Business groups in China

We investigate whether business groups in China act as internal capital markets, in an environment that is characterized by a high level of government intervention, a weak legal system, and an underdeveloped financial market. We study how institutional factors, such as the ultimate owner and level of market development, shape the role of these business groups. We find that business groups help member firms overcome constraints in raising external capital, and that the internal capital market within a business group is more likely to be an alternative financing channel among state-owned firms than among private firms. We also find that the internal capital market is more likely to help those affiliated firms which are private, local government owned relative to those owned by central government, or located in regions with a well-developed institutional environment. We present evidence of the role of business groups in risk sharing among affiliated firms, but find that business group affiliation has no impact on firm accounting performance. This study sheds new light on the theory of the firm and its boundaries, and provides a better understanding of China's rapidly growing economy.     

Firm internationalization and cost of equity: Evidence from China

This paper examines the relationship between firm internationalization and cost of equity. We find that firms with a higher degree of international operations have a significantly lower cost of equity, which is more pronounced for firms in provinces with a weak institutional environment or firms experiencing intense domestic competition. Our results are robust after adopting a firm fixed effect model, propensity score matching, difference-in-difference regressions and alternative measurements of key variables. Further, international operations help firms to break through their institutional constraints in the domestic market, which reduces the cost of equity and improves resource allocation efficiency in the capital market. Our paper enriches the literature on firm internationalization and the cost of equity from the perspective of emerging markets.     

The unintended real effects of short selling in an emerging market

Exploiting the staggered removal of short-sale bans in China, we document unintended real effects of allowing short selling in an emerging market featured by concentrated ownership and weak investor protection. Pilot firms have worse short-term and long-term market performances after the removal of short-sale bans. Additionally, pilot firms undertake less risk and have worse performance following the launch of the program. The effect is stronger when controlling shareholders' private benefit is large and when corporate governance is weak. Faced with increased short selling threats, pilot firms cut capital investments and R&D expenditures, reduce equity financing, and lower debt ratios. Contrary to prior studies showing that short selling encourages value-enhancing risky investments in developed markets, our findings suggest that in emerging markets such as China, short selling can result in value losses by inducing firms to forgo profitable risky projects.     

There's no need to be a pioneer in emerging private equity markets

There is currently considerable enthusiasm for emerging private equity markets, where investors believe they have access to “untapped deal flow”. Early entry may allow them to capitalize on exceptional growth opportunities; however, the pioneering investors enter immature capital markets and have no local transaction experience. This may outweigh the potential benefits of low deal-flow competition and expected growth. We address this potential drawback by analyzing a unique, hand-collected dataset of emerging private equity market transactions. We refer to 1157 deals in 86 host countries between 1973 and 2009, and find that early transactions underperform later deals. The evidence presented is robust and consistent with the improvement in the deal-making environment over time and the benefits of learning how to conduct emerging market private equity deals. The learning benefits are stronger if investors are located in the same country as the investee firm.     

The Beta Dilemma in Emerging Markets

In principle, emerging markets analysts employ the same analytical framework when estimating the value of businesses as their counterparts in developed economies: they forecast future cash flows and discount those to the present with appropriate costs of capital that are estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework. But in practice, emerging market analysts have a more complicated job because the task of estimating costs of equity in emerging markets is more difficult. Whereas developed economies have an abundance of historical data on overall stock market movements, industry share price behavior, and many individual share price histories, emerging market economies often do not. There may be no comparable local firms that are publicly traded—or if there are, their CAPM betas may be unreliable. And if analysts instead use the beta of a U.S. competitor as a surrogate for the emerging market beta, they face the question of whether domestic betas are equivalent across borders. As a consequence, appraisers of emerging market companies confront a “beta dilemma.” Part of this is a data problem stemming from shorter share price histories in emerging markets and the absence of publicly traded companies in some industries. In such cases, analysts may be inclined to use industry betas calculated with U.S. share prices as a substitute. But this creates an equivalence problem—the possibility, as confirmed by the author's research, that domestic U.S. and emerging market betas are not statistically equivalent for most industries. The author proposes a solution to this problem that involves grouping emerging markets into a single, distinctive asset class that allows for reliable calculations of industry betas. He also suggests ways of testing emerging market industry betas to determine whether they are statistically comparable.     

