Material And Value-Adding Inputs In Manufacturing Enterprises

Because of the nature of assembly-line operations, one would expect technologies in manufacturing firms to differ in systematic ways from those in many other types of firms. Identifying such differences can therefore be useful in the formulation and testing of restrictions to flexible functional forms. In the present paper, I characterize a multiproduct manufacturing firm and use the characterization to formulate testable hypotheses about the firm's technology, cost function, and profit function. I argue that manufacturing enterprises exhibit a form of almost nonjointness in input quantities and prices in which the individual sub-technologies have quasi-fixed proportions. Substitution across product lines is responsible for the substitutability between material and value-adding inputs that we often observe in aggregate data. Neglecting the special structure of manufacturing technology can seriously bias estimates of aggregate productivity growth rates.     

Should tariff-rate quotas mimic quotas?: Implications for trade liberalization under a supply management policy

This article compares price-equivalent import tariffs and quotas when domestic production is controlled by a marketing board with the power to restrict domestic supply through production quotas. Canada's dairy industry is supply-managed and protected by TRQs to achieve a domestic price target. TRQs are currently set to mimic the import quotas they replaced. However, they could be set to mimic tariffs instead. We provide welfare rankings between (domestic) price-equivalent quotas and tariffs under various assumptions regarding the powers of the marketing board to shed new light on liberalization in the Canadian dairy industry. When the marketing board is allowed to export, quotas can never be welfare-inferior to price-equivalent tariffs when transport costs between the two markets are insignificant. Import licensing methods have important implications for the ranking of the two trade instruments and the ranges of feasible domestic prices. If the marketing board controlled all import licenses and there was no rule preventing it from sleeping on part or all of its import licenses, the quota regime would support a small range of high feasible prices. In contrast, when the quota is a minimum access commitment, there are high prices under the tariff regime that are not feasible under the quota regime.     

Unionisation structures, productivity and firm performance: New insights from a heterogeneous firm model

This paper introduces collective bargaining at the firm and at the sector level into the heterogeneous firm model of Melitz and Ottaviano (Melitz, M. J., Ottaviano, G. I. P., 2008. Market size, trade, and productivity. Review of Economic Studies 75 (1), 295-316). It then analyses how the two bargaining regimes change aggregate industry productivity and firm performance relative to a competitive labour market. While sector-level bargaining forces the least productive firms to exit and thus increases average productivity relative to the competitive benchmark, firm-level bargaining allows less productive firms to stay in the market and thus reduces average productivity. Sector-level bargaining also results in higher average output and profit levels than either firm-level bargaining or a competitive labour market. The paper also shows that the choice between sector- and firm-level bargaining can involve a trade-off between product variety and product prices: Not only the average price level but also product variety tends to be lower under sector-level bargaining than under firm-level bargaining.     

Panel data estimates of the production function and product and labor market imperfections

Consistent with two models of imperfect competition in the labor market—the efficient bargaining model and the monopsony model—we provide two extensions of a microeconomic version of Hall's framework for estimating price‐cost margins. We show that both product and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue, which can be characterized by a ‘joint market imperfections parameter’. Using an unbalanced panel of 10,646 French firms in 38 manufacturing industries over the period 1978–2001, we can classify these industries into six different regimes depending on the type of competition in the product and the labor market. By far the most predominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and efficient bargaining in the labor market (IC‐EB), followed by a regime of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right‐to‐manage bargaining in the labor market (IC‐PR), and by a regime of perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market (PC‐MO). For each of these three predominant regimes, we assess within‐regime firm differences in the estimated average price‐cost mark‐up and rent sharing or labor supply elasticity parameters, following the Swamy methodology to determine the degree of true firm dispersion. To assess the plausibility of our findings in the case of the dominant regime (IC‐EB), we also relate our industry and firm‐level estimates of price‐cost mark‐up and extent of rent sharing to industry characteristics and firm‐specific variables respectively. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multinationals' Offshore Operations,Tax Avoidance,and Firm‐Specific Information Flows: International Evidence

