Price and quality competition with quality positions

In this study, we investigate price and quality decisions in a duopoly in the presence of firms’ quality positions , which are determined by the quality levels of their existing core products. Into a standard model of vertical differentiation, we incorporate a “repositioning cost” that is proportional to the quality differences between firms’ current and new products. By varying the levels of quality positions, we analyze the impact of this cost on the equilibrium outcomes. Our results show that the presence of repositioning costs restricts firms’ abilities to improve profitability and differentiate themselves vertically. As a result, a high‐positioned firm does not necessarily have a competitive advantage over a low‐positioned firm, even if the former offers a superior new product in equilibrium. In addition, if a low‐positioned firm is significantly cost‐efficient compared with its rival with regard to repositioning, then that firm can earn higher profits than those of a high‐positioned firm by strategically offering its low‐end product. These results contrast sharply with those based on the standard vertical differentiation model.     

Linking employer branding orientation and firm performance: Testing a dual mediation route of recruitment efficiency and positive affective climate

Faced with competitive labor markets, firms increasingly use employer branding to build a qualified workforce and engage their employees. However, our understanding of the impact of employer branding orientation on firm performance and the theoretical firm-level mechanisms underlying this potential impact is very limited. To address this gap, we integrate brand marketing theory with human resource management (HRM) research to develop a model explicating how employer branding orientation is linked to firm performance through a dual route by enhancing both recruitment efficiency (i.e., external route: applicants) and positive affective climate (i.e., internal route: incumbent employees). The results of a multisource study (i.e., top management, human resource managers, employees) with 93 firms show employer branding orientation is positively related to firm performance through positive affective climate but not recruitment efficiency. Using a brand equity approach to HRM, our results advance the literature by demonstrating the generalizability of employer branding effects independent of concrete brand attributes and explaining the firm-level mediating mechanisms linking it to firm performance.     

Looking Attractive until You Sell: Earnings Management,Lockup Expiration,and Venture Capitalists

Earnings management occurs when managerial discretion allows managers to influence reported earnings and thus mislead some investors about the underlying economic performance and quality of the firm. This study considers how potential investors may guard against earnings management by observing negative stock price reaction at the lockup expiration period of initial public offering (IPO) firms as a negative signal. Findings from a sample of 160 newly public firms show that earnings management behaviour is stronger in IPO firms backed by venture capitalists (VCs). Moreover, VC reputation negatively moderates this relationship such that IPO firms backed by reputable VCs are less likely to manage earnings, suggesting that reputable VCs serve an auditing function following an IPO. Overall, we provide insights into signalling theory by examining negative signals arising from the behaviour of multiple agents in an IPO firm.     

From original equipment manufacturing to branding: entrepreneurship,strategic leadership,and Taiwan’s firm transformation

This paper investigates firm transformation from original equipment manufacturing (OEM) to original brand manufacturing (OBM) based on variant experiences of Taiwan’s top global brands. Taking the competitive advantage of practicing OEM for multinational corporations (MNCs), latecomer firms can generate capital and accumulate capabilities by engaging with the global production network. Rarely does every firm transform into a global enterprise. We propose that only entrepreneurs with strategic leadership competence, which serves to manage a delicate balance between stability and change in a firm, are capable to facilitate firm transformation from OEM to a global enterprise practicing OBM. We provide an analytical framework that combines the research fields of entrepreneurship, strategic management, and leadership to analyze firm growth and firm transformation of Taiwanese firms. In light of possible branding dilemma when straddling dual-track businesses, successful transforming firms can alleviate this problem either by separating their OBM units from their OEM units or by creating a symbiotic relationship with their MNC customers. How Taiwanese firms first took advantage of initiating OEM to create capital and capabilities and later transformed into OBM provide useful experiences for other latecomer firms.     