CARE Conference Hong Kong Polytechnic University,June 9, 2014: Equity Financing for Early‐Stage Companies in China

Many of the smaller private‐sector Chinese companies in their entrepreneurial growth stage are now being funded by Chinese venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) firms. In contrast to western VC markets, where institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments have been the main providers of capital, in China most capital for domestic funds has come from private business owners and high net worth individuals. As relatively new players in the market who are less accustomed to entrusting their capital to fund managers for a lengthy period of time, Chinese VCs and their investors have shown a shorter investment horizon and demanded a faster return of capital and profits. In an attempt to explain this behavior, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner of Harvard Business School have offered a “grandstanding hypothesis” that focuses on the incentives of younger, less established VCs to push their portfolio companies out into the IPO market as early as they can—and thus possibly prematurely—to establish a track record and facilitate future fundraising. This explanation is supported by the under‐performance of Chinese VC‐backed IPOs that has been documented by the author's recent research. Although they continue to offer significant opportunities for global investors, China's VC and PE markets still face many challenges. The supervisory system and legal environment need further improvement, and Chinese funds need to find a way to attract more institutional investors—a goal that can and likely will be promoted through government inducements.     

The Private Equity Market: An Overveiw

The private equity market is an important source of funds for start‐up firms, private middle‐market firms, firms in financial distress, and public firms seeking buyout financing. Over the past fifteen years it has been the fastest growing corporate finance market, by an order of magnitude over the public equity and public and private bond markets. Despite its dramatic growth and increased significance for corporate finance, the private equity market has received little attention. This study examines the economic foundations of the private equity market, analyzes its development and current role in corporate finance, and describes the market's institutional structure. It examines the reasons or the market's explosive growth over the past fifteen years and highlights the main characteristics of that growth. It provides data on returns to private equity investors and analyzes the major secular and cyclical influences on returns. It describes the important investors, intermediaries, issuers, and agents in the market and their interactions with each other. Drawing on data from trade journals, the study also estimates the market's size as of year‐end 1995.     

International Cross‐Listings and Subsequent Security‐Market Choices: Evidence from ADRs

We study the link between the attributes of American depositary receipt (ADR)‐listed firms and their post‐listing security‐market choices. We find that developed market firms are more likely to issue equity and debt than their emerging market counterparts. Furthermore, we find that large firms are more likely to issue debt and less likely to issue equity. When we examine locations where ADR firms raise their capital, we find that firms originating from countries where the protection of minority shareholders is weak are more likely to issue debt on their home markets and less likely to issue debt on international markets (excluding U.S. markets). Furthermore, ADR firms originating from developed (emerging market) countries are more (less) likely to issue their equity on their domestic markets and less (more) likely to issue equity on international markets (excluding U.S. markets).     

The Role of Private Equity in Life Sciences

In a roundtable published in this journal a year ago, there was a clear consensus that the R&D function in big pharma was inefficient and in need of major restructuring, possibly through increased investments by venture capital and private equity firms. In this discussion, an accomplished group of industry practitioners begins by looking at the prospects for both venture capital and private equity to play meaningful roles in financing early- and mid-stage drug development. In so doing, they explore questions like the following:

• • Are there ways for big pharma and biotech to reduce “science risk” and make R&D funding more profitable and attractive to venture capital and private equity—and perhaps even hedge funds?
• • What roles do you see for specialty PE firms like Symphony Capital and Paul Capital, which are now bundling mid-stage development assets and securitizing royalties?

Then the panelists turn to the broader life sciences industry and consider the outlook for leveraged private equity transactions involving marketed products, late-stage development, and services. Here they consider issues like the following:

• • Will PE be attracted to less-R&D-intensive activities like medtech and generics?
• • Have the recent consolidation through mergers and reorganization of big pharma into decentralized business units created opportunities for carve-outs of certain businesses?

For big pharma and life sciences companies in general, the answers to such questions point to greater specialization and focus achieved partly through strategic alliances with venture capital, private equity, and even hedge funds, and involving marketed products and services as well as early-stage drug development.     

