Price authority and information sharing with competing supply chains

We characterize the degree of price discretion that two competing manufacturers grant their retailers in a framework where demand is uncertain and privately observed by the retailers, while manufacturers only learn it probabilistically. In contrast with the consolidated vertical contracting literature, we assume that manufacturers cannot use monetary incentives to align the retailers’ incentives to pass on their unverifiable distribution costs to consumers. Our objective is to study how, in this context, an information-sharing agreement according to which manufacturers share their demand information affects prices, profits and consumer surplus. While equilibria with full price delegation never exist, regardless of whether manufacturers share information, partial delegation equilibria may exist with and without the exchange of information. These equilibria feature binding price caps (list prices) that prevent retailers from passing on their distribution costs to consumers, and are more likely to occur when manufacturers exchange demand information than when they do not share this information. Manufacturers profit from exchanging demand information when products are sufficiently differentiated, and retailers’ distribution costs are high enough. Yet, expected prices are unambiguously lower when manufacturers exchange demand information than when they don’t, making the information exchange beneficial to consumers.     

Antitrust and Vertical Integration in “New Economy” Industries with Application to Broadband Access

Whether the firms that supply Internet hardware and software should face restrictions on the use of their property is an important and controversial policy issue. Advocates of “net neutrality”—including President Obama and the current FCC majority—believe that owners of broadband distribution systems (hardware used to distribute Internet and video services) and producers of certain “must-have” video content should be subject to prophylactic regulation that transcends present-day antitrust law enforcement. In the economic terms that are used in debates on competition policy, the concern is with vertical integration that may give firms both the opportunity (through denial of access or price discrimination) and incentive (increased profit) to restrict competition. This paper’s central point is that virtually every production process in the economy is vertically integrated, and economics predicts changes in the extent of vertical integration—that is, changes in the boundaries of the firm—in response to changes in relative prices, technology, or institutions. Both vertical integration and changes in the extent of vertical integration are benign characteristics of efficient, dynamic, competitive markets. While there is no shortage of theoretical models in which vertical integration may be harmful, most such models have restrictive assumptions and ambiguous welfare predictions—even when market power is assumed to be present. Empirical evidence that vertical integration or vertical restraints are harmful is weak, compared to evidence that vertical integration is beneficial—again, even in cases where market power appears to be present. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that prophylactic regulation is not necessary, and may well reduce welfare. Sound policy is to wait for ex post evidence of harm to justify interventions in specific cases. Net neutrality, recently enacted by the FCC but subject to judicial review, is an unfortunate idea.     

Vertical integration and innovation

Innovation is a driving force for most industries, where it moreover affects many stages of the vertical chain. We study the impact of vertical integration on innovation in an industry where firms need to undertake risky R&D investments at both production and distribution stages. Vertical integration brings better coordination within the integrated firm, which boosts its investment incentive at both upstream and downstream levels. However, it is only mutually beneficial for firms to integrate when both upstream and downstream innovations are important. When innovation is irrelevant at one level, firms favor instead vertical separation. The analysis provides insights for the wave of mergers and R&D outsourcing observed in the pharmaceutical industry and other vertically related industries.     

Vertical integration in a monopolistically competitive industry

This paper considers forward vertical integration by a monopolist producer of an intermediate good when the downstream industry is monopolistically competitive. Alternative methods of vertical control are considered in addition to the usual input mark-up; these include franchise fees, royalties, and resale price maintenance. It is found that these methods in combination achieve perfect or near-perfect replication of the outcome under full vertical integration. The case where downstream products are differentiated by location in a circular space is studied in detail, and alternative outcomes are ranked according to their social desirability.     

Vertical equilibrium in a competitive input market

Imperfect competition, imperfect information, disequilibrium, and rationing all induce vertical integration in relatively straightforward ways. But can vertical integration arise when firms are competitive and markets clear rapidly? This paper demonstrates that a vertical equilibrium can be generated when the intermediate market is subject to external fluctuations and when there are economies of coordination for firms which avoid the market via integration. The vertical equilibrium is one in which some firms will be integrated while some will not, despite the fact that all firms are identical. Thus, one need not conclude that differential degrees of integration within industries are the result of differing circumstances among firms.     