Unionisation structures, productivity and firm performance: New insights from a heterogeneous firm model

This paper introduces collective bargaining at the firm and at the sector level into the heterogeneous firm model of Melitz and Ottaviano (Melitz, M. J., Ottaviano, G. I. P., 2008. Market size, trade, and productivity. Review of Economic Studies 75 (1), 295-316). It then analyses how the two bargaining regimes change aggregate industry productivity and firm performance relative to a competitive labour market. While sector-level bargaining forces the least productive firms to exit and thus increases average productivity relative to the competitive benchmark, firm-level bargaining allows less productive firms to stay in the market and thus reduces average productivity. Sector-level bargaining also results in higher average output and profit levels than either firm-level bargaining or a competitive labour market. The paper also shows that the choice between sector- and firm-level bargaining can involve a trade-off between product variety and product prices: Not only the average price level but also product variety tends to be lower under sector-level bargaining than under firm-level bargaining.     

Bargains Followed by Bargains: When Switching Costs Make Markets More Competitive

In markets where consumers have switching costs and firms cannot price‐discriminate, firms have two conflicting strategies. A firm can either offer a low price to attract new consumers and build future market share or a firm can offer a high price to exploit the partial lock‐in of their existing consumers. This paper develops a theory of competition when overlapping generations of consumers have switching costs and firms produce differentiated products. Competition takes place over an infinite horizon with any number of firms. This paper shows that the relationship between the level of switching costs, firms' discount rate, and the number of firms determines whether firms offer low or high prices. Similar to previous duopoly studies, switching costs are likely to facilitate lower (higher) equilibrium prices when switching costs are small (large) or when a firm's discount rate is large (small). Unlike previous studies, this paper demonstrates that the number of firms also determines whether switching costs are pro‐ or anticompetitive, and with a sufficiently large (small) number of firms switching costs are pro‐ (anti‐) competitive.     

Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships

We use an adverse selection model to study the dynamics of firms' reputations when firms implement joint projects. We show that in the case of joint projects a firm's reputation does not necessarily increase following a success and does not necessarily decrease following a failure. We also study how reputation considerations affect firms' decisions to participate in joint projects. We show that a high‐reputation partner is not necessarily preferable to a low‐reputation partner and, when implementation of the joint project by a single firm is possible, a high‐quality partner may not be preferable to a low‐quality partner.     

Personalized Pricing and Quality Customization

We embed the principal–agent model in a model of spatial differentiation with correlated consumer preferences to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing and quality allocation (PPQ), whereby duopoly firms charge different prices and offer different qualities to different consumers, based on their willingness to pay. Our model sheds light on the equilibrium product-line pricing and quality schedules offered by firms, given that none, one, or both firms implement PPQ. The adoption of PPQ has three effects in our model: it enables firms to extract higher rents from loyal customers, intensifies price competition for nonloyal customers, and eliminates cannibalization from customer self-selection. Contrary to prior literature on one-to-one marketing and price discrimination, we show that even symmetric firms can avoid the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma problem when they engage in personalized pricing and quality customization. When both firms have PPQ, consumer surplus is nonmonotonic in valuations such that some low-valuation consumers get higher surplus than high-valuation consumers. The adoption of PPQ can reduce information asymmetry, and therefore sellers offer higher-quality products after the adoption of PPQ. Overall, we find that while the simultaneous adoption of PPQ generally improves total social welfare and firm profits, it decreases total consumer surplus.     

The dynamic annihilation of a rational competitive fringe by a low-cost dominant firm

A low-cost dominant firm will drive all competitive fringe firms out of the market if all firms have rational expectations; however, the dominant firm will not predate (price below marginal cost). Since a dominant firm will not drive out fringe firms if they have myopic expectations, it may be in the dominant firm's best interests to inform the fringe. The effects of governmental intervention on the optimal path and welfare are presented.     

