人力资本专用性对企业培训投资的影响

人力资本按其专用程度可以划分为通用性人力资本、准专用性人力资本和专用性人力资本。人力资本的专用程度影响着企业和雇员投资于人力资本培训的意愿及其投资量的大小。文章在分析企业和雇员各自培训投资的成本、风险和收益的基础上提出了一些促进双方投资于人力资本培训的建议     

企业人力资本投资的困境

本文以产权理论为依据,分析了企业人力资本投资的困境.人力资本的天然私有性使得企业进行培训投资的直接结果是受训者人力资本水平的提高,企业在与培训后雇员的谈判关系中处于不利地位,企业必须将培训的部分收益给予雇员,形成企业人力资本投资的困境,从而对企业事前的培训投资产生一定的扭曲.只有当预期未来收益足够高时,企业才会提供培训.各种影响企业获得收益的因素都会对企业的培训产生影响.     

经营者隐性人力资本与股权激励的经济学分析

经营者是拥有重要的隐性人力资本的“经济人”。经营者能力是具有“聚变效应”特性、专用性、利益相关性、不可分割性等特质的一种隐性人力资本。通过分成合约把经营者隐性人力资本所有权转化为对企业的剩余索取权，为企业的法人财产权奠定坚实的法人治理基础，使企业真正成为一个非人力资本与人力资本的契约，从而实现经营者能力资本化。股权制是经营者能力资本化有效的实现形式之一，但需要高效的资本市场、经理人市场、商品市场与合理的公司股权结构等隐性激励制度的配合。     

信息不对称与企业年金市场微观激励机制研究

本文针对企业年金发展滞后,利用博弈论考察信息不对称下雇主和雇员参与企业年金的微观激励机制。企业年金的人力资源管理价值是雇主的主要激励。在企业内部,雇主希望通过提供企业年金提升工作效率并留住雇员,但效果有待检验;在企业外部,雇主希望以企业年金为信号吸引优秀雇员,但雇主间的竞争、雇员对雇主行为的理解以及雇员的预期增大了雇主收益的不确定性。雇员参加企业年金计划旨在为养老提供储备,这有赖于企业年金基金管理机构的质量和费率。政府规制无法确保机构的质量,增加了雇员收益的不确定性;有效地规制可能导致的垄断和高费率,侵蚀雇员利益。仿真结果证明了理论推演。政策应该着眼于提高雇主和雇员在企业年金市场的预期收益。     

企业整体薪酬制度重构的理念阐释

企业整体薪酬制度是一个包含了经济性薪酬和非经济性薪酬、知识性资本报酬与雇员薪金、显性薪酬和隐性薪酬的多重组合。如何通过技术性和创新性的组合，既激励企业人力资本发挥其全部效能，又实现企业最大效益，是整体薪酬制度重构中所遵循的理念。应该结合企业实际状况，在基于雇员薪金和企业业绩角度而进行的绩效薪酬激励中，用活基于长期激励性计划的股权激励和非经济性激励等激励计划。     

契约不完全一定导致投资无效率吗?——一个带有不对称信息的敲竹杠模型

经典的不完全契约理论认为,契约不完全会导致专用性人力资本投资的无效率。但是这难以解释现实中大量存在的雇员进行有效率投资的现象。通过在一个经典的敲竹杠模型中引入重复博弈和关于投资者能力的不对称信息,本文证明:契约不完全一定会导致敲竹杠,但是敲竹杠未必妨碍专用性人力资本投资效率。本文刻画了三类完美贝叶斯均衡(PBE):好的声誉使高能者在第一期做出社会最优的专用性人力资本投资,并且使低能者退出市场;中性的声誉使高能者和低能者都在第一期做出社会最优的专用性人力资本投资;而坏的声誉使高能者和低能者都退出市场。本文还表明,在动态环境下产权仍然是重要的。     

