共查询到5条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
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Nick Feltovich 《Southern economic journal》2011,77(4):814-826
Economists and psychologists have documented patterns of individual decision‐making behavior (e.g., loss aversion) whereby losses and gains are treated differently. However, there has been little evidence of such patterns in multiplayer games. I report results showing the strongest evidence I know of that this phenomenon is present in games. Experimental subjects play two hawk‐dove games that are identical up to a constant; in one, all payoffs are positive, while in the other, payoffs are negative if and only if both players choose “hawk.” Under both fixed pairs and random matching, differences between the games are substantial, significant, and consistent with loss aversion. 相似文献
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Collusive Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Commodities. — A homogenous-goods Cournot model with two countries and two firms
is analyzed. Firms may collude by monopolizing their domestic markets, but they may also engage in collusive intra-industry
trade. It turns out that, though such trade is costly because of transportation costs, firms might indeed trade since this
enlarges the scope of successful collusion. Hence, intra-industry trade in homogenous goods is not a reliable indicator of
competition. 相似文献
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Juan Wang Chenhui Zhang 《美中经济评论(英文版)》2004,3(5):38-42
This paper analyses problems of Chinese income disparity and social stability through the game theory. Based on the utility function considering fairness, it analyses that the social low-income population's sensitive degree of income disparity has effect on their decision. And by the way of replacing the discount rate in repeated game by the income growth rate, it analyzes the condition that the social low income population takes the non-rational battle strategy departure from sub-game perfect equilibrium in dynamic game, which are decided by sensitive degree of income disparity, income growth rate and different expected incomes that social estates take the different strategies )under the current system. At last, it gives some suggestions for this problem. 相似文献
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Nada Ben Elhadj Khaïreddine Jebsi Rim Lahmandi‐Ayed 《International Journal of Economic Theory》2012,8(3):259-275
We consider a vertically differentiated market in which consumers’ utility is assumed to depend on the price, congestion level and the stand‐alone quality of the good or service. Two firms compete on this market, choosing capacities, stand‐alone qualities and prices. We characterize completely the subgame perfect equilibrium for the homogenous market case (where only one firm is active without congestion). We prove that both firms are active, choosing minimal differentiation along the capacity and quality dimensions. Therefore, the presence of congestion rules out market preemption as a possible outcome in equilibrium and weakens the incentive to differentiate. 相似文献