Using a large sample of multinational enterprises (MNEs) over the period 1999–2009, this study investigates whether and how offshore operations via offshore financial centers (OFCs) impact the extent to which firm‐specific information is incorporated into stock price, relative to common information. Our analyses show that, irrespective of whether a firm is a Type I offshore firm (directly having headquarters registered in OFCs) or a Type II offshore firm (indirectly setting up subsidiaries in OFCs), the amount of firm‐specific information flowing into stock price is lower for offshore firms than for non‐offshore firms. We also find that as offshore firms become more aggressive in their tax avoidance strategies, their stock prices impound a lower amount of firm‐specific information relative to common information. Finally, we find that a strong offshore proclivity also deters firm‐specific information flows, thereby driving up stock price synchronicity. Our results suggest that the opaque and complex nature of business and financial transactions in OFCs, coupled with their institutional characteristics, that is, weak and flexible legal enforcement, zero or extremely low taxation, and low litigation risk, provide offshore firms with not only stronger incentives but also the opportunities and means to adopt opaque disclosure policies and aggressive earnings management.     

THE MEASUREMENT OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY FROM AN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE: DEFINITION,MEASUREMENT AND IMPORTANCE

This paper starts by recognizing that despite the importance of absorptive capacity, economists in particular have made only limited use of the concept. Most theoretical and empirical studies derive from other fields of research. Thus, the first task is to compare and contrast the different approaches taken in measuring absorptive capacity. The rest of the paper then sets out an example of how typically economists have proceeded, using nationally representative CIS data to measure absorptive capacity across a 10‐year period and investigating if it remains stable in the long term. This is followed by considering how firms’ characteristics vary across lower to higher levels of absorptive capacity and whether such capacity determines firms’ productivity performance across both goods and service industries. Our results show that relative to other influences, absorptive capacity as measured here — net of the impact of foreign‐ownership and human capital — has a substantial influence on exporting, innovation and undertaking R&D and thus consequently firm‐level productivity. Finally, there is a discussion of why governments should consider helping firms to boost their levels of absorptive capacity.     

Takeover threats,antitakeover amendments and stock price reaction

We examine the influence of takeover threats on the stock price of firms proposing antitakeover amendments. Stock prices of the majority of firms, which are not takeover targets during the four years surrounding the amendments, are unaffected, while prices of firms that become takeover targets within two years increase significantly. We document weak evidence of wealth losses only for a sample of prior targets. Our findings suggest that shareholders of the average firm are not harmed by antitakeover amendments because they provide either a better bargaining position or an information signal to the market.     

Riskiness,endogenous productivity dispersion and business cycles

In the data, cross-sectional productivity dispersion is countercyclical at both the plant level and the firm level, see e.g. Bloom (2009). I incorporate a firm׳s choice of risk level into a model of firm dynamics with real business cycle features to explain this empirical finding both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the model, in every period, each firm chooses the investment amount and the risk level associated with a production project every period. All projects available to each firm have the same expected flow return, determined by the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to the firm׳s productivity, and differ from one another only in their risk. The endogenous option of exiting the market and the limited funding for new investment jointly play an important role in motivating firms׳ risk-taking behavior. The model predicts that, in each period, relatively small firms are more likely to take risk and hence exhibit a higher exit rate, and that the cross-sectional productivity dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of the realized individual component of productivity, is larger in recessions.     

Network effects,trade, and productivity

We consider network effects in the monopolistically competitive model of trade developed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). We show that a larger network effect intensifies competition by allowing more‐productive firms to raise prices and earn higher profits, but forcing less‐productive firms to reduce prices and earn lower profits. As a result, low‐productivity firms are driven out of the market. We also show that when network effects are asymmetric, it may be difficult for firms from a country with a small network effect to compete with firms from a country with a large network effect.     

Firm turnover and productivity differentials in Ethiopian manufacturing

Are the forces of market selection at work in Africa? How successful are markets in these economies in sorting out firms on an efficiency basis following the sequence of reforms to liberalize and particularly to transform some of the previous command economies to market oriented ones? What is the pattern of entry and exit in the manufacturing sector and how does it affect industry productivity growth? This study examines these issues using firm-level industrial census data from the Ethiopian manufacturing sector. It is the first attempt to analyze firm turnover and productivity differentials using industrial census data in sub-Saharan Africa. The Ethiopian manufacturing sector exhibits a high firm turnover rate that declines with size. Exit is particularly high among new entrants; 60% exit within the first 3 years in business. Our study consistently shows a significant difference in productivity across different groups of firms, which is reflected in a turnover pattern where the less productive exit while firms with better productivity survive. We also found higher aggregate productivity growth over the sample period, mainly driven by firm turnover.     