The Effect of Performance Standards on Health Care Provider Behavior: Evidence from Kidney Transplantation

Performance standards are designed to ensure a basic level of quality, and through public reporting of firm performance, encourage firms to compete on quality thus allowing the market to determine the optimal level of quality. In markets with substantial excess demand, however, demand effects may be insufficient to induce any change in firm behavior and enforcement may be required to ensure high quality. Even with enforcement, quality still may not improve at underperforming firms if gaming the system is less costly than improving quality. We test whether information alone or with regulatory enforcement improves outcomes or elicits gaming behavior in our study of 266 kidney transplant centers between 2001 and 2012. In a context of excess demand induced by price controls, we show that information alone has no impact and enforcement may actually increase market inefficiencies; firms respond to costly quality requirements, not by improving quality, but by reducing supply, which exacerbates the disequilibrium between supply and demand, and by cream‐skimming, which reduces access to transplantation among sicker patients.     

Accounting Scandals in IPO Firms: Do Underwriters and VCs Help?

We examine whether underwriter reputation, venture capitalist (VC) backing, and VC reputation are related to the probability that a newly public firm has serious accounting problems. Using a novel data set, we find that the probability of restatement by an initial public offering (IPO) firm is positively related to underwriter reputation and negatively related to VC backing, VC reputation, and VC maturity. Our results do not appear to be driven by the endogeneity of underwriter reputation or VC backing. Our findings suggest that while VCs positively influence the financial reporting quality of IPO firms, underwriters’ concerns about revenue generation outweigh their concerns about reputation.     

Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement

This paper shows that, in a repeated competitive procurement, a buyer can use the reserve price in a low-price auction as a “public”—hence nondiscriminatory—incentive device to elicit unverifiable quality. We study a model with many firms and one buyer, who is imperfectly informed on the firms' costs. When firms are ex ante identical, the provision of quality is sustained by a sufficiently high reserve price to reward firms for the quality provision and by the threat of setting a low reserve price forever, if quality is not delivered. The buyer can elicit the desired level of unverifiable quality provided her baseline valuation of the project is not too high and the net benefit from unverifiable quality is not too low. These results are robust to firms' heterogeneity in their time preferences when the punishment for a deviation is finite but sufficiently long.     

Survival of the fittest: The impact of eco‐certification and reputation on firm performance

Owing to the increased trend for organic products and the concept of sustainable development, firms must invest in valuable and unique resources to achieve long‐term success and gain competitive advantages. Building on insights from the resource‐based view and natural‐resource‐based view of the firm, the study focuses on the contribution of corporate reputation and eco‐certification as intangible influences on corporate performance. Duration analysis is applied on a sample of 1,572 German wineries over the period 1994 to 2017. The results indicate that individual reputation and eco‐certification have a statistically significant and positively impact on corporate performance, whereas there is no clear evidence of this relationship for collective reputation. In addition, especially those firms with high individual reputation benefit most from eco‐certification. These results are robust across different parametric and semiparametric model estimations.     

Macroeconomic policy and the pricing behavior of imperfectly competitive firms

This paper develops theoretical models of the effect of expansionary macroeconomic policy on the pricing behavior of pure monopolist and oligopolist firms. A number of factors are identified which affect the magnitude of the price change chosen by an imperfectly competitive firm in response to macro policy action. The behavior of oligopolistic firms in response to macro policy changes is found to be influenced by the fact that expansionary macro policy initially impacts on industry demand rather than firm demand, and that the oligopolist's consequent pricing behavior will affect the share of the industry demand increase which it is able to appropriate.     

Optimal pricing strategy for foreign market entry: a game theoretic approach

Given that pricing plays an important role in a company's international competitive strategy, researchers have long argued the need for theory building in the area of international pricing. This study develops an optimal pricing strategy for foreign market entry using a game theoretic framework. The proposed model assumes two firms, a local incumbent and a foreign entrant, competing in a market. Consumers know the quality of the incumbent's offering, but do not know how it compares to that of the foreign entrant's. Based on these assumptions, and using the theory of inference making, we propose an upward price distortion by the entrant firm as an optimal entry strategy under incomplete information. The paper presents a game theoretic derivation to establish that the game has a unique intuitive separating equilibrium where the entrant firm stands to gain by engaging in upward price distortion to signal high quality to consumers. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Voluntary Quality Disclosure under Price‐Signaling Competition