人力资本特性及其激励

人力资本在社会与经济发展中地位的不断提升决定着人们必须重视对人力资本的研究。人力资本表现出的特性决定着必须对人力资本建立一整套有机构成的评价体系。企业是市场中的企业，人力资本是市场中的资本。所以从人力资本特性出发的人力资本研究首先强调了人力资本的种种特性；其次，分析了人力资本的激励与约束问题，分析认为对人力资本重在激励，而激励与约束常存在某种替代性。而要较好地实现对人力资本的激励与约束，最终要依赖于一个健康、发育完善的市场。     

中国上市公司高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响——以福建省内的上市公司为例

现代企业拥有的资本包括财产资本和人力资本,在国际环境风云变幻、行业技术日新月异的今天,人力资本显得尤为重要,而高管无疑是企业人力资本的核心,如何激励高管人员努力工作、提高企业价值就成为一项重要课题。将高管人员薪酬与公司绩效联系起来是对高管进行激励约束的一种重要方法。     

四川民营企业人力资本投资的风险与对策

人力资本投资周期较长,往往导致投资括息不充分,给企业带来风险。四川民营企业多数属于劳动密集型中小企业,由于主客观的原因,更是很少重视人力资本投资。化解四川民营企业人力资本投资风险的对策有：匹配一般培训和特殊培训的投资收益和风险,建立合理的约束机制和补偿机制,完善薪酬制度,建立人力资本产权激励制度,加强企业文化建设并借用企业外部人力资本等。     

论企业薪酬设计

在知识经济下,随着经济的发展和企业规模的扩张以及随之而来的技术和管理过程的复杂化,物质资本的地位开始相对下降,人力资本的地位相对上升。因此,如何对企业的人力资本进行激励,成为关乎企业发展的重大问题。薪酬是企业激励人力资本的重要手段之一,完善的薪酬设计能使企业中的人力资本充分发挥作用。所以,薪酬设计在企业中发挥的作用也就越来越重要。     

基于培训视角的人力资本投资与企业绩效——中国非上市工业企业层面的截面数据分析

笔者利用2007年中国规模以上非上市工业企业构成的截面数据,用培训费衡量人力资本投资,实证分析了人力资本投资与企业绩效的关系。研究结果表明:企业的绩效与人力资本投资成正向关系;企业绩效与物质资本投资成负向关系;不同省份,人力资本投资对企业绩效影响波动较大,相对于西部地区来讲,中、东部地区人力资本投资对企业绩效的影响较大。因此,国家应该建立科学有效的人力资本投资体系,并形成稳定的投资制度。     

Human capital and the re‐employment of retrenchment labor in urban China

The inefficiency of state‐owned enterprises, followed by the economic reform in urban China, resulted in large‐scale retrenchment during the late1990s. The laid‐off workers were middle‐aged, not well educated and had accumulated a lot of firm‐specific human capital that was unlikely to be of value in the product market. In this study, we investigate how differently human capital affects laid‐off workers’ occupation choices: self‐employment, re‐employment and remaining unemployed. Using 2002 Chinese Household Income Project and 2009 Urban Household Survey datasets, we find that although general human capital measured by education is positively related to the probability of finding a job, it is negatively associated with the probability of self‐employment. Displaced workers with more sector‐specific work experience are more likely to be self‐employed than to be employed by others. Government‐sponsored training significantly increases the likelihood of finding a job. Health is positively associated with re‐employment.     

General training and oligopsony

I consider a duopsony model of a general skilled labour market. The source of the market power of the firms is the mobility cost of the workers. In the model general training is inefficient and the firms bear a share of the general training cost. If capital market imperfections prevent workers from investing in human capital, the imperfect competition in the skilled labour market compared with the perfect competition promotes general training. In order to remove the inefficiency of personnel training it is necessary to link together a minimum wage for skilled workers and loans to apprentices.     