The Growing Blessing of Unicorns: The Changing Nature of the Market for Privately Funded Companies

The past 15 years have seen the emergence of large infusions of private capital at levels previously accessible only in public markets. One direct effect of these non‐public fundraisings is the spawning of private entities with market valuations reaching $1 billion, thereby achieving the status of unicorns. As the authors reported in an earlier study, by the end of 2015, there were 142 unicorns with an aggregate value exceeding $500 billion. The conviction of many investors and managers at that time was that these companies could best create value by staying private, often by adopting governance structures focused on creating superior operating performance. It was also widely believed that unicorns would remain outside the public markets longer and succeed in attracting even more private capital, thereby enabling their investors to capture a greater share of the increase in company value. In this study, the authors examine how the characteristics and dynamics of “the blessing” have changed in the past five years. Despite the widespread view that the valuations and private financing trend fueling this market were not sustainable, the authors report that by March 2020, the “net” number of unicorns had grown from 142 to 464, a number that doesn't reflect the transformation of over half of the 2015 sample through acquisition or public offering and their replacement by new unicorns. Further, the cumulative market valuation of unicorns more than doubled from $500 billion to $1.37 trillion, representing growth far greater than that in the public equity markets (some 26% per annum, as compared to 9% for the S&P 500) over the same period—and the blessing has become more diversified, both in terms of industry and geographical location. The authors also consider what happens when unicorns “graduate” to a different organizational form by means of an IPO, private buyout, or business failure. Analyzing the 107 firms that departed the sample between 2015 and 2020, the authors report that the average lifespan of a unicorn from its founding date to its exit date has been 9.5 years, indicating that such firms indeed remain privately owned for a longer time than in the past. Additionally, the study finds that the founders and initial investors in unicorns have fared quite well, cashing out their initial investment at almost six times invested capital, on average. These private investment performance metrics have been significantly higher than the returns to public shareholders in the same firms during the post‐IPO period, signifying that unicorn investors have captured much more of the value created in the company's growth phase than public stockholders.     

Emerging Derivatives Markets: The Case of Chile

We compare the performance of firms affiliated with diversified business groups with the performance of unaffiliated firms in Turkey, an emerging market. We address the question of whether group-affiliated firms create internal capital markets or control large cash flows. Our findings indicate that group affiliation improves a firm's accounting performance, but not stock market performance. Deviation of cash-flow rights from voting rights has a negative but insignificant effect on accounting performance, but a significant effect on market performance. We also find that a firm's accounting, but not stock market, performance increases with the level of group diversification. Our results show that internal capital markets play an important role for the existence of business groups in an emerging market context.     

The Capital Structure of PE‐Funded Companies (and How New Debt Instruments and Investors Are Expanding Their Debt Capacity)

The capital structures and financial policies of companies controlled by private equity firms are notably different from those of public companies. The concentration of ownership and intense monitoring of leveraged buyouts by their largest investors (that is, the partners of the PE firms who sit on their boards), along with the contractual requirement of PE funds to return their capital within seven to ten years, have resulted in capital structures that are far more leveraged than those of their publicly traded counterparts, but also considerably more provisional and “opportunistic.” Whereas the average U.S. public company has long operated with roughly 30% debt and 70% equity, today's typical private‐equity sponsored company is initially capitalized with an “upside‐down” structure of 70% debt and just 30% equity, and then often charged with working down its debt as quickly as possible. Although banks supplied most of the debt for the first wave of LBOs in the 1980s, the remarkable growth of the private equity industry in the past 25 years has been supported by the parallel development of a new leveraged acquisition finance market. This financing innovation has led to a general movement away from a bankcentered funding base to one comprising a relatively new set of institutional investors, including business development corporations and hedge funds. Such investors have shown a strong appetite for new debt instruments and risks that banks have been unwilling or, thanks to increased capital requirements and other regulatory burdens, prohibited from taking on. Notable among these new instruments are second‐lien loans and uni‐tranche debt—instruments that, by shifting the allocation of claims on the debtor's cash flow and assets in ways consistent with the preferences of these new investors, have had the effect of increasing the debt capacity of their portfolio companies. And such increases in debt capacity have in turn enabled private equity funds—now sitting on near‐record amounts of capital from their limited partners—to bid higher prices and compete more effectively in today's intensely competitive M&A market, in which high target acquisition purchase prices are being fueled by a strong stock market and increased competition from corporate acquirers.     