We analyze an oligopolistic competition with differentiated products and qualities. The quality of a product is not known to consumers. Each firm can make an imperfect disclosure of its product quality before engaging in price‐signaling competition. There are two regimes for separating equilibrium in our model depending on the parameters. Our analysis reveals that, in one of the separating regimes, price signaling leads to intense price competition between the firms under which not only the high‐quality firm but also the low‐quality firm chooses to disclose its product quality to soften the price competition. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Economics of total quality management

This paper presents two models of the economics of total quality management. In the first, the concept of quality management is viewed as a technological innovation that requires investment. To reduce cost and improve quality, firms must make investments that are largely sunk. The effect of market competition on quality related technology investments is studied. Several results follow. With new quality technologies, price falls, quality rises and average cost declines. Firms must anticipate rivals' technology choices and the market prices when justifying quality technology investments. When all firms quickly adopt quality technology, returns of such investments are normal, that is, have a zero net present value. However, firms that do not invest in quality related technology are forced from the market. A firm that is faced by competitors that are slow to adopt quality related technology, can earn positive returns by early adoption. The firm invests more in quality related technology, and produces higher quality products, charges a higher price and earns higher profits than competitors. The firm's quality, price and profit advantages persist over time. In the second model, we show that firm value increases when customer satisfaction is used as an objective by aligning incentives. This explains the common use of customer satisfaction measures in TQM programs.     

The moderating effect of the technological level of industry on the relationship between innovation and corporate reputation

Corporate reputation is one of the principal intangible assets a firm possesses. The entrepreneurial, innovative nature of the firm has been recognized as one of the antecedents of corporate reputation. However, specialist literature has paid scant attention to the relative importance of an entrepreneurial nature as an element that helps to improve corporate reputation in comparison with other antecedents such as product quality. Even less is known about exactly how this antecedent influences corporate reputation among different stakeholders. Little is also known about possible variations in how this antecedent is perceived by different industries. Thus, with a view to contributing to knowledge on how corporate reputation is formed, derived from the innovative nature of the firm, this article attempts to analyze how the environment affects the causal relation between the entrepreneurial, innovative nature of the firm and its corporate reputation. We particularly analyze the environment according to its technological level, distinguishing between three types of industry: high tech, medium tech, and low tech, using a sample of 308 US firms and structural equation modeling (SEM) techniques. The empirical test provided some unexpected and interesting results.     

审计职业声誉损害、独立性与市场反应

独立审计是降低信息不对称程度和缓解委托代理成本的有效机制,其作用的发挥取决于审计质量,而职业声誉是市场衡量审计质量的便捷标准,注册会计师职业声誉的损害是否会削弱社会公众对审计质量的评价,进而影响市场对公司价值的判断?文章以2002年3月中国注册会计师协会发布的未通过年检的五家会计师事务所作为切入点,研究声誉受损对其主审上市公司累计异常回报率的影响,结果发现异常回报率显著为负,而且这种负面反应的程度与上市公司的委托代理成本相关,但与独立性不存在显著关系。     

Do Family Firms Have Better Reputations Than Non‐Family Firms? An Integration of Socioemotional Wealth and Social Identity Theories

We draw from socioemotional wealth and social identity research to develop a theory on reputational differences among family and non‐family firms. We propose that family members identify more strongly with their family firm than non‐family members do with either a family or non‐family firm. Heightened identification motivates family members to pursue a favourable reputation because it allows them to feel good about themselves, thus contributing to their socioemotional wealth. We hypothesize that when the family's name is part of the firm's name, the firm's reputation is higher because family members are particularly motivated for their firm to have a better reputation. Family members also need organizational power to pursue a favourable reputation; thus, we hypothesize that the level of family ownership and family board presence should be associated with more favourable reputations. We find support for our theory in a sample of large firms from eight countries with disparate governance systems and cultures.