further propose that the persistence of accrual components is positively associated with the reliability of those components. However, we find that the least reliable accrual component has the greatest persistence and suggest possible reasons for this. We then investigate the relationship between earnings persistence and managerial share ownership, but find no evidence of a consistent, strong relationship. Rather, for the non-current operating accruals we find evidence consistent with incentive alignment for large firms with high operating cash flows, whereas for small firms we find evidence consistent with efficient contracting.