The Choice of Private Versus Public Capital Markets: Evidence from Privatizations

We examine the impact of political, institutional, and economic factors on the choice between selling a state‐owned enterprise in the public capital market through a share issue privatization (SIP) and selling it in the private capital market in an asset sale. SIPs are more likely in less developed capital markets, for more profitable state‐owned enterprises, and where there are more protections of minority shareholders. Asset sales are more likely when there is less state control of the economy and when the firm is smaller. Our results suggest the importance of privatization activities in developing the equity markets of privatizing countries.     

The Future of Private Equity

A distinguished University of Chicago financial economist and longtime observer of private equity markets responds to questions like the following:

• ? With a track record that now stretches in some cases almost 30 years, what have private equity firms accomplished? What effects have they had on the performance of the companies they invest in, and have they been good for the economy?
• ? How will highly leveraged PE portfolio companies fare during the current downturn, especially with over $400 billion of loans coming due in the next three to five years?
• ? With PE firms now sitting on an estimated $500 billion in capital and leveraged loan markets shut down, are the firms now contemplating new kinds of investment that require less debt?
• ? If and when the industry makes a comeback, do you expect any major changes that might allow us to avoid another boom‐and‐bust cycle? Have the PE firms or their investors made any obvious mistakes that contribute to such cycles, and are they now showing any signs of having learned from those mistakes?

Despite the current problems, the operating capabilities of the best PE firms, together with their ability to manage high leverage and the increased receptiveness of public company CEOs and boards to PE investments, have all helped establish private equity as “a permanent asset class.” Although many of the deals done in 2006 and 2007 were probably overpriced, the “cov‐lite” deal structures, deferred repayments of principal, and larger coverage ratios have afforded more room for reworking troubled deals. As a result of that flexibility, and of the kinds of companies that get taken private in leveraged deals in the first place, most troubled PE portfolio companies should end up being restructured efficiently, thereby limiting the damage to the overall economy. Part of the restructuring process involves the use of the PE industry's huge stockpile of capital to purchase distressed debt and inject new equity into troubled deals (in many cases, their own). At the same time the PE firms have been working hard to rescue their own deals, some have been taking significant minority positions in public companies, while gaining some measure of control. Finally, to limit overpriced and overlev‐eraged deals in the future, and so avoid the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to have become a predictable part of the industry, the discussion explores the possibility that the limited partners and debt providers that supply most of the capital for PE investments will insist on larger commitments of equity by sponsors to their own funds and individual deals.     

Controlling shareholder share pledging and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China

We propose and test the incentive view—that the margin call pressure and ownership-control discrepancy associated with insider share pledging increase investors’ perceived risk, and thus also the cost of equity capital, in an emerging market. Using a controlling shareholder share pledging sample for Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with share pledging have a cost of equity capital that is 23.7 basis points higher than firms without share pledging. Further, share pledging increases the cost of equity capital through the information risks and agency conflicts channels. Cross-sectional analyses show that share pledging has a stronger effect on the cost of equity capital in non-state-owned enterprises, firms without monitoring of multiple large shareholders, firms with controlling shareholders assuming the position of chairperson, and firms with a weak institutional environment. In addition, using the global financial crisis and the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) as quasi-natural experiments, we disentangle the potential confounding effect of firm fundamentals and show that share pledging is positively associated with the cost of equity capital. Overall, the results are consistent with our incentive view that share pledging increases the cost of equity capital in an emerging market.     