Transfer pricing: Technical and productivity change within the firm

Use of transfer prices is regarded by many writers as an efficient means of management of multidivisional firms. Its use in effect creates an internal market for the firm. However, its value as a management technique isknown to be subject to a number of limitations of the type discussed in the general economic theory of market failure. Nevertheless, two important limitations of transfer pricing have been neglected in the literature: (1) imputed profit/loss based on optimal transfer prices can be a poor guide to the economic value of a division to a firm when market transaction costs are important (for instance, even if a division shows an imputed loss, it may not be optimal to dispose of it), and (2) transfer pricing can retard technical change, innovation and productivity enhancement within a division to the detriment of the firm as a whole. Both aspects are examined here.     

Firm entry,product repositioning and welfare

We show that the entry of a second firm in a horizontally differentiated market (ala Hotelling) may harm consumers as prices increase and consumer’s surplus possibly decrease. We first derive the price and the consumer’s surplus of a monopoly which is located at the center of the market. When a second firm enters the market the first firm repositions and the two firms locate at their equilibrium points. Although competition adds to variety and increases consumer’s surplus, the post entry increase in price may outweight the gains from extra variety and make consumers worse off.     

Who Appoints Them,What Do They Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan

Although reformers often claim Japanese firms appoint inefficiently few outside directors, the logic of market competition suggests otherwise. Given the competitive product, service, and capital markets in Japan, the firms that survive should disproportionately be firms that tend to appoint boards approaching their firm‐specifically optimal structure. The resulting debate thus suggests a test: do firms with more outsiders do better? If Japanese firms do maintain suboptimal numbers of outsiders, then those with more outsiders should outperform those with fewer; if market constraints instead drive them toward their firm‐specific optimum, then firm characteristics may determine board structure, but firm performance should show no observable relation to that structure. We explore the issue with data on the 1000 largest exchange‐listed Japanese firms from 1986 to 1994. We first ask which firms tend to appoint which outsiders to their boards. We find the appointments decidedly nonrandom. Firms appoint directors from the banking industry when they borrow heavily, when they have fewer mortgageable assets, or when they are themselves in the service and finance industry. They appoint retired government bureaucrats when they are in construction and sell a large fraction of their output to government agencies, and they appoint other retired business executives when they have a dominant parent corporation or when they are in the construction industry and sell heavily to the private sector. Coupling OLS regressions with two‐stage estimates on a subset of the data, we then ask whether the firms with more outside directors outperform those with fewer, and find that they do not. Instead, the regressions suggest—exactly as the logic of market competition predicts—that firms choose boards appropriate to them.     

Delegation in Multi‐Establishment Firms: Evidence from I.T. Purchasing

Recent contributions to a growing theory literature have focused on the tradeoff between adaptation and coordination in determining delegation within firms. Empirical evidence, however, is limited. Using establishment‐level data on decision rights over information technology investments, I find that a high net value of adaptation is strongly associated with delegation, as are local information advantages and firm‐wide diversification; in contrast, a high net value of within‐firm coordination is correlated with centralization. Variation across establishments within firms is widespread: most firms are neither fully centralized nor fully decentralized. Delegation patterns are largely consistent with standard team‐theory predictions; however, certain findings, such as a negative correlation between delegation and firm size, call for a consideration of agency costs as well.     