金融上市企业高管人力资本对其薪酬的影响——兼评“限薪令”

本文以2007年和2008年我国金融类上市企业为样本,分析了高管人力资本与其薪酬的关系。研究发现,体现高管人力资本的学历、工龄、任期与管理能力等变量在总体上和高管薪酬显著相关,但高管的管理能力则与其薪酬负相关;从所有制性质看,国有企业高管的人力资本与其薪酬不相关,而在非国有企业则相关;从时间上看,2007年和2008年金融国有企业高管的人力资本与其薪酬均不相关。研究结果为正确评价我国金融类上市企业高管薪酬体系的合理性提供了参考和依据,也为决策者制定科学的高管薪酬激励制度提供了经验支撑。     

人力资本对企业绩效的影响研究——薪酬的中介作用

本研究基于资源基础理论，对企业人力资本进行定量测度的基础上，分析了2615家上市公司在2014年至2017年期间薪酬管理模式在人力资本对企业绩效影响过程中发挥的作用，并使用结构方程模型和多群组分析法对假设进行检验。研究结果表明，薪酬管理在人力资本与企业绩效之间起完全中介效应。高人力资本、高薪酬激励的企业的绩效要高于低人力资本、低薪酬激励的企业的绩效；本研究还发现当企业具有高人力资本和低薪酬激励时，企业绩效甚至会低于具有低人力资本、低薪酬激励的企业绩效。本研究突破传统薪酬管理的质性研究方法，为打开战略人力资源管理领域的“黑箱”提供了一个新的视角。     

Training, search and wage dispersion

This paper combines on-the-job search and human capital theory to study the coexistence of firm-funded general training and frequent job turnovers. Although ex ante identical, firms differ in their training decisions. The model generates correlations between various firm characteristics that are consistent with the data. Wage dispersion exists among ex ante identical workers because workers of the same productivity are paid differently across firms, and because workers differ in their productivity ex post. Endogenous training breaks the perfect correlation between work experience and human capital, which yields new insights on wage dispersion and wage dynamics.     

HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND CONTINUOUS TRAINING: EVIDENCE FOR EU COUNTRIES

This paper links data on continuous training from the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) to information on skill levels and earnings from the EU KLEMS growth and productivity accounts, to examine the relative magnitudes of continuous workforce training versus human capital formation through the general education system in the European Union. The measurement methodology draws from the literature on measuring intangible investments by firms and sources of growth in an accounting framework. The results suggest that in the EU15 group of countries, intangible investments in continuous training represent just under 2 percent of GDP or about 35 percent of expenditure on general education. The share of GDP accounted for by training is less than a third as large in the new member states. A growth accounting method is employed to show that failure to account for continuous training leads to an underestimate of the impact of human capital on output growth in the EU.     

International migration,economic policy and human capital accumulation: a simulation study

"This paper examines the economic policy implications of international migration and human capital accumulation within a dynamic general equilibrium model. Each country produces by means of physical and human capital of two types (skilled and unskilled labour). Along optimal growth paths in a world of diverging population growth rates immigration can only be beneficial when the free rider effect (i.e., not paying for training costs) exceeds the capital dilution effect of an increase in population growth. Under quite general conditions the optimal immigration rate is zero."     

论用人力资本所有者产权主导中国国有企业改革

我国国有企业的改革,仍然遵循着"谁投资,谁所有,谁受益"的货币资本产权原则,不能科学地体现中国国有企业的设立宗旨和特定功能,也不能科学地建立国有企业的治理结构。现实需要我们用人力资本产权原则替代货币资本的产权原则主导国有企业的下一步改革,用人力资本产权原则确定全体人民的国有资产所有权。     

Does Poaching Distort Training?

We analyse the efficiency of the labour market outcome in a competitive search equilibrium model with endogenous turnover and endogenous general human capital formation. We show that search frictions do not distort training decisions if firms and their employees are able to coordinate efficiently, for instance, by using long-term contracts. In the absence of efficient coordination devices there is too much turnover and too little investment in general training. Nonetheless, the number of training firms and the amount of training provided are constrained optimal, and training subsidies therefore reduce welfare.