Climate risk: The price of drought

We document a significant positive relation between drought risk and the cost of equity capital. Our estimation shows that the cost of equity capital is 92 basis points higher for firms affected by severe drought conditions. We provide evidence that when firms are affected by droughts, firms with higher local institutional holdings exhibit a higher cost of equity capital. This result supports the well-known local bias of institutional investors, and suggests that diversification cannot fully eliminate the loss in wealth caused by droughts. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that drought duration and drought intensity further increase a firm's risk premium. However, for firms with diversified cash flows/investments, geographically dispersed business operations, and high cash holdings, the impact of drought on the expected return is significantly lessened. Overall, our findings show that investors require a higher rate of returns on firms affected by droughts and offer implications on how firms can mitigate the impact of droughts on their cost of capital.     

TOWARD A GLOBAL MODEL OF VENTURE CAPITAL?

While the U.S. still accounts for about two‐thirds of the world's total private equity fund‐raising and investment, other countries have been adopting American practices and are experiencing significant growth in their private equity markets. In fact, a case can be made that a global market for venture capital and private equity is emerging, at least in Western Europe and North America, where venture markets are seeing significant convergence in funding levels, investment patterns, and realized returns. To date, however, the European Union has had little success in establishing community‐wide commercial laws, taxation regimes, or corporate governance policies, so each country's private equity funds are organized in segmented national markets, and investment also tends to be largely localized. The Asian markets are even more fragmented: venture capital shows no sign of taking root in Japan, and China lacks the basic legal infrastructure needed to support a vibrant venture capital market. Venture capitalists create value through their role as active investors, and government and business leaders around the world have come to realize that venture capital and private equity investing can be a significant force in promoting economic development and technological progress. In general, countries with English common law codes offer greater protection to inves‐tors; the ratio of venture capital spending to GDP for common law countries is nearly double that in civil law countries. Government efforts to promote venture capital would probably be better focused on eliminating regulatory road‐blocks, lowering taxes, and provid‐ing a favorable investor climate. In the meantime, it appears that pri‐vate equity fund‐raising and invest‐ment have hit their cyclical lows and are poised to surpass $250 billion globally within three or four years and to reach one‐half trillion dollars by the end of the decade. The author also predicts that India, whose history as a former British colony has given it a common law framework as well as system of elite universities and technical institutes known for the quality of its gradu‐ates, should become one of the five leading venture capital markets by the end of this decade.     

Legal protection of investors,corporate governance,and the cost of equity capital

This study examines the effect of firm-level corporate governance on the cost of equity capital in emerging markets and how the effect is influenced by country-level legal protection of investors. We find that firm-level corporate governance has a significantly negative effect on the cost of equity capital in these markets. In addition, this corporate governance effect is more pronounced in countries that provide relatively poor legal protection. Thus, in emerging markets, firm-level corporate governance and country-level shareholder protection seem to be substitutes for each other in reducing the cost of equity. Our results are consistent with the finding from McKinsey's surveys that institutional investors are willing to pay a higher premium for shares in firms with good corporate governance, especially when the firms are in countries where the legal protection of investors is weak.     

代币发行融资研究——基于企业生存时间的视角

本文以中国境内所有的代币发行融资项目为研究对象,研究代币发行融资对初创企业生存时间的影响。研究发现,相比股权融资,代币发行融资会显著缩短初创企业的寿命。这一结论在增加控制变量和使用工具变量等方法后依然稳健。渠道检验的结果显示,代币发行融资阻碍了初创企业人力资本的进一步深化,从而缩短了企业的持续经营时间。从代币发行融资的宏观经济后果来看,代币发行融资所造成的不良影响恶化了地区的信用环境,从而显著提高了地区的融资成本。进一步研究表明,代币发行融资对初创企业的负面影响在信息披露水平较低、不受关注以及缺少媒体监督的样本中更加显著。本文揭示了代币发行融资带来的负面影响,为禁止代币发行融资等规范金融创新的政策提供了经验证据。     

Foreign Speculators and Emerging Equity Markets

We propose a cross-sectional time-series model to assess the impact of market liberalizations in emerging equity markets on the cost of capital, volatility, beta, and correlation with world market returns. Liberalizations are defined by regulatory changes, the introduction of depositary receipts and country funds, and structural breaks in equity capital flows to the emerging markets. We control for other economic events that might confound the impact of foreign speculators on local equity markets. Across a range of specifications, the cost of capital always decreases after a capital market liberalization with the effect varying between 5 and 75 basis points.