A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance

This paper provides a theory of firm behavior motivated by moral duty, self-interest, and social pressure. A morally managed and a self-interested firm compete in a market in which their corporate social performance (CSP) provides product differentiation. Some citizens have altruistic or warm glow preferences for products with associated CSP, personal giving to social causes, holding shares in firms providing CSP, and contributing to social pressure to increase CSP. Social pressure is delivered by an activist NGO funded by voluntary contributions by citizens. The model characterizes an equilibrium in the product market, the capital market, and the market for social pressure. The equilibrium establishes a price for CSP and for activist-induced social pressure. The theory provides predictions of the market values of firms, the prices of products, firm profits, target selection, contributions to the activist, and the amount of CSP supplied. For example, if citizens do not distinguish between morally motivated CSP and CSP induced by social pressure, the activist is more likely to target the softer, morally motivated firm. Higher quality activists are better funded, target self-interested firms, and obtain greater corporate social performance. Lower quality activists target morally managed firms.     

Explaining Firm Emergence: Specialization,Transaction Costs,and the Integration Process

This article explains firm emergence and the role of firms in the market structure using the productive power of specialization. Based on productivity efficiencies through technological specialization, a model for firm emergence is drafted alongside Coasean transaction cost theory. I find that transaction costs cannot explain firm emergence, but the entrepreneurial specialization perspective here adopted provides a promising approach to understanding the firm's function to the entrepreneur and its internal organization and capabilities. It suggests a foundational framework for studying the creation of capabilities and the interplay between markets, firms, and entrepreneurs. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choosing the Quality of the Fit between Complementary Products

In this paper, I examine how firms should position their complementary products. I assume that there are two competing firms, each producing two complementary products. Each firm decides whether to employ strategies that enhance the quality of the fit (the degree of complementarity) between its pair of complementary products before competing in prices. The consumers have heterogeneous tastes for the four possible bundles. They are willing to pay a price premium in order to purchase a bundle from the same firm if this firm chose to make such bundle more attractive. I find that increasing the degree of complementarity between a firm's complementary products intensifies price competition and often leads to smaller profits. Only when complementarity‐enhancing strategies significantly increase the demand for a firm's matching bundle, does the firm benefit from employing them. The highest profits for both firms are obtained when both firms do not employ complementarity‐enhancing strategies. Deteriorating the quality of the fit between one's own and a rival's complementary products is never profitable.     

Competing Platforms

Why do competing platforms or networks exist? This paper focuses on instances where the value of a platform depends on the adoption decisions of a small number of firms, and analyzes the strategic competition among platforms to get this oligopolistic side on‐board. I study a bilateral contracting game among platforms and firms that allows for general externalities across both contracting and noncontracting partners, and examine when a market will sustain a single or multiple platforms. When firms can join only one platform, I provide conditions under which market‐tipping and/or market‐splitting equilibria may exist. In particular, even without coordination failure, congestion effects, or firm multihoming, multiple platforms can co‐exist in equilibrium despite being inefficient from the perspective of the contracting parties. Expanding the contracting space to include contingent contracts may exacerbate this inefficiency.     

Why does eco‐innovation differ in service firms? Some insights from Spain

Although environmental innovation studies have traditionally focused on manufacturing firms, the distinctive features of eco‐innovation activities carried out by service firms require special attention. Using the Spanish Commumity Innovation Survey (CIS), this paper determines which are the main drivers of undertaking eco‐innovation and investigates the similarities and differences between service and manufacturing firms within the five sub‐groups of services (supplier dominated, scale intensive physical networks, scale intensive information networks, science‐based, and others). The results confirm that the main eco‐innovation triggers are similar—technological push factor orientation (internal R&D and persistence) and firm size—while the impact of market pull factors and public environmental legislation differ within the services sub‐groups. In addition, we find a high degree of heterogeneity within service firms. In contrast to traditional service firms, those in the groups involving R&D activities, information networks, and scale‐intensive physical networks exhibit intensive eco‐innovation performance and show a high level of green indicators.     

Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of buyer types known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses of the agent, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog offers. In the second stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm and product-price pair from that firm’s catalog. By backward induction, this Stackelberg game with asymmetric information reduces to a game over catalogs with payoff indeterminacies. In particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or across catalogs, corresponding to any catalog profile offered by firms there may be multiple possible expected firm payoffs, all consistent with the rational optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types. The resolution of these indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which emerges in the market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular game over catalogs, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game. We call such a mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we address in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism—and therefore, does there exist a Nash equilibrium for the catalog game? We show under fairly mild conditions on primitives that catalog games naturally possess tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash equilibria.