纵向一体化网络的接入定价研究

中国铁路、煤气、自来水、邮政等绝大多数网络型产业的结构改革将选择纵向一体化与自由接入作为突破口，研究纵向一体化网络的接入定价理论和政策已成为中国网络型产业规制政策研究的一个重要问题。本文首先依据资源最优配置、次优配置、生产效率等原则，研究了不同的接入定价理论，详细探讨了不同的接入定价方法，最后进一步分析了纵向一体化网络在不同政策目标下的接入定价政策选择。     

Implementing policy on next-generation broadband networks and implications for equity of access to high speed broadband: A case study of Australia's NBN

Next generation telecommunications infrastructure is expanding and supporting rapid growth of broadband technologies and a digital economy. In this context, digital information and communications technologies (ICTs) are of increasing importance as a means for people to gain access to health or social services, employment opportunities, information and social networks. In this article we draw on our recent case study research to examine the policy (and politics) shaping implementation of Australia's National Broadband Network (NBN) and its likely effects on equity of access to high speed broadband (HSB) services. We monitored NBN policy and implementation from 2015 to 2018 through policy documents, reports, and media. To assess likely effects of NBN policy on implementation and subsequently on equity of access to HSB we: a) applied a framework defining four elements of equity of access; and b) analysed stakeholder views drawn from media articles and 22 interviews with experts on NBN policy including politicians, government staff, and industry representatives. We found that equity considerations competed with political and commercial imperatives during the rollout of the NBN. This resulted in positive and negative consequences for equity of access to HSB, with a change in policy and implementation in 2013 bringing greater risks to equity of access. The case study provides a framework for considering equity in the implementation of next generation telecommunications infrastructure and highlights the importance of considering equity in the evaluation of telecommunications infrastructure.     

The impact of vertical integration on losses from collusion

Upstream collusion that increases the price of an input can harm an independent downstream producer (D). We ask whether this harm is more or less pronounced when D’s downstream rival is a vertically integrated producer. We find that such vertical integration increases D’s loss from collusion when D is not a particularly strong competitor. However, when D is a sufficiently strong competitor, vertical integration can reduce D’s loss from collusion when price competition prevails downstream.     

Strategic choice and broadband divergence in the transition to next generation networks: Evidence from Canada and the U.S.

This article investigates how infrastructure competition among broadband network infrastructure operators in Canada and the U.S. has influenced their incentives to increase fixed broadband connection speeds and invest in next generation fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) technologies. The evolution of measured broadband speeds since the late 2000s documents growing differences in the incentives of dominant broadband operators to respond to demand for higher speed connectivity by increasing connectivity speeds they deliver to their customers. Dominant network operators in Canada have shown relatively stronger incentives than their counterparts in the U.S. to invest in and increase the capacity of legacy platforms. In the U.S. FTTP deployment incentives have been somewhat stronger, but network operators have been more reluctant to upgrade legacy technologies to deliver higher speeds. Diversity of strategic choices by large operators helps explain increasing regional and local broadband infrastructure gaps within the two countries. A high dividend payout financial strategy and increasing vertical integration appear to enhance the potential for overinvestment and inefficient duplication in legacy platforms by competing infrastructure providers.     

Strategic investments under competition for access provision

We examine competition for access provision when symmetric vertically integrated firms invest in infrastructure upgrades. Spillovers through access have two effects (a wholesale-profit effect and a retail-production effect) on infrastructure investment made by vertically integrated firms. When the vertically integrated firms freely set access charges, due to the dominance of the wholesale-profit effect, quality differentials endogenously occur between these firms (asymmetric equilibria). When access charges are regulated, symmetric equilibria occur with multiple equilibrium investments due to the retail-production effect. Because competition for access provision induces a strong incentive for infrastructure investment, it also achieves a higher social welfare than does access regulation.     

INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND COMPETITION IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS*

We develop a model of information exchange between calling parties. We characterize the equilibrium when two interconnected networks compete by charging both for outgoing and incoming calls. We show that networks have reduced incentives to use off‐net price discrimination to induce a connectivity breakdown when calls originated and received are complements in the information exchange. This breakdown disappears if operators are allowed to negotiate reciprocal access charges. We also study the relationship between sending and receiving retail charges as a function of the level of access charges. We identify circumstances where private negotiations over access charges induce first‐best retail prices.     

Selling cross-border in online markets: The impact of the ban on geoblocking strategies

We develop a model of strategic geoblocking, where two competing multi-channel retailers, located in different countries, can decide to block access to their online store from foreign consumers. We characterize the equilibrium when firms decide unilaterally whether to introduce geoblocking restrictions. We show that geoblocking allows firms to soften competition, but at the cost of lower demand. A ban on geoblocking leads to lower prices, both offline and online. However, when firms can invest in increasing online demand, the ban may have adverse effects on investment and social welfare. We extend our analysis to account for price discrimination and investigate the role of shipping costs.     

A contingent plan for disaster response

Natural and man-made disasters imply a great deal of uncertainty in terms of potential damage, though it is certain that there would be a huge spike in the demand for relief supplies causing shortages and/or delays in providing aid. Ruptures in the infrastructure (roads, utility, and communication lines) cause additional delays due to repairs. Therefore, the relief providers need to work in collaboration with retailers, and infrastructure service providers for improving responsiveness. The relief providers (government and non government) rely on acquiring and delivering supplies in real time because such actions accompany little risk of resource underutilization, though the cost of real time acquisitions can be high. In contrast, a proactive response, while minimizing acquisition cost, can be very ineffective if demand surges are high. We study a hybrid of reactive and proactive approaches, where the reactive response is contingent upon the disaster intensity exceeding a certain threshold. We show how the threshold value may impact capacity acquisitions and prices and establish the optimality of contingent response. Further, we establish how an infrastructure contract may help reducing the social cost of disaster.     

Balancing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing: effects on product portfolio,product success,and firm performance

Most prior research has focused on vertical integration or strategic outsourcing in isolation to examine their effects on important performance outcomes. In contrast, we focus on the simultaneous pursuit of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing. Our baseline proposition is that balancing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing in the pursuit of taper integration enriches a firm's product portfolio and product success, and in turn contributes to competitive advantage and thus to overall firm performance. We derive a set of detailed hypotheses, and test them on a unique and fine‐grained panel of longitudinal data documenting over 3,500 product introductions in the global microcomputer industry. The results provide strong support for the notion that carefully balancing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing when organizing for innovation helps firms to achieve superior performance. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Analysis of fixed broadband access and use in Thailand: Drivers and barriers

The aim of this paper is to analyze the demand for fixed broadband in Thailand. Data were obtained from a national survey in 2010 by the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) of Thailand. The bivariate probit model was employed to examine empirically whether accessibility to fixed telephony infrastructure, socio-economic variables and the area of residence have a systematic link to fixed broadband access in the first stage, and then, specific usage, provided access exists, is estimated. Results of this study show that the variables, together with their potential impact, are as follows: fixed infrastructure, income, gender, level of education, age of consumer and residential area. The impact of these factors varies from service to service (i.e. video download, social network, searching and e-mail). The implications for the NBTC are to encourage competition through the infrastructure and to permit more competition in infrastructure development. This could stimulate the growth of fixed broadband access and use. At the same time, the government could also implement policies to encourage more access and usage, for example income subsidization and training program.     

Toward an integrated theory of the firm: The interplay between internal organization and vertical integration

Research summary : Two central issues in strategic management are the determination of a firm's internal delegation and its vertical boundaries. Despite the importance of these issues, there is scant analysis concerning their interaction. Using a comprehensive database of the construction industry, we show that vertical integration positively influences the centralization decision and that the main mechanism driving this relationship is an improvement in the hierarchically coordinated adaptation of firm activities when complexity and uncertainty are high. We also observe that centralization is negatively related to the extent of relational contracts between principals and agents, and positively related to an exogenous increase in the cost of employee layoffs. Our results suggest that managers cannot consider firm boundaries and internal organization to be independent decisions. Managerial summary : We ask whether a firm's decision about vertically integrating or outsourcing its activities affects the choice of centralizing or delegating its internal decision‐making process. Our statistical analysis shows that firms with more vertical integration tend to centralize the decision‐making process and that firms that outsource more tend to decentralize more. Why? Vertical integration enables the use of centralized authority to coordinate activities that interact intensively. Accordingly, we found that the positive influence of vertical integration on centralization is especially significant in more complex and uncertain environments, when the need for coordination is higher. Thus, our results suggest that managers should choose vertical integration considering its effect on internal decision‐making processes, particularly when coordination is important. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Product variety and vertical integration

R esearch summary: In vertical relationships, the potential for scale economy in manufacturing often calls for specialization and outsourcing. Specialization, however, depends critically on the stability of the task and contractual environment. In a highly uncertain environment, the need for frequent mutual adjustments favors integration instead of outsourcing. To evaluate vertical relationships in value chains where one stage competes on product variety under great uncertainty and the other stage competes on scale, we compare operations data at about 300 distribution centers within a major soft‐drink bottler before and after it was integrated into an upstream concentrate producer. We find that vertical integration improved coordination for the integrated firm by aligning incentives and reducing strategic information asymmetry, but it worsened coordination for upstream rivals that shared the same downstream facilities. M anagerial summary: Managers make frequent decisions about outsourcing versus integration. This article helps to crystalize the costs and benefits of integration by pointing to two important factors: the potential for economies of scale and the need for coordination under uncertainty. It studies an industry where one stage of the value chain competes on product variety under great uncertainty and the other stage competes on scale. Based on operations data at about 300 distribution centers within a major soft‐drink bottler before and after it was integrated into an upstream concentrate producer, we find that vertical integration improved coordination for the integrated firm (by reducing both stockouts and inventory, and improving sales forecasts), but it worsened coordination for upstream rivals that shared the same downstream facilities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Demand-driven integration and divorcement policy

Traditionally, vertical integration has concerned industrial economists only insofar as it affects market outcomes, particularly prices. This paper considers reverse causality, from prices – and more generally, from demand – to integration in a model of a dynamic oligopoly. If integration is costly but enhances productive efficiency, then a trend of rising prices and increasing integration could be due to growing demand, in which case a divorcement policy of forced divestiture may be counterproductive. Divorcement can only help consumers if it undermines collusion, but then there are dominating policies. We discuss well-known divorcement episodes in retail gasoline and British beer, as well as other evidence, in light of the model.     

Xiaolingtong versus 3G in China: Which will be the winner?

Xiaolingtong (XLT), a new type of mobile phone system based on PHS technology for wireless access of fixed-line telephone networks, has grown very rapidly in China. However, there are many doubts about the future of XLT once 3G (the third generation of mobile communication) is finally employed. This paper proposes a theoretical framework to assess and compare XLT and 3G from four perspectives: technology, market demand, business models and government policy. It concludes that XLT and 3G will coexist with existing 2G/2.5G mobile communication networks for a considerable period of time. With service collaboration and integration, the coexistence of both of these technologies can enhance China's mobile communication infrastructure and support the growth of mobile commerce.     

Tradable universal service obligations

This paper proposes a novel policy to motivate private-sector operators of basic infrastructure to expand infrastructure into previously unserved regions. It is particularly useful when resources are transferred to the private sector, as occurs during the privatisation of a state-owned telecommunications carrier, the introduction of competition, the release of spectrum, or the allocation of cash subsidies for this purpose. Firms receive tradable universal service obligations in the form of milestones that must be met, and commitments to meet specific deadlines. By exchanging its commitments, a firm can increase or decrease the rate at which it must expand infrastructure. By exchanging milestones, a firm can change where it must expand infrastructure. Making milestones and commitments independent and fully tradable allows each firm to develop the most cost effective business strategy possible, and to adapt that strategy as technology and demand evolve over time. The exchange of milestones and commitments does not diminish the obligations that must be met by industry as a whole, insuring the timely expansion of infrastructure. This paper focuses on telecommunications, but the approach is also applicable to other forms of infrastructure, such as electric power.